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“Although commissioned to honor the Upjohn Institute’s 75th anniversary, A Fu-
ture of Good Jobs could hardly be better timed with respect to current trends in 
the American economy. While most of these trends—widening wage inequality, 
underemployment of the less educated, increased global competition, and cutbacks 
in health insurance and retirement coverage—are far from new, it is only recently 
that policymakers and mainstream economists have come to acknowledge that they 
are not necessarily self-correcting. The practical, concrete remedies offered in this 
book are especially welcome in that they are sensitive both to the realities of the 
U.S. labor force and to the needs and resources of U.S. employers.” 
–Jodie Allen, Senior Editor, Pew Research Center 
“This book provides a readable and highly interesting discussion of some of the 
key problems facing American workers. The chapters are well-written and the facts 
are clearly presented. The policy discussions are on-target. I particularly liked the 
discussion of policies to improve job quality in low-wage jobs; others will be in-
terested in the chapters on immigration, older workers, employer-provided health 
insurance, or employment and training programs. Any reader who wants to know 
more about work, jobs, and the economy will find this book useful reading.” 
–Rebecca Blank, Henry Carter Adams Collegiate Professor of Public Policy and 
former Dean of Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan   
                               
“Since 1980 American workers with average and below-average skills have re-
ceived anemic pay gains. Many have seen erosion in crucial employment benefits, 
including health insurance. The surge in productivity after the mid-1990s gave a 
temporary boost to wages, but the relief proved short-lived. Workers who are not in 
the top ranks of the pay distribution have seen meager wage gains in recent years, 
even when the economy is growing robustly. Timothy Bartik and Susan Houseman 
have assembled a first-rate team of economists to assess the problems of strug-
gling workers. They offer cogent analyses of America’s workplace problems. More 
importantly, they provide a timely set of prescriptions to address those problems. 
Many writers wring their hands at the challenges facing workers who are at the bot-
tom of the pay ladder. The authors of this volume focus on the more difficult task 
of crafting humane but tough-minded solutions to the problem of shrinking wages. 
For readers who are interested in clear-eyed analysis as well as shrewd policy ad-
vocacy, this book offers an excellent starting place for thinking about solutions to 
the problem of lousy jobs and lousy pay.”
 –Gary Burtless, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution
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“Leading policy analysts not only frame the major challenges facing U.S. labor 
policy in this book, but they provide possible solutions. Growing inequality, de-
clining coverage and generosity of employer-sponsored benefits, soaring health 
insurance costs, less job security, and a sharp decline in the employment of less-
educated men are serious problems. The presidential candidates, economic policy 
analysts, and concerned citizens would do well to study the ideas in this book to 
prepare for the challenges ahead.” 
–Richard A. Hobbie, Executive Director, National Association of State Workforce 
Agencies 
“The middle class is anxious and for good reasons. Recent productivity increases 
have done little to raise the wages of most workers, health and retirement benefits 
along with jobs are less secure, and education and training policies have not kept 
pace with new global challenges. The authors of this volume provide both good 
diagnosis and some interesting ideas for how the nation should respond.”
–Isabel Sawhill, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution
§§ §
§§ §
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Introduction and Overview
Timothy J. Bartik
Susan N. Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Can the U.S. economy generate healthy growth of “good” jobs—
jobs that will ensure a steady improvement in the standard of living 
for the middle class and that will offer a way out of poverty for low-
income Americans? This is the fundamental economic policy challenge 
facing our country in an age of intense global competition. By some 
measures, the U.S. economy appears poised to perform well in the long-
term, whatever its short-term difficulties. With Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and productivity growth high and unemployment relatively low 
in recent years, key economic indicators suggest a fundamentally strong 
U.S. economy that can withstand downward cyclical pressures. 
Beneath these aggregate statistics, however, are signs that those at 
the bottom and a growing number in the middle are being left behind. 
Rapid globalization and technological progress have brought substantial 
benefits to American consumers in the form of better and cheaper goods 
and services. But globalization and technological improvements have 
also been associated with substantial dislocation, stagnant or declining 
real wages and benefits, and reduced job security for many workers. 
The gains from economic growth in recent years have accrued primar-
ily to those at the very top of the income distribution, as evidenced by 
the growth of inequality in this country. 
In this book, which was the outgrowth of a conference sponsored by 
the Upjohn Institute in Washington, D.C., in June 2007, leading policy 
analysts frame the major challenges facing U.S. labor policy: 
• Improving the skills of American workers so that they can better 
compete in a global economy; 
• Addressing the crisis in our system of employer-sponsored health 
insurance; 
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• Minimizing the effects of dislocation due to immigration and 
trade; 
• Removing barriers to employment for older workers; 
• Improving the quality of jobs for low-wage workers without 
harming the competitiveness of American companies; 
• Addressing the serious employment barriers of the disadvan-
taged. 
Each chapter in this volume tackles one of these policy challenges, 
identifying the key problems, evaluating the effectiveness of current 
policy approaches, and offering innovative, forward-thinking, but prag-
matic alternative policies. Collectively, the chapters in this volume of-
fer a clear road map for future labor market policy. 
SIGnS OF TROUBLE FOR U.S. WORkERS
The difficulty that the United States will have in generating good 
jobs and improving living standards for all Americans is readily appar-
ent in problems already facing middle-class and low-wage workers. 
Growing Inequality 
Wage inequality has widened substantially in recent years. From 
2000 to 2006, average real hourly wages dropped by 0.5 percent for 
those in the fifth to the fifteenth percentiles of the wage distribution, 
increased by 3.4 percent for those in the forty-fifth to fifty-fifth percen-
tiles, and rose by 5.9 percent for those in the eighty-fifth to ninety-fifth 
percentiles.1 Indeed, this recent increase in inequality is a continuation 
of a general trend evident since the 1980s, during which time wages for 
the middle and lower classes have risen far less than the rate of produc-
tivity growth, and most of the increased wealth generated by produc-
tivity gains has gone to the highest income households. From 1979 to 
2006, hourly wages for the median worker grew only 16 percent in real 
terms, or about 0.5 percent per year.2 In contrast, the U.S. economy’s 
total output per hour over that same period grew 58 percent, or about 
1.7 percent per year.3 Figure 1.1, which shows the growth in real hour-
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ly wages at various percentiles of the overall U.S. wage distribution 
between 1979 and 2006, depicts the increase in inequality.4 Wages at 
the bottom 10 percent of the distribution have actually declined in real 
terms since 1979. Real wage growth has been low for workers between 
the tenth percentile and the eightieth percentile—increasing by less than 
20 percent over this 27-year period—compared to the much more rapid 
wage growth for those at the ninetieth percentile and above. 
Real hourly wage growth of approximately 1.1 percent per year 
from 1979 to 2006 would have been needed for the growth in total com-
pensation to match labor productivity growth over the period.5 Only 
earnings at the ninetieth percentile and above matched or exceeded this 
rate. To understand the extent to which inequality in this country has 
grown, consider the fact that if wages below the ninetieth percentile 
had grown at a rate consistent with productivity growth from 1979 to 
2006, earnings for these workers would have been $734 billion higher 
in 2006.6 This amount represents about 12 percent of all wage and sal-
ary income and about 7 percent of GDP in 2006. 
NOTE: These data are based on our calculations from the CPS-ORG for 1979 and 2006. 
See Note 4 for details.
Figure 1.1  Growth in Wage Inequality in the United States, 1979–2006
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Declining Coverage and Generosity of Benefits
Employer-sponsored health insurance has been the foundation of 
the U.S. health insurance system for over 50 years. Yet the fraction of 
the nonelderly population with employer-sponsored health insurance 
has dropped sharply in recent years, accompanying the steep increase 
in health insurance costs. In 2005, health insurance was as costly to 
employers as paid leave, historically the most expensive benefit (GAO 
2006). From 2000 to 2006, the percentage of firms offering health in-
surance benefits declined by 8 percentage points, and the percentage of 
the nonelderly adults with employer-sponsored health insurance cov-
erage declined by 5 percentage points. By 2006, only 62 percent of 
the nonelderly population was covered by employer-sponsored health 
insurance. 
The fraction of the working population with retiree health insur-
ance benefits similarly has dropped. The largest drop occurred among 
private-sector workers following an accounting rule change in 1993 
that required companies to show future retiree health-benefit costs as 
liabilities on their financial statements. The fraction of private-sector 
workers working in companies that offer some type of retiree health- 
insurance benefits has continued to fall since then, however, dropping 
from an estimated 32 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2003 (Buchmuel-
ler, Johnson, and Lo Sasso 2006). Analysts believe that recent changes 
in government accounting rules will lead to a sharp drop in the incidence 
of retiree health-insurance coverage offered to public-sector workers as 
well (Johnson 2006). 
Besides health insurance and paid leave, the primary workplace 
benefit is a retirement plan. Although the fraction of workers who are 
covered by some retirement plan has not declined in recent years, com-
panies’ shift from traditional defined-benefit to defined-contribution re-
tirement plans shifts investment risks to workers. In addition, although 
defined benefit plans are not intrinsically more generous than defined 
contribution plans, companies’ shift to defined contribution plans typi-
cally has been associated with reduced benefits (Ghilarducci and Sun 
2006).
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Less Job Security 
Long-term employment with a single company is becoming less 
common. Mean and median job tenure have declined among men over 
the last 50 years, and the fraction of men in a long-term job (whether it 
be for 10 years or 20) has declined for all age groups, with the decline 
most notable for older men (Farber 2007). Related to this phenomenon, 
there is evidence of a persistent trend towards increased job loss in re-
cent years, especially among more educated and older workers (Farber 
2005). Thus, American workers appear more likely than in the recent 
past to experience dislocation and are more likely to have to make a 
late-in-life job change. 
Sharp Drop in Employment among Low-Educated Men
The employment rates of men of all ages with a high school educa-
tion or less have declined precipitously since the 1980s. Among prime-
age (25–54) white, non-Hispanic men, the employment rate (the per-
centage ratio of employment to population) has dropped by 13 percent-
age points since 1979 among high school dropouts and by 5 percentage 
points among those with only a high school degree.7 Among prime-age 
black men, the employment rate has dropped by 21 percentage points 
for high school dropouts and by 10 percentage points for those with 
only a high school degree.8 The employment rate of prime-age black 
men who had dropped out of high school stood at only 54 percent in 
2006. The sharply declining employment rates among low-educated 
men contrast with the employment rate trend for college-educated men, 
which has changed little over this period. 
Offsetting these large declines in the employment rates of low-
educated men would require significant expansion of employment in 
the U.S. economy. For example, in 1979 the employment rate among 
prime-age, white non-Hispanic men without a high school degree was 
84.6 percent.9 If all prime-age men without a high school degree had 
been employed at that rate in 2006, more than 600,000 additional jobs 
would have been required. Similarly, if all prime-age men with only a 
high school degree in 2006 had been employed at the same rate as that 
experienced by white prime-age men with only a high school degree 
in 1979 (93.5 percent), an additional 2.2 million men would have been 
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employed. Taken together, such an expansion of employment among 
prime-age, less-educated men would require an additional 2.9 million 
jobs, or about a 2 percent expansion of employment in the U.S. econo-
my, if all else remained the same. 
Less-educated men in their 50s, which are traditionally the immedi-
ate preretirement years, have also experienced sharp declines in em-
ployment. From 1979 to 2006, employment rates among men in their 
50s declined by 12 percentage points for high school dropouts and by 
11 percentage points for high school graduates.
Although one might argue that declining employment rates among 
low-educated men reflect increased employment among women, this 
explanation is insufficient. Employment rates for college-educated men 
have not fallen, in spite of the sharp increase in employment among 
college-educated women. Moreover, employment rates among prime-
age, high-school-dropout women have been relatively constant and 
thus would appear to explain none of the sharp drop in employment 
rates among their male counterparts.10 Instead, the fact that employ-
ment rates have remained quite low among prime-age women without a 
high school degree—in spite of the overall high growth in employment 
among other prime-age women and in spite of declining marriage rates 
and welfare reform, which has decreased public support for many of 
these women—suggests insufficient employment opportunities for low-
educated women as well. 
FORCES SHAPInG THE AMERICAn WORkPLACE
These problems of growing inequality, declining generosity and 
coverage of benefits, reduced job security, and declining employment 
rates among low-educated men are attributable to a range of economic 
and social forces. Widespread involvement of large institutional inves-
tors in the stock market beginning in the 1980s led to greater focus on 
lowering costs to boost short-term earnings and stock prices, which in 
turn contributed to downward pressure on compensation and reduced 
job security. 
Rapid technological advances have also played an important role. 
Developments in health technology have reduced mortality and im-
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proved the quality of life for many Americans. But these advances have 
greatly increased the cost of health care and placed severe strains on our 
employer-financed system of health insurance. 
Economists generally believe that computer technology introduced 
into the workplace in the 1980s and 1990s has favored more-skilled 
workers and helps explain growing inequality. However, by opening up 
the possibility of offshoring many service jobs, the development of the 
Internet and other communications technologies potentially will have 
far-reaching implications for American workers at all skill levels in the 
future. 
Globalization reinforces pressures from financial markets and new 
technology. Recent political and economic reform in China, Eastern 
Europe, and elsewhere has enabled tremendous expansion of trade to 
occur in large sections of the world. Bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements have further paved the way for the expansion of trade. 
These factors—coupled with lower transportation and communications 
costs and financial market pressures on U.S. companies to lower costs 
through offshore outsourcing—have greatly increased the importance 
of trade in the U.S. economy. Figure 1.2 displays the manifestation of 
this trend through U.S. exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
From 1980 to 2006, the combination of exports and imports rose as a 
proportion of GDP in the United States from 20 to 28 percent. Almost 
all of that increase was attributable to the growth of imports, reflecting 
the steep increase in the U.S. trade deficit, particularly in the last several 
years (Figure 1.3). While Americans broadly benefit from lower-priced 
imports, the growth of the global economy has led to substantial worker 
dislocation and placed further downward pressure on many workers’ 
wages. 
At the same time that these economic forces are placing strains on 
middle-class and low-wage workers, institutions that historically have 
helped to mitigate income inequality have significantly weakened. 
Most notable are the decline in the value of the minimum wage and the 
decline in union representation. Before its increase in July 2007, the 
minimum wage had fallen to 77 percent of its real value in 1996, the 
year the minimum wage was last increased.11 Unionization rates have 
continued to fall from their peak in the 1950s. In 2006 just 12 percent 
of all U.S. workers and just 7.4 percent of the private-sector workforce 
belonged to a union. 
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Figure 1.2  The Growing Importance of Trade in the U.S. Economy: 
Imports and Exports as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
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Figure 1.3  Balance of Trade for Goods and Services
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005, 2007).
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POLICy ACTIOn PLAn
To address the problems of inequality and pressures from globaliza-
tion, the contributors to this volume recommend several key reforms of 
labor market policy:
Reform the Delivery of Education and Training
Virtually all agree that improving the skills of our current and future 
workforce is critical to competing in a global economy. Yet, Robert Ler-
man points out, current federal and state policies are overly narrow and 
often counterproductive. According to Lerman, a key problem is that 
the United States lacks comprehensive measures of skills. The common 
focus on school completion and academic test scores leads to policies 
that devote too few resources to productivity-enhancing noncognitive 
skills and occupational skills. The results are poor preparation of many 
workers and an insufficient supply of workers for many jobs that are in 
demand and pay good wages. 
Lerman urges the development of education curricula that are more 
closely tied to workplace needs, that meet the diverse learning styles of 
students, and that expand support for vocational training in high schools. 
High school students should be able to achieve occupational qualifica-
tions by combining school instruction with well-structured work-based 
learning. The K-12 system should be rewarded for raising noncognitive 
skills and occupational skills, even if some students do not complete 
all of the requirements for admission to a four-year college. The mini-
mal federal budget allocation for apprenticeship programs should be in-
creased. Finally, Lerman recommends changes in financial accounting 
rules so that firms count their workforces’ human capital as assets and 
thereby are encouraged to invest more in worker training. 
Reform Health Insurance
Can employers continue to afford health insurance coverage for 
employees and remain competitive in the global economy? The answer 
for a growing number of small and large companies is no. Katherine 
Swartz explains why the current system of employer-sponsored health 
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insurance is inefficient and is leading to a downward spiral of coverage 
in our country. Swartz warns that the rapid drop in employer-sponsored 
health insurance coverage adds a new urgency to reform in the financ-
ing of health insurance, and she offers a road map for universal cover-
age based on three principles: 1) everyone should enroll in a health 
plan and pay a minimum amount, 2) additional premiums should be 
collected from individuals in proportion to family income, and 3) com-
panies should contribute to financing the insurance. The Netherlands, 
Germany, and Switzerland have health insurance systems that meet 
these three principles and so offer potential models for a reformed U.S. 
system. The system proposed by Swartz would preserve a central role 
for private health insurance. 
Swartz emphasizes that changing the financing of health insurance 
would change the way health insurance costs are shared but should not 
increase—and possibly would lower—the total amount spent on health 
care. A reformed system could avoid inefficiencies that result from lack 
of insurance coverage, increase productivity by allowing individuals to 
switch jobs without losing coverage, increase competitiveness of U.S. 
companies in the global market, and reduce perverse incentives em-
ployers have to contract out work or avoid hiring older workers. 
Expand and Revamp Return-to-Work Programs 
Federal funding of employment and training programs in 2007 is 
about 40 percent lower in real terms than it was a decade ago (Abraham 
and Houseman 2008), while the need for such programs has grown be-
cause of declining job security and a growing population. Failure to 
implement effective return-to-work programs is expensive for soci-
ety, leading to lower employment and greater dependence on public 
assistance. 
In their respective chapters, first Lori Kletzer and then Katharine 
Abraham and Susan Houseman present proposals for expanded em-
ployment and training programs, wage insurance programs, and bet-
ter targeting of government programs to the needs of dislocated and 
older workers. Kletzer recommends expanding the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program, currently limited to manufacturing workers, to in-
clude displaced service-sector workers and also to include additional 
monies for training. The wage-loss insurance program, started in 2002, 
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provides trade-displaced workers over age 50 with up to half the dif-
ference between their old and new wages. Kletzer calls for evaluating 
this program—as Congress stipulated that it should be—and possibly 
extending the program to workers in their 40s. Echoing the call for 
program evaluation, Abraham and Houseman emphasize the need to 
evaluate promising older-worker initiatives being taken at the state lev-
el—including placing older-worker specialists in employment centers, 
instituting outreach for seniors, and providing older workers with basic 
computer skills—to determine their effectiveness and suitability for ex-
pansion at the national level. 
Implement Special Policies for Low-Skilled Workers
The growth in inequality has hit low-skilled workers hardest. Paul 
Osterman calls for a two-pronged approach to improving the quality 
of jobs at the low end. The first is improvement in labor standards: 
continued increases in the minimum wage, protection for unions and 
other forms of worker organization, and tax incentives that promote the 
development of good jobs. The second strategy involves programmatic 
assistance to employers to encourage job upgrading. Osterman propos-
es that the U.S. Department of Labor establish a “Low Wage Challenge 
Fund” to assist employers in improving the skills of their workforce 
and thereby the quality of jobs. The Low Wage Challenge Fund would 
also provide matching funds to states for customized training programs 
oriented toward the low-skill workforce and would provide funding to 
community colleges to increase their involvement with employers and 
the low-skill workforce. 
To boost earnings of the least skilled workers, Steven Raphael pro-
poses expansion of the successful Earned Income Tax Credit. Specifi-
cally, Raphael proposes an expanded EITC for childless adults, with 
liberalization of benefits for the poorest married couples. 
The rapid rise in incarceration rates and the precipitous drop in 
employment rates of low-skilled men require special policies to bring 
this growing underclass out of the cycle of crime and poverty and into 
productive employment. In addition to an expanded EITC program, 
Raphael advocates four specific policies to reduce barriers to employ-
ment for those with criminal records: 1) removing summary disquali-
fications of former inmates from financial assistance for education or 
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other public assistance, 2) basing publicly mandated employment bans 
of former felons from certain jobs on specific offenses rather than hav-
ing blanket bans, 3) expunging selected criminal records after a period 
of time, and 4) funding training intermediaries to prepare ex-inmates 
for employment. 
COnCLUSIOn
Taken together, the policies proposed here balance the need to in-
crease workers’ wages and benefits with the need to preserve employ-
ers’ competitiveness. For instance, the health insurance proposals in this 
book would guarantee health insurance coverage for all while lowering 
many employers’ health insurance costs. Expanding the Earned Income 
Tax Credit increases workers’ take-home wages without increasing em-
ployers’ costs. And although the book includes proposals for increases 
in the minimum wage and more protection for unions’ organizing rights, 
the book also includes proposals for greater availability of customized 
training grants to firms, which would increase worker productivity and, 
in turn, support higher pay. 
In an era of tight government budgets, can the United States af-
ford to implement the set of policies proposed in this book? We argue 
that any additional government expenditures required by these policies 
represent investments that are necessary to improve the efficiency and 
equity of the American economy. An education system that addresses 
the diversity of needs of students and prepares them for a range of jobs 
in the workplace is central to increasing American workers’ wages and 
to improving the future competitiveness of our country. The United 
States has the highest per-capita spending on health care in the world, 
yet among developed countries it has the lowest rate of health insurance 
coverage and relatively poor health outcomes (Anderson et al. 2000; 
Anderson and Poullier 1999; Swartz 2008). Although reform of the 
employer-sponsored system of health insurance will require increased 
government expenditures on health care, such reform is essential to im-
prove the efficiency of health care delivery and lower health care ex-
penditures overall. In some cases, government expenditures to improve 
the effectiveness of certain programs may significantly reduce govern-
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ment expenditures in other program areas. For example, our failure to 
fund and implement effective employment and training programs and 
policies for dislocated workers, older workers, and the poor results in 
high public costs in the form of expensive and extensive dependence 
on public support programs, including Social Security, lower levels of 
employment and tax revenues, and higher crime and health problems. 
Although healthy growth of the aggregate U.S. economy has ac-
companied rapid globalization in recent years, the benefits of economic 
expansion have accrued disproportionately to those at the very top of the 
income distribution. Many lower and middle income Americans have 
instead experienced less security and lower employment rates, stagnant 
or falling real wages, and lower benefit levels. The policies advocated 
in this book would go a long way toward guaranteeing a future of good 
jobs for all Americans. 
notes
 1. These statistics are based on our analysis of data from the Current Population 
Survey—Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG). We averaged over multiple per-
centiles to minimize the statistical noise for individual percentiles. 
 2. It is sometimes asserted that much of the gap between wage and productivity 
growth can be explained by the growth of the cost of benefits such as health insur-
ance (see, for example, Council of Economic Advisers 2007, p. 51). This is largely 
true if we focus on the gap between productivity growth and mean wage growth 
using consistent price deflators. But the growth of nonwage compensation only 
explains a small portion of the gap between U.S. economic output and measured 
real wage growth for the median worker, or for most workers. For example, in the 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, average real wages 
per hour grew 1.27 percent per year from 1979 to 2005, whereas average real 
compensation (including benefits) per hour grew 1.42 percent per year from 1979 
to 2005, a difference of 0.15 percent per year. 
 3. Productivity for the nonfarm business sector grew 2.0 percent per year, according 
to figures published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The estimated 1.7 percent 
annual growth rate of productivity for the overall economy adjusts for the lower 
productivity growth in the farm sector, as reported in Dew-Becker and Gordon 
(2005). 
 4. We exclude all observations with imputed earnings, hours, or wages. For workers 
paid by the hour, we use hourly wages. For other workers, we use usual weekly 
earnings divided by usual weekly hours, where available. For workers whose usu-
al weekly hours vary, we use actual weekly hours the previous week. For workers 
whose usual weekly earnings are top-coded, we multiply the top code by 1.4. 
Wage observations are treated as outliers and dropped if the real wage is less 
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than $2 per hour or more than $200 per hour in 2004 dollars, deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index research series produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The percentiles are then calculated over all remaining workers in the CPS-ORG 
sample for each year. The CPS earnings weights are used in calculating the per-
centiles. The reported statistics in the figure equal the ratio of the 2006 wage to the 
1979 wage at each percentile. 
 5. Wage growth consistent with productivity growth would be less than 1.7 percent, 
for a couple of reasons. First, total compensation includes benefits, such as health 
insurance and retirement plans, whose value grew at a rate greater than 1.7 percent. 
Second, the GDP deflator used to deflate real output in the productivity statistics 
grew more slowly than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflator used to calculate 
the real wage trends. The first factor might explain an annual growth difference of 
0.2 percent (see Note 1). The second factor suggests that real wage growth using 
the CPI will be lowered by 0.4 percent per year relative to real productivity statis-
tics using the GDP deflator. These figures come from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data on the CPI research series (BLS 2007) and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
data on the GDP price deflator, taken from Table 1.1.4 of the National Income and 
Product Accounts (BEA 2007).
 6. These estimates are based on data on earnings or hourly wages and weekly hours 
of work from the outgoing rotation groups in the Current Population Survey in 
1979 and 2006. First, we computed real hourly wages in 2006 consistent with a 
1.1 percent annual growth in real hourly wages from 1979 to 2006 for the first to 
the eighty-ninth percentile. We subtracted from these figures the actual wage rates 
in 2006 at each percentile to get the hourly wage increment required for wage 
growth to match productivity growth. The annual earnings increment at each per-
centile was computed as the product of this hourly wage increment, the number of 
workers in each CPS percentile in 2006, the average weekly hours of those in each 
percentile, and 52 (for the number of weeks per year). In computing these figures, 
we dropped all observations with imputations for earnings, hours, or wages, and 
excluded wage outliers. Thus, we adjusted these numbers upwards to reflect the 
ratio between total CPS employment, as measured by the BLS in 2006, and the 
smaller estimated number of weighted CPS workers in our sample. The estimate 
of $734 billion is the sum of this annual earnings increment across the first 89 
percentiles. 
 7. All employment-rate statistics come from our analysis of CPS-ORG data.
 8. Employment rates among low-educated Hispanic men, in contrast, have been 
fairly stable.
 9. The employment rate among prime-age Hispanic men was slightly higher, 85.8 per-
cent, and among black prime-age men significantly lower, 75.0 percent, in 1979.
 10. This may be surprising to some because of the presumed effects of welfare reform 
on labor-force participation among low-educated women. Although the employ-
ment rate among high-school-dropout women aged 25–54 did increase from 45 
percent to 51 percent between 1979 and 2000, it fell back to 47 percent by 2006. 
 11. The new minimum wage law will incrementally increase the federal minimum 
wage from $5.15 to $8.25 by 2009. Assuming a rate of inflation of about 3 percent 
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per year, the minimum wage would approximately return to its real 1996 value in 
2009. However, without future policy initiatives to increase the nominal minimum 
wage, the real value of the minimum wage would start declining again in 2009.
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Are Skills the Problem? 
Reforming the Education and 
Training System in the United States 
Robert I. Lerman
American University, Urban Institute, and IZA
Skill formation is a life cycle process. It begins in the womb 
and continues on in the workplace. Education policy is only 
one aspect of a successful skill formation policy, and not 
necessarily the most important one.
 —James Heckman and Dimitriy Masterov (2005) 
As the larger return to education and skill is likely the sin-
gle greatest source of the long-term increase in inequality, 
policies that boost our national investment in education and 
training can help reduce inequality while expanding eco-
nomic opportunity. . . . The economically relevant concept 
of education is much broader than the traditional course of 
schooling from kindergarten through high school and into 
college. Indeed, substantial economic benefits may result 
from any form of training that helps individuals acquire eco-
nomically and socially useful skills, including not only K-12 
education, college, and graduate work but also on-the-job 
training, course work at community colleges and vocational 
schools, extension courses, on-line education, and training 
in financial literacy.
 —Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of  
 the Federal Reserve (2007) 
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STATInG THE ARGUMEnT
The stellar economic growth of the United States since the early 
1990s surprised scholars and policy analysts who had decried the me-
diocre skills of the American workforce and the inadequate preparation 
of students for careers. Unlike other countries, which have comprehen-
sive school and career development systems, the United States lacked 
a well-structured approach to education and training, especially for the 
“forgotten half” of young people not pursuing a college education.1 
The skill development models of Germany, Japan, and other developed 
countries were especially compelling examples to emulate. 
Certainly, the argument seemed convincing. American students and 
workers were underperforming compared to their counterparts in other 
developed countries on tests of international reading, math, and writing 
skills. Young people not going on to college experienced difficult tran-
sitions from high school to career-oriented jobs. Productivity growth 
had slowed over the 1970s and 1980s. The wage gap between high 
school–educated and college-educated workers had widened sharply, 
and compensation had actually declined for high school dropouts. Eco-
nomic analyses indicated that the rising wage inequality partly resulted 
from the increasingly important role of the skills required to comple-
ment rapid technological changes, such as those embodied in comput-
ers. Another reason for the rising demand for skill was that changes 
in the organization of work were giving nonsupervisory workers more 
responsibility for decisions and for achieving high quality (Murnane 
and Levy 1996). 
From today’s perspective the skills problem looks overstated, since 
during the past 15 years the U.S. economy has far exceeded expecta-
tions. Between 1991 and 2005, national income rose in the United States 
by 45 percent, triple the 15 percent growth achieved in Japan and more 
than twice the 19 percent growth in Germany. U.S. gains in productivity 
also outpaced productivity growth in Japan, Germany, and most other 
advanced economies. The strong U.S. labor productivity performance 
is especially impressive in the context of a rapidly expanding job mar-
ket that lowered unemployment rates and absorbed millions of poorly 
educated immigrants from less-developed countries, along with more 
than one million single parents who were former or potential welfare 
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recipients. Since 2000, unemployment rates have averaged 4.9 percent, 
down from 5.8 percent in the 1990s and from 7.3 percent in the 1980s. 
The decline in unemployment rates has extended to workers without a 
high school degree; their rates of joblessness fell from about 10.5 per-
cent in the 1992–1994 period to under 7 percent in the late 1990s and 
in 2006–2007.2 
Notwithstanding these indicators of the health of the U.S. economy, 
not all is going well for workers. Less-educated workers have seen their 
wages stagnate or decline, causing them to fall further behind college-
educated workers. The share of workers covered by pensions and health 
insurance has declined in recent years. The intensification of global com-
petition is posing a threat to workers at all levels. Concerns are growing 
about immigration, outsourcing, and the expanding labor force in India, 
China, and other less-developed countries whose workers are now a 
part of a world labor market (Freeman 2007). Trade and the dynam-
ics of companies generate worker displacement, resulting in frequent 
earnings losses when workers move to other jobs. The share of U.S. 
workers with a high school diploma and the share with a college degree 
are no longer the highest in the developed world. According to the New 
Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (NCSAW 2007), 
even well-paying jobs for college graduates are threatened by outsourc-
ing to low-paid but well-educated workers in poor countries. Given 
automation, outsourcing, and the need for creative workers, the com-
mission finds that “people who prefer conventional work environments 
are likely to see their jobs disappear.” At the same time, employers re-
port difficulty in recruiting workers with adequate skills: over half of 
manufacturing firms have reported that the shortage of available skills 
is affecting their ability to serve customers, and 84 percent say the K-12 
school system is not doing a good job of preparing students for the 
workplace (Deloitte Consulting 2005). 
Perhaps the central concerns are shortfalls in skills and declining 
wages among a segment of American workers. Wages of men with less 
than a high school diploma have fallen. Men who graduated from high 
school but did not attend college have seen their wages stagnate. The 
worsening job market for African American men with no more than a 
high school degree has weakened their ability to start and maintain fam-
ilies. In contrast, well-educated workers, including African Americans 
with college degrees, enjoy low unemployment rates and earn good 
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salaries. Apparently the demand for skill is rising faster than the supply. 
In 1979, the median hourly wage of college-educated workers was 34 
percent higher than that of high school–educated workers. By 2005, the 
advantage to the college-educated reached 56 percent.3 Thus, while ex-
panding the skills of the current and future U.S. workforce may not be 
sufficient, most experts see raising educational attainment as necessary 
for a future of good jobs. 
Translating a skills strategy into policy is, however, not straight-
forward. The first problem is with the definition of skills. No one index 
can capture the multiplicity of skills required in a wide variety of work 
and occupational contexts. Reading, math, and writing capabilities are 
in high demand (Barton 2000) and are relevant to most jobs, including 
jobs held by workers with no college education (Holzer 1997). But so 
too are a range of other general skills (such as communication, respon-
sibility, teamwork, allocating resources, problem-solving, and finding 
information) and occupation-specific skills.4 Yet the nearly exclusive 
emphasis in public policy and in public funding is on academic skills. 
Today’s goals, as espoused by leaders from politics, education, and the 
corporate sector, are twofold: 1) to raise educational attainment for K-
12 students as high as possible, encouraging them to obtain at least a 
bachelor’s degree, and 2) to insure that elementary and secondary stu-
dents achieve at least basic academic competencies in a limited number 
of subjects. One measure of success is the share of students who pass 
academic tests of reading, math, and writing skills. A second is the share 
of students completing a bachelor’s (or at least an associate’s) degree. 
Implicitly, the United States has embarked on what James Rosenbaum 
(2001) has called a “college for all” policy. 
To achieve these goals, governments have been doing four things: 
1) increasing spending on elementary, secondary, and postsecond-
ary schools; 2) mandating test-based performance measures that hold 
schools accountable for student performance; 3) expanding competi-
tion and school choice; and 4) offering subsidies to help students attend 
college. An increasing number of experts favor a skills strategy that 
begins at birth and uses high-quality, developmental child care before 
elementary school (Heckman and Masterov 2007). Although subsidized 
training through the public sector and through employers is a part of 
the nation’s skill-building activities, spending on secondary and post-
secondary education dwarfs the modest dollars spent training adults or 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   20 2/29/2008   1:42:02 PM
Are Skills the Problem?   21
youth who have dropped out of the mainstream educational system. 
Some secondary and postsecondary institutions, such as vocational 
high schools, community colleges, and proprietary private vocational 
schools, offer school-based programs that involve occupational train-
ing. But the traditional ways workers learned an occupational skill—
through informal on-the-job training and formal apprenticeships—have 
attracted very little attention. 
The emphasis on schooling and academic test scores as skill en-
hancement strategies results partly from a failure to conceptualize and 
measure a broader array of skills that are critical to success in the work-
place. Without institutions that specify and document a range of well-
accepted generic and occupational skills, public statistical agencies 
regularly quantify only schooling and occasionally measure verbal and 
math skills based on test scores. These indicators are meaningful but 
incomplete and sometimes inaccurate or contested.5 As a result, we lack 
comprehensive measures of the job skills of the nation’s workforce. We 
know little about the share of workers who have attained, for example, 
communication skills or the ability to allocate resources and to work 
effectively in a team environment. We have only limited information on 
occupational skills. 
Unfortunately, the weakness in the data is not merely an academic 
issue; it can lead to a distorted set of education and training policies. 
When the public, policymakers, and educators lack information on 
critical generic and occupational skills, they find it difficult to diagnose 
trends, to identify skill gaps, to learn about the skill limitations of dif-
ferent subgroups, to understand the skills that are most in demand, and 
to determine the best mechanisms for teaching skills. The incomplete 
measures are a problem for the private as well as the public sector. Busi-
ness firms rarely measure the skills of their employees, perhaps in part 
because their accounting methods disregard the asset value of the skills 
of their employees. 
The simplified, academic-based measures of skill cause policymak-
ers to use schooling as virtually the sole method by which students learn 
skills. The result is a standardized set of school-based requirements, 
often accompanied by a uniform approach to teaching. Such methods 
may be appropriate for elementary school and perhaps through early 
high school, but the approach has two great flaws, especially beyond 
this level of schooling. One is the assumption that people learn the same 
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way—primarily through didactic teaching in a school setting. There is 
considerable evidence that learning styles differ markedly across stu-
dents and that many learn best in a contextualized setting (Gardner 
1999; Resnick 1987). The second flaw is the failure to appreciate the 
skill heterogeneity in the job market. Educational systems are usually 
large operations and typically require rules and conventions to make 
outcomes meaningful across students, school districts, states, and coun-
tries. Their emphasis on a few subjects, which are only marginally 
linked to student career interests, limits student incentives. Moreover, 
by their nature, school systems teach a homogeneous set of subjects and 
use a highly standardized approach to teaching. By comparison, the job 
market is strikingly heterogeneous, with hundreds of broad occupations 
and within each of those occupations different levels of work. The gap 
between the simple school-based definition of skill and the complex 
and varied skills required in the workplace is barely recognized in the 
United States. In contrast, many other countries recognize the heteroge-
neous and contextual nature of skills in three broad ways: 1) by using 
formal systems that qualify workers for most occupations, 2) by certi-
fying workers for a variety of qualifications, and 3) by measuring the 
qualifications workers attain and the number of workers lacking valued 
qualifications.
Still, the U.S. system of skill-building has a critical asset: flexibil-
ity. The lack of formal pathways leaves space for workers to move in 
and out of schooling and training, which are often supplied by oppor-
tunistic community colleges, private occupational schools, on-line col-
leges, adult extension courses, apprenticeships, and often employers 
themselves. In distinguishing between the U.S. school system and the 
American learning system, Samuelson (2006) argues that these institu-
tions offer workers a second chance, ways of combining school and 
work, and a close link between education and careers. Their flexibility 
and relevance, he says, overcome some but not all weaknesses of the 
mainstream system of high schools and colleges. Unfortunately, some 
students only use a community college to take a remedial course offer-
ing material that they should have learned in high school (Rosenbaum 
2001). Others never attend, whether because their bad high school ex-
periences make them unable or unwilling to return to school, because 
they get into trouble with crime or drugs, or because early parenthood 
creates barriers to long-term skill development. 
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What will it take for the training system to contribute in a greater 
way to helping American workers become more productive and have 
more rewarding careers? The central argument of this paper is that do-
ing better requires that public policymakers and education and train-
ing practitioners recognize and address the multidimensional nature of 
skills, the variety of learning approaches (including the value of con-
textualized learning), and the desirability of close links with employers 
and the workplace. The next section considers conceptual and measure-
ment issues related to the heterogeneous nature of skills demanded in 
the current and future U.S. economy. Section three examines the chang-
ing demand and supply of skills based on existing measures. In section 
four, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of the current system of 
U.S. skill development. Section five presents recommendations for im-
proving and expanding skill development efforts in the United States. 
DEFInInG AnD MEASURInG SkILLS
The modern economic approach to analyzing skills begins with hu-
man capital theory (Becker 1964). The analogy with capital arises be-
cause to increase workers’ skills requires an investment of real resourc-
es in the present that yields a flow of returns in the form of enhanced 
productivity in the future. The enhanced skills may be specific (in that 
they raise a worker’s productivity only within one firm), general (in that 
the worker’s added capabilities can increase productivity to a range of 
firms), or some of both (learning one firm’s computer system can help 
in another firm). This specific versus general distinction affects whom 
we expect to finance education and training and who benefits from these 
investments. The added productivity potential from general skills raises 
the willingness of all firms to pay high salaries to workers who enhance 
their general skills. Since workers gain the benefits from investments 
in general skills, firms are unlikely to fund the education and training 
that generates the skills. In contrast, some of the returns to firm-specific 
skills will be captured by the employer. Since other firms would not 
benefit from specific skills, they do not bid up wages, causing workers 
to remain with their existing firms at a higher level of productivity and 
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lowering the costs of turnover and recruitment. In this case, firms may 
finance and reap some of the benefits from training. 
The language of human capital has entered the lexicon of policy-
makers and professionals throughout the world. Studies of the rates of 
return to education have been undertaken in scores of countries (Blöndal, 
Field, and Girouard 2002; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). The evi-
dence from this vast literature documents positive returns to education 
and finds that the highest rates of return to primary school occur in 
less-developed countries. The average private and social returns to edu-
cation remain around 10 percent even in wealthy countries and even 
at high levels of education. Although these returns are healthy, they 
represent the average return across all workers achieving the additional 
education, not the individuals at the margin of either obtaining the edu-
cation or not. Moreover, besides ignoring the risk and uncertainty of the 
returns, they often ignore the costs paid on behalf of those who do not 
complete the added education.
One common misperception is that education conveys general skills 
useful in a range of fields while training provides only specialized skills 
that help in very specific contexts. A second is that employers will never 
pay for skills that might be used outside the firm. As Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1999) point out, employers often have an incentive to finance 
general training because of transaction costs in the labor market that, in 
reality, make it difficult for workers to quit and costly for employers to 
replace them. Also, firms providing the training know more than other 
firms about the content and value of training and how well individual 
workers have absorbed the knowledge. Firms realize that specific and 
general skills are often complementary—the ability to achieve high 
productivity gains from specific training increases as the worker’s gen-
eral skills rise. Still another issue is that the distinction between general 
and specific downplays the critical role of occupational skills, which are 
general in the sense of having value to more than one firm but which are 
specific to a set of firms. Task-specific skills in one occupation are often 
transferable to jobs in another occupation using similar skills. 
Though useful and effective in predicting a range of outcomes, the 
human capital perspective ignores some motivational factors that af-
fect the accumulation and effective use of skills. Not all learning is for 
instrumental purposes. People often learn in order to satisfy their curi-
osity or to gain a sense of accomplishment. The ability to learn a skill 
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conveys a sense of pride, and the effective use of skills in an occupation 
often brings workers a sense of identity. Skills rarely raise productivity 
in isolation; increases in productivity typically result when workers use 
their skills to complement the work of others in an appropriate setting 
within the organization (Brown 2001). 
The framework provided by human capital offers little guidance 
as to which general, specific, or occupational skills are valuable in any 
given labor market. One approach is to estimate the gains in earnings 
associated with specific skills. While economists have developed such 
estimates showing that measures of math and verbal skills are corre-
lated with earnings (Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995), the fact that 
test scores do not account for much of the variation in earnings among 
workers suggests that other attributes or skills are relevant to job per-
formance (Holzer 1997). To find out what these attributes might be, 
the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) created the Secretary’s Com-
mission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS) in the early 1990s to 
study what skills effective workers require to succeed in specific set-
tings. The commission’s report highlights what have come to be called 
SCANS skills and characterizes them as incorporating many capabili-
ties not directly taught in school. Some examples of SCANS skills are 
the abilities to allocate time and resources, to acquire and evaluate in-
formation, to participate effectively as a member of a team, to teach 
others, to negotiate differences, to listen and communicate with cus-
tomers and supervisors, to understand the functioning of organizational 
systems, to select technology, and to apply technology to relevant tasks. 
The recent classification known as 21st Century Skills incorporates 
academic skills and knowledge but also emphasizes such other skills 
as interactive communication, teamwork, adaptability, planning, self- 
direction, and responsibility.6 For all types of skills, there are many 
levels of competence. Context matters greatly. Responsibility and at-
tention to detail may be necessary for both mowing lawns well and 
for nursing, but the required levels differ dramatically between the two 
occupations. 
Employer hiring decisions are sensitive to an array of skills that go 
well beyond academic skills. In a survey of 3,200 employers in four 
large metropolitan areas, employers reported that such personal quali-
ties as responsibility, integrity, and self-management are as important as 
or more important than basic skills (Holzer 1997). Further documenta-
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tion on the importance of these job criteria comes from the National 
Employer Survey, which obtained responses from more than 3,300 
businesses. These employers ranked attitude, communication skills, 
previous work experience, employer recommendations, and industry-
based credentials above years of schooling, grades, and test scores ad-
ministered as part of the interview (Zemsky 1997). Evidence for the rel-
evance of occupation-specific and industry-specific skills comes from 
a paper by Sullivan (2006). He finds that some workers gain high wage 
returns to occupation-specific work experience while others gain high 
wage returns to industry-specific work experience. 
The sociocultural approach to examining skills emphasizes the 
contextual nature of skills and the importance of nonacademic skills, 
which are often obtained in a work environment through joining ex-
perienced workers in “a community of practice” (Stasz 2001). Nelsen 
(1997) points out that workplaces not only require formal knowledge—
facts, principles, theories, math, and writing skills—but also informal 
knowledge as embodied in heuristics, work styles, and contextualized 
understanding of tools and techniques. In a highly revealing case study 
of auto repair workers, she describes the importance of social skills for 
learning the informal knowledge, as captured in stories, advice, and 
guided practice. Nelsen further argues that the social skills learned at 
school are not necessarily useful at work and may even be counter-
productive. (For example, in school, helping out one’s peers on exams 
and on some homework is considered cheating, whereas at work the 
exchange of information and knowledge is essential.) By implication, 
years of schooling are probably not a good proxy for informal knowl-
edge or for the attributes helpful in attaining such knowledge. 
Further evidence showing the importance of noncognitive skills 
comes from a complex analysis by Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 
(2006) of the schooling and job market experience of a national sample 
of young workers as they age from 14 through 30. Although the authors 
use a limited set of measures to capture cognitive and noncognitive 
skills, their results are striking. They find that, except for college gradu-
ates, noncognitive skills (as measured by indices of locus of control and 
self-esteem) exert at least as high and probably a higher impact on job 
market outcomes than do cognitive skills (word knowledge, paragraph 
comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, mathematical knowledge, and 
coding speed as measured by the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude 
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Battery). Using another major data set, the National Education Lon-
gitudinal Study (NELS), Deke and Haimson (2006) develop evidence 
reinforcing the importance of nonacademic competencies, such as work 
habits, leadership skills, teamwork and other sports-related skills, and 
attitudes toward whether luck or effort determines success in life. They 
find that for two-thirds of all high school students, a nonacademic skill 
is most predictive of earnings. Operators of job training programs em-
phasize the need for disadvantaged men to gain self-esteem, communi-
cate effectively, envision long-term goals, and demonstrate personal re-
sponsibility as well as to avoid inflexibility, dishonesty, defensiveness, 
and impatience (Carmona 2007).
The importance of noncognitive skills for performance on jobs 
should not be taken to mean that verbal, math, and writing skills are 
irrelevant or unnecessary for the vast majority of positions. When em-
ployers emphasize personal qualities, many may be assuming workers 
have at least some basic academic skills and that, once some threshold 
level is reached, noncognitive skills become a priority. On the other 
hand, few workers use many of the academic skills that educators view 
as vital to success. In a survey of a representative sample of workers, 
only 9 percent reported using the capabilities learned in Algebra I, and 
fewer than 13 percent of workers below the upper white-collar level 
ever write anything five pages or longer (Handel 2007).
Wage rates and wage differentials offer one way to assess the skills 
valued in the market, since they generally reflect productivity levels 
and differences across workers. Wage rates indirectly capture the return 
to the skills of the marginal worker. Since the employer is voluntarily 
paying to obtain the productive services of the worker, the wage may be 
indirectly capturing the full complement of skills. Still, understanding 
which skills are most important in determining wages would require 
data on the multidimensional pattern of skills. Moreover, wage differ-
ences might reflect factors other than skill, such as the danger of the job 
and the level of unionization. 
The connection between wages and productivity, along with the 
variability of wage rates within groups that have ostensibly similar 
skills, offers further evidence for the multidimensional nature of skills. 
Although education is highly and positively correlated with wages, 
educational attainment explains only a small part of the variability in 
earnings. Indeed, the inequality of wage rates within major educational 
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categories is almost as high as wage inequality across the entire work-
force. Work experience apparently raises wages, but the precise con-
nections between actual skills and wages are rarely explicit. Higher test 
scores, especially on math tests, are associated with higher earnings, but 
they explain only a modest amount of wage variability.  
The evidence provides some indicators for how best to measure 
skills, but, in practice, indicators of the skills of U.S. workers usually 
boil down to educational attainment and, in some cases, test scores and 
years of work experience. For example, in the 2006 Economic Report of 
the President, the chapter on “Skills for the U.S. Workforce” relies en-
tirely on three considerations: 1) years of schooling and highest degree 
attained; 2) math and science test scores of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-olds 
relative to scores in other countries; and 3) the declining share of engi-
neering and science degrees held by U.S. workers relative to immigrant 
workers (Council of Economic Advisers 2006). The concerns of the 
NCSAW about low skills also relate to how well the United States is do-
ing relative to other countries. The commission focuses not only on the 
math and science test scores of current students and the literacy skills 
of the adult workforce, but also on an apparent shortfall in the training 
of U.S. engineers and scientists, especially when compared to the num-
bers being turned out by China and India. The commission highlights 
the importance of firms using creativity to retain high-wage jobs in the 
future but provides no measure of this elusive concept. 
Educational attainment and test scores are commonly used as prox-
ies for skills, but how well do they capture the level and trend of skills 
in the U.S. workforce? It turns out that accurate measures of even these 
basic indicators of skill are more elusive than is commonly recognized. 
More importantly, the education-based data provide no measure of ad-
ditional dimensions of skill, an omission that can lead to faulty conclu-
sions and policies.
Turning to data on the capabilities of U.S. workers, we start with the 
figures on educational attainment and ask about broad trends and about 
variations in school completion across subgroups by race, sex, Hispanic 
status, and metropolitan area. The standard data show steady progress 
toward the completion of high school and college and declining and 
modest racial gaps in the completion of high school. Table 2.1 shows 
the rise in high school completion and in college completion by race, 
sex, and Hispanic origin. The proportion of the over-25 population with 
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high school degrees jumped from 64 percent in 1976 to 86 percent in 
2006. The share with a bachelor’s degree nearly doubled, to 28 percent. 
In addition, the black-white gap in high-school completion narrowed 
from 20–24 percentage points in 1976 to less than 6 in 2006. The gains 
were much larger for the adult population than for successive cohorts 
of 25-to-29-year-olds. Still, as of 2006, 86 percent of all 25-to-29-year-
olds had graduated from high school, including 83 percent of black men 
and 88 percent of black women. The rates of high school completion 
were much lower among Hispanic men and women. Growth in college 
graduates was especially high for all groups of women, but not nearly 
as strong for men. 
Changes in the educational composition of the labor force are espe-
cially striking from the perspective of net additional workers. Between 
1992 and early 2007, the adult labor force (ages 25 and over) expanded 
by about 24 million workers. Over the same period, workers with a 
bachelor’s degree increased by 15.5 million and workers with at least 
some college rose by 7.9 million. Additional workers with no college 
amounted to only about 400,000, or 2 percent of the overall net chang-
es. This number looks implausible given that over 40 percent of a recent 
cohort left school without any college.7 Two phenomena explain the 
seemingly divergent pattern. First, the inflow of less-educated young 
people and immigrants into the labor force was offset by an outflow of 
less-educated older workers. Second, labor force participation rates are 
lower among less-educated than among more-educated workers. The 
demographic component will differ in the future because the segment 
of today’s workforce nearing retirement is much more highly educated 
than past retirees. As a result, we are very likely to be adding many 
more less-educated workers than we lose to retirement. 
The information for these conclusions comes from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS), the household survey used to measure the na-
tion’s unemployment rate since the late 1940s. These household surveys 
obtain information on the education, employment, and income of each 
member of the household from a responsible adult in the household. 
Unfortunately, the CPS data do not tell the entire story and may 
be quite inaccurate, especially with respect to high school graduation. 
Data drawn from school reports (Common Core Data, or CCD) sug-
gest much lower high school graduation rates, especially among black 
youth. Since schools report all ninth-graders registered and all high 
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Table 2.1  High School and College Completion of noninstitutional Population by Race, Hispanic Status, and Sex: 
Ages 25 and Over and 25–29 at Five-year Intervals from 1976 to 2006 (%)
Age and year
All White Black Hispanic
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Completed high school,  
25 and over
2006 85.0 85.9 85.5 86.7 80.1 81.2 58.5 60.1
2001 84.1 84.2 84.4 85.1 79.2 78.5 55.5 58.0
1996 81.9 81.6 82.7 82.8 74.3 74.2 53.0 53.3
1991 78.5 78.3 79.8 79.9 66.7 66.7 51.4 51.2
1986 75.1 74.4 76.5 75.9 61.5 63.0 49.2 47.8
1981 70.3 69.1 72.1 71.2 53.2 52.6 45.5 43.6
1976 64.7 63.5 66.7 65.5 42.3 45.0 41.4 37.3
Completed college,  
25 and over
2006 29.2 26.9 29.7 27.1 17.2 19.4 11.9 12.9
2001 28.2 24.3 28.7 24.6 15.3 16.1 10.8 11.4
1996 26.0 21.4 26.9 21.8 12.4 14.6 10.3 8.3
1991 24.3 18.8 25.4 19.3 11.4 11.6 10.0 9.4
1986 23.2 16.1 24.1 16.4 11.2 10.7 9.5 7.4
1981 21.1 13.4 22.2 13.8 8.2 8.2 9.7 5.9
1976 18.6 11.3 19.6 11.6 6.3 6.8 8.6 4.0
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Completed high 
school, 25–29
2006 84.4 88.5 84.1 88.3 83.1 87.8 60.6 66.7
2001 85.3 88.3 84.6 88.3 85.4 87.0 58.3 67.3
1996 86.5 88.1 86.3 88.8 87.2 84.2 59.7 62.9
1991 84.9 85.8 85.1 86.6 83.5 80.1 56.4 57.1
1986 85.9 86.4 85.6 87.4 86.5 80.6 58.2 60.0
1981 86.5 86.1 87.6 87.6 78.4 76.4 59.1 60.4
1976 86.0 83.5 87.3 84.6 72.5 74.9 57.6 58.4
Completed college, 
25–29
2006 25.3 31.6 25.0 31.7 14.9 21.6 6.9 12.8
2001 25.5 31.3 25.1 32.1 15.6 17.9 8.2 13.3
1996 26.1 28.2 27.2 29.1 12.4 16.4 10.2 9.8
1991 23.0 23.4 24.1 25.0 11.5 10.6 8.1 10.4
1986 22.9 21.9 24.1 22.9 10.1 13.3 8.9 9.1
1981 23.1 19.6 24.3 20.5 12.1 11.1 8.6 6.5
1976 27.5 20.1 28.7 20.6 12.0 13.6 10.3 4.8
NOTE: The four categories represent 1) the percentage of the noninstitutional population aged 25 and over that has completed four years of 
high school or more, 2) aged 25 and over that has completed four years of college or more, 3) aged 25–29 that has completed four years 
of high school or more, and 4) aged 25–29 that has completed four years of college or more.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2007).
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school diplomas awarded each year, some researchers have derived 
high school graduation rates by dividing the diplomas awarded by the 
ninth-grade enrollments four years earlier, while adjusting for the fact 
that ninth-grade enrollments can be swelled by high retention rates 
and also adjusting for internal and international migration. Unlike the 
case with conventional CPS-based measures, analysts using the CCD 
measures do not include private school students or count individuals 
earning GEDs as having graduated from high school.8 Moreover, they 
do not capture the extent to which dropouts return to school. Still, the 
results are striking and troubling. Instead of only 8 percent of non-His-
panic whites in public schools not graduating from high school, the 
figure looks as high as 19 percent. Among African Americans, the share 
not completing high school jumps from 14 percent to 38 percent (War-
ren and Halpern-Manners 2007). The Hispanic graduation rate looks at 
least as high in the administrative data as in the household-based data. 
One broad and revealing measure is the number of public and private 
diplomas awarded divided by the number of 17-year-olds. It shows a 
decline from 77 percent in 1969 to 70 percent in 2000 (Chaplin 2002), 
but a recent increase back to 75 percent in 2004–2005. Overall, the 
trends in high school graduation look far less optimistic when using 
CCD-based measures than when relying on CPS-based data. 
The low graduation rates based on administrative data raise serious 
questions about analyses of skills in the United States, as well as about 
public policies. Consider, for example, one of the stylized facts of labor 
economics, namely the rising earnings gap between high school gradu-
ates and college graduates. If many classified as high school graduates 
did not in fact complete high school and the misreporting is worsening, 
then current college–high school graduate comparisons and estimates 
of past trends may be highly inaccurate. Similarly, policy decisions 
could be influenced by this revised picture of high school completion. 
The nature of reforms to the nation’s school system depends on whether 
the share of students not completing high school is small and declining 
or high and not declining at all, especially among African American stu-
dents. If nearly everyone is graduating, administering high-stakes tests 
that require students to learn more in school may have a higher priority 
than reducing dropout rates. 
From the perspective of measuring the nation’s skills, one would 
like to know whether measurement problems extend to college comple-
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tion as well. So far administrative tracking has not been undertaken to 
capture the accuracy of self-reported CPS data on the completion of 
an associate’s, bachelor’s, or professional degree. Although the col-
lege completion data may be entirely accurate, it is difficult to know for 
sure. 
Test scores offer an independent indicator of skills that are reward-
ed in the workforce. There are a plethora of national tests, including the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which measures 
reading, math, science, and writing skills over time and across states. 
International comparative data provide estimates of the adult literacy of 
U.S. workers and the academic skills of American students compared 
to their counterparts in other countries. Although U.S.-based policy re-
searchers and political leaders often decry the poor performance of U.S. 
students in academic tests of comparative competencies, the data as a 
whole reveal a mixed picture (Boe and Shin 2005). In comparison to 
students in other industrial countries, U.S. students perform about aver-
age. U.S. students do considerably better than average in reading and 
civics, about the same in science, but worse than average in mathemat-
ics. Restricting the sample to the largest Western economies (the G7), 
Boe and Shin find that the U.S. disadvantage occurs only in math and 
only relative to Japan. They attribute some of the shortfall in U.S. test 
scores to the more heterogeneous U.S. population. When we restrict 
the sample to non-Hispanic white students, U.S. scores far exceed the 
scores of other G7 countries, except for Japan in math and science. 
These data offer information only on the competency measures of 
current students. To learn about the literacy and basic math skills of 
the U.S. adult population, we turn to the 2003 National Assessment of 
Adult Literacy (NAAL). The NAAL tests cover prose literacy (skills 
in comprehending and using information from continuous text, such as 
news stories and instructional materials), document literacy (skills in 
using information from other texts, such as job applications, tables, and 
drug and food labels), and quantitative literacy (skills in identifying and 
performing computations of numbers embedded in a text, such as by 
filling out an order form, calculating interest on a loan, or figuring out 
a tip). The report (Kutner et al. 2007) defines levels of competency in 
terms of four categories: 1) below basic, 2) basic, 3) intermediate, and 
4) proficient. “Below basic” does not necessarily mean illiterate; many 
in this category can, for example, find information in a short, simple 
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prose passage and identify on an instruction sheet what is permissible 
to drink before a medical test. Within the below basic range of quantita-
tive literacy, individuals can add two numbers from a deposit slip and 
calculate change from a $20 bill. But this group cannot calculate the 
weekly salary for a job based on hourly wages or locate two numbers on 
a bar graph and calculate the difference between them. At the high end, 
those individuals classified as “proficient” in terms of prose literacy can 
compare viewpoints in two editorials with contrasting interpretations of 
scientific and economic evidence. “Proficient” in quantitative literacy 
means individuals can calculate the yearly cost of a specified amount 
of life insurance using a table that gives monthly costs for each $1,000 
of coverage. 
The tabulations provide considerable detail on levels of literacy by 
demographic, education, and occupational group, as well as informa-
tion on changes between 1992 and 2003, the two years NAAL was con-
ducted. For the entire population, about 14 percent scored in the low-
est category (below basic) on prose literacy, 12 percent on document 
literacy, and 22 percent on quantitative literacy. About 13 percent of 
the population was “proficient” in all literacy measures. These figures 
understate the skills of the workforce because the age group least likely 
to participate in the workforce (ages 65 and over) performed worst in 
terms of literacy. Only about 11 to 12 percent of the 19–64 age group 
fell into the below basic category in prose and document literacy; 20 
percent were below basic in quantitative literacy. 
Apart from the over-65 population, the two groups with low lit-
eracy levels are Hispanic adults—especially those who spoke another 
language, at least before starting school—and African American adults. 
Depending on the measure, 36 to 50 percent of all Hispanic adults 
scored in the below basic literacy levels; fully 61 percent of adults who 
grew up speaking only Spanish tested below basic in prose literacy. 
African Americans also showed low rates of adult literacy, as 24 to 47 
percent were classified as below basic for the three categories. In con-
trast, only 7 to 13 percent of whites were in this low literacy category. 
Some improvement took place over the 1992–2003 period for African 
Americans, but the trend worsened among Hispanics, perhaps because 
of the inflow of immigrants. 
The NAAL confirms a close (but far from complete) connection 
between literacy scores and educational attainment. Consider, for ex-
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ample, the prose literacy scores. While fully one-half of all adults with-
out a high school degree or GED score in the below basic range, the 
proportion in this lowest category falls to 10 percent for those with 
GEDs. About 5 percent or fewer of those with at least some college fall 
into this bottom category. On the other end of the scale, the proportions 
reaching “proficient” rise from nearly zero among high school dropouts 
to 31 percent among those with a bachelor of arts and 41 percent among 
those with a graduate degree. Although college graduates achieve prose 
proficiency at levels well above less-educated adults, it is troubling that 
less than one-third meet this standard and that the proportion in the “pro-
ficient” group declined from 40 to 31 percent from 1992 to 2003. The 
overlap among categories is notable. In quantitative literacy, 63 percent 
of adults with associate’s degrees score higher than 26 percent of adults 
with bachelor’s degrees. For all three tests, the average performance of 
whites with an associate’s degree is higher than the average score of 
African American and Hispanic adults with a bachelor’s degree.
The combination of test score information and educational attain-
ment provides considerable information on skills, but the precise con-
nection with the job market is not clear. The evidence demonstrates 
that, while more education and higher literacy skills predict higher 
wage rates, much is left unexplained. A good example is the economic 
gains attached to a GED, which is sometimes considered an equivalent 
certification to a high school diploma. However, researchers have found 
that the GED by itself does little or nothing to raise the wages of work-
ers without a high school diploma (Cameron and Heckman 1993), sug-
gesting that the GED does not generate added skills. Yet the NAAL data 
show that those with a GED have test scores on prose, document, and 
quantitative literacy that are nearly identical to the test scores of adults 
with a high school diploma and that are far above the scores of high 
school dropouts. By implication, factors other than the academic skills 
measured in the NAAL must be important determinants of wages.9 
More broadly, wage variability is high within education groups. Us-
ing data from the 2005 Current Population Survey (but excluding the 
upper half of the top 1 percent), I found that the Gini coefficient of wage 
rates is almost as high among male high school and college graduates 
(0.29 and 0.31) as among all adult male workers (0.33). 
The rich nature of the NAAL data provides other indicators of the 
relevance of skills. One of special interest is the respondents’ own as-
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sessments about whether their existing skills have limited their job op-
portunities. Not surprisingly, those at high literacy levels were much 
less likely to feel limited by their current skill levels. Of those in the 
“proficient” category of quantitative literacy, 89 percent said their cur-
rent reading skills were not limiting their job options at all, and only 4 
percent saw more than a very small limitation. Similarly, 80 percent of 
those in the “intermediate” category saw no job limitations. The unex-
pected result is that 66 percent at “basic” and even 40 percent at “below 
basic” levels believed their quantitative literacy did not limit their job 
opportunities. Some respondents are no doubt misinformed about their 
limited access to jobs, but others may actually qualify for the jobs of 
interest to them. 
Educational attainment and test scores certainly offer important in-
formation about the nation’s skills. The general skills that result from 
schooling and academic competencies are valued in the job market. But 
they do not tell the full story about the qualifications of American work-
ers to perform well at the workplace. As documented by the SCANS 
report and other research, having a range of noncognitive, interperson-
al, occupational, and industry-specific skills matters at levels that vary 
given the contexts in which they are used. The term “qualifications” is 
perhaps better at capturing the specificity of requirements of jobs and 
careers than the word “skills.” 
One common job qualification—often overlooked in discussions of 
skills and the workforce—is that applicants must be drug-free. Entry-
level workers are frequently tested for marijuana and cocaine before ob-
taining employment. It is unclear to what extent illicit drug use influenc-
es the capabilities of American workers, but the evidence suggests that 
chronic drug use lowers employment (French, Roebuck, and Alexandre 
2001). 
Although job qualifications are diverse and go well beyond cog-
nitive skills, we lack good measures of qualifications that incorporate 
noncognitive skills, occupational and industry skills, skills gained from 
general work experience, and work readiness. In part, the measurement 
problem arises because of the nation’s complex and often informal 
mechanisms for certifying and qualifying worker skills in occupations 
and industries. Becoming a manager at a hotel requires a set of skills 
that hotel firms judge as being necessary for the position. Yet most man-
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agers do not receive a formal, recognized certification documenting this 
mix of skills. Instead, many jobs involve on-the-job training with little 
or no certification. In this context, it is not surprising that statistical 
agencies do little to measure and researchers do little to analyze occu-
pational certification. 
Contrast this pattern with the qualification systems of other ad-
vanced economies. As a National Research Council panel pointed out 
(Hansen 1994), several countries have national standards for work-re-
lated skills and certify those skills through training that qualifies work-
ers for a particular occupation. Some of these countries make extensive 
use of apprenticeships that involve years of workplace and school-based 
training and formal testing to certify occupation and industry skills. The 
occupations are not limited to construction and craft positions but in-
clude computer work, technical sales, managerial positions, and service 
positions. Individuals earn one certification for completing an appren-
ticeship and another, much higher-level certification for becoming a 
master in the field. 
One approach to national standards, emphasized by the United 
Kingdom and some other countries, is to develop a modular system 
of skill certification through the National Vocational Qualifications, or 
NVQs.10 The NVQs set standards that define the competencies, knowl-
edge, and understanding needed to perform well in a given occupa-
tion. The NVQs recognize workplace learning and competence based 
on evidence of performance at the workplace. The NVQ system takes 
account of skill gradations in each defined field and allows workers to 
gain documentation for each level, whether attained with one employer 
or many. The ultimate goal is that employers will place a value on their 
workers’ attaining a qualification level, thus giving workers an incentive 
to learn on the job. Although this system has not worked as effectively 
as planned (Eraut 2001), the NVQ approach offers one example of how 
certifying the attainment of skills can provide the basis for measuring 
the heterogeneity of skills.11 
Actually, skill standards embodied in state licensing laws and regu-
lations and other standards adopted by industries or through apprentice-
ship programs have become common in the United States. About 20 
percent of workers are required to have a state license to practice their 
occupation, up from less than 5 percent in the early 1950s (Kleiner 
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2006). Much of this increase has resulted from rapid growth in tra-
ditionally licensed occupations, such as medicine, dentistry, and law. 
However, the number of licensing laws has been increasing as well. 
The distinction between certification of skills and licensing of occu-
pations is important. Licensing requires everyone working in an occupa-
tion to meet a minimum qualification standard and excludes unlicensed 
workers from practicing the occupation. In the United States, licensing 
rules vary widely across states, and states regulate occupations as var-
ied as alarm contractor, auctioneer, manicurist, and massage therapist. 
Economists have long stressed the anticompetitive nature of licensing, 
as incumbents in an occupation try to limit the supply of competitors 
(Kleiner 2006). Although licenses ostensibly offer some assurance to 
consumers that all providers will be of a consistent quality, Kleiner 
finds evidence that licensure plays more of a role in raising prices than 
in assuring quality. In contrast, certification provides information about 
a worker’s skills but does not limit competition from those who lack 
certification. In the United States, certification is lacking in many fields, 
is too narrow and complex in other fields, and is not sufficiently por-
table and well recognized in still others (Wills 1992). In 1994, Congress 
established the National Skill Standards Board (NSSB) to develop a 
system of relevant, rigorous, portable, and well-recognized skill stan-
dards that would guide training and would provide reliable signals to 
worker and employers. Unfortunately, the NSSB was extremely slow to 
develop, rationalize, or recognize useful occupational standards.12 
Given the uncoordinated and opaque approach to occupational 
certification in the United States, it is not surprising that policymakers 
rarely incorporate this dimension into deliberations about the skills of 
American workers. Measures of these skills are not readily available to 
capture changes over time, but occasionally statistical agencies collect 
data on occupational certificates. The Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) provides some information on occupational certi-
fication, but only through schools. According to these data, almost 19 
percent of workers reported earning “a diploma or certificate from a 
vocational, technical, trade, or business school.” Included in this group 
are 7 percent of high school dropouts, 27 percent of high school gradu-
ates with no college, about 38 percent of those with some college but 
no associate’s or bachelor’s degree, 56 percent of those earning an as-
sociate’s degree, and 10 percent of those with a bachelor’s degree. This 
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information suggests the importance of vocational certification for a 
sizable share of workers, especially those with a high school degree 
but no bachelor’s degree. Unfortunately, these data are rarely reported, 
and they probably miss various occupational certifications not granted 
through schools, such as is the case with many apprenticeships. I know 
of no nationally representative data source regularly reporting whether 
an individual holds a license or certification in his or her occupation. 
Workers who complete apprenticeships are often very highly skilled, 
highly trained in a field relevant to the job market, and well paid. Yet 
the limited information on apprenticeships illustrates the weakness of 
measures of the skills of the U.S. workforce. The size of the current 
apprenticeship system is unclear. For the USDOL and its Office of Ap-
prenticeship, the count of apprentices includes only those within the 
“registered” system governed by state or federal apprenticeship coun-
cils. A program becomes registered by submitting the plans for meeting 
the hours of on-the-job training and classroom training required by the 
relevant council. Although not recognized officially by the USDOL, 
some unregistered positions that involve coordinated work-based and 
school-based training may nonetheless be called apprenticeships by 
many workers and firms. Given the different definitions, estimates of 
the number of current apprentices range widely, from 426,000 active 
and registered apprentices (as reported by USDOL in 2006) to 1.5 mil-
lion. The latter figure is based on the number of individuals in the Na-
tional Household Education Survey who reported having participated 
in “a formal program in the 12 months prior to the interview that led to 
journeyman status in a craft or trade.” 
Still another measurement weakness arises because businesses do 
not keep track of the impact of their own investments on the human 
capital of their employees. No doubt employers believe they earn a re-
turn on their investments in training and educating their workers. Like 
investments in physical capital, the dollars spent this year on human 
capital investments yield a flow of added productivity over time. The 
benefits of investments in physical and human capital are not used up 
within the year. For this reason, the full expenditures on this year’s 
physical investments are not counted as costs against current-year rev-
enues. This year’s costs (depreciation) are only the amount of the asset 
used up this year, and the remaining value is recorded as a firm asset. 
Because human capital is not recorded in a similar fashion, firms do not 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   39 2/29/2008   1:42:03 PM
40   Lerman
keep records of human capital investment with the same care or include 
the asset of a highly trained workforce on their balance sheets.
So What?
Clearly, measures of the skills of the U.S. workforce have important 
weaknesses. But does it matter? Would policy development or the in-
terpretation of economic trends change in response to a more thorough 
definition and measure of skills? 
Certainly, the emphasis on reading and math skills looks justified 
by the clear shortfalls in the literacy and basic quantitative abilities of 
the U.S. workforce as measured by the NAAL. Nonetheless, reliance 
almost exclusively on educational attainment, student test scores, and 
limited adult testing pushes policymakers toward an unbalanced ap-
proach, one that tries to improve on the skill indicators we measure 
while ignoring the skills we rarely measure. One gap of particular im-
portance and potential relevance to policy is the lack of any good mea-
sure of occupational skills or qualifications. Contrast this approach with 
the broader measurements and policies of many other countries that 
measure occupational skill certifications and encourage rigorous work-
based learning.13 Although efforts to improve outcomes for students go-
ing through high school make sense, the pessimistic data on dropouts 
raise questions about what and how best to teach students. In particular, 
focusing solely on academic skills and school-based solutions may not 
work as well as a balanced approach that widens the definition of skill 
and offers substantial opportunity for skill development in workplaces 
and other institutions. 
DEMAnDS FOR SkILLS 
By nearly any indicator, the demand for skills has been increas-
ing. To economists, the most convincing evidence is the increase in 
the wage premium paid to college-educated workers over high school–
educated workers and the premium paid to more-experienced workers 
over less-experienced workers (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005). At the 
same time, the rising wage differences within educational and experi-
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ence groups has been interpreted as reflecting an increasing demand for 
unobserved skills. 
Discussions of rising skill demands often take place at a high level 
of abstraction and often ignore differences in occupational demands. 
To sense the importance of occupational demand factors in determining 
skill requirements, consider the job market for PhD physicists, people 
who have mastered science at the highest level. Raising the skills of 
the workforce by encouraging more people to learn enough to become 
physicists would increase the supply in a market with stagnant or de-
clining demand. The 1990s saw substantially more doctorates granted 
than openings for physicists, and expectations are for continued slow 
growth in job openings in this field (BLS 2007). The example of physi-
cists is not meant to dismiss the real increases in the demand for skills in 
the U.S. economy. Instead, it offers a cautionary note that raising skills 
does not always lead to improved jobs. Physicists certainly have the 
talent and capability to earn good wages in other professions, but their 
example and other evidence show that developing skills in fields not in 
demand can lead to frustration, job dissatisfaction, lower wages, and 
not necessarily to more good jobs (Allen and van der Velden 2001). 
On the other hand, some occupations that require occupational 
skills but not significant formal education are in short supply. Even in 
manufacturing, an industry in which employment has declined by 3.4 
million workers over the past 20 years, employers are having trouble 
finding welders and other technically competent workers.14 Electrical 
occupations in the construction industry are fields in demand that re-
quire extensive occupation-specific skills but allow workers with no 
more than a high school diploma to enter training. Skill development 
for these fields takes place both in academic and in workplace settings. 
Moreover, demand for these workers is rising more rapidly than the 
workforce as a whole. In fact, the 2.8 million increase in construction 
jobs over the past two decades has gone largely unnoticed in compari-
son to the drop-off in manufacturing jobs. 
On an aggregate level, the trends in occupations indicate an upgrad-
ing of skills, but one matched by the rise in educational attainment. Of 
the 23 million jobs added between 1992 and 2006, 22 percent were in 
management, business, or financial operations and 31 percent were in 
professional positions. These positions all require skill and consider-
able training, but many of these positions, such as lab technician or 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   41 2/29/2008   1:42:04 PM
42   Lerman
manager of a fast food restaurant, do not require a bachelor’s degree. 
Over the same 14 years, the 14.4 million increase in workers holding 
bachelor’s degrees amounted to almost 60 percent of the net increase in 
the 25-and-older employed population. 
For the future, the projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) provide a starting point. Using three factors—1) projections for 
demand for output by each industry, 2) the composition of occupations 
within industries, and 3) the educational requirements of occupations—
the BLS has projected the educational requirements that would enable 
the economy to fill both the jobs newly created in each occupation and 
the job openings to replace workers expected to leave the occupation. 
The BLS demand projections suggest that of the 19 million new jobs 
that will be created between 2004 and 2014, a bachelor’s degree or 
higher will be required for about 36 percent, some college for 28 per-
cent, and a high school degree or less for 37 percent. Counting replace-
ment demand indicates somewhat lower educational requirements: in-
cluding replacement workers, a bachelor’s degree will be needed for 26 
percent of openings and some college for an additional 28 percent. 
The projections cover more than 700 detailed occupations, and un-
certainty is inherent in such an exercise. One critique argues that the 
projections have systematically understated the growth of skilled oc-
cupations (Bishop and Carter 1991). A second important issue is the 
extent to which skill requirements within occupations are expected 
to change. Another critical set of uncertainties has to do with flex-
ibility and unmeasured skills not captured by the occupational or 
even the educational breakdown. Some education and training gener-
ate skills that can be applied to a variety of occupations. In addition, 
some positions may require a considerable amount of relevant work 
experience, yet existing data do not allow us to determine whether 
past work experience is well or poorly matched to demand. We may 
match workers to broad educational categories yet generate mismatch-
es between skills and specific occupations in demand. These mis-
matches create shortages and missed opportunities, especially when 
the occupations require more than short-term training for the worker 
to perform productively. 
One way to minimize mismatches is to develop close linkages be-
tween education and training systems and employers, so as to glean at 
least some information about employers’ current and future demands. 
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Such linkages take place every day at the community college level, at 
workforce agencies, and occasionally at the undergraduate and gradu-
ate levels of universities, but often the educational realm operates quite 
independently of patterns of employer demand. 
U.S. SkILL DEvELOPMEnT SySTEM
People have long learned skills outside of formal education and 
training institutions (Resnick 1987). Although the vast expansion of ac-
cessible information has reinforced this tendency, formal institutions 
remain important in helping people gain the tools required to judge 
the quality of information and to use it effectively. Indeed, skills are 
likely complementary to the increased information flow of the Internet 
and other new technologies. People with sufficient skills become much 
more valuable because they can take the best advantage of today’s com-
puting and information revolution. 
Although people become educated and learn skills for many rea-
sons, this section focuses on skill development for productive careers. 
A useful way to begin is to classify these skill creation strategies as 
either initial preparation or continuing preparation for careers. It is true 
that some institutions—notably community colleges—provide each of 
these two kinds of skill development, but the distinction is nonetheless 
worth making. 
Schools and Other Skill-Building Organizations
Initial preparation starts in the school system. At least 10 years of 
schooling is the common experience of nearly every American growing 
up in the United States. Spending on the nation’s educational system at 
all levels is nearly $1 trillion, or about 7.5 percent of GDP. As of fall 
2005, enrollment had reached more than 72 million students, of which 
55 million were in elementary and secondary schools and 17 million 
were enrolled in postsecondary schools. Despite high and rising expen-
ditures per student, national reports, public officials, and the general 
public have voiced dissatisfaction with the ability of the educational 
system to help students gain adequate skills. Going back at least to the 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   43 2/29/2008   1:42:04 PM
44   Lerman
1983 report A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform 
and continuing through today, schools have been subject to withering 
critiques. The public has consistently rated public schools at about a C 
level, and its assessment has changed little since the mid-1980s.
Over the past couple of decades, we have witnessed a wide array of 
proposals designed to overcome the perceived weakness of the school 
system. Proposals for school vouchers, charter schools, school decen-
tralization, school-based management, national standards, new math 
and reading curricula, and after-school programs are some of the ideas 
put forward for improving schooling outcomes. The No Child Left Be-
hind (NCLB) Act, enacted in early 2002, is the most recent effort to in-
sure that students acquire proficiency at reading, math, science, writing, 
and other skills. One focus of this law is on holding schools accountable 
for the performance of their students. To determine student progress, 
NCLB mandates an extensive system of annual tests for third- through 
eighth-graders. This level of testing is controversial because of vari-
ous concerns: that state tests do not necessarily offer high standards; 
that excessive, high-stakes testing imposes constraints on the ability 
of teachers to broaden course content; and that schools get little credit 
for students who increase their scores if they are either well below the 
threshold for passing or well above the threshold. So far, the evidence for 
improvements in national reading, math, science, and writing skills in 
the wake of NCLB is mixed. Reading scores barely changed for fourth-, 
eighth-, and twelfth-graders; in fact, twelfth-graders scored worse in 
reading in 2005 than in 1992 (Perie, Grigg, and Dion 2005). In con-
trast, math scores have increased impressively for fourth- and eighth-
graders (Perie, Grigg, and Donahue 2005). Other data comparing high 
school sophomores between 1980 and 2002 also revealed gains in math 
achievement but not in reading (Cahalan et al. 2006). 
Making schools accountable for insuring that most if not all stu-
dents attain basic reading and math skills is appropriate at early grades. 
However, in the higher grades, what is necessary for success in careers 
becomes less clear. More may not always be better, especially if the 
result is that many students fail, become discouraged, and have little 
chance to learn skills more relevant to their potential careers. What we 
know about workplace skills should play a significant role in setting 
benchmarks, but rarely are work-related skills considered worthy of 
teaching and testing. Murnane and Levy (1996) define the academic 
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skills required for a middle-class job as the New Basics. They include 
the abilities to read and do math at the ninth-grade level or higher, to 
solve semistructured problems by forming a hypothesis and testing it, to 
work in groups with persons of diverse backgrounds, to communicate 
effectively, and to use a personal computer for tasks like word pro-
cessing. For many individuals who reach these basic skill levels, the 
marginal gain in academic skills may yield no more benefit—and pos-
sibly less—than would a marginal improvement in other skills. Only a 
modest percentage of workers use many of the academic skills taught in 
late high school and college (Handel 2007). As noted above, Deke and 
Haimson (2006) report that, beyond a certain level, gains in earnings 
depend more on noncognitive than on cognitive skills for most students. 
Certainly, higher math and verbal SAT scores will help students enter 
more selective colleges. But this benefit only accrues to the small share 
of students competing for highly selective colleges. 
For most jobs, the issue is not only the skill qualifications, but also 
the use of those skills. Although advanced math is a critical stepping 
stone for many engineering, scientific, and some social science endeav-
ors, most other college students will probably not take a derivative any-
time in their careers. But it is the continuing use of skills that leads to 
mastery. Students who learn—but make little use of—the tools of trigo-
nometry or calculus are unlikely to retain them for long. 
Indirectly and outside of formal courses, students often develop 
many of the problem-solving and common-sense skills emphasized in 
the SCANS report, as well as the physical, psychological, emotional, 
and social skills highlighted by Eccles and Gootman (2002) as neces-
sary for healthy development of youth. Several of the assets said to 
promote youth development are closely linked to SCANS, including 
conflict resolution skills, the ability to plan and to allocate time, and 
working with others on a team. Other assets involve a sense of personal 
autonomy, efficacy, motivation, realism and optimism, and knowledge 
of vocations. Clubs, sports, internships, part-time jobs, and community 
service work are good places to develop these attributes. In 2002, about 
half of high school sophomores participated in athletics, 22 percent in a 
music activity, and 8 percent in an academic or vocational club. In addi-
tion, nearly 60 percent had worked for pay and 26 percent were working 
at the time of the survey. Sophomores from low-income families had 
somewhat lower activity levels. Although participation in these activi-
Bartik & Houseman.indb   45 2/29/2008   1:42:04 PM
46   Lerman
ties probably helps youth develop, no one measures the acquisition of 
added skill sets. 
Despite the academic tests mandated by NCLB and a growing em-
phasis by states on a strictly academic curriculum, a sizable share of 
students still take vocational courses in high school. Students often 
take a vocational program alongside a strong academic program. Some 
students attend a regional vocational school part-time for vocational 
courses while continuing to take their academic courses at their home 
high schools (Silverberg et al. 2004). Some career and technical educa-
tion (CTE) courses are not occupationally oriented but deal with fam-
ily and consumer education as well as general workforce preparation 
skills, such as basic computer skills and learning about the job market 
(Levesque 2003). The occupational fields vary widely and include such 
diverse fields as business and marketing, health care, computers, food 
service and hospitality, construction, printing, and transportation. Stu-
dents in vocational concentrations (three or more courses in a broad oc-
cupational field) are increasingly taking a solid set of academic courses 
as well.15 But vocational concentrators have declined over time.16 
Conventional high schools sometimes relate to the job market 
through work-based learning that counts for course credit under general 
programs or cooperative education. General work experience involves 
work for course credit that is not connected to a specific occupational 
program pursued in school. Cooperative education allows students to 
earn school credit for work related to an occupational program. Schools 
help place students in jobs that involve supervision by the teacher and 
employer, and employers evaluate students for their work-based learn-
ing and accomplishments. Work for class credit increased, from about 
27 percent of students in 1982 to 32 percent in 1998. 
While vocational education (now called career and technical educa-
tion, or CTE) has declined in importance, alternative approaches, such 
as Career Academies and Tech Prep, have emerged to try to bridge the 
gap between career-focused learning and academic learning. Career 
Academies are high schools organized around an occupational or indus-
try focus, such as finance (22 percent of Career Academies), informa-
tion technology (14 percent), and hospitality and tourism (12 percent). 
The more than 1,588 academies involved in the program try to weave 
related occupational or industrial themes into a college preparatory 
curriculum. Students take two to four classes a year in the academy 
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taught by a common team of teachers, and at least one course is career- 
or occupation-focused. Academies attempt to use applied learning in 
academic courses as well as career-focused courses. They try to form 
partnerships with employers and local colleges. However, work-based 
learning in real jobs is not emphasized, and many students do not expe-
rience long-term internships or jobs. Tech Prep programs build integrat-
ed sequential courses of study involving high school and community 
college programs. Agreements between institutions allow some courses 
taken in high school to count toward a two-year associate’s degree. As 
of 2003, about 1,000 consortia involving high schools and community 
colleges were operating, mostly coordinated by community and techni-
cal colleges and involving at least articulation agreements allowing the 
transfer of high school credits. Tech Prep participation has increased 
substantially, from about 173,000 students in 1993 to more than 1.2 
million in 2001 (Silverberg et al. 2004). But these figures may overstate 
concentrators since some students report being in Tech Prep although 
they have taken only one vocational course that has transferability. 
Skill development in postsecondary education takes place mostly 
through two-year and four-year colleges and universities. Even as un-
dergraduates, about 60 percent of students are in programs with a career 
orientation, such as engineering, accounting or other business fields, 
teaching, and health care. Most of the more than 1 million degrees 
earned every year at schools that provide degrees in less than two years 
are in some occupational specialty. For the 2003–2004 academic year, 
almost 25 percent of these subbaccalaureate degree earners were in the 
health care field. Another 13 percent obtained a degree in a business-
related field, and 15 percent graduated in a computer-related, engineer-
ing-related, or security field. Not all these subbaccalaureate vocational 
students are young. As of 2000, 56 percent were aged 24 or older and 
34 percent were aged 30 or older. Still, younger people recently tran-
sitioning from high school made up more than half of those entering 
associate’s degree or certificate programs. Enrollments in vocational as-
sociate’s degree programs have increased substantially since the 1980s 
but have leveled off in recent years. 
Some students use for-profit proprietary vocational schools, such 
as the Coastal Truck Driving School in New Orleans, for their career-
focused education and training. Although national data on enrollments 
and numbers of schools are limited, there is considerable evidence that 
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millions of students enroll in proprietary vocational schools (Cellini 
2006). The occupational and industry programs operating in proprietary 
schools are often similar to programs at community colleges. 
Another route to obtaining skills is through job training, which is 
financed by several federal government agencies as well as state gov-
ernments and private foundations. These training programs offer initial 
preparation for the workforce as well as retraining of adult workers. 
Usually, the goal is to help specific groups, including at-risk youth, dis-
placed workers (especially those who have lost their jobs because of 
imports), workers with some kind of disability, senior citizens, migrants 
and farm workers, and workers who have been on welfare programs. 
Among the USDOL programs are dislocated worker, adult, and youth 
programs under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), the Job Corps, 
Trade Adjustment Assistance, and veterans’ programs. Other examples 
of job training programs with federal funding include YouthBuild, a 
program providing construction work experience and training to at-risk 
youth; and vocational rehabilitation grants to provide training to recipi-
ents of Food Stamps and of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). The administration, oversight, and operation of these programs 
vary. WIA provides money to state and local entities which, in turn, 
set up One-Stop centers that provide employment placement services 
and contract for training with various providers, including community 
nonprofits or larger organizations, such as STRIVE and Goodwill In-
dustries. In contrast, Jobs Corps is managed by the federal government, 
which awards competitive contracts to companies to operate Job Corps 
centers. Often, funds provided through federal job training programs 
pay for courses at community colleges or other established educational 
institutions. 
Although the number of these programs is large, their scale is rela-
tively small. According to estimates developed by Mikelson and Night-
ingale (2004), federal outlays for training provided by USDOL and 
other federal departments amounted to no more than about $5 billion in 
2003. Counting state job training programs adds only about $500 mil-
lion to the total. While these figures use a somewhat narrow definition 
of training and skill-building, the dollar allocation to training is very 
small—even under a more expansive concept of training—when com-
pared to the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on education-oriented 
programs. 
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Often overlooked when surveying education and training institu-
tions in the United States is the U.S. military. The Armed Forces is 
arguably the largest training organization in the United States (Hansen 
1994; Laurence 1994). The military trains tens of thousands of military 
personnel in such fields as health care, electronics mechanic, auto re-
pair, and trucking. Trainees learn skills that apply to their current em-
ployer (the military), but in many cases the occupational competencies 
learned have civilian applications too. However, some skilled workers 
exiting the military face certification and licensure problems in trans-
ferring their skills (Congressional Commission 1998). Although the 
military is an innovator in the job training field, the dissemination of 
military training approaches to the civilian economy remains limited. 
Of special interest but rarely studied are the training approaches used 
by the military in Project 100,000, launched in 1966, and in other initia-
tives to educate and train entrants allowed into the military despite their 
subpar qualifications (Sticht et al. 1987). 
Some training takes place in prisons, but the quality and magnitude 
is uncertain and varies across states. Although many offenders are in 
great need of employment assistance, few prisoners receive employ-
ment-related training (Solomon et al. 2006). While one-quarter of pris-
oners released from Maryland and Virginia had taken part in vocational 
training, only 6 percent of New Jersey prisoners had, and only 1 percent 
of Georgia prisoners had. Many more participate in work-related activ-
ity, but only a modest effort goes into teaching work-related skills such 
as SCANS skills.
Outside the educational system, the largest amount of training takes 
place through employers in formal workplace programs and in informal, 
on-the-job training (OJT). In the late 1990s, over 70 percent of employ-
ers provided workers with some amount of formal training (Lerman, 
McKernan, and Riegg 2004). Although estimates vary, between 35 and 
65 percent of workers received some formal training. 
About 15 percent of workers participate in training for a full two 
weeks. Nearly all workers receive some informal training as well, in-
cluding 95 percent of workers in firms with 50 or more employees. The 
training varies from a few days of instruction to several years of inten-
sive apprenticeship training. In 1997, 82 percent of employers reported 
offering to reimburse workers for tuition for approved courses, includ-
ing 69 percent who said they extended the offer to front-line workers. 
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Although only a minority of workers use tuition subsidies in a given 
year, 53 percent of adults enrolled in postsecondary degree programs 
received employer support from a tuition subsidy or paid leave. In 
2001, employers apparently provided 30 hours of training for the aver-
age worker, mainly through for-credit courses or other courses. Outlays 
for employer-sponsored training are estimated to reach at least $60 bil-
lion a year. The training is rarely intensive enough to prepare workers 
for specific occupational careers, but it usually upgrades the skills of 
existing workers. 
ASSESSInG THE SkILL-BUILDInG SySTEM  
To evaluate the system’s effectiveness, one must answer three 
questions: 
 1)  Does the system increase skills? 
 2)  Do the added skills help workers increase productivity and 
earnings in the labor market? 
 3)  Is the system cost-effective—does it generate high rates of 
return? 
Even with excellent data and research, the questions are difficult 
to answer definitively. First, there is the counterfactual question—this 
system or system component compared to what set of alternatives? Sec-
ond, benefits for individual workers and firms may not translate into 
gains for society as a whole. Third, the system may function well for 
some groups but not for others. 
From the standpoint of overall productivity, the results of the U.S. 
training system look reasonable and, according to Lewis (2004), do not 
constrain U.S. productivity levels. Notwithstanding the conventional 
view of the ostensibly poor skills of the U.S. workforce, Lewis reviews 
comparative studies done by McKinsey Global Institute on many indus-
tries and finds that “the U.S. workforce achieved higher labor produc-
tivity than anyplace on earth” (p. 244). 
Yet from the standpoint of high U.S. wage inequality and a weak 
job market for less-educated American workers, the U.S. system has 
much room for improvement. Many workers are in low-paying and low-
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skilled positions, while businesses have trouble hiring U.S. workers for 
many well-paying jobs, whether as welders or computer scientists, be-
cause there are not enough of them. Other workers learn skills for jobs 
not in high demand. Still others lack basic academic, noncognitive, and 
occupational skills to qualify for good jobs. 
Earnings Outcomes and Skill Development from Schools and 
School-Linked Programs 
So which parts of the skill-building system are sound, and which 
parts are in need of significant improvement? Although many in this 
country are dissatisfied with the academic outcomes of students in the 
K-12 education system, judging the effectiveness of the $500-billion-
plus outlays is difficult. Some observers base their assessment on com-
parisons of academic competencies and costs in the United States and 
other countries. Others point to the high share of minority and low-in-
come students who perform poorly on tests of academic performance 
in reading, math, science, and writing. As noted above, U.S. students 
perform at about the OECD average; still, about one in four cannot 
reach basic levels of proficiency in math, reading, writing, and science, 
as defined by the NAEP. In 2003, about 1.1 million families were suffi-
ciently dissatisfied with the public and private school options available 
to them that they turned to homeschooling.17 
Education experts have developed measures of school performance 
and academic achievement, but the relationship between these indica-
tors and job market outcomes is unclear. On one hand, more education is 
associated with higher earnings; moreover, there is strong evidence that 
added schooling is the cause of the earnings gains. The rate of return on 
completing high school is over 13 percent and the return on completing 
college averages about 10 percent. These returns suggest a real payoff 
from schooling, indicating that schools must be doing something right. 
On the other hand, impacts vary widely across students. As many as one 
in four students leave school before completing high school. Although 
the size of the high school dropout problem is uncertain, nearly half of 
the dropouts attribute their leaving school to boredom and lack of in-
terest in classes. Moreover, employers report great dissatisfaction with 
the quality of high school graduates. Manufacturing firms report that 
60 percent of applicants that have a high school diploma or GED are 
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poorly prepared for the typical entry job in the firm (Deloitte Consulting 
2005). At the college level, the risks of wage volatility or of having a 
low return on one’s education are high enough to reduce college com-
pletion. Finally, observed rates of return to completing high school and 
college do not reveal whether alternative approaches might improve 
earnings and occupational outcomes. 
One argument for career and technical education (CTE) is that some 
students may remain engaged in school and earn more in the job mar-
ket from a career-focused approach to learning. It is well known that 
high school CTE in the United States varies in intensity, quality, and 
interaction with employers. But, in an extensive review of overall ef-
fectiveness, Silverberg et al. (2004) find that a higher share of voca-
tional courses raises earnings, at least in the short run and the medium 
run. Another recent study, Bishop and Mane (2004), estimates that tak-
ing four advanced CTE courses instead of two academic courses and 
one personal interest course led to substantial gains in employment and 
earnings about eight years after normal high school graduation. The 
gains were higher than average for vocational students among at-risk 
and minority students and in groups taking the New Basics academic 
curriculum. Work-based learning through cooperative education added 
to the earnings effects. Bishop and Mane (2003) find that employer in-
volvement, such as employer-school partnerships, raises earnings, re-
duces unemployment, and leads to higher rates of students holding jobs. 
Even students with low grades do better in the labor market as a result 
of these partnerships. In fact, employer-school partnerships appear to 
raise the share of students graduating on time and of those earning a 
high school diploma instead of a GED.18 
Other indications of the effectiveness of career-focused education 
come from a major evaluation of Career Academies (Kemple 2004). 
The evaluation involves a social experiment in eight cities, in which 
Career Academy applicants are randomly assigned either to the Career 
Academy or to the regular school. The impact analysis reveals that the 
academies generate an 18 percent earnings gain for young men (com-
pared to those who applied to Career Academies but were not allowed 
into the program and were instead assigned to a regular school) but 
no change in earnings among young women. Moreover, the earnings 
gains are concentrated among students with a high or medium risk of 
dropping out of high school. For this group, Career Academies generate 
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as much growth in earnings as would accrue from two to three years 
of added education. The improved outcomes may be due to the small 
and closely linked learning community or to the occupation or industry 
that is the focus of the education. It is still too early to determine the 
sustainability of the career academy model, especially as regards its 
ability to develop and maintain close links with businesses and other 
employers.19 
Turning to community colleges, we find that a recent review (Sil-
verberg et al. 2004) reports that, for men, a year in a vocational pro-
gram raises earnings by almost 8 percent over no education beyond 
high school. No gains in earnings accrue to men with a year of aca-
demic college work or even an academic associate’s degree. However, 
earnings jump by 30 percent for men who have completed a vocational 
associate’s degree. Women who have taken postsecondary academic 
courses do better in earnings even when not completing a certificate or 
degree than women with no postsecondary vocational courses: a year of 
community college education raises their earnings by 16 percent (over 
a high school degree only) when they take an academic curriculum 
but has no effect when they take a vocational curriculum. On the other 
hand, women who complete associate’s degrees do better with a voca-
tional than with an academic concentration (a 47-percent earnings gain 
versus 40 percent for those earning an academic associate’s degree). 
Estimates of the impacts of career-focused, proprietary schools are 
rare in the literature. According to one evaluation (Washington State 
Workforce Training 2004), most proprietary school students report that 
they learn a lot (66 percent), and 96 percent of employers are very or 
mostly satisfied with the training these students receive. On the other 
hand, attendees of private career schools did not achieve statistically 
significant gains in earnings over a comparison group with similar 
characteristics who registered with the state employment service. And 
while completers of these career school programs raised their employ-
ment by 8 percent and their earnings by $373 a quarter, the gains were 
much smaller than among participants in community college programs. 
However, unobserved differences in the student populations might 
account for the weak performance of proprietary schools. Nearly 80 
percent of proprietary school students receive a federal postsecondary 
grant or loan, which implies that low-income individuals often attend 
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these schools. Despite substantial government spending on proprietary 
schools, the evaluative evidence concerning their impact is meager. 
Another way in which the education system interacts with the 
world of work is through internships, co-op programs, and apprentice-
ships. Few students participate in intensive, career-focused programs 
with substantial amounts of work-based learning (Haimson and Bel-
lotti 2001).20 One study of the early experience of minority high school 
students finds high participation in career majors: 30 to 40 percent of 
students who were in or just completing twelfth grade were taking these 
majors as of 1998 (Rivera-Batiz 2003). The study estimates that partici-
pation in a school-to-work activity increased course work in math and 
science in high schools, along with hours worked, and that it reduced 
the likelihood of dropping out of high school. 
A recent study finds that job shadowing, mentoring, cooperative ed-
ucation, and internships boost participation in postsecondary education 
for women and (except for internships) for men as well (Neumark and 
Rothstein 2005). However, the gains in earnings from these activities 
are largely limited to men. For men unlikely to attend college, coopera-
tive education, school enterprises, and internship or apprenticeship in-
crease employment and lower the share of youth who are idle after high 
school. Women unlikely to attend college also achieve earnings gains 
from the internship or apprenticeship components. 
Youth apprenticeships go beyond school internships by providing 
in-depth, work-based learning combined with related course work. 
Though youth apprenticeships constitute the most intensive form of ca-
reer-focused education and training, youth apprenticeships and other 
(including certified) apprenticeships have been the least-studied major 
intervention. Despite the widespread, long-term use of apprenticeships 
in some countries and their resurgence in others (Leitch Commission 
2006; Steedman 2005), few studies have examined how entering and 
completing apprenticeships in the United States affects educational and 
job market outcomes. One analysis followed high school students who 
participated in a Wisconsin youth apprenticeship in printing and found 
that participant earnings levels were substantially above expected earn-
ings for similar youth (Orr 1995). 
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Effects of Job Training 
The most rigorous evaluations cover the least expensive parts of 
the skill development system—government-sponsored job training for 
low-income workers. Unlike education and training offered through the 
school system and employers, government-sponsored job training pro-
grams generally serve low-income, low-skilled workers who have lim-
ited skills and, often, other barriers to career success. Two large, highly 
cited studies are the evaluations of the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA) and the Job Corps. Each used a social experiment in which ap-
plicants were randomly assigned either to have access to that particular 
job training program or to have no access. The administrative approach 
to the two programs differed markedly. JTPA was highly decentralized 
(as is its successor, WIA), whereas the federal government contracts 
directly with Job Corps providers, resulting in a more uniform program. 
The JTPA evaluation involved 16 independent, diverse sites drawn from 
hundreds of locally managed programs. JTPA participants typically ob-
tain some classroom training in basic and occupation-specific skills, as 
well as on-the-job training and job search assistance. The Job Corps 
provides longer and more intensive educational and occupational-skills 
training, usually in a residential environment where participants have 
access to health care and other services. 
The impacts of these programs are usually reported separately for 
youth and adults and for men and women. In the adult JTPA programs, 
the evidence shows that both adult men and adult women who are given 
access to JTPA earn more than the control group in the years after as-
signment to JTPA. Although the modest gains for both groups of adults 
(around 5 percent of earnings) were large enough to justify the pro-
gram’s modest costs, they were not sufficient to achieve a substantially 
improved job market outcome. Moreover, it is unclear how much addi-
tional skill the programs generated. The JPTA interventions did little or 
nothing to raise the earnings of youth participants (Carneiro and Heck-
man 2003, pp. 322–323; Orr et al. 1996). 
Given the high cost per participant for those in Job Corps, the pro-
gram must raise earnings substantially to achieve an adequate rate of 
return. Initially, the evaluation found sizable earnings increases which, 
when projected forward, indicated that the program’s social benefits 
exceeded its costs. However, further analysis based on administrative 
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data through 2001 (almost three years beyond the earlier follow-up) 
documented a rapid erosion of Job Corps earnings gains after the four-
year follow-up and a likely overstatement of earlier earnings gains 
because of differential attrition (Schochet, McConnell, and Burghardt 
2003). For the full sample, earnings gains from Job Corps had eroded 
completely soon after the 48-month follow-up. The sharp reduction in 
medium-term and long-term earnings gains meant that projected social 
benefits per participant were more than $10,000 (in 1995 prices) below 
social costs. Some groups of participants, such as young people enter-
ing their early 20s, sustained their earnings gains, but others (Hispanics 
and those with an arrest record containing serious offenses) did worse 
than their counterparts in the control group. The disappointing results 
are in some ways surprising, since Job Corps participants obtained suf-
ficient education and training to increase their attainment of GEDs and 
vocational certificates. 
Space does not permit a review of the evidence concerning many 
other government job training programs. Some have attained modest 
gains for participants, especially by increasing employment levels, but 
none are considered major successes. A meta-analysis of 31 evaluations 
of government-funded training programs for the disadvantaged found 
that annual earnings gains were about $1,400 (1999 dollars) for adult 
women, $300 for adult men, and zero or negative for youth (Greenberg, 
Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003). 
Turning to employer-led training, we find wide variations in depth, 
purpose, and coverage of workers. Some training is brief and involves 
introducing workers to operations (such as a computer system or a tele-
phone system), to safety aspects of the job, and to organizational goals. 
Other training aims at raising the basic skills of workers and their capa-
bility to implement new technologies or organizational methods. Some 
elaborate and intensive training takes place through apprenticeships, 
which combine three to four years of learning on the job with substan-
tial course work. Nearly always, employer-led training occurs in the 
context of a work environment; indeed, that is one reason for its greater 
effectiveness in using contextualized learning (Resnick 1987)—for ex-
ample, by teaching basic skills using materials that working students 
use on a daily basis. 
Employer-led training is generally viewed as achieving high returns 
and skill development. Some estimates may overstate the true impacts 
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because those who take the training are drawn from a more capable 
group of workers than those who do not take training.21 On the other 
hand, those who need more training to do a good job could be drawn 
from a less capable group. Although training affects employers as well 
as workers, the most straightforward way to measure its effects is to 
examine impacts on earnings of workers. We look first at apprentice-
ship training, where the evidence indicates significant gains for par-
ticipants (Cook 1989). Researchers from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research found that the gains associated with apprentice-
ship training in Washington were substantial two to three years after 
participants had left the program (Washington State Workforce Train-
ing 2004): those completing apprenticeships earned nearly $4,300 more 
per quarter than the primary comparison group. These earnings gains 
are nearly three times the comparably estimated gains for those gradu-
ating with vocational degrees from community colleges, relative to the 
comparison group. 
Broader studies indicate private-sector training yields modest gains 
in wage rates but very high rates of return on the typical training per-
formed. One recent study (Frazis and Loewenstein 2005) finds that 60 
hours of training increases wage rates by about 5 percent but has rates 
of return on an annualized basis of at least 40–50 percent. Employers 
finance 96 percent of formal company training, but they also fund 42 
percent of training in the category involving business-school, appren-
ticeship, vocational or technical institute, and correspondence-course 
training (Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998). Firms certainly gain some of 
the benefit from training, but how much is not well understood. 
A great deal of skill development takes place informally on the job 
as workers gain expertise in their occupations and industries (Sullivan 
2006). For workers, the wage gains from occupation-specific experi-
ence are especially high in craft occupations, whereas for managers 
high returns occur for industry-specific experience. Professionals gain 
significantly from both types of experience. These wage gains provide 
confirming evidence of the importance of skill development through 
contextualized learning and communities of practice. Such situations 
offer workers in the same field the chance to share their understanding 
of how to be effective. 
The significance of occupation-based and industry-based training 
and work experience is becoming increasingly recognized in founda-
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tion-supported and publicly sponsored job training for low-income 
workers. Under “sectoral strategies,” programs target an industry (or 
a subset of an industry), become a strategic partner of the industry by 
learning about the factors shaping the industry’s workforce policies, 
reach out to low-income job seekers, and work with other labor market 
groups, such as community colleges, community nonprofits, employer 
groups, and policymakers. Nonexperimental evidence indicates that the 
six sectoral programs taking part in the Sectoral Employment Develop-
ment Learning Project (SEDLP) have yielded impressive results but 
without a control group (Blair 2002). Earnings jumped by 73 percent 
in two years for the 95 percent of participants employed for those two 
years. Although most of the gains came from higher work levels, wage 
rates increased by 23 percent. Moreover, two years after training, 69 
percent of participants were employed in occupations related to their 
training. The focused nature of the training, the linkages with employ-
ers, the development of pathways for entry level workers to advance, 
and the expertise gained by the training organizations probably all have 
contributed to the apparent success of the sectoral strategy approach. 
Learning from What Works Best
Although education and training yield mixed results when it comes 
to acquiring skills related to higher earnings, several lessons emerge 
from a review of the evidence. First, the education system, which spends 
nearly all of the money allocated to skill development, generates good 
but variable returns. Students typically learn basic academic skills that 
are critical for the vast majority of jobs and that yield high returns. At 
high levels of education, the system becomes more heterogeneous and 
the returns become more variable. The variations become pronounced 
throughout high school and postsecondary education. About 24 percent 
of all entering students and perhaps 40–50 percent of disadvantaged 
students (Warren and Halpern-Manners 2007) fail to complete high 
school despite free access to schooling. Thus, the cost of trying to edu-
cate these students is high but the returns are low. Other students gain 
more than the average student does from high school by completing 
vocationally oriented classes and by participating in school programs 
related to an industry or an occupation. Rates of return for college dif-
fer markedly between those not currently completing college and those 
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who are new college graduates. Thus, expanding access to higher edu-
cation involves high added spending, but it may not increase earnings 
for students who learn little of relevance to their careers or who do not 
complete high school or college.
Second, education and training programs work well in having stu-
dents learn and retain skills when the instruction uses hands-on or proj-
ect-based learning, often in a work context. Integrating training with 
employers or employer organizations is typically beneficial as well. 
Third, the modest outlays on public job-training programs for the dis-
advantaged yield varying returns but rarely achieve significant earnings 
gains. Fourth, employer-sponsored training generates high rates of re-
turn, but the dollar amount of increased earnings is often low because 
employer training is usually short-term. Fifth, among the most success-
ful programs are those that build occupation-specific skills in collabo-
ration with employers, unions, or other organizations and that involve 
considerable learning at the workplace. 
Despite the apparent benefits of emphasizing contextualized learn-
ing, close employer linkages, a broad array of skills, and a career fo-
cus, outlays for this approach to skill-building are minimal in compari-
son with spending on traditional K-12 schools and four-year colleges. 
While U.S. schools, government training programs, and firms spend 
about $1 trillion a year on education and training, we are starving the 
programs that use highly effective strategies and meet the needs of most 
future workers. 
DIRECTIOnS FOR THE FUTURE
Doing better in building skills for good jobs requires improvements 
on many fronts. This section proposes a few steps aimed at raising the 
skills and qualifications of current and future workers. Notwithstanding 
the importance of investing more in prekindergarten learning to achieve 
increased skills, I do not cover this area.22 This section makes two sug-
gestions for upgrading the skills of the workforce, beginning with skill 
preparation during the high-school and the immediate post–high school 
periods. These periods form a critical time for skill-building: students 
learning skills at an early age have low foregone earnings, can afford to 
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accept a lower training wage, can reap a long payoff, and can increase 
their ability to absorb future education and training. Providing students 
with a variety of skill-building options may reduce their likelihood of 
dropping out of high school and cause fewer to resort to job training 
programs for low-wage workers. Many of these programs have proven 
to have only modest success. 
Reform the Way High Schools Prepare Future Workers
Concerns about the weaknesses of American high schools and calls 
for major reforms are increasingly widespread (Gates 2005). Although 
few would quibble with Bill Gates’ assertion that “all students can and 
should graduate from high school ready for college, work, and citizen-
ship,” tensions arise when it comes to making the means to that end 
more concrete. To many, the statement’s implicit goal is to prepare all 
students for college. This is clear from the effort to require that all stu-
dents take academic courses that meet college requirements. And while 
the prerequisites for college are well known and broadly similar, there 
is little discussion or analysis of what is meant by “ready for work.” We 
can assume that work readiness means more than the ability to find a 
low-wage job. But even subtituting the phrase “ready for a rewarding 
career” leaves open what should be the appropriate courses and other 
potential activities, such as workplace learning, undertaken by students. 
Education and political leaders seem to view “ready for work” as im-
plying that students should complete a college-preparatory academic 
course, under the assumption that students will learn occupational and 
other workplace skills on the job or in community colleges (Achieve and 
National Governors Association 2005). Indeed, the agenda sponsored 
by the National Governors Association makes no distinction between 
the requirements for work and those for college. The report does little 
to document why these courses should be universal requirements for 
students in order for them to become ready for work. At the same time, 
the report ignores many skills that have been documented by SCANS 
and other projects as necessary for career success. 
Another useful distinction is between the knowledge and skills all 
students should master and those that are particular to college prepara-
tion. While more learning is desirable, not every content standard in 
literature, math, science, and social science is necessary for students 
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to be well prepared for work or even a productive career. Consider, for 
example, the California English content standards for grades 11 and 12 
that require students to be able to analyze “the ways poets use imagery, 
personification, figures of speech, and sounds to evoke readers’ emo-
tions” and “the ways authors have used archetypes drawn from myth 
and tradition in literature, film, political speeches, and religious writ-
ings” (California State Board of Education 2007). Although such skills 
are desirable in themselves, there are tradeoffs in the use of student 
time. Forcing these content standards on all graduates may limit stu-
dents from taking courses more helpful to their careers and, at worst, 
may worsen the dropout problem (Warren and Corl 2007). Nearly all 
careers involve some mastery of reading comprehension, writing, and 
math, but some state standards go far beyond actual career require-
ments. Whatever the standards, many students learn and retain informa-
tion best through contextualized instruction and by applying the skills 
to school-based projects or to a work context (Resnick 1987; Packer 
2006). Whereas schools emphasize individual instruction unaided by 
tools, cognitive social scientists point out the importance of learning 
in groups and of making use of tools; whereas schools stress symbol 
manipulation, cognitive scientists point to contextualized reasoning; 
and whereas schools focus on generalized learning, cognitive scientists 
favor situation-specific competencies.
What, then, are sensible high school reforms that can create a better- 
qualified workforce? Let’s first recognize the diversity of student inter-
ests and abilities, of skills required in the workplace, of career aspira-
tions, and of career outlets. One way of making more students “ready 
for work” is to permit students to focus on attaining occupational quali-
fications at recognized standards that incorporate academic, occupa-
tional, and other workplace skills. High school students would have the 
chance to combine school-based instruction with well-structured work-
based learning in a program that leads to an occupational certification 
and entry into postprogram training. Students would learn discipline 
with regard to work and would make practical use of their reading, writ-
ing, math, and science skills in the context of achieving a demanding 
occupational standard. Of the 47 percent of dropouts who leave school 
because they find classes uninteresting, many could be highly engaged 
in a program that provides learning at work, pay, and an occupational 
certification. 
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This approach of utilizing workplaces as learning locations can be 
linked to several strands of research and analysis. It builds on evidence 
of the importance of occupational skills and other noncognitive skills, 
as described in SCANS. It is consistent with evidence on the effective-
ness of sectoral approaches and of employer-based training, including 
on-the-job training. It offers good options for meeting such youth de-
velopment goals as personal autonomy and efficacy, motivation, real-
ism and optimism, and knowledge of vocations. It helps link the supply 
mix of skills to the composition of demands by employers. Evidence 
from other countries shows that the model helps students develop an 
occupational identity, a professional ethic, and self-esteem based on ac-
complishment (Rauner 2007). 
A common argument against a career-oriented approach is that the 
mix of jobs changes so frequently that occupational skills easily become 
outmoded. In contrast, academic skills are said to apply broadly and 
make future workers more adaptable. In fact, many of the occupational 
and SCANS skills are as likely to provide flexibility as academic skills 
are. Skills erode at least as much from disuse as from the dying out of 
occupations. Well-developed, career-focused programs that emphasize 
project-based learning and allow students to use what they learn in the 
workplace will do as much or more to help students retain skills as tra-
ditional academic classes. 
One initiative that combines high standards, project-based learning, 
and an occupational focus is Project Lead the Way (PLTW). It offers 
engineering and biomedical science curricula to high school students 
in more than 1,500 schools, often through CTE programs. The PLTW 
program emphasizes project-based learning and the application of math 
and science to subjects like electronics, civil engineering, and architec-
ture. PLTW is also noteworthy for incorporating noncognitive skills, 
such as working in and leading a team; public speaking; listening; 
and managing time, resources and projects. While the PLTW option is 
broadly available to schools, those that have adopted the program have 
largely been CTE programs. A charter school movement, High Tech 
Schools, is trying to place technology and preengineering throughout 
the curriculum. Started in San Diego but expanding to other areas, the 
program incorporates work-based learning through a 100-hour intern-
ship, project-based goals, and the building of student portfolios. 
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Career Academy and Tech Prep programs also offer starting points 
for expanding occupational skills and noncognitive workplace skills. 
However, the occupational learning takes place almost entirely in school 
settings. Both programs would benefit if they included a larger work-
based component that involved standards for achieving skills and close 
cooperation with employers and industry associations. Some students 
should be able to gain a recognized initial occupational qualification 
which they can build on as they acquire work experience in the oc-
cupation. Already, the two programs allow early entry into community 
college courses. Certainly, these and other programs should keep better 
track of their students’ achievement of SCANS skills and of occupa-
tional qualifications. 
These examples offer ways of expanding the learning approaches 
to enhance the skills of high school students. To diffuse the approaches 
across a wide variety of schools, state standards should incorporate 
SCANS skills and states should take steps to encourage instead of dis-
courage the development of career-focused qualifications linked with 
real careers. One barrier to recognizing these skills is the disparate na-
ture of occupational skill qualifications. As noted above, states typically 
have a plethora of standards for certification and licensing requirements, 
often influenced by current members of the occupation (Kleiner 2006). 
Although the National Skill Standards Board was unable to make these 
standards more coherent during its existence from 1994 to 2003, it is 
time for another try. The federal government should support states in-
terested in developing models for judging outcomes based on SCANS 
and a streamlined set of occupational qualifications. Once sound stan-
dards are in place and schools see themselves and their students being 
judged on the basis of these broader competencies, they may be more 
receptive to approaches that build on these skills. 
Expanding valuable Skills of Adults 
Public and private activities to increase job-related skills are in-
creasingly turning to employer-led or employer-linked training initia-
tives. Both foundations and the USDOL have sponsored sectoral strate-
gies that focus planning, recruitment, and operations on the skill re-
quirements of employers in specific industry sectors (Blair 2002). The 
USDOL is sponsoring the industry-focused High Growth Jobs Training 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   63 2/29/2008   1:42:05 PM
64   Lerman
Initiative for projects that involve coalitions of employers and training 
organizations. Both initiatives select a sector or group of sectors, create 
coalitions, assess the skill requirements for existing positions, project 
the skills required to upgrade jobs, recruit and target potential train-
ees, develop training modules, and obtain a mix of public and private 
funding. Often, the workers who receive training come from groups 
targeted under USDOL-sponsored training programs, such as disadvan-
taged youth, dislocated workers, veterans, and individuals with basic 
skill deficiencies. Participating firms often include some of their current 
(incumbent) workers. The focus on industry needs and close linkages 
with employers are sound principles and have led to some effective 
programs that train workers to improve their jobs and earnings. So far, 
the programs are ad hoc arrangements and not a systemic part of the 
landscape. The training is usually short-term in nature and only occa-
sionally leads to a recognized qualification. While the programs should 
be encouraged, the long-term goal should be to develop a large-scale, 
more intense, sustainable skill-building system using these principles. 
In fact, we already have such a system—apprenticeship, which 
provides demand-driven, long-term training to potential workers. This 
system generates high skills for participants, involves extensive work-
based learning, requires little or no foregone earnings on the part of 
participants, and fills positions that are in demand, and have job lad-
ders and long-term options. It can promote productivity and can better 
the life chances of workers (Steedman, Gospel, and Ryan 1998). Ap-
prenticeship programs teach both academic subjects in classrooms and 
applications in the workplace—the latter in the context of the tasks, 
problem solving, and social interactions of the occupation. The learner 
can draw on help from experienced adults and from peers trying to suc-
ceed in the same career. The entry requirements vary, but some require 
only a high school diploma. Though such apprenticeship programs are 
not well known to many public officials and policymakers, the number 
of apprentices at least matches the number of participants in public job-
training programs and exceeds the number receiving intensive, long-
term training. Yet the federal budget for the Office of Apprenticeship 
(OA) is only $20 million, an amount that must cover the national of-
fice and all of the individuals in regions around the country who are 
monitoring such programs and helping to promote apprenticeship. The 
government provides no direct funds to help finance the training and 
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conducts virtually no research and little monitoring of many aspects of 
the apprenticeship programs. In recent years, OA has funded industry 
efforts to establish apprenticeships in nontraditional sectors, including 
nursing, information technology, geospatial technology, advanced man-
ufacturing, and maritime occupations. 
An expansion of apprenticeship training would certainly increase 
the nation’s stock of usable skills and substantially raise the earnings 
of participants. Although the pool of apprenticeships depends mostly 
on employers, apprenticeship activity is likely to increase in response 
to an investment by the USDOL. Tripling the current budget, which 
would cost only $40 million, could go a long way toward expanding 
outreach and technical assistance to stimulate more employers to offer 
apprenticeships, toward funding development and marketing of new ap-
prenticable occupations, toward coordinating skill requirements across 
programs in the same occupations, and toward conducting research and 
analysis. If the expanded funding generated a 2–3 percent increase in 
apprentices, it would more than pay for itself. Ideally, apprenticeship 
programs should work closely with high schools to provide immediate 
outlets for graduates. These steps could well encourage more students 
to complete high school and to gain sufficient academic competencies 
to qualify for the new opportunities. 
Expanding apprenticeships is likely to be a highly cost-effective 
method for skill-building in high-demand occupations and for raising 
productivity and earnings at intermediate levels of the job distribution. 
Apprenticeships vary widely, but their social cost is very low in com-
parison to college. Foregone earnings (and foregone output) are low or 
zero, depending on the alternative job available to the apprentice. The 
classroom instruction costs about as much as 1–2 years in a community 
college program, or a total of about $20,000. In comparison, the real 
costs of a four-year degree, some of which are borne by students and 
some by the government, are in the range of $180,000 (about $25,000 a 
year for tuition and expenses and $20,000 a year in foregone earnings). 
Although no definitive analysis has estimated the returns to appren-
tices (over, say, high school graduates with no other certification), the 
evidence from the state of Washington indicates earnings gains in the 
range of $15,000–17,000 a year. If this figure could be confirmed, the 
cost-effectiveness of adding apprentices would almost certainly exceed 
the social returns to adding college students, especially since two-thirds 
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of community college participants do not complete a degree within four 
years and about 45 percent of entrants to four-year programs fail to ob-
tain a degree within six years.  
Apprenticeships are expanding in many European countries, where 
they play a major role in developing skills for a wide variety of careers 
(Steedman 2005). The Leitch Review of Skills (2006) in the United 
Kingdom recently recommended expanding the number of apprentice-
ships to 500,000 for that country. In the United States, achieving the 
same proportion of apprentices in the population would require a four-
fold increase in apprenticeships, to about 2.3 million. 
Alter Accounting Practices to Count Some Skill Development  
as Investment
Managers often proclaim that the skills and commitment of their 
employees are their companies’ most precious assets. At the same time, 
they commonly admit that they can only manage what they can measure. 
These statements have consequences for human capital investment by 
private firms and, in turn, for the skills of the U.S. workforce. As noted 
above, productive investments in building the skills of a company’s 
workforce count as current costs to firms and ultimately as consumption 
in national income accounts.23 When companies invest in capital goods 
and plants, only a modest portion of the purchase counts as current-year 
costs in determining profits. The remaining value is counted as an as-
set on the company’s balance sheet. In contrast, all of the spending on 
skill development counts as a cost in the current year, despite the reality 
that the company will gain benefits from these expenses over a period 
of years. 
For tax purposes, it is advantageous to count training costs as ex-
penses in the year they are incurred. However, this accounting treatment 
distorts the profitability of training investments relative to investments 
in capital, which firms depreciate over time. If investments in training 
were treated more in line with economic reality for measuring profits 
and assets (but not for tax purposes), the contributions of training in-
vestments might be measured more precisely and the benefits would 
become more apparent. Firms might then undertake considerably more 
training and increase the skills of their workforces. Employer training 
appears to yield high returns to workers as well as to firms. Thus, any 
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measure that increases the incentive for companies to increase spending 
on training could raise the useful skills of the U.S. workforce substan-
tially. If businesses increased their training outlays by only 1 percent 
of wages and salaries, the added investments in human capital would 
amount to more than $60 billion a year, or about double the entire edu-
cation-related expenditures by all community colleges in the United 
States. Of course, the impact of accounting changes might be much 
smaller, but it is plausible to expect added training outlays in the bil-
lions of dollars. 
One potential objection comes from the problem of how to measure 
the benefit to firms of two factors: 1) added worker capabilities and 
2) the duration of these benefits. Another worry is that companies will 
overstate their training outlays relative to other labor costs. Such shifts 
would reduce accounting costs and overstate profits inappropriately, 
since only part of training outlays but all of salaries count against profits 
in a given year. Of course, similar judgments are required for allocating 
the costs of physical capital as well, especially concerning the length of 
the depreciation period. A major distinction between physical and hu-
man capital is that the firm has no property rights to the added human 
capital, as it has with added physical capital. If workers are not reward-
ed for the added human capital with wage increases, those workers may 
leave. Thus, training investments should count as assets to the company 
only to the extent that the company is able to benefit from the increased 
human capital. Certainly, the very fact that companies currently finance 
an extensive amount of training is indicative of their ability to capture 
some of the gains. 
Valuation problems are real, but dealing in approximations is better 
than ignoring the reality that training does constitute an investment and 
should not be treated like goods or services that are used up in the cur-
rent year. After all, the idea of counting the cost to the firm of providing 
financial options to employees was initially greeted with skepticism, 
both about the theory and about the feasibility of calculating an ap-
propriate dollar amount. In fact, some measures of the costs of options 
depend on assumptions about longevity with the firm. Moreover, some 
firms already amortize some training expenses when workers are learn-
ing how to operate new equipment. 
It will take some time to develop a consensus that accounting for 
the firm’s human capital assets makes sense and to agree on a practi-
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cal method for doing so. But the increase in the importance of human 
capital to the firm (not just to the worker) should stimulate action in the 
near term. The result will be additional training and ultimately better 
and more productive jobs.
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOn
Generating skills is a critical task of modern economies. Not count-
ing the value of the time students themselves spend on learning, the 
United States invests nearly $1 trillion, or about 7 percent of its output, 
in education and training each year. A primary goal of this investment 
is to produce a well-qualified workforce that can find good jobs and re-
warding careers. The stakes are high, not only for U.S. living standards 
but also for equality of opportunity and social cohesion. 
So how well is the U.S. skill development system performing? With 
its schools, formal training programs, and on-the-job training activi-
ties, the U.S. system has helped develop a workforce skilled enough to 
achieve healthy productivity growth, especially over the past decade. 
The nation’s universities attract hundreds of thousands of foreign stu-
dents. At the same time, many workers have been left behind: they earn 
low wages that are stagnant from year to year, and they apparently are 
ill-equipped for well-paying jobs. Furthermore, employers are con-
cerned about the lack of qualified workers in many occupations that 
require long-term education and training. 
While the skills of the current and future U.S. workforce are a ma-
jor topic for the public and for policymakers, we lack comprehensive 
measures of skills that are relevant to the distribution of jobs and to the 
achievement of high productivity. Information on school completion 
and on selected academic testing is widely used, and it properly forms 
part of the skills picture. However, these measures fall short because 
1) they do not account for productivity-enhancing noncognitive skills 
of the type highlighted in SCANS, 2) they do not capture occupation-
specific skills or broader skills learned through work experience, 3) the 
schooling and test score indicators are plagued by uncertainties, and 4) 
employers usually do not measure the increased capabilities attained by 
training their workforce. 
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Unfortunately, the weakness of existing measures affects public 
initiatives to improve skills. Policies are developed to raise schooling 
requirements and test scores, but they largely ignore other key indica-
tors of productive skills. Investment decisions are directed at improving 
these imperfect indicators, leaving few resources and limited attention 
for other skills critical to workplace success. In the absence of well-ac-
cepted occupational qualifications for a broad range of careers, there are 
few measures of what share of workers have occupational qualifications 
and few policies to raise the share that have qualifications valued in the 
market. The result can be serious mismatches between the distribution 
of jobs in demand that pay good wages and the distribution of qualifi-
cations of the workforce. Some of these mismatches can be overcome 
with short-term training, but others require long-term training and work 
experience in the occupation. 
How education and training providers conceive of skills affects cur-
riculum content and teaching methods. When skill is viewed as knowl-
edge in math, reading, writing and science, as measured by standard-
ized tests, schools focus on theoretical concepts, emphasize individual 
learning instead of group learning and teamwork, use abstract tools in-
stead of problem-solving in specific situations, and offer content that 
is weakly related to qualifications for careers. Nevertheless, classroom 
education works for many students. On average, more formal school-
ing yields solid financial returns through increased earnings, which pre-
sumably reflect increased productivity. But the gains from schooling 
vary widely, as do the ability and motivation of students to complete 
secondary and postsecondary degrees. 
Only at the margins does the education system respond effectively 
to the diversity of learning styles, talents, and interests of students. The 
emphasis on college for all students leads to the adoption of curricula 
pushed by universities, which marginalizes career-oriented subjects and 
devalues experiential, work-based learning. The mismatches between 
the two types of curricula, approaches to teaching, student interests, and 
employer requirements contribute to high dropout rates (students often 
leaving out of boredom), low rates of qualification for many occupa-
tions, and poor earnings outcomes for a high share of young people. 
As a result, many students leave the mainstream educational system 
without getting genuine qualifications for a good career. One reason for 
this is that the U.S. spends little on expanding skills that are well re-
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warded in the workplace or on initiatives that involve close connections 
with employers, including but not limited to formal apprenticeship. 
Employer-led training is common, but only a small share of resources 
is devoted to collaborative school-based and work-based learning. 
Much can be done to strengthen productive skills, but the first step 
is to recognize the differences in academic and career interests, learning 
approaches, and qualifications for careers. Reforms at the high school 
level should reflect this diversity. Many school-based programs offer 
learning in context and link education effectively with careers, but they 
are swimming against a strong tide of sentiment for requiring all stu-
dents to meet college requirements. Students should be able to seek 
to achieve occupational qualifications by combining school-based in-
struction with well-structured work-based learning. The education and 
training system should be rewarded for raising standards not only for all 
broad-based, useful skills (including SCANS and 21st Century skills) 
but also for occupational skills. Career-focused programs, such as ap-
prenticeships, provide a good way of achieving these outcomes. 
Many adults respond effectively to career opportunities by using the 
nation’s private and public vocational schooling. Though these schools 
are flexible and often provide excellent career preparations, many lack 
close linkages with employers, causing trainees to experience frustra-
tion upon graduating, having spent time and money in a program only 
to fail to land a job. One highly successful system to train adults for 
rewarding careers is apprenticeship. While apprenticeship provides a 
large component of training for careers in some countries and is grow-
ing in others, only a small and declining share of adults in the United 
States participate. One way to shore up and expand apprenticeship in the 
United States would be to increase its federal budget allocation, which 
at present is minimal. Expanding apprenticeship is likely to prove far 
more effective in raising long-term earnings at modest cost than is in-
creasing the share of students entering college.
Altering accounting procedures to recognize the asset value of 
human capital is another low-cost intervention that could be used to 
encourage employer training. The change would recognize in income 
statements and balance sheets that training investments generate assets 
that yield future benefits. Although this modification in a company’s 
practice would not be easy to construct, the result would be to make 
accounts better reflect current operations and company assets. Whether 
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managers were focusing on short-term or long-term profits, they would 
have more incentive to invest in training. Since employer-sponsored 
training yields a high return, additional employer-sponsored training 
is likely to prove productive and improve the skills, qualifications, and 
earnings of American workers. 
Americans have long viewed the attainment of knowledge and 
skills as a primary mechanism for economic mobility. Unfortunately, in 
recent years the nation’s laudable effort at promoting opportunity by en-
hancing skills has become too narrowly defined as raising educational 
attainment and academic test scores. In fact, limiting public initiatives 
to the goal of expanding and improving schools might actually increase 
inequality, since those who perform least effectively in academic set-
tings will face continuing disadvantages. To fulfill our nation’s goal of 
opportunity for all, we must do much more to measure and develop 
skills on the basis of a broader, more realistic perspective.
notes
 1. National commissions and policy researchers forcefully argued these points. 
Examples include the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce 
(1990) and the William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work, Family, and 
Citizenship (1988). Also see Lerman and Pouncy (1990) and Hamilton (1987). 
 2. For an intriguing explanation of the U.S. productivity advantage and the determi-
nants of sector and country differences in productivity, see Lewis (2004). 
 3. These are differences in log wages based on tabulations in Table 3.17 of Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007) and accessible on the Economic Policy Institute 
Web site at http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/datazone_dznational.
 4. See, for example, the report of the Secretary’s Commission on Achieving 
Necessary Skills (SCANS 1992) for one ambitious effort to document and clas-
sify an extensive array of skills that goes well beyond traditional verbal and math 
competencies. A recent approach that highlights similar skills is known as 21st 
Century Skills (see, for example, Metiri Group 2007).
 5. See, for example, the recent controversy over the alternative estimates of the share 
of a recent student cohort that graduated from high school. 
 6. For an overview of 21st Century Skills, see Metiri Group (2007). 
 7. These numbers were tabulated by the author, using figures from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Web site, www.bls.gov. 
 8. In studying a youth cohort that went through high school in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Yates (2005) finds that about 40 percent of high school dropouts who 
left school for a year or more without a diploma ultimately completed at least a 
high school degree.
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 9. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) make a similar point when they show that, hold-
ing constant for ability as measured by the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude 
Battery, having a GED actually is associated with lower earnings than being a high 
school dropout.
 10. For an overview on NVQ and other qualification systems in the United Kingdom, 
see material provided by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (2007). 
 11. The recent report by the Leitch Commission (2006) illustrates the use of qualifica-
tion standards in assessing national skills and in developing policy initiatives to 
enhance skills.
 12. Some industries issued standards through this process, but those standards have not 
come into common use by employers or by providers of education and training. 
 13. These broader measures and policies are embedded not only in systems that uti-
lize apprenticeships extensively (including Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and 
Denmark), but also in the United Kingdom and other countries that use transparent 
approaches to occupational qualification. 
 14. See, for example, Brat (2006) and Deloitte Consulting (2005).
 15. In 1990, only 19 percent of students with a vocational concentration completed the 
New Basics program of academic courses (four years of English and three years 
each of math, science, and social science). By 2000, 51 percent of vocational con-
centrators did so. 
 16. The share of students who were occupational (or vocational) concentrators 
dropped from nearly 34 to about 25 percent between 1982 and 1990 and remained 
at the lower rate through 2000. Seniors who were occupational concentrators and 
took at least one advanced course in the occupational field declined from 24 to 
14.4 percent of all seniors from 1982 to 1998.
 17. About two in three parents of homeschooled children report dissatisfaction with 
academic instruction in the schools, but their most important reasons for abandon-
ing public (and private) schools are concerns about safety, drugs, and peer pres-
sure and the desire to provide religious and moral instruction (National Center for 
Education Statistics 2007).
 18. The Lansing Area Manufacturing Partnership (LAMP) offers a good example 
of an effective employer-school partnership. Cosponsored by the United Auto 
Workers, General Motors, and the local school districts, LAMP exposes students 
to careers in the auto industry and improves their educational and career outcomes 
(MacAllum et al. 2002). 
 19. This last comment is based on correspondence with a former president of a school 
board in an inner-city community. He found that several Career Academies began 
well, but that their performance eroded over time. He attributes part of the prob-
lem to the weak links they had with employers. 
 20. No more than 3 percent were participating in a school-linked, structured, long-
term (one to two years or longer) experience demanding the learning of new skills 
at the workplace and leading to any type of certification (Hershey 2003).
 21. Although the estimates typically control for observed differences in capability, 
there may be quality differences not readily observed in the data. 
 22. However, see the set of working papers on pre-K learning sponsored by the 
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Committee on Economic Development (CED), a business-sponsored public poli-
cy organization (CED 2007). 
 23. Counting education and training as investments would alter dramatically the cur-
rent understatement of U.S. savings rates, in that properly accounting for human 
capital would increase measured investment and savings. 
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Revising Employers’ Role in  
Sponsoring and Financing Health 
Insurance and Medical Care 
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health
Globalization of markets is the straw that is breaking the camel’s 
back of employer-financed health insurance in the United States. Gen-
eral Motors’ (GM) CEO Rick Wagoner is perhaps the most visible chief 
executive to declare that the cost of health care must be reallocated 
away from employers and toward workers and the government. In 
2006, Wagoner and his counterparts at Ford and DaimlerChrysler pro-
posed that the federal government assume responsibility for the medical 
costs of the people in the top 1 percent of the health care expenditure 
distribution. Since people with medical expenses in the top 1 percent of 
the population account for about 30 percent of all health care spending 
each year, Wagoner and his colleagues argue for a significant shift in 
how we finance health insurance in the United States.1 
GM’s concerns about employee health care expenses are widely 
shared among employers. Between 2000 and 2006, the proportion of 
the nonelderly population (younger than 65) with employer-sponsored 
health insurance (ESI) went from 66.8 percent to 62 percent (Fronstin 
2006). Employment-based health insurance coverage has contracted 
and expanded over the past two decades with changes in the economy, 
but the current decline is larger and faster than in previous periods. 
Moreover, the percentage of firms offering health benefits fell from 69 
percent in 2000 to 61 percent in 2006 (Claxton, Gil et al. 2006). These 
trends reflect the rapid rise in health insurance premiums: between 2000 
and 2005 they increased 73 percent (Gabel et al. 2005). The annual 
rates at which premiums grew are much higher than the annual increas-
es in the Consumer Price Index and workers’ wages, and they exceed 
productivity growth rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007; Gabel et 
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al. 2005). Perhaps not surprisingly, companies reacted by attempting to 
hold down increases in their health insurance costs.
Even before 2000, employers were engaged in efforts to hold down 
health insurance costs—some stopped sponsoring coverage, and oth-
ers (generally new companies) opted not to begin sponsoring coverage; 
some shifted to hiring workers on a contractual basis or as temporary 
workers so they would not be eligible for the companies’ health ben-
efits; and others increased the employee share of premiums and/or other 
out-of-pocket costs (e.g., the annual deductible or co-payments when 
obtaining care). Although the Census Bureau’s February Employee 
Benefit and Contingent Worker Supplement to the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) shows little increase in the use of contingent workers be-
tween 2000 and 2005, there is increasing anecdotal evidence of people 
being hired to work as contract or temporary workers or having to be-
come self-employed workers (Swartz 2006).2 Small service firms that 
in earlier decades might have been composed of a president and em-
ployees now frequently are organized as “virtual companies” in which 
there is a founder-president and all the other workers are technically 
self-employed associates or consultants. Such contingent work arrange-
ments enable firms to avoid providing fringe benefits altogether. These 
moves shifted more health care costs onto employees and no doubt 
prevented premiums from rising faster than they did. Yet the concerns 
raised by the chief executives of the “Big Three” automotive makers 
visibly show that the future financing of ESI is far from certain. With 
growing competition from companies abroad, American workers can 
no longer assume that “good jobs” will provide ESI as part of the com-
pensation package. 
This chapter explores the question of what will happen to employ-
er-sponsored health insurance in the next few decades with increased 
global competition. In particular, this chapter focuses on the question 
of how we might share the costs of health care between employers, 
employees, and government (that is, taxpayers). In the next section we 
review why and for whom health insurance has been a component of to-
tal compensation. In the third section we briefly describe the enormous 
growth in health care spending and health insurance costs over the last 
50 years. It is the rapid rate of growth in these costs, particularly during 
the last decade, that has been causing employers to argue that they can-
not continue to pay as much as they have for ESI. 
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We then examine in the fourth section the effects of both rising 
health insurance costs and global competition on employers and their 
efforts to reduce their ESI costs. The effects are widespread. In the fifth 
section we turn to the future and consider how the country might reor-
ganize the financing of health insurance. We begin by examining differ-
ent schemes that are being used in three European countries—the Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Switzerland—to compare how other countries 
have chosen to share the costs between employers, workers, and indi-
viduals and companies as taxpayers to the government to help subsidize 
lower-income people. Three principles are then suggested for framing 
how we might share the costs of health insurance among individuals 
and employers. In the sixth section we develop back-of-the-envelope 
estimates of the amount of money spent by private health insurance and 
other sources for the medical care of the nonelderly in 2005. We use this 
as a starting point to estimate how that sum could be financed through 
premiums and different taxes on individuals and companies rather than 
the current system of employer and employee payments. 
In the concluding section, we discuss the benefits of increased eq-
uity and efficiency in the economy that would result from restructur-
ing the financing of health insurance, along with the fact that private 
insurance plans can still exist. Finally, we note that there is an urgency 
to creating a new financing structure—before the global competition 
and rising health insurance costs cause companies to cross a threshold 
where less than half of the nonelderly population have ESI.
HEALTH InSURAnCE AS PART OF COMPEnSATIOn  
FOR WORk: WHO PAyS?
Economic theory suggests that workers will accept fringe benefits 
in lieu of part of their wages if the value of the fringe benefits is at least 
equal to the value of the forgone wages. This implies that workers are 
paying for health insurance by giving up some of what they otherwise 
would have received as higher wages and salary. The tax code treatment 
of the share of health insurance premiums paid by employers slightly 
complicates the simple trade-off between wages and health insurance 
provided by an employer. Since 1954, premiums paid by employers (or 
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in the case of self-insured firms, the premium equivalents) have been 
treated as nontaxable income by the U.S. tax code (Burman 1994).3 
This means that a dollar of premium paid by the employer, unlike a 
dollar of wages, is not subject to the employer and employee payroll 
taxes for Social Security and Medicare hospital insurance (currently a 
total tax of 15.3 percent) or the employee’s federal and state income tax. 
Avoiding payroll taxes on health insurance premiums provides a strong 
incentive for employers to offer ESI rather than additional wages and 
for workers to want ESI rather than additional wages.4
Yet health insurance is a product that cannot be purchased in small 
incremental amounts, and employers cannot set up different combina-
tions of wages and health benefits among different employees. Current 
laws require that employers who offer a fringe benefit must offer the 
same benefit to all employees; they cannot distinguish among classes of 
employees by offering different versions of a benefit to different sets of 
workers. Insurers in turn are unwilling to create many tiers of premium 
classes (the tiers that have come into use are: single person, married 
couple, parent and child[ren], and family headed by two adults) because 
as the number of tiers increases, there is less opportunity for spreading 
risks across all workers in a company. The result is that workers who 
earn quite different wages or salaries pay the same premium for health 
insurance.5 Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible for either 
companies or workers to trade income at the margin for the price of 
health benefits for individual workers. Moreover, most employees are 
aware that what they pay out-of-pocket for their share of the premium 
for ESI is significantly less than what they would have to pay for in-
surance in the individual insurance market, particularly if they would 
be paying with after-tax income. Further, ESI policies generally cover 
more health care services and require lower out-of-pocket cost-sharing 
than policies in the individual market. As a result, almost all employ-
ees of large companies either take up ESI if it is offered or have ESI 
through a spouse’s employer (Haas and Swartz 2007). 
Despite the fact that economic theory suggests that employees pay 
for health insurance by forgoing wage and salary income, the common 
public perception is that it is employers that pay. The belief that em-
ployers pay for health insurance has roots in the decade after World 
War II, when unions were agitating for large companies to give them 
a percentage of payroll for union-run social welfare programs, includ-
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ing health insurance. As Klein (2003) has documented in detail, neither 
large insurance companies nor large manufacturing companies wanted 
the unions to run the health plans. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made 
official what was already the standard of the day—unions could not 
run social welfare plans independently of employers, and employers 
could avoid collective bargaining over health insurance by simply an-
nouncing that they were paying for health insurance for the employees. 
The 1950 contract settlements between the United Auto Workers and 
the Big Three automakers—known as the Treaty of Detroit because 
the unions agreed to a five-year contract, reducing the threat of labor 
disruptions—and the subsequent 1955 bargaining agreements further 
solidified the public impression that it was employers that were paying 
for health benefits. 
The perception that employers pay for ESI also was bolstered by 
the way in which firms use fringe benefits, including health insurance, 
to woo or retain workers with desirable skills, especially in a tight labor 
market. Although the large unions in manufacturing and mining ob-
tained health insurance in the 1950s, the growth in ESI coverage in the 
1950s and 1960s occurred especially among white-collar profession-
als. The large manufacturing companies that chose to provide health 
benefits to the unions naturally gave the same or better benefits to their 
white-collar workers. This set a pattern for nonmanufacturing busi-
nesses—to attract and keep college-educated and other highly skilled 
workers, fringe benefits, including health insurance, had to be part of 
the compensation package. White-collar workers who were not self-
employed took it for granted that they would have ESI and treated it as 
an expected perk that the employers provided.
But this part of the history of health insurance as a fringe benefit 
should be seen not as evidence per se that employers pay for health insur-
ance. Instead, it contributes to the argument that how the premiums are 
shared between companies, workers, and others—principally purchas-
ers of a company’s product and a company’s stockholders—depends on 
the labor market and the market for the product. For example, workers 
who have skills that are in short supply are able to obtain greater com-
pensation because of their bargaining position with employers. When 
the supply of workers exceeds the demand for them (as is often the case 
with people with general skills), the workers are in a weak position for 
obtaining compensation on a par with workers who have skills in short 
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supply. Firms with a predominantly low-wage workforce are much less 
likely to offer ESI because they do not need to increase compensation 
to be able to recruit or retain workers. When “low-wage” companies do 
offer ESI, it is usually because they occupy a niche in which they pro-
vide highly desired customer services and that allows them to shift at 
least some of the benefit costs to the customers. Starbucks, for example, 
faces strong demand for its lattes and frappuccinos, so it can charge 
relatively high prices for coffee and offer ESI to its low-wage work-
ers. In this case, it is the coffee drinkers who are paying a large share 
of the costs for Starbucks’ employees’ health benefits. Thus, it is too 
simplistic to argue that ESI is paid only by either workers or employers. 
Depending on the circumstances, workers, companies, consumers, and 
company stockholders all pay varying shares of the costs. 
Several empirical studies have shown that the costs of fringe benefits 
are largely paid by workers (see, for example, Eberts and Stone [1985]; 
Gruber and Krueger [1991]; and Woodbury [1983]). Using differences 
in the timing when 23 states required health insurance policies to cover 
maternity benefits before the federal government followed suit in 1978 
(with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act), Gruber estimated the states’ 
mandates’ effects on wages (Gruber 1994). He found that between 59 
and 90 percent of the cost of the mandates was shifted back to workers 
via reduced wages in the states with the mandates, and that the wages of 
married women were particularly reduced relative to the wages of sin-
gle women and married men. But, as Blumberg (1999) has pointed out, 
there has been little research on the wage effects of job-based general 
health insurance, and there is little evidence as to how workers’ wages 
are adjusted to compensate for the costs of the health benefits. Thus, 
we do not have a clear picture of the extent or configuration of how the 
burden of paying for employer-sponsored health insurance is shared be-
tween workers, companies, consumers, and companies’ stockholders. 
Perhaps because it is not clear how much workers pay for ESI, em-
ployer claims that they pay for health benefits have been relatively un-
challenged in public discussions of who pays. The tax code treatment 
of the share of health insurance premiums paid by employers reinforces 
the idea that employers pay for health insurance rather than the work-
ers. The fact that what companies pay for health benefits is referred to 
as a cost in the same way that other inputs to the company’s produc-
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tion process are costs of production also implies that employers pay for 
health benefits.
Thus, for more than 50 years, employer-sponsored group health in-
surance has been viewed as something that employers pay for, not em-
ployees. Given the history of how ESI started, it is somewhat ironic that 
we now find employers wanting to not pay for health benefits.
GROWTH In HEALTH CARE SPEnDInG AnD HEALTH 
InSURAnCE COSTS
To see why employers are trying to limit what they pay for health 
benefits, it is important to understand how much health care has changed 
in the last half-century—how much more medicine can do and how 
much more it costs. In 1960, per capita health care spending in the Unit-
ed States was $944 (in 2005 dollars); by 2005 (the last year for which 
we have data) it was $6,697—a 600 percent increase (Levit et al. 1994). 
During those same 45 years, median family income increased from 
$31,390 to $56,194 (both in 2005 dollars)—a 79 percent increase—and 
productivity in the nonfarm business sector of the country increased by 
160 percent (Council of Economic Advisers 2007, Table B-49, p. 288; 
U.S. Census Bureau n.d.a., Table F-7). A small portion of the increase in 
health care spending per capita is attributable to the aging of the popula-
tion, but the vast majority is due to changes in how we are able to treat 
diseases and conditions (Newhouse 1992, 1993). At the end of World 
War II, it would have been next to impossible for large companies (or 
indeed anyone) to predict that medical care would change so dramati-
cally between the midcentury point and 2000 as to increase health care 
spending per capita by so much more than incomes or productivity. 
In the 1950s, the three biggest causes of death were heart disease, 
cancer, and stroke. People who had these conditions generally did not 
live long. But in the intervening five decades we have made enormous 
progress in combating these diseases. The sharp decline in smoking and 
tobacco use and the recognition that cholesterol increases the risks of 
heart disease and stroke have reduced the incidence of all three, even 
though they remained the leading causes of death in 2006. Yet it is the 
advances in medicine that have contributed the most to the increased 
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survival rates for people diagnosed with these diseases. New drugs, new 
surgical techniques, and new diagnostic testing devices have increased 
life expectancy for people diagnosed with a wide variety of previously 
untreatable illnesses and conditions that are now considered chronic 
illnesses, including renal disease, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclero-
sis, and COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). Advances in 
medicine also have enabled millions of people to have higher quality of 
life when they have conditions ranging from torn ligaments to cataracts 
to HIV to knees or hips that need replacing. But these advances have 
come at a price—Americans now have per capita health care expen-
ditures that are the highest in the world and 50 percent larger than the 
two countries with the next highest per capita spending, Norway and 
Switzerland (Anderson et al. 2006).
Thus, the shift in employer attitudes regarding sponsoring group 
health insurance for workers has to be seen in the context of how dif-
ferent medical care is today compared to what it was 50 or 60 years 
ago. Private industry employers did not anticipate that a fringe benefit 
that equaled about 1–2 percent of compensation in 1960 would equal 7 
percent in 2006; for state and local governments the growth in the costs 
of health benefits was even higher—in 2006, health benefits equaled 
10.7 percent of total compensation for their workers (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2007). 
Employers’ Efforts to Slow Health Care Spending
From the 1950s through the 1970s, the set of medical services cov-
ered by most health insurance policies expanded from simply a per 
diem payment for a limited number of hospital days to covering a high 
percentage of the costs for a high number (often unlimited) of hospi-
tal days, physician services, and more diagnostic tests. By the early 
1980s, prescription drug coverage also began to be added to the pack-
age of covered services. The expansion of services covered by health 
insurance was encouraged by the tax treatment of employer payments 
for health insurance, especially as incomes were rising from the 1950s 
through the early 1970s as productivity increased. 
But in the second half of the 1970s, productivity growth stalled, and 
when the country experienced the recession of 1981–1983, employers 
began to actively look for ways to slow the growth in their health care 
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spending. Managed care plans were viewed by employers as a partic-
ularly promising mechanism. The hope was that managed care plans 
would restrict spending by reducing choice of health care providers and 
thereby obtaining discounts in fees from providers. In part because of 
the HMO Act of 1973, which required employers that offered ESI to 
offer an HMO alternative if one were located nearby, the fraction of 
employees at large employers (200 or more employees) who were in 
managed care plans increased from 5 percent in 1984 to 50 percent by 
1993; by 1998, that fraction increased further to 86 percent (Marquis 
and Long 1999). Small firms that offered ESI also shifted their work-
ers to managed care plans during this time: by 1995, only 31 percent 
of workers in small firms with ESI were enrolled in indemnity plans. 
The growth in health care spending did, in fact, slow during the early to 
mid-1990s, although it is now widely believed that the slowdown was 
not a direct result of managed care per se. 
Workers, however, were not happy with managed care plans’ re-
strictions on which medical care providers they could see. By the late 
1990s, with a very tight labor market and a booming economy, employ-
ers worked with managed care plans to develop alternative plan struc-
tures that permitted greater choice of providers. Perhaps in part because 
of fewer restrictions on providers, but more likely because of the large 
number of new prescription drugs that came on the market in the late 
1990s, as well as advances in arthroscopic surgical techniques and ra-
diological scanning, health care spending resumed its higher growth 
rates after 2000.  
An unintended consequence of the shift to managed care plans was 
that a very large share of the population became used to “first-dollar” 
coverage—that is, they paid only a nominal co-payment when they 
sought medical care and faced no other co-payment or deductible. Be-
fore managed care became so widespread, the vast majority of insured 
Americans had indemnity insurance coverage. Indemnity policies re-
quired the insured individual to pay out-of-pocket for the first $100 or 
more of medical care each year (the deductible) and then usually 20–30 
percent of all allowed (insured) medical expenses above the deductible. 
A generation of the working age population has lost the idea of insur-
ance as protection against catastrophic medical expenses. The result is 
that if they do not expect to use much medical care in the coming year, 
they view the current levels of premiums as being excessive. This is 
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especially true among young and healthy individuals who have to pay 
most or all of the premium themselves because they are employees of 
small firms or are self-employed. It helps explain why people who used 
to be employed within companies but now are self-employed and work-
ing on contracts are not buying individual insurance.
More Reliance on Cost-Sharing of Medical and Insurance Costs
Since the pullback from relying on managed care to slow the growth 
in health care spending, employers have shifted their efforts toward im-
posing more costs of medical care on individuals and creating health 
plans that also involve more management of diseases and conditions. 
Almost all employers with more than 500 employees now are self-in-
sured, and they have been especially active in developing plans that 
contain deductibles of $500 (or more) per person and payment incen-
tives to the insurers if they meet benchmarks for preventive care and 
disease management. In addition, co-payments for office visits and 
emergency room visits have doubled since 2001 for most people with 
preferred provider organization (PPO) types of health plans (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). By increasing the use of deductibles (as well as 
the dollar amount of deductibles) and adopting higher co-payments for 
physician office visits and diagnostic tests, employers have likely pre-
vented premiums from rising more than they did.6 
Some employers also increased the fraction of the premium for 
which employees are responsible, particularly for family policies. While 
on average the employee shares of premiums for individual and family 
policies have not changed much since 2000, there is substantial varia-
tion in the fraction paid by employees. In 2006, the average employee 
share of premiums was 16 percent for individual coverage and 27 per-
cent for family coverage. But, depending on the size of the firm some-
one works for and the fraction of workers who are low-wage within the 
firm, a worker can pay very different shares of the premium (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). Yet for all the efforts by employers to increase the 
cost-sharing by employees for health care costs, ESI premiums rose 
an average of 73 percent between 2000 and 2005 and an average of 68 
percent between 2001 and 2006 (Claxton, Gabel et al. 2006; Gabel et 
al. 2005). 
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It is in this context that companies facing competition from abroad 
are especially concerned about their ability to continue to pay for health 
care costs. Although the European Union countries finance their health 
insurance systems with a combination of worker-individual premiums 
(or taxes) and employer contributions largely based on payroll taxes, a 
key point is that EU countries have significantly lower per capita health 
costs than the United States. Thus, employer payments for health in-
surance in the EU are lower than they are in the United States. With 
the exception of Japan, Asian and Latin American countries generally 
do not require employers to contribute much if anything to the health 
care costs of their workers. For many U.S. firms, the choice is therefore 
to move their operations to lower-wage countries—with far lower em-
ployer payments to health care costs—or to radically restructure their 
role with ESI here. 
RIPPLE EFFECTS OF RISInG HEALTH InSURAnCE COSTS
While it is clear that companies facing direct competition from 
abroad are most sensitive to the increasing health insurance costs, the 
twin effects of rising health insurance costs and globalization are more 
nuanced and widespread among employers of all sorts in the United 
States. 
Manufacturing Was the Beginning
Although manufacturing was the first industrial sector to be seen 
as losing to the lower wage workforces in Asia and Latin America, it 
slowly became apparent that what enabled goods to be made abroad 
was the expansion of relatively inexpensive and fast transportation. 
Containers that could be loaded up at the factory and then quickly load-
ed onto trucks, ships, or airplanes dramatically reduced shipping time 
between countries (Levinson 2006). Then, with the advent of the Inter-
net and global computer communications by the early 1990s, suddenly 
shipping time for services that rely on electronic transmission was the 
same within the United States as across the world—and it wasn’t just 
manufacturing that could be done more cheaply overseas. Many types 
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of services can now be provided by people in other countries who are 
paid less than Americans. These services range from call centers taking 
reservations to software engineers who may be located 6–12 time zones 
from other workers but can take advantage of the time difference and 
the Internet to jointly work on new software programs. 
Companies that have been most obviously affected by foreign com-
petition are in manufacturing; many of these companies and industries 
had both aging production equipment and aging workforces (so-called 
legacy workforces)—automobiles, steel, durable appliances, and tex-
tiles/clothing are the prime examples. Those industries have been 
through several episodes of wrenching downsizing of their companies, 
and will experience more such downsizing in the coming decade. 
Services Sector Industries and Small Firms
The growth in employment in the United States since the mid-1980s 
has been in construction and the services sector, especially financial 
services, professional and business services, education and health-re-
lated services, and entertainment and leisure services (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics n.d.; Council of Economic Advisers 2005; Swartz 2006, Fig-
ure 2.2, p. 22). Although some of these industries may seem insulated 
from foreign competition because they cater to individuals and sell their 
services to American companies, they are not insulated from the pres-
sures to keep labor costs low. Rising health insurance costs are there-
fore a target in the efforts to keep labor costs competitive. Electronic 
transmission of information has enabled many service industries to ship 
or threaten to ship some of their jobs offshore, essentially reducing em-
ployee bargaining power in wage negotiations. 
At the same time, while manufacturing was dominated by large 
companies until very recently, the dominant type of firm in construction 
and the services sector is small (fewer than 50 employees). Growth in 
employment in these industries explains why, since 1979, a rising share 
of the private sector workforce has been employed by firms with fewer 
than 50 workers.7 In 2005, 43 percent of the private sector workforce 
was employed by small firms; in 1979 it was 37 percent. 
For many years, small firms have been far less likely to offer ESI 
than large firms: 36 percent of firms with less than 10 employees offer 
ESI and 66 percent of firms with 10 to 24 employees offer ESI, com-
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pared with 95 percent of firms with more than 100 employees (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2003, Table 1.A.2). Small firms 
face much higher premiums per person than do large firms because 
they have to buy policies underwritten by insurers; they do not have 
the financial resources to self-insure their employees’ health care costs. 
Insurers have to account for the risk of adverse selection in the small 
group market when they price small group policies, and the risk in-
creases as the size of the firm shrinks. Insurers’ concern with adverse 
selection is that small firms that apply for coverage without buying 
other types of insurance (for example, life insurance) are more likely 
to be owned by someone who either has a health problem within his 
or her family or knows something about the health needs of a favorite 
employee. Until the 1990s, when a substantial fraction of large employ-
ers became self-insured, insurers could use their large-group insurance 
policies to cross-subsidize the higher risks in the small group insurance 
part of their business. Today, most insurers do not underwrite the health 
care costs of large employers; instead they are paid to be administra-
tors of self-insured large companies. This change has helped drive up 
insurance costs for small firms even faster than the increase in premium 
equivalents among self-insured large firms. Thus, the last two decades’ 
shift in private sector employment to the service sector and smaller 
firms coincided with a change in the insurance business that increased 
the costs of small firms’ health insurance policies—at the very time that 
worries about foreign low-wage labor started rising. 
Small businesses also typically have short lifetimes; many are small 
retail shops, restaurants, and service businesses that have an average 
tenure of two years. When any business starts up, it is short on cash—
revenues lag behind start-up costs. Although many small businesses 
may want to offer health benefits, the more than doubling of premium 
costs since 2000 contributes to small firms’ decisions not to offer insur-
ance. They are reluctant to offer a benefit that they suspect they will not 
be able to afford within three years. 
Finally, many service sector firms may not face direct competition 
from overseas but they supply services to companies that are facing 
foreign competition, which keeps up the pressure to reduce costs. Firms 
in the professional and business services, for example, work with com-
panies that compete with international firms, and these service firms are 
constantly looking for ways to reduce their labor costs so they will not 
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lose business. Among small professional services firms, it is not uncom-
mon now to find “virtual” firms, where a person who has a reputation 
for client service obtains a contract for a service that actually requires 
several people to do the job, and then the person goes to other self-
employed people he or she has worked with in the past and gives them 
contracts to work on the job at hand. A decade or more ago, these people 
would all have been in-house employees of large companies with ESI. 
But because the services they provide are not “core competency” func-
tions, they now have to sell their services as independent contractors. 
Increasing numbers of people in software development, information 
technology in general, marketing consulting, advertising and writing, 
and a host of professional business support activities are such contract 
workers, and they do not have employer-group health insurance. 
Service Companies with Large numbers of Low-Wage Workers
A different type of ripple effect caused by fears of foreign competi-
tion exists in service industries with high numbers of low-wage and low-
skilled workers—for example, the entertainment industry, protective 
services, food processing, and long-term care health services. Global-
ization has meant the movement of low-wage labor from other countries 
to these industries in the United States, in contrast with the movement 
of manufacturing to countries with lower-wage workers. Many service 
sector firms do not need to offer ESI to attract workers since there has 
been a steady supply of workers with the general skills needed for such 
firms. In the past, low-skilled workers might have organized to demand 
higher wages and fringe benefits such as ESI, but with a steady influx 
of immigrant workers willing to work for low wages, they have been 
reluctant to organize to demand higher wages and fringe benefits. Such 
workers know that other recent immigrants will be willing to take their 
place for the same low wages and lack of health insurance. Similarly, 
service-sector firms with low-wage workers know that if they were to 
provide ESI, they would be underbid in competition for contracts by 
firms with lower labor costs because they do not offer ESI. 
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Effects of Demographic Changes on Employers’ Health  
Insurance Costs
The decline in ESI coverage, especially among workers in the 
25–34-year-old and 35–44-year-old age cohorts, is coming at the same 
time that the demographics of the U.S. population are marked by the 
baby boomers in the older half of the workforce. The baby boomer co-
hort is currently 44–61 years old and consists of about 73.5 million 
people. The cohorts just behind them are 25–34 and 35–44 years old, 
and they include almost the same number of people: 70.3 million (U.S. 
Census Bureau n.d.b.). Roughly 10.5 million of the baby boomers are 
uninsured, but 18.3 million of the 25–44-year-olds are uninsured. With 
sharply smaller numbers of younger adults covered by ESI, the em-
ployers that do offer health benefits are facing higher premiums (or 
premium equivalents if they are self-insured) in part because so many 
younger workers are not part of the risk pool. When the baby boomers 
were younger, they had low levels of health care spending (as is typical 
of younger adults) and cross-subsidized the relatively smaller numbers 
of older workers in their firms. Today, that degree of cross-subsidization 
within firms no longer exists.
The demographic shift among workers also has reinforced com-
panies’ decisions to limit their financial obligations for retiree health 
benefits. (Abraham and Houseman [2008] have a more detailed discus-
sion in Chapter 5 of how retiree health benefits are likely to change in 
the next decade.) Since 1988, the fraction of companies with 200 or 
more employees that are offering retiree health insurance has declined 
sharply, from 66 percent to 33–35 percent in 2005 and 2006 (Claxton, 
Gabel et al. 2006). The catalyst for this decline, most of which occurred 
by 1993, is widely believed to be a change in how the future costs of 
retiree benefits are to be accounted for in companies’ financial state-
ments. The non-governmental Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) required that companies show the expected future retiree health 
benefit costs as liabilities on their financial statements for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1992. (As of 2007, larger state and lo-
cal governments also are required to show liabilities for future ben-
efits on statements; smaller government units have an additional two 
years to meet the new rules. These employers, too, are under financial 
strain because of inadequately funded future obligations and concerns 
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about funding for current employees.8) Since 2000, the percentage of 
medium and large firms offering retiree health benefits has been vacil-
lating between 33 and 38 percent, with most of those companies that do 
offer retiree benefits being large or older firms in particular industries. 
But because newer firms are particularly likely to have large shares of 
younger workers and have not offered retiree health benefits, their low-
er labor cost structure is putting pressure on those companies that do 
provide retiree health benefits. They are cutting back on retiree health 
benefit provisions for people who were hired within the last 10 years 
and/or limiting the company’s financial obligations for such benefits 
in the future.9 Recent surveys of employers and retirees also show that 
a rising number of companies are shifting the rising costs of retiree 
health benefits onto the retirees. Thus, over the last decade especially, 
companies became quite conscious of retiree health benefits costs and 
the adverse effects of having an aging workforce. The FASB accounting 
rules changes for retiree health benefits reinforced companies’ unease 
about the rising costs of offering health benefits to active workers as 
well as retirees. 
Large and long-standing companies are particularly likely to have 
high fractions of their workforces who are baby boomers. Much has 
been made of the Big Three automakers’ legacy workforce (and re-
tiree health benefits costs) and how foreign-owned car manufacturers 
that produce cars in the United States—with their younger American 
workers—have much lower health benefits costs per car made in the 
United States.10 It is not surprising that many production workers at 
large companies are now hired on a contingent basis (Dey, Houseman, 
and Polivka 2007). They are paid on a lower pay-scale and are not per-
manent employees, so the companies do not pay benefits. For the large 
self-insured firms, this strategy allows output per worker to be obtained 
at a lower labor cost. But when these firms report the costs of health 
benefits per employee, they are focusing just on their aging workforce 
and do not include the contingent workers who would cost much less if 
they also had health benefits.
For smaller companies that are not large enough to self-insure, the 
decline in younger workers covered by true health insurance policies 
means that small group health insurance premiums are rising faster in 
part because the pool of people with such policies are aging. This fur-
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ther increases the pressures on small businesses to stop offering health 
benefits. 
Thus, it would be incorrect to conclude that it is the large companies 
in the United States that have been most affected by the rising costs 
of health insurance and intensified competition due to globalization. 
Instead, the effects are widespread, with ripples expanding throughout 
the economy and with the greatest effects on younger adult cohorts. It 
is increasingly clear that our system of private health insurance built on 
employer-sponsored coverage is under pressure from rising health care 
costs and global competition and is unraveling in many directions.
RECOnFIGURInG HOW WE PAy FOR HEALTH 
InSURAnCE: WHAT MIGHT EMPLOyERS PAy?
With employers moving to reduce their exposure to the costs of 
health care, it is increasingly likely that a large fraction of the U.S. 
workforce soon will not have ESI as we have known it in the second 
half of the twentieth century. People with highly sought-after skills may 
still obtain health insurance as a fringe benefit. But a rapidly increasing 
number of jobs that are currently considered good jobs will not have 
ESI as part of the compensation or will include only a defined contribu-
tion to help pay for health benefits. 
This is a sea change in the American employment relationship.11 
The change provides an opportunity for reconfiguring the financing of 
health insurance so there can be more equity in how much people with 
the same income pay for health coverage. But the opportunity comes 
with an urgent need to devise a new financing structure quickly, ahead 
of the market changes being driven by companies’ responses to in-
creased globalization and rising health insurance costs. 
As a starting place for restructuring the financing of health insur-
ance, it is useful to see what several European countries have done re-
cently to reconfigure their financing of health insurance. Many people 
in the United States regard other countries’ health insurance systems, 
especially those in Europe, as being nationalized systems with a single 
payer and all health care providers as employees. This is not the case, 
however. A number of countries have private health insurance plans (or, 
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as many Europeans call them, sickness funds) that compete with one 
another for enrollees. The countries collect funding for the insurance 
from a variety of sources and generally funnel the revenues to a cen-
tral government fund that then disperses the funds to the health plans. 
The central government fund also is used to subsidize lower-income 
people’s payments and in some cases to adjust the payments to reflect 
the expected higher costs of older or sicker individuals. 
How Three Other Countries Finance Health Insurance
The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland are the three European 
Union countries with the highest percent of GDP spent on health care 
in 2003: Switzerland had 11.5 percent, Germany 11.1 percent, and the 
Netherlands 9.8 percent (Anderson et al. 2006). While they spend less 
per person than the United States (which spent 15 percent of GDP on 
health care in 2003 and 16 percent in 2005), all three countries changed 
their health insurance systems and financing structures within the past 
decade. They also all rely on private health insurance plans, providing 
useful examples of how we might consider alternative structures for 
financing U.S. health insurance. 
The Netherlands implemented its changes on January 1, 2006 (De-
Jong and Mosca 2006; Prinsze and van Vliet 2008). Everyone in the 
country is covered for basic services; people can purchase additional 
coverage if they want. There are 33 health insurers (some of which 
are for-profit) that compete for enrollment. They cannot turn away any 
applicant for basic services although they can deny coverage for sup-
plemental policies. People can choose between plans that do and do 
not have deductibles; those with deductibles have lower premiums.12 
Everyone pays a nominal premium that depends on which plan they 
choose (in 2006, the average was 1,050 euros, or about $1,500). In ad-
dition to the premium, employers pay a payroll tax of 6.5 percent on 
their employees’ income up to 30,105 euros (about $43,050), or a maxi-
mum tax of about 2,000 euros ($2,860) per year.13 Self-employed people 
and retirees pay 4.4 percent of their income. Low-income people can 
apply for a subsidy, which is dependent on a person’s income. About 
30 percent (5 million people) of the population receive such subsidies. 
The health insurance costs of children under age 18 are viewed as the 
responsibility of the country, so parents do not explicitly pay for their 
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children’s health plans, although the children enroll in whichever plan 
the parents choose. The Dutch also reward people who have no medical 
expenses in a year with up to 255 euros in rebates.14 The Dutch have 
long had a tradition of community-rated premiums, which continues 
under the revised health insurance system. To compensate insurers that 
might experience high numbers of enrollees with high medical costs, 
the Dutch are continuing their use of a risk adjustment mechanism that 
they have been expanding since 1992 and that provides risk-adjustments 
to the premiums. As a result, insurers receive a risk-adjustment from a 
central (federal) fund according to the risk characteristics of the people 
who enrolled in the plan. (The risk characteristics are a mix of simple 
demographic characteristics and recent medical care use factors.) 
Germany requires that all people with annual incomes below about 
47,250 euros ($67,570) participate; about 10 percent of the population 
is exempt from the social system. Employees pay 7.5 percent of their 
salaries (up to 47,250 euros) and employers pay 6.6 percent of their 
workers’ salaries (up to 47,250 euros) for insurance. For the compul-
sory insurance, children and nonworking spouses are covered “free of 
charge”; there are no distinctions between individual and family poli-
cies. However, in the private insurance system, family members are 
charged separately. Private insurance premiums are set to reflect the 
expected risk of individuals, and the insurance companies can turn peo-
ple down for coverage. (The insurance companies have full access to a 
person’s medical records.) Germany is very concerned about stabilizing 
the financing of its health care system and reducing the costs of labor in 
order to increase German companies’ competitiveness. 
Switzerland implemented changes to its health insurance system in 
1996. It now requires that everyone enroll in a health insurance plan. 
(Like the United States, there were fierce debates about mandating cov-
erage, but since the law was passed, there has been widespread accep-
tance of the requirement [Noble 2007].) Insurance plans compete on 
premiums—like the Dutch system—but not on services provided. Like 
the Dutch, everyone has basic coverage and can purchase supplemental 
coverage if they want; they do not have to buy the supplemental and 
basic policies from the same insurance plan. (There were 93 insurance 
plans in 2004.) Premiums are community rated by canton for the man-
datory basic package of benefits, and there is considerable variation in 
the premiums by canton. This has created disparities by income since 
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people are restricted to buying their coverage within the cantons where 
they live. Insurers cannot reject someone who applies for the basic cov-
erage but they can reject applicants for the supplemental policies. Most 
people have the same insurer for both plans, leading some to speculate 
that people are afraid to change basic plan insurers for fear that their 
premium for the supplemental policy might then increase significantly. 
To reduce the income consequences of per capita premiums, the fed-
eral government and the canton government subsidize the premiums 
for basic coverage through tax-financed, means-tested subsidies. Other 
than paying taxes to the federal and canton governments, companies do 
not pay for the financing of health insurance. In 1996, the expectation 
was that people would pay no more than 6 percent of their tax-adjusted 
income for health insurance, but it appears that a majority of people are 
now paying 8–10 percent of income.
Principles for Financing Health Insurance
The recent experiences of these three countries offer suggestions 
for how we might think about financing the costs of health insurance in 
the United States. Most importantly, they provide a set of principles that 
ought to govern how we share the costs among various interested par-
ties. Three principles stand out. First, everyone is required to enroll in 
a health insurance plan that covers a basic set of services, and everyone 
pays at least a nominal premium. Second, the countries all subsidize 
lower-income people via taxes that flow to a central, federal fund. The 
Dutch further adjust the premium payments that go to the private insur-
ance plans with risk adjustments based on a person’s age, gender, and 
prior medical history. These risk adjustments also come from the taxes 
collected by the federal government. Third, companies help pay for the 
health insurance. Of the three countries, only Switzerland does not tax 
companies specifically for health insurance; however, the companies do 
pay taxes that are part of the general revenues used to subsidize lower-
income people’s premiums. 
We could apply these same principles to a new financing system 
for health insurance in the United States. Requiring everyone to enroll 
in a health insurance plan and setting a nominal premium for every 
person implies that individuals have an obligation to participate in a so-
cial compact such as health insurance. Moreover, requiring everyone to 
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contribute at least a small amount toward the costs of their health care 
reinforces the social compact of sharing risk for high health costs while 
simultaneously signaling that everyone is entitled to access to health 
care. Collecting additional revenues from individuals in proportion to 
their family income ensures that no person or family pays more than 
what is deemed an affordable percent of income, and that higher-income 
people contribute to the subsidization of lower-income people. Such a 
system also creates equity in that people with the same levels of income 
pay the same amount toward health insurance. Our current system does 
not have this equity. Premiums for health insurance depend primarily 
on the number and age distribution of a person’s fellow workers.
Requiring companies also to contribute to the financing of health in-
surance is part of the social compact. Companies benefit tremendously 
from having a healthy workforce, and it seems reasonable therefore that 
they also should contribute to the financing of health care. Since (as we 
discussed earlier) not all companies actually hire people as their own 
employees, it is important that companies be the organizational entities 
that are required to contribute to the financing of health insurance and 
not just “employers.” Companies might share in the financing of health 
care in a myriad of ways. For example, payments could be based on 
payroll, the number of employees (both those who are on the compa-
ny’s payroll and those who are there as temporary or contract workers), 
profits, or the value added by the company. Given our concern with the 
future of jobs in America, it is important that the financing mechanism 
for companies’ contributions not contain incentives for companies to 
reduce the number of people working for them. 
As we discussed earlier, the common perception is that employers 
pay most of the costs of health insurance. But as we also discussed, the 
costs are shared among workers, companies, consumers, and company 
stockholders, and the actual shares are determined by the markets for 
the labor used by the company and the product produced by the com-
pany. Embedded in the three principles are a notion of a social compact 
and a desire for equity in how the financing will be shared among in-
dividuals and companies. The social compact involves a responsibil-
ity to participate in the health insurance system—we all benefit from a 
system that ensures access to health care and we all have to contribute 
to that system. Further, subsidies to make sure people in weaker eco-
nomic circumstances have a basic level of insurance are part of the 
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social compact. Equity requires both that people in the same economic 
position pay the same amount and that companies contribute equally on 
whatever metric is chosen for determining company payments. 
Note that these principles would permit basic health insurance cov-
erage to be disconnected from where one works—basic insurance would 
be portable across jobs. This would increase the efficiency of the labor 
market in terms of sorting people to jobs where their talents might best 
be used. Although the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was intended to minimize “job lock” caused by 
workers’ concerns about losing health insurance if they changed jobs, 
people still have such concerns. Reconfiguring health insurance financ-
ing so that a person’s benefits did not depend on a particular company 
would eliminate the inefficiencies in labor market sorting and increase 
overall labor productivity. 
FUnDS nEEDED FOR U.S. HEALTH InSURAnCE:  
HOW MIGHT THEy BE REAPPORTIOnED?
We can do a back-of-the-envelope estimate of how health insurance 
financing would need to be distributed across all sources by examining 
recent health care expenditures by private health insurance and other 
private funds that financed care for the uninsured. Such expenditures 
would be covered by health insurance if we structure the financing such 
that everyone has health insurance. Note that almost all of this spending 
already is financed by employers and individuals, so in restructuring 
how we would pay for health insurance, we do not need to raise new 
monies other than what would be needed to cover the uninsured who 
need subsidies. Also, since we are interested in how we might restruc-
ture the financing for private health insurance, we will exclude health 
care spending paid for by Medicare and Medicare supplemental insur-
ance, Medicaid, and the military health care system. 
In 2005, the last year for which we have national health spending 
data, the United States spent a total of almost $2 trillion on health care 
(Catlin et al. 2007). We will use the financing sources in 2005 for our 
estimates, which are shown in Table 3.1. Of the $2 trillion, a little more 
than half (55 percent) was purchased with private funds (out-of-pock-
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et spending by consumers, private health insurance, and other private 
funds). Private health insurance accounted for almost $700 billion. This 
includes spending paid by Medicare supplemental health insurance pol-
icies, however. If we assume that 20 percent of the spending financed 
by private health insurance came from Medicare supplemental policies, 
then approximately $560 billion was paid by private health insurance 
for the nonelderly (line 3 of Table 3.1).15 This does not include admin-
istrative costs associated with health insurance—it simply tells us how 
much private health insurance policies paid out for health care services. 
Since the costs of billing and insurance-related administrative activi-
ties need to be included in our estimate of insurance costs, we could 
estimate those costs as 10–15 percent of what is collected in premium 
revenues (Kahn et al. 2005). That is, the $560 billion of health care 
spending for the nonelderly paid by private insurance would equal 85–
90 percent of premium revenues. This suggests that premium revenues 
for private insurance for the nonelderly were almost $622–$660 billion 
in 2005 (line 4 of Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1  Estimate of Health Care Spending That Would Have Been 
Paid by Private Insurance in 2005 for the nonelderly Who  
Are not Covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Military 
Health Care System, Using 2005 Health Care Expenditures 
(for illustrative purposes only)
Type of spending and assumption $ (billions)
(1) Total U.S. health care spending 2,000
(2) Paid by private health insurance 
Less 20% paid by Medicare supplemental
700
−140
(3) Paid by private health insurance for nonelderly 
Plus administrative costs: 10–15% of revenues
560
+ 62 – 100
(4) Total private insurance costs for nonelderly 622 – 660
(5) Out-of-pocket spending  
Retain as out-of-pocket spending
250
−150 – 200
(6) Would be covered by private insurance 50 – 100
(7) Other private funds 140
(8) Would be covered by private insurance 140
(9) Total (2005) spending that would have been 
covered by private insurance
815 – 900
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Out-of-pocket spending on health care in 2005 was about $250 bil-
lion (line 5 of Table 3.1). Out-of-pocket expenditures are generated by 
people with and without health insurance. Uninsured people often pay 
for medical care when they use it (and sometimes they pay more than 
an insured person) (Anderson 2007). Insured people are responsible for 
out-of-pocket expenditures for co-payments (including for prescription 
drugs) and deductibles as well as expenditures for over-the-counter 
medications and medical equipment that are not covered by insurance. 
In addition, some medical services such as mental health or substance 
abuse care often are not covered by health insurance policies, so expen-
ditures for such health care are paid out-of-pocket even by people with 
health benefits. We can assume that health insurance is likely to retain 
cost-sharing at the time of seeking medical care, and that a number of 
medical services such as mental health and substance abuse services 
would be covered with limits. Then perhaps between $50 and $100 bil-
lion of what were out-of-pocket expenditures in 2005 would be covered 
by health insurance if all the uninsured were covered (line 6 of Table 
3.1). The $140 billion of health spending in 2005 paid by other private 
funds largely involves charity care, and we could assume that all of 
that spending would be covered by insurance under the new financing 
structure (line 8 of Table 3.1). 
Taking all these spending estimates and assumptions together, the 
total amount of spending that we might have covered by private insur-
ance and that we would have needed to pay for under a new financing 
structure in 2005 is between $815 and $900 billion (line 9 of Table 
1). These expenditures would have been for people who were covered 
by private health insurance or were not insured; that is, they were for 
people who were not covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or military health 
coverage. In 2005, there were 203 million such people (out of a total 
population of 294 million) who generated these expenditures.16 On a 
per capita basis then, the spending financed by insurance would have 
been approximately $4,000–$4,435.
Note that in thinking about how we might reconfigure the financing 
for health insurance, the new system of premiums and taxes would re-
place payments currently made by individuals and companies for health 
insurance. We would raise a modest amount more from premiums and 
taxes than we now obtain from premiums paid by workers and employ-
ers, but everyone not currently insured would be covered.17
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Distributing the Financing for Health Insurance
How would we restructure the way we finance the $815–$900 bil-
lion (in 2005 dollars) for private health insurance? First, recall that 
these funds are not “new” or additional funds that have to be raised 
from individuals and companies. These funds were, in fact, spent on 
health care for the nonelderly in 2005. What we want to create is a new 
arrangement for how these same funds would be raised from a combi-
nation of premiums paid by individuals and taxes paid by individuals 
and companies. The new arrangement would substitute for the premi-
ums individuals and companies are paying now for private insurance as 
well as other private funds that pay for medical care. In the aggregate, 
the amount could be split between workers, companies, people who 
are not employed for pay, and company stockholders, as well as other 
payers of collective taxes raised by the federal government. We can 
assume that anyone with an income below the poverty level would be 
enrolled in Medicaid (or be fully subsidized), and anyone eligible for 
Medicare would be enrolled in Medicare, so we are focused on restruc-
turing how we finance the $815–$900 billion for private insurance. We 
might reallocate these costs along the following lines for individuals 
and companies. 
Individuals
First, we could set a nominal annual premium of $1,000 per person; 
this would account for approximately $200 billion. Of course, not ev-
eryone would be able to pay such a premium—subsidies would have to 
be provided to people with family incomes between the poverty level 
and some threshold.18 But $1,000 per year is less than $100 per month, 
and many people who are not eligible for Medicaid should be able to 
pay a sizeable portion of the $1,000. Moreover, the $1,000 per person 
per year is about what most people with employer-sponsored health 
insurance now pay out-of-pocket for their share of the premium, so it 
would not be a new burden for most people.
The remaining $615–$700 billion (plus whatever funds will be need-
ed for the subsidies to the nominal premiums) would be paid by higher-
income people (who include stockholders) and companies. Calculating 
how the members of these two groups might share the responsibility for 
the costs requires estimating sophisticated models of the distribution 
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of income, profits and productivity, and taxes paid by individuals and 
companies. More to the point, the distributional consequences of new 
taxes for health insurance must be considered in conjunction with the 
effects of other taxes. It is unlikely that reconfiguring how we might 
finance health insurance would be considered without a general review 
of the current tax code.19
Nonetheless, we can use estimates of changes in tax rates to obtain 
rough estimates of how much money might be raised by changes in the 
tax rates. In thinking about these estimates, we need to recall that what 
people and companies are paying now for health insurance would be 
replaced by any new taxes and premiums. Thus, people’s out-of-pocket 
contributions to the total premium for their employer-sponsored cov-
erage would become their tax payments for health insurance. For our 
purposes here, we will make a simplifying assumption that premium 
payments (or premium equivalent payments) by companies for health 
insurance would not be paid as increased income to workers. By as-
suming this, we can ignore the increased tax payments that workers and 
companies would have to pay if such payments became taxable income. 
Moreover, as we discuss below, these payments will shift to payroll 
taxes (or some other tax) that the employers will pay.
Currently, for individuals, the lowest tax rate for ordinary taxable 
income is 10 percent and the highest rate is 35 percent (for income 
above $349,700 in 2007).20 The Congressional Budget Office (2007) 
has estimated the change in revenues that would occur if small changes 
were made in a number of taxes. If all tax rates on ordinary income 
were increased by 1 percentage point, tax revenues would increase by 
$30.3 billion in 2010. If just the top ordinary tax rate were increased by 
1 percentage point, revenues would go up by only $5.5 billion in 2010. 
Thus, it is clear that very small changes in the individual tax rates would 
not yield the magnitude of funds needed. A tax code change that would 
yield somewhat larger revenue increases is to limit the total of itemized 
deductions (for example, state and local income and property taxes, 
home mortgage interest payments, and contributions to charitable in-
stitutions) to 15 percent of a household’s income. This would cause 
tax revenues to increase by $54.7 billion in 2010 and $90.3 billion in 
2011. In contrast to these changes, if the tax cuts enacted since 2001 are 
made permanent, tax revenues will decline by $97.8 billion in 2011 and 
$174.7 billion in 2012. In the face of growing needs for federal dollars, 
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these tax revenue losses could not easily be made up by small changes 
in the tax rates. 
Clearly, for taxes on individuals to fund a substantial share of the 
$615–$700 billion for health insurance, the personal income tax cuts 
of 2001 will have to be rolled back and additional taxes imposed. But 
we are not expecting that individuals will pay all of the $615–$700 bil-
lion—the principles noted earlier include the principle that companies 
should pay substantial amounts of the health insurance costs, too. More-
over, since companies now are paying the majority of health insurance 
costs and we are simply working to restructure how the total costs are 
allocated, we would expect those same dollars to be coming into the fi-
nancing system. The dollars will likely be distributed differently across 
all companies, however, because many companies do not now offer 
ESI as we discussed earlier. The question is, how should those dollars 
be apportioned?
Companies
Corporate income does not appear to be a good basis for taxing 
companies to finance health insurance—only about 8 percent of busi-
nesses currently pay corporate income taxes. In July 2006, corporate 
tax receipts for the nine months between September 2005 and June 
2006 were $250 billion (Andrews 2006).21 The corporate income tax 
has been a declining source of federal revenues since 1950. In 1952, 
corporate income tax receipts accounted for almost a third of federal 
tax receipts, but since the 1980s they have accounted for less than 10 
percent (Friedman 2003). 
Payroll taxes have replaced corporate income taxes as a substantial 
source of federal tax revenues. In 1952, they accounted for 10 percent of 
all federal tax receipts, but in 2003, the fraction was 40 percent (Fried-
man 2003). The second largest payroll tax paid by companies is that for 
the Medicare Part A Trust Fund, also known as the Medicare Hospital 
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. The Medicare payroll tax is 1.45 percent 
and it applies to all employee earnings paid by an employer (there is no 
maximum on what is taxable income); individual workers also pay a tax 
of 1.45 percent on their wages and salary, so the combined Medicare HI 
tax rate is 2.9 percent of earnings.22 In 2006, the Medicare HI payroll 
tax revenues were $211.5 billion—half paid by companies and half paid 
by workers (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 2007). 
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This provides an estimate of the amount of financing we could raise 
from employers if we were to use a payroll tax: a tax paid by employers 
of almost 3 percent of payroll in 2006 would have raised about $215 
billion and a tax of 6 percent would have raised about $430 billion. To 
put this in perspective, a payroll tax of 6 percent would have raised at 
least 60 percent of the $615–$700 billion needed in 2005.
There are benefits and costs to using a payroll tax for obtaining 
company financing for health insurance. The costs are that a payroll tax 
raises the costs of labor, providing an incentive for companies to look 
for cheaper ways of producing their products, most likely involving less 
labor. However, the payroll tax needs to be seen in the context of how 
much many companies are now paying for ESI; a 6 percent payroll tax 
is on average what companies that provide employer-sponsored health 
insurance are paying now. Equally important, it is likely to be less ex-
pensive than what companies expect health insurance premiums will 
cost them later this decade. The other cost associated with using a pay-
roll tax to collect health insurance financing from companies is that an 
increasing number of workers are not technically employees of a com-
pany—they are hired through temporary agencies or contract houses or 
are self-employed and have a contract to do a specific task. They are 
not part of the payroll for which companies pay taxes. If a payroll tax 
is used to obtain financing from companies, then it needs to apply to 
companies that hire people as contingent workers as well. 
The primary benefit from using a payroll tax is that it redistributes 
the costs of employer financing of health insurance so that all employ-
ers are paying for health insurance. Large companies with legacy work-
forces will no longer be paying significantly more for ESI than their 
competitors with younger workforces. Further, the payroll tax creates a 
progressive tax across companies relative to company payrolls—com-
panies with low-wage workers would pay less than companies with 
high-income workers, so companies with high margins would subsidize 
companies with low margins.
Summary of Distributing the Financing across Individuals  
and Companies
In sum, if we had been financing private health insurance for the 
nonelderly in 2005, we would have needed between $815 and $900 bil-
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lion. An annual per person premium of $1,000 paid by everyone who 
was not enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare would have raised about 
$200 billion. The remaining $615–$700 billion would then have been 
shared by individual taxpayers and companies. If companies exchange 
what they are paying now for ESI for a payroll tax of 6 percent, rev-
enues of about $430 billion would have been collected. The remaining 
$185–$270 billion would have to come either from increased taxes paid 
by individuals or a combination of individuals and a slightly higher 
payroll tax. 
A SEA CHAnGE AnD THE nEED TO ACT QUICkLy 
We are in the midst of a sea change in how private health insurance 
is financed for most Americans. The last half of the twentieth century 
was a period when employer-sponsored health insurance grew rapidly 
and became the source of private health insurance for as many as 70 
percent of the nonelderly population. But in the last decade, the propor-
tion of nonelderly with ESI has declined to about 60 percent, and em-
ployers are pulling back from paying for health insurance to the extent 
that they did even just five years ago. The twin forces behind this sea 
change are the global economy and the continuing high rates of increase 
in health care spending and insurance premiums. Looking to the near 
future, it is clear that we need to restructure how we pay for health in-
surance before the economic changes already under way cause a large 
fraction of the nonelderly to become uninsured.
Greater Equity and Efficiency
The need to restructure how we finance health insurance provides 
an opportunity for creating a financing system that is more equitable 
and more efficient than the current system of ESI and individually pur-
chased coverage. Restructuring the system so everyone would have 
coverage and everyone would pay in proportion to their income is far 
more equitable than what we have now. Currently, whether a person has 
insurance at all and the premium that a person pays depend on where a 
person works, who else works for the company, and a person’s own de-
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mographic characteristics and health history. Restructuring the financ-
ing so a company would pay only a tax rather than being involved in 
negotiating premiums and terms of a policy also is more efficient for 
employers. Companies would not have to pay for administrative costs 
associated with sponsoring health insurance. They also would not have 
to worry about possible adverse consequences to their premiums of hir-
ing someone who has a medical condition (for example, diabetes or 
asthma). As a result, the labor market would operate more efficiently.
Restructuring the financing of health insurance also would create a 
safety net for everyone—something that is going to be increasingly im-
portant as the country goes through other significant changes affecting 
our economy and society in the next two decades. The global economy 
is forcing changes on how we manufacture and produce an increas-
ing array of products, putting pressure on pensions and retiree health 
coverage as well as health insurance. The demographic changes and 
longer life expectancies are pushing people to rethink how long they 
need to work to have enough income in retirement. It is increasingly ob-
vious that many Americans do not have sufficient savings to carry them 
through their old age. This is coming at a time when Medicare is in need 
of a financing restructuring, too. Finally, the age cohorts that are cur-
rently most affected by the lack of health insurance are also cohorts that 
are being squeezed by debts for higher education and the consequences 
of deficit spending over the past six years. Having a basic level of health 
insurance for everyone would provide a level of security that is going to 
be greatly needed if we are to avoid a general malaise.
Basic Insurance and the need to Restrain Growth in Spending
The United States is not alone in struggling to slow the rate of in-
crease in health care spending. All of the OECD countries and Japan 
are experiencing similar rates of increases in health care spending. This 
is good for American companies that are competing with companies 
in these countries since their health care costs are increasing at about 
the same rate as those in the United States. But at the same time, the 
similar rates of growth in spending mean that if we are to be successful 
competitors in a global economy, we need to restrain the rate of growth 
in the United States to keep our labor costs competitive. Particularly 
given the difficult transitions we are likely facing in the next decade or 
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two, we simply cannot afford to have per capita spending on health care 
continue to rise at rates that far exceed productivity growth. 
One way to restrain growth in medical spending is to finance only 
a basic package of health care services. This is the conclusion that the 
European Union countries have reached, although some allow people to 
purchase supplemental coverage if they wish. A basic package of health 
care services could include most if not all of the health care services 
that are now covered by most large companies. But in the future, new 
services would have to be shown to be cost-effective to be included in 
the basic package. This would provide an incentive for innovators to 
look for less costly ways of producing the same service.
Private Insurance Can Be Retained
Restructuring how we pay for health insurance does not have to 
be synonymous with a single-payer, national health insurance system. 
We can still have a system where people choose among private health 
insurance companies just as they do in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land. Financing funds are collected in these countries through a cen-
tral agency, and then premium equivalent funds are sent to the insurers 
selected by individuals. However, in order to compensate insurers for 
enrolling individuals who may be likely to incur higher than average 
medical expenses, we also would want to adjust the premium payments 
for factors known to increase health care spending. As noted earlier, the 
Netherlands has a risk adjustment system that does this, and the risk 
adjustment models are very similar to those developed by Medicare and 
Medicaid for adjusting payments for enrollees who are in managed care 
plans. We also would need to understand more about why there are large 
regional differences in how much medical care people receive—specifi-
cally, how many different types of services are provided. To the extent 
that those differences are meaningful and justified, we also would need 
to adjust premiums on the basis of where one lives.
Finance Restructuring Must Be Done Quickly
The United States is experiencing a sea change in businesses’ atti-
tudes toward their role in financing and organizing health insurance for 
workers. Particularly because of the pressures from the global economy, 
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companies feel they cannot compete if they cannot control spending for 
employee health benefits. Given the rapid rate of increase in premiums 
for ESI over the past six years especially, employers have reached a 
level of frustration where they no longer believe they can continue to 
pay for future costs of health coverage. Many also have decided that 
they do not need to offer ESI to attract or retain workers. This slip-
page in business support for ESI is likely to accelerate over the next 
decade, creating a crisis for millions of Americans as well as medical 
care providers. 
This looming crisis could be mitigated or even avoided altogether if 
the country’s public and private policy leaders move now to establish a 
new structure for financing health insurance for the nonelderly who are 
not enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare. There is an urgent need to start 
restructuring the financing—it will take time to agree on the different 
shares that workers, companies, people who are not employed for pay, 
and company stockholders will pay. And in the meantime, the market 
forces that are driving companies to decide they cannot afford to pay 
more for health insurance will continue to pressure businesses. As the 
percentage of companies that offer ESI gets closer to 50 percent, which 
it will within this next decade, we will arrive at a tipping point where 
large numbers of firms may choose to stop sponsoring health benefits. 
We need to structure a new way of paying for health insurance—with 
the help of business leaders, labor leaders, academics, and public poli-
cymakers—before we reach that tipping point.
America’s challenge in the new global economy is to provide a 
safety net of social services—particularly health insurance—so that 
companies and workers will be able to use their imagination and skills 
to create new products that the world economy will purchase. Sharing 
the financing of these social services more equitably among companies 
and individuals will help ensure growth in the American economy—on 
which a future of good jobs and a strong nation depends.
notes
I want to thank particularly Susan Houseman, Timothy Bartik, and Frank Levy for 
providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of the chapter; they are not responsible for 
any errors that remain.
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 1.  Given the role that the country’s largest companies—including General Motors—
played in the decade right after World War II in establishing employer-sponsored 
group health insurance rather than supporting national health insurance, there is 
some irony in the leaders of the automotive industry now suggesting that the gov-
ernment should have a large responsibility for health care expenditures.
 2. People who have studied the contingent workforce, including Susan Houseman, 
have raised concerns about the way respondents to the CPS may be answering 
questions about where they work and therefore whether the survey is picking up 
the full extent to which people are working as contract workers or as self-em-
ployed people. 
 3. Congress enacted section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which elimi-
nated confusion arising from a 1953 IRS ruling that seemed to contradict its 1943 
ruling that employer contributions to health insurance policies were tax-exempt. 
 4. In addition, an employer can pay more for ESI and thereby provide something 
more for all employees—but if the employer increases the wages of everyone in 
a certain position or rank, the employer then has to increase the wages of all the 
workers in more senior positions. This can be a far more costly proposition for 
companies. 
 5. Companies may choose to create different premium shares paid by employees 
based on income tiers—so higher-income employees pay more than lower- 
income workers—but the premium charged per employee by the insurer is the 
same within policy tier choice. Self-insured employers could set employee shares 
of premiums individually—perhaps on the basis of income, for example—but 
they have been reluctant to do this. One reason may be that companies have long 
stressed that ESI is a group benefit, and even self-insured firms are loathe to break 
the grouping bonds by setting employee shares of premiums that are highly tai-
lored to individual workers’ characteristics.
 6. Note, however, that by shifting more of the lower level of medical expenses onto 
workers, people are bearing more of their medical expenses when they are sick or 
if they have chronic conditions.
 7. Author’s tabulations from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Office of Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Covered Employment 
and Wages (ES-202) data. See also Swartz (2006, Chapter 2, pp. 22–23).
 8. State and local governments’ accounting standards are set by the Governmen-
tal Accounting Standards Board (GASB), which in 2005 adopted rules similar to 
those of FASB. See also Freudenheim and Walsh (2005) and Carroll (2007).
 9. Moreover, as employment growth has been occurring in firms that are new com-
panies, a rising fraction of current workers do not have retiree health benefits as 
part of their benefits. This puts yet more pressure on those companies with aging 
workforces to reduce their labor costs by restricting their own obligations for re-
tiree benefits for current workers.
 10. The competition between the Big Three automakers and Toyota America offers 
a stark illustration of these differences. The Big Three contend that when wage, 
health care, retiree health care, and pensions are included, they pay UAW work-
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ers $70–$75 per hour, whereas Toyota and the other Japanese automakers pay 
$40–$45 per hour for cars made at plants in the United States.
 11. Momentum for this shift appears to be growing as rapidly as the shift from defined 
benefit pensions to 401(K) plans a decade ago and the move by employers to 
change their ESI benefits from indemnity health insurance plans to managed care 
plans at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.
 12. The highest deductible in 2006 was 500 euros (or about $715) per person. See 
the Royal Netherlands Government (2006). All dollar amounts in this chapter 
are based on the exchange rate as of October 18, 2007, which was $1.43.
 13. Technically, the individuals pay the 6.5 percent tax on their income up to 30,150 
euros, but employers are required to reimburse this amount to their employees.
 14. In 2005, almost 4 million people received this rebate.
 15. Author’s assumption based on approximations from Keehan et al. (2004).   
 16. Author’s calculations from census data contained in DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Lee (2006).
17. Of course, perhaps as many as 40 percent of the people currently uninsured would 
be covered by Medicaid or be fully subsidized for their health insurance premium 
because they are poor or near-poor.
18. We could assume that 22.8 million uninsured with incomes between one and three 
times the poverty level in 2006 would be subsidized on a sliding scale related to 
their incomes. If the average subsidy were $700 per person, such a subsidy would 
cost about $16 billion.
 19. Three issues are particularly likely to cause the tax code to be revised. One is the 
fact that the country now has a large deficit. The second is that the alternative min-
imum tax (AMT) is not doing what it was intended to do and is instead affecting 
the taxes of increasing numbers of Americans. Third, there is increasing evidence 
that the very highest income earners in the country have benefited tremendously 
over the past two decades from the growth in productivity, but that the great bulk 
of people with incomes below the top 5 percent have not gained at all (see Levy 
and Temin 2007). Moreover, the changes in the tax code since 2001 have been 
highly regressive; if made permanent, they will become even more regressive. 
(If the tax cuts become permanent in 2011—as opposed to sunsetting at the end 
of 2010—the burden of federal taxes will shift onto middle-income taxpayers.) 
As the Urban Institute-Brooking Institution’s Tax Policy Center (2006) estimates, 
taxpayers in the top 1 percent of the income distribution would see their share of 
the federal tax burden fall by 0.5 percentage points, while the share paid by house-
holds in the middle of the income distribution would increase by 0.1 percentage 
points. All of this suggests that before 2010, the country will at a minimum repeal 
the tax cuts for the highest income households, and then begin a serious overhaul 
of the tax code.
20. Income from long-term capital gains is taxed at lower rates, as is income from 
dividends (until 2010). The alternative minimum tax (AMT) will become the tax 
system for almost all people with incomes between $200,000 and $500,000 by 
2010 if it is not changed; and the Urban Institute–Brookings Institution’s Tax 
Policy Center (2006) estimates that almost half of all households with incomes 
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between $75,000 and $100,000 will pay the AMT by 2010 unless Congress acts 
to change current law. The AMT is extremely complicated, so comparing ordinary 
income tax rates with the AMT is not meaningful.
  21. The $250 billion for the nine months was 26 percent larger than the amount raised 
a year earlier for the same nine months.
  22. The primary payroll tax collected from companies is the tax for Social Security for 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—what most people call Social Security. 
Employers pay a tax rate of 5.3 percent on earnings up to an annual maximum per 
person ($97,500 in 2007) for the OASI Trust Fund. Workers also pay 5.3 percent 
of their earnings up to the annual maximum so the combined payroll tax paid by 
employers and workers for OASI is 10.6 percent. There is a second Social Secu-
rity payroll tax for the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund; the DI payroll tax is 
0.9 percent, which employers and workers each pay for a combined rate of 1.8 
percent on earnings up to the annual maximum.  
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Trade and Immigration 
Implications for the U.S. Labor Market 
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University of California, Santa Cruz, and
Peterson Institute for International Economics
In the United States, debate and concern about trade and immigra-
tion, two of the major components of globalization, have focused to 
date on low and moderately skilled workers. This focus is changing. As 
trade in services expands and as attention is directed to American tech-
nological leadership and a high-skill workforce, the more highly-skilled 
sides of trade and immigration are emerging as topical concerns for 
policy and politics. With the growth of services trade and the potential 
for services offshoring, the set of workers at risk of job displacement 
has broadened from a production and manufacturing focus to include 
professionals, office and administrative workers, and more generally 
the services sector. The migration of foreign-born skilled workers, par-
ticularly in the information technology sector, creates another outlet 
where more highly skilled domestic workers feel threatened by interna-
tional forces. While it might be an overstatement to conclude that trade 
and immigration are two sides of the same coin in the sense of posing 
foreign competition to American workers, there are informative par-
allels for policy analysis. Importantly, international trade (as the flow 
of goods and services) and immigration and migration (as the flow of 
potential labor) are two sides of the same coin from the perspective 
of measured impact. In both cases, measured impact (net benefit) is a 
question of distribution: the net benefits of both are unevenly distrib-
uted. As Lowenstein (2006) notes, “Like any form of economic change, 
immigration causes distress and disruption to some” (pg. 71). Change 
one word, and the same sentence applies to trade. 
On the political and policy side, 2008 is an important time, and the 
window of opportunity may be open only for a short period. President 
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Bush’s trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as fast-track 
authority to negotiate trade agreements, expired at the end of June 2007, 
and TAA authorization expired that fall. It may not be an opportune time 
for the Bush administration to push for trade expansion. With the return 
of Congress to Democratic leadership following the midterm elections 
in November 2006, the ground has shifted on trade-related legislation. 
Passions about trade topics are running high, given the size of the cur-
rent account deficit and the imbalance with China. The so-called social 
effects of trade are likely to get a louder hearing under Democrats. In 
particular, enforcing tougher labor standards for other countries within 
trade agreements will get some attention, which is due in no small part 
to strategic choices by organized labor. During the summer of 2007, 
Congress discussed (and ultimately failed to pass) a bipartisan immi-
gration compromise—potential legislation addressing undocumented 
migrants, a guest worker program, border security, and a point system 
for green cards. All of this activity is taking place amid broadening 
anxiety over the impact of trade and immigration at home. 
This chapter adds a focus on skilled migration, services trade, and 
offshoring to the existing assessment of the impact of trade and immi-
gration on the labor market and domestic workers. I review recent stud-
ies of services trade and offshoring in the context of more established 
analyses of manufacturing trade and production-worker job loss. On the 
immigration side, I examine issues and concerns regarding high-skill 
migration that add complexity to the ongoing debate on the domestic 
labor market impact of immigration, particularly that of undocumented 
migration. A concluding section offers policy recommendations. 
STARTInG POInTS—A BRIEF SynTHESIS OF  
THE LITERATURE
Trade: U.S. Gains from Global Integration; Trade-Related Job Loss
Almost without exception, economists view trade liberalization as a 
known and proven method of increasing national income. Comparative 
advantage, economies of scale, technological spillovers, and import 
competition are the main channels for (net) increases in national in-
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come. Production efficiencies result from all four of these channels. Im-
port competition is the most controversial, in that when domestic firms 
lose market share or close, workers, firm owners, and communities lose 
sources of income and profits. It is widely agreed that the benefits are 
large and diffuse, and the costs relatively smaller and concentrated.1
There is a sizable literature quantifying the gains from trade and 
investment liberalization. Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005) syn-
thesize a large number of studies using different methods and assump-
tions. The various estimates reveal substantial gains—on the order of 
$1 trillion annually—from past integration. The estimates are notable 
in size: “The estimated gain in 2003 income is in the range of $2,800 to 
$5,000 additional income for the average person and between $7,100 
and $12,900 for the average household” (pg. 68). Estimates of gains 
from future integration range from $450 billion to $1.3 trillion annually. 
Gains from future integration will be large because of the (likely) inclu-
sion of agriculture and services. Readers interested in a more detailed 
discussion of gains (from product variety to firm productivity) should 
consult Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005).2 
Richardson (2004) provides a cogent summary of research detail-
ing the unevenness of gains. Firms that are globally engaged, through 
exports, imports, investment, outsourcing, and licensing, share distinc-
tive benefits. Some of these benefits include faster growth rates, lower 
risk of plant closure, and higher worker wages. The gains from import 
liberalization are broadly distributed.3 
Recent attention has been drawn to free-trade skeptics, economists 
whose writings have been interpreted as noting second thoughts about 
free trade. Examples include Samuelson (2004), Blinder (2006), and 
Rodrik (2006). In all cases, the remarks are not really new; rather, the 
remarks represent a change in tone (emphasizing distributional aspects 
over aggregate welfare gains), or a highlight of points known for some 
time but largely ignored. Samuelson (2004) is a prominent example 
in his consideration of the timely issue of technological progress and 
human capital advancement in developing countries. Samuelson’s ba-
sic point is that there are situations where free trade, in the context of 
changes in comparative advantage, is not always welfare-enhancing. He 
points out that in simple cases of (large) differences in labor productiv-
ity, free trade leads unambiguously to increases in national income for 
both countries. Yet in the case where a country (call it China) improves 
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productivity in the goods it imports (and thus the goods that the United 
States exports), trade can be wiped out (if the productivity improve-
ment is just enough to equalize wage ratios), robbing the United States 
of the benefits of trade it previously enjoyed. In other words, technical 
progress in China can reduce the potential benefits of trade experienced 
by the United States. For example, if China began producing aircraft 
(a good it imports and the United States exports), the United States 
would be made worse off by the direct change in the terms of trade.4 As 
Panagariya (2004) notes, this point about productivity growth and tech-
nological change is not new; when the United States was growing faster 
than Europe in the 1950s, Europeans were concerned that U.S. growth 
might decrease their standard of living; when Japan was growing in the 
1960s and 1970s, the United States was concerned about Japan’s effects 
on American standards of living.5
In fairness to the aforementioned skeptics, none dispute the overall 
gains from trade. Rather, they take up reallocative costs and the uneven 
distribution of gains. Because traditionally the gains from free trade have 
played a much larger role in economic discourse than any discussion of 
the costs, there seems to be some notion of skepticism when influential 
scholars pick up the refrain that benefits are net, with often considerable 
gross costs. In part, this unevenness comes from the prominence of eco-
nomic theory, where, as noted by Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan 
(2004, pg. 111), “Popular economic models of trade, at least the basic 
ones . . . typically assume that workers who lose one job can readily find 
another. . . . In the real world, workers may suffer through a period of 
joblessness and displacement.” These real-world questions are clearly 
empirical in nature. There are agents and units in the economy (work-
ers, firms, and communities) that bear costs because of firm closure, job 
loss, or reemployment at lower earnings. Community futures are often 
tied to employment opportunities. Scaling up summaries of microdata 
outcomes reported in Kletzer (2001), Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer 
(2005) estimate that U.S. trade-displaced manufacturing workers lose 
$54 billion in lifetime earnings. Yet federal government spending on 
programs explicitly tied to trade liberalization (such as Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance) is less than $2 billion annually, clearly far less than 
the worker costs and overwhelmingly smaller than the permanent gains 
from trade and investment liberalization. 
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The discussion here is hardly unique in noting the large and positive 
net benefits of free trade, and the corresponding ability of free trade’s 
“winners” to compensate the “losers,” based on the estimated sizes of 
benefits and costs. Within the economics literature, the presumption that 
the losers can be compensated (at least partially if not fully) is strong, 
and often seems to serve as adequate justification for promoting policies 
that advance free trade. These presumptions work well in the academic 
literature but are problematic in any policy or political context. 
One key problem is that presumptions of an ability to compensate 
have only weakly translated into a record of compensation policies and 
programs. The record of trade liberalizations undertaken by the United 
States is not matched by a record of policies to compensate workers for 
their trade-related job losses. The creation of, and reforms to, Trade Ad-
justment Assistance (TAA) have some parallels to rounds of trade lib-
eralization, but the important dimension is in results, and on this score 
there is little sense that TAA brings to workers any form of adequate 
compensation.6
The highly visible nature of job loss, along with the failure of cur-
rent federal adjustment programs to compensate workers for their loss-
es, clearly weakens popular support for the view that economic integra-
tion brings widespread benefits. Yet opinions about trade liberalization 
do become more favorable when it is linked to worker adjustment pro-
grams (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The public sense remains strong 
that fairness dictates compensation for workers affected by trade. Ac-
cess to a wider variety of goods, at lower prices, seems to be of little 
relief when accompanied by job insecurity. 
Immigration
Similar to trade, immigration imparts both benefits and costs to the 
United States.7 With the flow of people across borders, the benefit/cost 
calculations are even more political and emotional, given the complexi-
ties of race, ethnicity, class, language, and geography. But the questions 
remain distributional ones: how much is lost by native workers com-
peting with immigrant labor; how much is gained by native workers 
complementary to immigrant labor; how much is gained by consumers 
of immigrant-produced goods and services (standard consumer benefit 
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of a factor increase); and if immigration lowers the price of labor, what 
are the gains to employers?
Both academic and popular discussions of the impact of immigra-
tion on the employment opportunities of natives start with the basic 
textbook model of a competitive labor market where an influx of im-
migrant workers lowers the wage of competing (native) workers. (The 
earnings of complementary factors—whether labor or capital—in-
crease.) That is, immigrants represent an outward shift of the labor sup-
ply curve, along a downward sloping labor demand curve. Given the 
widespread appeal of a simple demand and supply model, there is often 
surprise that the literature provides mixed results. Measured impacts 
vary considerably across studies, and it is commonly concluded that the 
estimated effects cluster around zero (Borjas 2003; Friedberg and Hunt 
1995). More specifically, Friedberg and Hunt (1995, pg. 42) conclude 
strongly that “there is no evidence of economically significant reduc-
tions in native employment.” On the wage side, estimated effects are 
truly small, with a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants 
being associated with a 1 percent reduction in native wages. 
Skill is very much the essence of the question about the impact 
of immigration, and skill is strongly associated with country of origin. 
The European dominance of migration to the United States, stemming 
from the national origin quotas of the Immigrant and Nationality Act 
of 1924, have given way to an Asian, Mexican, and Central American 
dominance, following the establishment of preferences for family re-
unification in the 1965 Immigration Act. Card (2005) reports, from the 
2000 census, that both recent and more established migrants include a 
much larger fraction of people with low levels of educational attain-
ment than is true for natives. About 40 percent of recent (less than five 
years) and more established (five-plus years) migrants are high school 
dropouts, as compared to 13 percent of natives. Card also notes that 
immigrants were 13 percent of the working-age population in the 2000 
census, yet they made up 28 percent of the population having less than 
a high school diploma. Thus, from a relative supply perspective (the 
basis of the straightforward demand and supply model), natives with 
the lowest levels of education are seen as those facing the greatest labor 
market competition from migrants, and most studies have focused on 
this group. This group has also faced potentially adverse consequences 
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from increasing manufacturing trade, from a stagnant minimum wage, 
and from declining unionization.
For economists, the debate about immigration is also methodologi-
cal. Exploiting the presence of many local labor markets in the United 
States with different fractions of immigrants and therefore different rel-
ative supplies of skilled labor, one approach uses a cross-city research 
design.8 If cities were closed economies, this approach might mimic the 
shift in labor supply associated with the textbook model. But cities are 
not isolated or closed; if natives respond to changes in price and wages, 
the impact of immigration may be diffused. In addition, migrants are 
not likely to be randomly distributed across cities, which means there 
is the potential for spurious correlations between migrant flows and 
changes in native employment opportunities. Recognizing the flow of 
goods and factors across local labor markets, the second approach is 
national, relating changes in relative outcomes to time-series changes 
in immigrant shares. This approach lacks a clear counterfactual (what 
would have happened without immigration), in part because of coinci-
dent time trends such as technological change.
Lewis (2005) takes on the interesting question of why local labor 
market outcomes of low-skilled natives are not much affected by rela-
tive supply shocks. Despite the large impact of immigrants on the rela-
tive supply of low-skilled workers, there is little impact on the wages 
of native low-skilled workers. He finds an absorption of unskilled im-
migrants within industries in high immigrant cities.9
MOvInG UP THE SkILL LADDER: TRADE  
AnD IMMIGRATIOn
Services Trade and Services Offshoring
Globalization, particularly globalized production, is evolving and 
broadening from manufacturing into services. Services activities have 
become increasingly tradable and now account for a larger share of 
global trade than in the past. Services trade has almost doubled over 
the past decade and a half: over the period 1990 to 2005, exports have 
increased from $189 billion to $353 billion, and imports have increased 
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from $143 billion to $267 billion (GPO Access 2007, Table B-25). 
These changes, and their implications for American firms and workers, 
have attracted widespread attention.
That trade is now different can be seen simply in the phrase “knowl-
edge industries.” Knowledge industries are characterized by a focus on 
creating value from new ideas and concepts, a notion that is different 
from creating value from material inputs and physical labor. Firms 
have always had ideas and used knowledge, of course, but now the out-
put is often information-based, intangible, or conceptual. Knowledge 
work and output includes areas such as software development, finan-
cial services, pharmaceuticals, engineering services, and biotechnol-
ogy. Knowledge work need not be “new”; it can include new products, 
services, and processes within older and more established industries 
such as architectural and accounting services. Trade in knowledge in-
dustries and in information technology–enabled service activities have 
broadened services trade beyond the traditional areas of transportation, 
travel, and tourism.
The growth in services trade is seen in Figure 4.1, which shows net 
exports of services.10 The United States is a net exporter of many ser-
vices, most prominently financial services, business, professional and 
technical services, and education. The trade surplus in services is in 
contrast to goods trade, where imports exceed exports by a wide margin 
(Figure 4.2).
Services offshoring, which is the migration of jobs (but not the 
people performing them) across national borders (mostly from rich 
countries to poor ones), has received considerable attention since 2000. 
Fueled by the 2004 presidential race and continued slack in the labor 
market, the services-offshoring debate became headline material. The 
literature on services offshoring is expanding rapidly (see Jensen and 
Kletzer 2006 and Blinder 2006 for references).
The scope of the phenomenon is largely unknown because of a lack 
of data. Anxiety over services trade is often fueled by one simple statis-
tic: the large share of employment in the services sector. As Figure 4.3 
shows, services employment has been predominant in the United States 
for more than 30 years, and the services sector now accounts for 70 per-
cent of total civilian employment (GPO Access 2007, Table B46). Most 
observers believe that the scope of services offshoring will be large, 
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even huge. Here is an example, from the Web site of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology: 
Recently, however, offshoring has begun to strike at the very high-
tech jobs that we believed U.S. workers would move to fill as 
blue-collar opportunities shifted to other countries.  A Cable News 
Network report in early March 2006 noted that 500,000 American 
jobs have migrated to India in recent years. That number is ex-
pected to triple in the next two years as American companies seek 
to cuts costs and streamline business.  India is but one example of 
a country that seems to be gaining employment at the expense of 
American workers. Over the last six years, the U.S. has lost just 
under 3 million jobs due to offshoring.
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Now, we are witnessing software engineering, computer design, 
research and development, radiology, architecture and design and 
other high-value-added positions moving offshore to low-wage 
markets such as India, China, Ireland, and Brazil (Committee on 
Science and Technology 2006).
Jensen and Kletzer (2006) developed a new empirical approach to 
identify, at a detailed level, service activities that are potentially exposed 
to international trade. The approach uses the geographic concentration 
of service activities within the United States to identify which service 
activities are traded domestically, then classifies activities that are trad-
ed domestically as potentially tradable internationally. With the trad-
ability classification, we developed estimates of the number of workers 
who are in tradable activities for all sectors of the economy. The paper 
offers comparisons of the demographic characteristics of workers in 
tradable and nontradable activities and employment growth in traded 
and nontraded service activities. The tradability designation also allows 
an examination of the risk of job loss and other employment outcomes 
for workers in tradable activities. 
Figure 4.2  U.S. Trade in Goods, 1992–2005
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The Jensen and Kletzer methodology finds substantial employment 
in tradable service industries and occupations. Given the overall size 
of the services sector, it may not be surprising that more workers are 
employed in tradable industries in the services sector than in the manu-
facturing sector. Outside of education, health care, and personal care 
occupations, the typical white-collar occupation involves a potentially 
tradable activity. Workers in these industries and occupations are more 
highly skilled and have higher incomes than workers in the manufactur-
ing sector and nontradable service activities. But the higher incomes are 
not solely a result of higher skill levels—in regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics, workers in select tradable service activities 
earn 16–17 percent higher incomes than similar workers in nontradable 
activities in the same sector.
There is little evidence that tradable service industries or occupa-
tions have lower employment growth than nontradable industries or 
occupations overall, though employment growth is negative for trad-
able services at the low end of the skill distribution. High-skill service 
activities have the highest employment growth rates.
Figure 4.3  U.S. Employment by Aggregated Sector, 1970–2006
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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While the share of employment in tradable services is large, this 
does not suggest that all or even most of these jobs are likely to move 
offshore. Just because an activity is tradable does not necessarily mean 
that the job will move to a lower-cost location. Tradable services are 
largely consistent with U.S. comparative advantage. While professional 
and business services are more skilled and higher paying than manufac-
turing in general, tradable services within these sectors are even more 
highly skilled and more highly paid than nontradable service activities. 
As technological and organizational change increases the potential for 
trade in services, economic activity within the United States will shift 
to activities consistent with comparative advantage. Because these ac-
tivities are consistent with U.S. comparative advantage, it is possible 
that further liberalization in international services trade would directly 
benefit workers and firms in the United States. 
Jensen and Kletzer (2007) extend the examination of tradable jobs 
with a focus on the task and activity content of jobs, in order to develop 
measures of the occupational job tasks, activities, and characteristics 
associated with potential offshoring. The literature on offshoring notes 
that movable jobs are those with the following characteristics: little 
face-to-face customer contact, high information content, and a work 
process that is Internet-enabled or telecommutable (Bardhan and Kroll 
2003; Blinder 2006; Dossani and Kenney 2003). More informally, it is 
commonly believed that if the output of a job can be sent down a wire 
(or sent wireless), that job is offshorable. 
The next step involves an operational assessment of how the basic 
principles of offshorability (high information content, remote from cus-
tomer, Internet-enabled) match up to the characteristics of “real” jobs. 
Detailed information on the content and context of jobs (occupations) 
is available from O*Net, a U.S. Department of Labor database of 450 
occupations. (O*Net is the successor to the well-known Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles.) For each of hundreds of occupations, O*Net con-
tains detailed qualitative information on job tasks, work activities (in-
teracting with computers, processing information), and work context 
(face-to-face discussions, work with others, work outdoors).
The Jensen and Kletzer index of offshorability (in which occupa-
tions are ranked based on a weighting of these characteristics) produces 
occupations that are “most tradable,” such as credit authorizers, data-
entry keyers, accountants, medical transcriptionists, market research 
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analysts, bookkeepers, and account clerks. Occupations at the bottom 
of the list, the “least tradable,” include crossing guards, massage thera-
pists, manicurists, and barbers. 
Blinder (2007) explores a subjective index based on various mea-
sures of face-to-face interaction: establishing and maintaining personal 
relationships, assisting and caring for others, performing for or working 
directly with the public, selling to others or influencing others, being 
aware of others’ reactions and understanding why they react as they 
do (social perceptiveness). He concludes that an objective index does 
poorly in assessing offshorability (as compared to his subjective assess-
ment, based on O*Net data). His subjective index does not incorporate 
any attributes related to amount of information content or to Internet 
enabling, nor does he consider the creativity or routineness of work.11 
Objective measures may well be preferred, given the number of oc-
cupations (more than 450) and the desire for replication. Using both 
production and nonproduction occupations, Blinder estimates that 30 to 
40 million workers are currently in potentially tradable jobs, based on 
May 2005 employment levels. 
An important question in moving forward is the time frame for the 
process of services offshoring. It is commonly believed (although un-
tested) that a phenomenon that takes years to be fully realized will be 
less disruptive than a more rapid structural change.
Much more is yet to be learned about the scale, scope, and labor 
market costs of services offshoring. Until then, it remains to be seen 
whether Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004, pg. 94) were cor-
rect when they pronounced that “outsourcing is fundamentally just a 
trade phenomenon; that is, subject to the usual theoretical caveats and 
practical responses, outsourcing leads to gains from trade, and its ef-
fects on jobs and wages are not qualitatively different from those of 
conventional trade in goods.”12
Services offshoring is one aspect of a larger concept that we might 
call “global operations.” Briefly, global operations allow firms to ac-
cess new markets and new sources of revenue, technologies, and ways 
of production. As firms globalize their business operations, there are 
implications for work and for workers. Much attention is paid to cost 
reduction (largely in the form of wages) as a motivator; other factors 
include proximity to global customers and enhanced abilities to meet 
customers’ expectations that they should be able to reach a representa-
Bartik & Houseman.indb   131 2/29/2008   1:42:11 PM
132   Kletzer
tive at any time of day or night. See Gereffi (2005) for a comprehensive 
introduction to research on global supply chains. 
Skills and Immigration
The immigration debate is occurring at both ends of the skill spec-
trum. While headline coverage is often limited to undocumented (and 
lesser-skilled) migration, Web sites and the business press provide 
ample evidence of a heated debate about legally admitted, temporary, 
high-skill foreign workers. At the high-skill end, the real debate may 
be over whether or not a shortage exists of (legally residing, not neces-
sarily native) computer programmers, systems analysts, and computer 
scientists. Claims of a shortage buttress arguments for more liberal H-
1B caps.13 These claims arose in the late 1990s, as the labor market 
tightened with strong economic growth and with the peak of the dot-
com boom. 
The United States is a net importer of the highly educated, par-
ticularly of scientists and engineers. There is little doubt that foreigners 
help the United States maintain its position at the technological frontier. 
“Leadership in science and technology gives the U.S. its comparative 
advantage in the global economy,” writes Freeman (2006a, p. 124). 
“U.S. exports are disproportionately from sectors that rely extensively 
on scientific and engineering workers and that embody the newest tech-
nologies. . . . In a knowledge-based economy, leadership in science and 
technology contributes substantially to economic success.”
Highly skilled immigrants play a prominent role in the economy. In 
2003, the foreign-born accounted for about 13.0 percent of the popu-
lation, 14.4 percent of the total adult workforce, and 17.2 percent of 
young adult workers (Figure 4.4). As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the share 
of foreign-born in the workforce has risen considerably since the late 
1990s. The foreign-born are well-educated (particularly advanced de-
gree holders). In 2002, they made up 16.2 percent of science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and mathematical (STEM) occupations and 18.4 per-
cent of core STEM (excluding social scientists and technicians) occu-
pations (Figure 4.5). Foreign-born workers are particularly important in 
computer science occupations. Foreign-born STEM workers are more 
likely to have advanced degrees than natives, and the vast majority of 
both natives and foreign-born have degrees from U.S. institutions.
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Figure 4.4  Percentage of Foreign-Born in the U.S. Workforce
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Saxenian (2002) notes the role of immigrants in Silicon Valley en-
trepreneurship. Wadhwa et al. (2007) update and expand that study and 
find that one-quarter of engineering and technology companies started 
between 1995 and 2005 had at least one foreign-born founder. Freeman 
(2006a) reports that 60 percent of the growth in the number of U.S.-
based scientists and engineers over the decade of the 1990s came from 
the foreign-born. There is a critical question about maintaining U.S. 
comparative advantage in the absence of highly educated immigrants. 
With higher earnings, more domestic (or native) workers could be at-
tracted to science and engineering fields, but this will take time. With-
out adequate supply, more research and development could be located 
offshore. Yet maintaining the flow of foreign-born scientists and engi-
neers might lessen earnings growth, making it difficult to attract native 
students into science and engineering fields.
Since 1965, U.S. immigrant policy has been strongly based in fam-
ily reunification. (Before 1965, immigrant admission was based on na-
tional origin.) The focus of the debate over skilled migrants is not about 
immigrant entry, but rather about nonimmigrant entry, the visa category 
of H-1B. 
The H-1 nonimmigrant category was created under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 to assist U.S. employers needing workers 
temporarily.14 Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals who come to the 
U.S. on a temporary basis and for a specific purpose, such as school-
ing or work. The H-1B program was created by the Immigration Act 
of 1990, amending the 1952 Act. The H-1B program allows an em-
ployer to temporarily employ a foreign worker in the United States on 
a nonimmigrant basis in a specialty occupation or as “a fashion model 
of distinguished merit and ability.” A specialty occupation requires the 
theoretical and practical application of a body of specialized knowledge 
and a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent in the specific specialty (e.g., 
sciences, medicine and health care, education, biotechnology, and busi-
ness specialties). The 1990 act, which is current law, limits the number 
of foreign workers who may be issued a visa or otherwise be provided 
H-1B status to 65,000 a year. 
In 1998, Congress increased the H-1B cap to 115,000 for fiscal 
years 1999 and 2000. In 2000, Congress set the cap higher, at 195,000 
for fiscal year 2001. That level was maintained for fiscal years 2002 and 
2003. From fiscal year 2004 on, the cap has reverted back to 65,000.15 
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Under the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, H-1B workers hired by in-
stitutions of higher education, nonprofits, and government research or-
ganizations are exempt from the cap. There is a separate 20,000 cap on 
H-1B petitions filed on behalf of aliens with U.S.-earned master’s or 
higher degrees. An H-1B visa is generally valid for three years of em-
ployment and is renewable for an additional three years. From an H-1B 
visa, individuals may apply for permanent residency status.
To hire a foreign worker on H-1B visa status, the U.S. employer 
files a labor condition application (LCA) with the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration. On the applica-
tion, the employer must attest to meeting the following four conditions: 
1) paying at least the local prevailing wage, or the employer’s actual 
wage, whichever is higher; 2) offering nonimmigrants benefits on the 
same basis as U.S. workers receive; 3) that employment of H-1B non-
immigrants must not adversely affect the working conditions of U.S. 
workers; and 4) that no strike or lockout exists in the occupational clas-
sification at the place of employment. In addition, the employer must 
attest to notifying employees, at the place of employment, of the intent 
to employ H-1B workers.
Employers who are “H-1B dependent”—that is, whose workforce 
is comprised of 15 percent or more H-1B employees—face additional 
requirements. These requirements include attesting to the following 
three conditions: 1) no U.S. workers displaced within a period of 90 
days before or 90 days after filing an LCA petition; 2) good-faith steps 
were taken before filing the LCA to recruit U.S. workers and the job 
was offered to a U.S. applicant equally or better qualified than an H-1B 
worker; and 3) before placing the H-1B worker with another employer, 
the first employer inquired and has no knowledge as to that employer’s 
action or intent to displace a U.S. worker within the 90 days before or 
90 days after the placement of the H-1B worker with that employer.16
Information on worker characteristics is available from petitions to 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) for visas. These petitions 
are not, however, clear proxies for admission. Petitions are used to 
sponsor initial employment, continued employment, a change in em-
ployer (for someone already in the United States with H-1B status), or 
a change in location with the same employer. The total number of peti-
tions therefore greatly exceeds the number of foreigners with nonimmi-
grant status. By country of origin, India, China, and Canada accounted 
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for 58 percent of fiscal year 2005 petitions (44 percent, 9.2 percent, and 
4.4 percent, respectively). Sixty-five percent of approved petitions were 
for workers between 25 and 34 years of age; 45 percent for workers 
with a bachelor’s degree, 37 percent for those with a master’s degree, 
5 percent for those with a doctorate, and 12 percent for those with a 
professional degree. Forty-three percent went to those in computer- 
related occupations; 12 percent to those in architecture, engineering, 
and surveying; 10.9 percent to those in education (CIS 2006).
Hira (2007) argues that the above LCA conditions do not constitute 
a “labor market test,” in the sense that employers can hire H-1B work-
ers even (as worded by the U.S. Department of Labor) “when a quali-
fied U.S. worker wants the job, and a U.S. worker can be displaced from 
the job in favor of the foreign worker” (pg. 2). Only H-1B–dependent 
employers face more stringent requirements about not displacing na-
tive (resident) workers. Hira also sees the following problems from the 
H-1B program and any proposed expansion: more offshore outsourc-
ing of jobs, displacement of American technology workers, decreased 
wages and job opportunities for domestic workers, and discouragement 
of young Americans from entering science and engineering fields. 
Hira’s unique contribution to the debate is his assertion that the H-
1B program promotes offshoring. He argues that the biggest users of 
H-1B visas are offshore outsourcing firms, and that these firms do not 
sponsor permanent resident status for their workers; rather, they train 
them in the United States and send those workers, along with the pro-
duction, back to the country of origin. According to Hira’s analysis of 
data from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Foreign Labor Cer-
tification (OFLC), the top 11 (and 15 of the top 20) H-1B requesters are 
firms that specialize in offshore outsourcing (Hira 2007, Table 1). These 
firms use H-1B (and L-1) workers as part of their knowledge transfer 
operations, rotating foreign workers to learn U.S. workers’ jobs. H-1B 
workers also provide on-site (domestic) presence for these firms with 
their customers.17
Proponents of H-1B argue that nonimmigrant workers are vital be-
cause of systematic shortages of native (or resident) technology (sci-
ence and engineering) workers. Yet standard labor market indicators 
yield little or mixed evidence of IT worker shortages. Wage or earnings 
growth is moderate (similar to that of other professionals); unemploy-
ment rates shot up in the dot-com bust and have now fallen. In a com-
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prehensive survey, Lowell (2001a) found little evidence of shortages. 
Private (trade) surveys do often conclude that there are shortages, but 
there is little corroboration from public use data. The growth in H-1B 
visas alone is not evidence of a shortage; other factors include back-
logs in the permanent visa application process, cyclical demand in main 
(IT) industries in the 1990s, strong U.S. economic growth, changes in 
global competition that create demand for foreign workers because of 
expansions of foreign markets, the growing importance of international 
students in U.S. institutions (students who stay in this country upon 
graduation and need to be transitioned from student visa status to a 
working visa). Healthy H-1B hiring, with an absence of clear evidence 
of shortages, is not a sufficient argument for an expansion of the H-1B 
program. Expanded H-1B caps will create problems for the permanent 
residency component of immigration (where there are already consider-
able backlogs). 
Secondarily, proponents argue that the H-1B program is the point 
of entry for the world’s best and brightest and essential for maintaining 
U.S. competitiveness. Existing separately from the H-1B debate, but 
clearly confounded with it, is the widespread concern that the United 
States faces a problem in maintaining its position as the scientific and 
technological leader in the world and that loss of leadership threatens 
the nation’s future economic well-being and national security. Busi-
ness, science, and education groups have issued reports that highlight 
the value to the country of leadership in science and technology. More 
specifically, numerous reports highlight the contribution of immigrants 
in innovative fields. In a report on the entrepreneurial economy, the 
Kauffman Foundation (2007) advocated an “entrepreneurial immigra-
tion policy” of raising H-1B quotas in the short term and eliminating 
them in the long term. There is also advocacy of new policies to increase 
the supply of scientific and engineering talent in the United States.18
A central charge is that employment of H-1B visa holders comes 
at a cost to older native-born workers, particularly engineers and tech-
nology (computer) workers, in terms of both wages and employment. 
Serious data limitations have prevented economists from doing much 
analysis on the question of the impact of H-1B visas on the wages and 
employment of U.S. workers.19 The National Research Council (2001) 
concludes that the magnitude of a wage effect caused by the H-1B pro-
gram is difficult to estimate. That report suggests that the H-1B program 
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has an effect in keeping wages from rising as quickly as they might in 
the absence of an H-1B program (Lowell 1999, 2000a,b, 2001a,b). Za-
vodny (2003), using Department of Labor LCA data for fiscal year 2001 
across states, found no relationship between share of H-1B workers and 
domestic earnings, earnings growth, or unemployment.20 
As the fraction of doctoral degrees awarded to foreign students has 
risen (from 11.3 to 24.4 percent between 1976 and 2000), there is a 
natural question about labor market competition: do foreign student 
doctorates harm the economic opportunities of native doctorates? Bor-
jas (2005a) estimates factor price elasticities and finds that an immigra-
tion-induced 10 percent increase in the supply of doctorates lowers the 
wages of competing workers by about 3 percent. 
Thinking About Immigration Policy
A successful immigration policy is a challenge to build, given the 
lack of clear political alignments, contradictory empirical evidence, 
strong emotions, and conflicting political ideologies. It is easy to think 
of immigration as a “problem.” But as Marshall (2007, pg. 1) advises,
Immigration is not the problem: the United States is and will re-
main a nation of immigrants, who have contributed greatly to the 
vitality, diversity, and creativity of American life. Immigrants are 
particularly important to the U.S. economy, accounting for over 
half of the workforce growth during the 1990s and 86 percent 
of the increase in employment between 2000 and 2005. Because 
there will be no net increase in the number of prime-working-age 
natives (aged 25 to 54) for the next 20 years, the strength of the 
American economy could depend heavily on how the nation re-
lates immigration to economic and social policy. 
The most heated issues in the current immigration policy reform de-
bate lie outside the boundaries of traditional economic policy thinking. 
Questions of culture, language, race, ethnicity, and geography trump 
economics now, and they could continue to do so. Current immigration 
policy is based on family unification, not economics. The small eco-
nomic costs of immigration do not provide justification for an econom-
ics-based policy. As Borjas (1999a,b) argues, evidence alone (whether 
economic or not) cannot decide the course of immigration policy.21 
There needs to be an explicit understanding of national interest—what 
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it is that Americans intend from an immigration policy. Borjas suggests 
consideration of three groups, whose interests may be in conflict: peo-
ple living in the United States (“natives”), potential immigrants, and 
people who remain in the source countries. Most discussions attach the 
largest weight to the interests of natives. Even with this simplification, 
economic interests need to be defined: as Borjas asks, is it the size of 
economic pie (national income, or per capital income), or the splitting 
of the slices of the pie (distribution of income)? 
This last question has a straightforward answer: like trade, the eco-
nomic impact of immigration is distributional. The net impact is rela-
tively small (a small increase in net national income), with losses (also 
small) concentrated among the less-skilled, and gains accruing to the 
skilled and owners of capital.22 Borjas (1999b) states in plain terms, 
“The debate over how many and which types of immigrants to admit is 
best viewed as a tug-of-war between those who gain from immigration 
and those who lose from it” (p. 185). Yet, unlike trade, the policy “solu-
tion” for immigration is likely to involve regulation of the flow, while 
for trade the solution involves addressing adjustment costs. In this way, 
immigration policy stands out from trade and financial policy in the 
context of globalization. As countries have moved to liberalize flows of 
goods, services, and capital, the climate for liberalized movements of 
people has distinctly cooled. Freeman (2006a) notes that opinion sur-
veys across the rich countries find majority support for more restrictive 
immigration. 
An economics-based immigration policy may largely involve skill. 
Arguments for an entry system that favors skilled migrants include 
three considerations: 1) the skilled earn more, pay more taxes, and re-
quire fewer social services; 2) capital benefits from skilled migration 
(although Lewis [2005] sees production choices as endogenous to local 
relative skill supply, allowing capital to benefit from less-skilled migra-
tion as well); and 3) skilled migrants also contribute to innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Wadhwa et al. 2007). On the national competitive-
ness front, there is advocacy of a high-skill immigration policy that 
would permit unrestricted H-1Bs and automatic citizenship to foreign 
nationals earning science and engineering graduate degrees from U.S. 
institutions (Kauffman Foundation 2007). 
Addressing the flow, presence, and impact of undocumented mi-
grants dominates current public discourse on immigration policy re-
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form. The “bipartisan immigration compromise,” as it has been com-
monly termed, is the current template for public discourse. Highlights 
and contentious issues of that compromise include the following: border 
security, legalizing the residency of undocumented migrants, a guest 
worker program, and a point system for future immigrants that rewards 
skill (measured as educational attainment, occupational qualifications, 
and English-language proficiency). Other migration issues are also 
hotly contested, most prominently the H-1B visa program. Two bills 
were introduced in Spring 2007 to increase the allotment of H-1B visas 
while tightening the regulations regarding employer good-faith efforts 
to hire American workers first and strengthening USDOL enforcement 
capabilities.23
CURREnT WORkER ADJUSTMEnT ASSISTAnCE POLICy 
AnD PROGRAMS; MOvInG AHEAD On POLICy 
Regarding trade, the policy focus is on labor market adjustment 
programs. This section reviews the current policy landscape and looks 
ahead at possible reforms and expansions.
Current Policy Mix
The United States has a well-developed and broad set of labor mar-
ket adjustment policies and programs, with unemployment insurance 
(UI) at the center. Other programs include advance notice for major 
layoffs, which is mandated by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (WARN) Act, and training and job search assistance, which 
is provided under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). The Trade Ad-
justment Assistance (TAA) program, created in 1962, provides adjust-
ment assistance to workers laid off as a result of international trade. 
The United States is unique among industrialized countries in providing 
special assistance to workers who have lost jobs because of increased 
imports or international shifts in the location of production.
The main benefits available through TAA are extended income 
support and training. The following summary comes from the GAO 
(2006a). By statute, the U.S. Department of Labor certifies groups of 
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laid-off workers as potentially eligible for TAA benefits and services by 
investigating petitions filed on behalf of workers. Petitions can be filed 
by firms, unions, or groups of workers. Workers are eligible if laid off 
as a result of international trade and if they were involved in making 
a product, supplying component parts, or performing finishing work 
for directly affected firms. Historically, most eligible workers have lost 
jobs in the manufacturing sector. 
Under the current TAA program, eligible participants have access to 
the following assistance:
• Training—up to 130 weeks, including 104 weeks of vocational 
training and 26 weeks of remedial training (such as ESL or lan-
guage literacy). TAA-approved training must be full-time.
• Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRAs, or extended income 
support)—up to 104 weeks of extended income support, after 
the 26 weeks of standard UI is exhausted. By statute, the level 
of TRA support is set at the state’s UI benefit level. The 104 
weeks include 78 weeks while participating in vocational train-
ing and an additional 26 weeks if remedial training is necessary. 
During the first 26 weeks of TRA receipt, participants must be 
enrolled in training, have completed training, or have a waiver 
of the training requirement. Beyond the first 26 weeks, receipt of 
TRA support is conditional on training enrollment. 
• Job search and relocation benefits.
• Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC). Eligible participants may 
receive an advanceable tax credit covering 65 percent of the 
health insurance premiums. To be HCTC-eligible, workers must 
be receiving TRA support, be eligible for TRA but still receiving 
standard UI (in both cases, in training), or be enrolled in ATAA 
(see below).
• Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA)—a targeted 
program of wage insurance, designed for workers aged 50 and 
older who forgo training, become reemployed within 26 weeks, 
and experience a reduction in earnings from the old job to the 
new job. If annual earnings on the new job are $50,000 or less, 
the benefit covers 50 percent of the difference between old and 
new job earnings, up to a maximum of $10,000 over two years.
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The narrow focus of TAA on manufacturing, while historically ap-
propriate given the predominance of goods (as opposed to services) in 
international trade, is becoming a serious point of contention. The U.S. 
Department of Labor follows a narrow interpretation in its eligibility 
determinations. The statute requires workers to prove that they lost their 
job from a firm that makes a product that is “similar to or like an im-
ported good.” The department’s interpretation of the word “good” has 
resulted in many denials of eligibility. As services offshoring continues 
to capture attention, this conflict over interpretation will persist.
More generally, eligibility denial is a contentious issue. Workers, or 
worker groups, have appealed to the U.S. Court of International Trade, 
the court with jurisdiction over TAA. As noted by Kletzer and Rosen 
(2005), the Court is increasingly sharply critical of the Department of 
Labor’s decisions on denials. The Court’s opinion in the case of Former 
Employees of BMC Software Inc. vs. U.S. Secretary of Labor is illustra-
tive, and worth quoting at length:
Trade adjustment assistance programs historically have been—and 
today continue to be—touted as the quid pro quo for U.S. national 
policies of free trade.
As illustrated by the history of virtually every TAA case filed with 
the court in recent years, the Labor Department’s standard investi-
gative modus operandi appears to be to target whichever element 
of a TAA claim the agency perceives to be the weakest, and—if the 
agency finds that that particular element is not satisfied—to deny 
the claim on that basis, with no investigation or analysis of the 
other elements of the claim. 
The TAA program is fundamentally broken, as evidenced by a 
number of key indicators, particularly the . . . extraordinarily high 
percentage of cases in which the agency reverses itself on appeal. 
Those statistics are a scathing indictment of the Labor Depart-
ment’s administration of the TAA program. 
In short, “there is something fundamentally wrong with the admin-
istration of the nation’s trade adjustment assistance programs if, 
as a practical matter, workers often must appeal their cases to the 
courts to secure the thorough investigation that the Labor Depart-
ment is obligated to conduct by law.”
The literature assessing TAA performance is limited, in large part 
because of the Labor Department’s paltry release of outcome and perfor-
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mance data. Decker and Corson (1995) is perhaps the most commonly 
cited study, and it was based not on (the nonexistent) publicly available 
data, but on data obtained through Mathematica’s contracted evaluation 
of TAA in 1993. The 2002 Trade Act mandated an evaluation, with data 
collection beginning in 2005 and a final report to be issued by the end 
of 2008. GAO (2004) offers a preliminary assessment, based on contact 
with state workforce agencies, of the 2002 reforms. Kletzer and Rosen 
(2005) also offer an assessment, based on publicly available informa-
tion, and with an eye to policy reform. In the context of program evalu-
ation, GAO (2006b) notes serious administrative concerns about the 
collection of TAA program performance data, and of data on outcomes 
such as employment and earnings. As that GAO report concludes,
since the passage of the TAA Reform Act of 2002, the TAA pro-
gram has evolved to become one of the most important means to 
help the workers affected by our nation’s trade policies rejoin our 
nation’s workforce. The program has seen substantial increases in 
the population it serves and in the funds available to serve them. 
Unfortunately, efforts to monitor the program’s performance have 
not kept pace with the program’s development. Four years after the 
passage of the reforms, we still do not know whether the program 
is achieving what lawmakers intended. 
In the current budgetary environment, with many claims on limited 
discretionary funds, it is increasingly important to have performance 
data and assessments. 
Two of the 2002 reforms, the health care tax credit and wage in-
surance (ATAA), have received considerable recent attention (Andrews 
2007). A number of recent policy-related studies and articles address 
the costs and benefits of wage insurance (Brainard, Litan, and War-
ren 2006; Kletzer and Rosen 2006; Kling 2006). While these debates 
are a vital component of policy discourse, it is frustrating to note that 
virtually nothing is known about the efficacy of these two program ad-
ditions. Kletzer and Rosen’s (2005) study predates any real numbers on 
ATAA take-up, and surprisingly little has been learned since late 2004. 
GAO (2006a) concludes that
while few workers took advantage of training and long-term in-
come support through the TAA program, even fewer made use of 
two new benefits under the TAA program—health insurance as-
sistance and wage insurance for older workers. Workers who knew 
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about the benefits sometimes told us that the benefit levels were 
not high enough to get them to participate. But relatively large 
numbers were simply not aware of the benefits, and some said they 
might have applied for the benefits had they known about them. 
Sometimes workers admitted to being overwhelmed by the pros-
pect of losing their jobs and by the wealth of information they 
initially received. However, states’ efforts to inform workers about 
and explain these benefits have been mixed at best—some trained 
their case managers to answer questions from workers, while oth-
ers did not see that as their role. Despite Labor’s efforts to encour-
age states to make this information more widely available, many 
workers still do not know about these benefits and, as a result, can-
not make use of them. Without better information, these workers 
may not have the opportunity to avail themselves of benefits that 
could ease their transition to reemployment.
MOvInG AHEAD On POLICy—SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
A Democratically controlled Congress facing a lame-duck Republi-
can administration, and a costly war in Iraq, are impediments to the goal 
of progress on the globalization policy agenda. Public skepticism about 
the benefits of trade expansion further complicates the picture. With 
all these complexities, it may not be possible to set out an economi-
cally defensible policy plan that is also politically feasible. Thus the 
discussion here will focus on the former, and leave the latter to political 
professionals.24
Any policy discussion must recognize the highly dynamic nature of 
the U.S. labor market, in which millions of jobs are created and lost each 
year. A flexible labor market can benefit an economy, especially when 
workers are able to move from low- to high-productivity jobs. Young 
workers benefit from turnover, since they gain skills and experience 
and find productive matches with a sequence of employers. At the same 
time, labor market flexibility can impose significant costs on workers 
and their families. Workers can experience prolonged unemployment, 
and once reemployed they may experience large and persistent earnings 
losses. In a rapidly changing economy, workers lose jobs for many rea-
sons (domestic competition, technological change, plant or office relo-
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cation), and, as shown in Kletzer (2001), there is very little variation in 
the reemployment earnings consequences: losing a job is costly, regard-
less of reason. Analysis of data from the Dislocated Worker Survey re-
veals that only two-thirds of unemployed workers find a new job within 
one to three years after layoff. More than 40 percent of workers expe-
rience earnings losses. Only about one-fourth of workers experience 
no earnings loss or an improvement in earnings after reemployment. 
Preliminary evidence on the reemployment consequences of services 
job loss, as reported in Jensen and Kletzer (2006), suggests little reason 
to temper this conclusion on costly job loss. The numbers of workers 
facing job displacement are significant: over the 2003–2005 period, 1.8 
million workers were displaced from manufacturing industries, and 3.7 
million workers were displaced from services industries (down from 
the 2001–2003 period, when 2.9 million workers were displaced from 
manufacturing and 4.9 million were displaced from services).25
Calls for reform are timely, based on workers’ needs, which are 
unmet by current programs. It may, however, be time to reconsider the 
usual ways of advocating assistance policy. Consider the legislative his-
tory of TAA. President Kennedy and Congress established the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in 1962 to provide assistance 
to workers who lose jobs because of increased import competition. 
The unique manner in which international trade policy is conducted in 
the United States, along with the modest level of existing adjustment 
assistance, played a role in the establishment of TAA. Congress must 
transfer, temporarily, authority to the president in order for the admin-
istration to participate in trade negotiations. This transfer of authority 
(now called trade promotion authority) gives Congress an opportunity 
to influence the negotiating agenda. Just as importantly, Congress gets 
a chance to pass legislation to compensate workers adversely affected 
by changes in foreign competition associated with trade agreements. As 
a result, expansions of TAA programs have been highly correlated with 
efforts to liberalize trade. This is the framework in which TAA has been 
seen as a quid pro quo for congressional support of trade-liberalizing 
legislation. As noted by Kletzer and Rosen (2005), reforms to TAA in 
the 1980s, the creation of NAFTA-TAA, and the 2002 reforms to TAA 
all fit into this framework of mustering votes to pass trade legislation. 
There is a view that little additional gain accrues from assistance 
programs targeted at trade-displaced workers. TAA does not receive 
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much support from organized labor. On a practical basis, unions do 
work to ensure that workers receive assistance, yet their political sup-
port is tepid out of fear that out-and-out support will weaken unions’ 
priority position against trade liberalization. With TAA as assistance 
after job loss (and modest levels of assistance at that), the program is 
often sarcastically referred to as “burial insurance” among union lead-
ers. The same arguments exist for organized labor’s lukewarm response 
to wage insurance (Andrews 2007). As analyzed by Destler (2005), the 
2002 reforms to TAA, as part of the Trade Act of 2002 that granted 
trade promotion authority to the president, gained little additional Dem-
ocratic support. TAA is viewed by many as “a backwater government 
program that gets attention only when an administration needs votes for 
trade legislation” (Destler 2005, p. 328). A broad program of assistance 
to all displaced workers is more justifiable on the economic costs of job 
loss and is likely to more broadly address public anxieties about job in-
security. In addition, a general program of adjustment assistance avoids 
politicizing (or demonizing) any one particular cause of job loss, such 
as free trade and globalization. 
In turning to a broad program of assistance to all displaced workers, 
we should recognize that a comprehensive reform strategy starts with 
reforming UI. Unfortunately, political will does not currently seem to 
exist to significantly reform UI. Short of UI reform, the next best alter-
native would be to continue expanding TAA eligibility to include more 
workers, specifically those adversely affected by the various aspects of 
globalization. An expanded TAA program would be in addition to the 
existing UI system. Rosen (2007) suggests the following parameters, in 
a program that would be renamed Globalization Adjustment Assistance 
(GAA).
Eligibility
The existing eligibility test, i.e., the association between 1) an in-
crease in imports or a shift in production and 2) a decline in output and 
employment, is tedious, difficult to implement, and subject to judicial 
objection. In addition the USDOL currently does not consider workers 
who are employed in the service sector as producing “an article” and 
thus deems them ineligible for TAA. The problem of covering service 
workers is exacerbated by the absence of detailed service import data, 
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which makes it difficult to show that a decline in output and employ-
ment is associated with an increase in service imports.
One alternative would be to move toward more qualitative eligibil-
ity criteria. Criteria would be developed to determine if an entire in-
dustry, occupation, or region was considered to be under distress. Once 
this determination was made, any worker losing a job from that in-
dustry, occupation, or region would only need to prove membership in 
any of these groupings in order to receive assistance under the revised 
program. This reform would reduce the discrimination between similar 
workers and also significantly reduce the bureaucratic burden associ-
ated with administering the program.
Criteria to determine industry distress could include some combina-
tion of declines in sales and output, increases in imports, and job loss 
throughout the entire industry or occupation, not just a single firm. The 
addition of occupations as a potential eligible grouping is necessary due 
to the task-oriented (or occupation-oriented) nature of services offshor-
ing. High unemployment, plant closings, and vacancies could be used 
to identify regions under distress. 
Financial Assistance
The current system of providing 78 weeks of income maintenance 
at the UI rate if a worker is enrolled in training (a provision that goes 
well beyond the traditional 26 weeks of UI) would continue to be the 
central aspect of the program. The adjustment burden of workers chang-
ing industry or occupation is high (Kletzer 2001). Longer duration of 
income maintenance enables workers to enroll in significant training 
and thereby make a serious adjustment. In the case of regional distress, 
income maintenance payments can help stimulate the local economy.
Training
Training funds are inadequate, and many states exhaust their allo-
cation before the end of the year. Income maintenance payments under 
TAA are an entitlement—i.e., Congress must appropriate enough mon-
ey to provide income maintenance payments to all eligible workers. In 
contrast, appropriation of training funds is considered a “capped en-
titlement,” for which Congress sets an appropriation cap on the amount 
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of total funding for training. It is inconsistent to make entitled income 
maintenance payments conditional on (limited) training enrollment.26 
In addition, given the training appropriation cap, all workers may not 
receive the same amount or quality of training. Raising the training ap-
propriation cap would begin to address this problem. 
Health Coverage Tax Credit
Currently, workers participating in TAA can receive a 65 percent 
advanceable, refundable tax credit to help cover the cost of maintain-
ing health insurance during the period of unemployment. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that workers find the Health Coverage Tax Credit 
(HCTC) to be the most valuable form of assistance offered under the 
TAA program. On the other hand, the GAO (2006a) finds that many 
workers claim they cannot afford to pay the remaining 35 percent in or-
der to maintain their health insurance. To remedy this, the HCTC could 
be increased to 75 percent. In addition, states could be encouraged to 
offer some assistance, thereby reducing workers’ out-of-pocket expen-
ditures even more. 
Wage Insurance
Wage insurance offers assistance that is tailored to actual earnings 
losses. In order to be effective, wage-loss insurance must be a comple-
ment to traditional UI, since it only assists those workers who find new 
jobs. Under the program, eligible workers would receive some fraction—
perhaps half—of their weekly earnings loss over a specific period. 
For example, between 1979 and 2001, the average weekly wage 
before layoff for workers displaced from manufacturing industries was 
$396.88. At the same time, the average weekly wage for those laid off 
from nonmanufacturing jobs was $368.65. For those workers who found 
new jobs, the average percentage loss in earnings was 29.2 percent for 
manufacturing workers and 18.6 percent for nonmanufacturing work-
ers. Had a wage-loss insurance program been in place, manufacturing 
workers would have received approximately $6,000 over a two-year 
period, which is 15 percent of their prelayoff wage. Nonmanufacturing 
workers would have received approximately $3,600 over a two-year 
period, which is equal to 9 percent of their prelayoff wage. 
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Despite its benefits, wage insurance is not a perfect solution to ad-
dressing the costs associated with unemployment. Structuring a pro-
gram with a relatively short eligibility period, which would start with 
the date of job loss, creates a reemployment incentive and addresses 
one of the most commonly expressed UI concerns, but it also limits the 
compensatory nature of the program. Displaced worker earnings losses 
are long-term (earnings losses exist for five to six years after job loss), 
well beyond the two years covered by ATAA.
The cost of a wage insurance program depends on the number of 
eligible workers, the earnings losses of those reemployed at lower pay, 
and the duration of unemployment prior to reemployment. Other criti-
cal program characteristics include the duration of wage insurance pay-
ments, the annual cap on program payments, and the replacement rate. 
It has been estimated that the cost for a program with a two-year dura-
tion, a 50 percent replacement rate, and a $10,000 annual cap for all 
dislocated workers would be around $4 billion. 
The Trade Act of 2002 established a wage insurance program, for-
mally called Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA). ATAA 
encourages and provides financial assistance to workers who return 
to work within 26 weeks after separation. It is possible that their new 
employers may provide on-the-job training, which is seen by many as 
more effective than classroom training. 
Financing an Expanded Program
The Office of Management and Budget reports that current spending 
on TAA is approximately $1 billion a year. Kletzer and Rosen (2005) 
estimate that making all workers that have been displaced from im-
port-competing manufacturing industries eligible for TAA would cost 
approximately $3 billion a year. Including service workers could poten-
tially double the price tag. Increasing the HCTC and reducing the wage 
insurance age requirement could add another $1 billion to the total cost. 
These estimates are very tentative, but total spending on an assistance 
program sketched here could be in the range of $6–$7 billion a year. 
One immediate proposal for financing the additional costs would be 
to raise the maximum taxable wage base currently used in calculating 
the UI payroll tax (the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, or FUTA). In 
addition to raising revenue to offset the additional expense associated 
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with expanding the program, raising the maximum taxable wage base 
would also make the UI tax more progressive. The maximum wage 
base has been fixed at $7,000 for more than 20 years. Adjusting the 
base to $45,000, over time, could be expected to raise an additional $9 
billion, enough to finance a program expansion.
A More Expansive Policy Reform
Should the political will exist (or be found) to engage in a more 
comprehensive reform of the nation’s worker assistance programs, the 
first step would be UI reform.27 The original UI program was designed 
to offset income losses during cyclical periods of temporary involuntary 
unemployment. In contrast, current workers face long-term structural 
unemployment. The existing UI system is inadequate in responding to 
these current labor market conditions. 
The current UI system does not assist workers who seek part-time 
employment, workers who voluntarily leave one job in order to take 
another, or workers who experience long-term unemployment. New en-
trants and reentrants into the labor market are not currently eligible for 
UI, since these two groups of unemployed do not fit well with one of 
the program’s original objectives, i.e., insuring against the risk of invol-
untary job loss. Covering these workers would raise issues concerning 
the amount and duration of assistance, since they may not have relevant 
work experience.
Underlining these macroeconomic changes to the U.S. labor market 
is a shift from traditional employer-based full-time employment to an 
increased reliance on contingent and part-time employment. The shift 
to these nontraditional forms of employment reflects additional short-
falls in the current UI program. A system designed to provide income 
support during temporary layoffs for workers who were permanently 
attached to a single employer is not well designed for a labor market 
with considerable self-employment and contingent, part-time, and low-
wage employment. 
Although there clearly remain some differences in local labor mar-
ket conditions, the current pressures on the U.S. labor market are be-
coming more national. State differences in the incidence and experi-
ence of unemployment have narrowed considerably. Local labor market 
conditions primarily affect the prospects for reemployment. Given the 
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increasingly national nature of the labor market, UI would be better 
able to meet its original objectives if the federal government played a 
more prominent role in this state-federal partnership. 
In addition to inequities created by disparate rules across states, 
a significant downside of the current federal-state partnership is the 
states’ real or perceived fears that program generosity will result in ad-
verse changes to their business environment. Increased federal leader-
ship would avoid interstate competition and a race to the bottom in 
program benefits.
An increased leadership role for the federal government would be 
characterized by expanding standards for eligibility, duration, and level 
of benefits, and for financing the program. Recommendations include 
the following:
• Standardize the base period for determining eligibility to the past 
four complete calendar quarters prior to job loss. This change, 
already implemented by a number of states, updates the opera-
tional definition of labor market attachment and reflects the re-
duced time needed to report earnings. 
• Use hours rather than earnings in determining eligibility. Shift-
ing the determination of eligibility to hours instead of earnings 
would bring more low- and moderate-wage workers—who often 
most need help during periods of unemployment—into the sys-
tem.
• Harmonize nonmonetary eligibility standards. The patchwork of 
nonmonetary eligibility criteria, in which some states consider 
voluntary separations for good cause while others do not, creates 
unnecessary complexity and inequities in the system. 
• Enable reentrants to the labor force, if it is determined retroac-
tively that they were eligible at the time of job loss or separation, 
to be eligible to receive the benefits they would have received at 
the time of job loss. In a fluid labor market, many workers may 
leave the labor force for some time (e.g., to care for a child or 
parent) and then return. If the workers were eligible for UI when 
they separated from their previous job but did not claim them at 
that time, they should be eligible for benefits when they return to 
the labor force.
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• Amend the work test to allow job search for part-time employ-
ment. Part-time work is a common feature of the current labor 
market, accounting for 16 percent of employment in July 2006, 
and unemployed workers should not be disqualified from receiv-
ing benefits because they are searching for part-time work.
The share of unemployed workers who actually received assistance 
under the UI program averaged 37 percent between 1980 and 2005. The 
proposals outlined above are designed to increase the number and share 
of unemployed workers eligible to receive assistance. Table 4.1 reports 
estimates for the costs associated with raising the recipiency rate in 
increments to 50 percent. 
A more comprehensive reform would bring the fuller set of assis-
tance programs into the twenty-first century. The basic structure of cur-
rent UI was designed for a system of single employers, full-time work, 
and cyclical temporary layoff. The workforce today faces permanent 
job loss, part-time or contingent work, and self-employment. In addi-
tion, technological change and intensified competition from globaliza-
tion create increased pressures and anxieties. 
COnCLUSIOn
The U.S. debate about trade and immigration is broadening to in-
clude higher skilled workers. The growing services trade potentially 
broadens the group of workers at risk of displacement. Migration and 
immigration of skilled workers also may be perceived as a threat to 
higher skilled U.S. workers. 
Trade-displaced manufacturing workers may lose over $50 billion 
in lifetime earnings, and there are additional service workers’ losses. 
Federal spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance is less than $2 billion 
annually, due in part to restrictions on workers’ eligibility. Because the 
TAA statute refers to “imported goods,” virtually all displaced service 
workers are deemed ineligible for TAA. 
Most reviews conclude that immigration’s effects on native U.S. 
workers are small, in terms of wages and employment. High skill im-
migrants help the U.S. maintain technological leadership. 
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Strengthening programs of adjustment assistance is essential for 
maintaining any significant level of public support for globalization ef-
forts. Eligibility for Trade Adjustment Assistance should be expanded 
to include services workers, and additional training dollars should be 
made available to program participants. The wage insurance program 
started in 2002, which provides trade-displaced workers over age 50 
with up to half the difference between their old and new wages, should 
be evaluated, with the possibility of expanding eligibility to workers in 
their 40s. Reforms to the unemployment insurance (UI) system should 
include allowances for reentrants and part-time employment and the 
addition of wage-loss insurance for all displaced workers. 
Skilled migration is critical for U.S. innovation. Ensuring that tem-
porary migrant workers have basic labor market rights, such as free 
mobility, may help lessen problems from more open immigration. 
Openness to flows of goods, services, people, and investment 
brings economic benefits to Americans. The same flows are also as-
sociated with economic costs, especially for competing workers, firms, 
and communities. Thus, it is the distribution of benefits and costs that 
is contentious and controversial. While the academic debate remains 
lively on the distributional questions and can be expected to continue, 
there is a clear need to strengthen the programs and policies in place to 
assist workers who are confronting job and income losses and the un-
certainties created by globalization and other structural change. 
Table 4.1  Estimated Costs Associated with Increasing the Recipiency Rate
Recipiency rate
Increase in number of 
workers eligible (thousands)a
Increase in total benefits  
paid (billions $)a
0.40 220 1.6
0.45 620 4.5
0.50 1,000 7.4
a Increase in workers and costs (benefits paid) relative to 25-year average.
SOURCE: Kletzer and Rosen (2006). 
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 1. Gains to all countries do not necessarily follow on theoretical grounds. In ad-
dition, trade liberalization is only guaranteed to enhance welfare under certain 
limited theoretical conditions (including that the home economy is small, relative 
to world markets).
  2. Broda and Weinstein (2005) examine in more detail the gains from expanded va-
rieties of goods.
  3. Gresser (2002) showed that textile tariffs apply disproportionately to lower-end 
garments, purchased mainly by lower-income consumers.
  4. Gomory and Baumol (2000) present a model with similar outcomes, where gains 
from trade can shrink as competitors gain technological expertise. 
  5. See Rodrik (2006) for other skeptical thoughts on the benefits of free trade. He 
sees the evidence of the past 15 years as yielding no one single recipe for develop-
ing country growth, including policies of open trade.
  6. TAA has held center stage in the limited mix of worker adjustment policies since 
the mid-1970s. Overlapping with the evaluation literature, a number of papers 
consider the evidence on TAA and training for displaced workers. See Decker and 
Corson (1995) and Leigh (1990).
  7. The two-sides-of-the-same-coin analogy fits well in economy theory. In models of 
international trade based on differing factor endowments across countries, trade 
in goods and services or movements of factors of production can equalize prices 
and earnings. In an essay on international labor mobility, Freeman (2006b) notes 
that Mundell (1957) provides a model of substitutability between commodity 
movements and factor movements. If country A has more labor relative to capital 
than country B, A can send labor to B directly through immigration or indirect-
ly through the export of labor-intensive goods. Immigration restrictions should 
therefore result in an increase in trade. 
  8. Grossman (1982) was the first in this approach. Card (2005) provides an updated 
summary.
  9. Most of the immigration literature focuses on impacts on lesser-skilled workers. 
Friedberg (2001) studied mass migration from the former Soviet Union to Israel, 
finding little effect on the earnings and employment of natives. The H-1B litera-
ture is even thinner, given data limitations. 
 10. Net exports (of either services or goods) is the difference between the value of 
exports and the value of imports—i.e., exports (in $) minus imports (in $).
 11. The routineness of work, or the codification of tasks, is a characteristic empha-
sized by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
 12. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004) seem to mean “offshoring” when 
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they use “outsourcing.” Their outsourcing is arms-length and located in a foreign 
country.
 13. As discussed in more detail below, the H-1B nonimmigrant work visa allows em-
ployers to temporarily employ foreign workers in the United States in a specialty 
occupation.
 14. GAO (2006c) is the source of information for this section.
 15. Over the recent past, employer demand for H-1B visas has greatly exceeded the 
cap. For fiscal 2007, the application cap was reached in May 2006. For fiscal 
2008, first-day applications exceeded the cap, and Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS) received a record 150,000 applications as of late afternoon on April 
2, 2007. For the first time, applications will be placed in a computer-generated lot-
tery (Marcucci 2007).
 16. As noted in GAO (2006c), these additional requirements applied from January 
19, 2001, to September 30, 2003. The provision requiring these attestations ex-
pired, and was only reinstated on March 8, 2005. From October 1, 2003, to March 
7, 2005, H-1B–dependent employers and willful-violator employers were able to 
hire H1-B workers even if U.S. workers were displaced, and they did not have to 
undertake efforts to hire U.S. workers. 
 17. The L-1 nonimmigrant visa is for intracompany transfers.
 18. Freeman (2006b) proposes tripling the number of NSF graduate fellowships and 
increasing the size of the award to encourage advanced study in science and engi-
neering fields.
 19. See Matloff (2003) for a survey. 
 20. The problem with LCA data is that observations are applications, not actual visa 
issuances for workers. Wage information is the submitted prevailing wage, not the 
wage paid. 
 21. Chapter 1 of Borjas (1999b) contains a thoughtful discussion on the framing of a 
U.S. immigration policy.
 22. Focusing on California, Peri (2007) finds that immigrants are imperfect substi-
tutes for natives with similar education and age and that immigrant flows stimu-
lated, rather than harmed, the demand for—and the wages of—most U.S. native 
workers.
 23. The two bills are “The H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 
2007,” introduced by Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Chuck Grassley (R-IA) 
and “The Skilled Worker Immigration and Fairness Act of 2007,” introduced by 
Senators Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE). 
 24. See Destler (2005) for a broader discussion of a desirable direction for American 
trade policy.
 25. Based on author’s estimates from the 2004 and 2006 Displaced Worker Surveys. 
Overall manufacturing employment has declined by nearly 18 percent since 2000, 
while employment in the services sector has grown by 5.4 percent.
 26. Workers can apply for a waiver to excuse them from the requirement of enrolling 
in training in order to receive income maintenance payments.
 27. This section borrows heavily from Kletzer and Rosen (2006).
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Over the next dozen years, as the baby boomers age, the share of the 
population aged 55 and older is projected to grow dramatically, from 
21.4 percent in 2000 to 25.1 percent by 2010 and 29.5 percent by 2020. 
Over the same period, the share of the population aged 25–54—the 
age group that historically has been attached most strongly to the labor 
market—is projected to fall from 43.4 percent in 2000 to 40.8 percent 
in 2010 and 37.7 percent in 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Among 
other anticipated consequences, the aging of the population threatens 
the solvency of both the Social Security and the Medicare systems. Re-
flecting concerns over these trends, there is a growing consensus that 
increased employment among older Americans would be in the public 
interest. 
Congress already has taken several important steps to encourage 
work at older ages. Recent changes to the law allow Social Security 
beneficiaries to earn more money without having their benefits reduced 
and permit workers under the normal retirement age to phase into retire-
ment by collecting pension benefits while working a reduced schedule. 
Congress also has raised the age at which workers may collect full So-
cial Security benefits—in effect making benefits less generous—and 
this too can be expected to increase older Americans’ desire to work. 
Developments in the private sector, most notably the shift from defined 
benefit retirement plans to less generous defined contribution plans and 
the shrinking share of employers who offer retiree health benefits, have 
reinforced the effects of public policy changes. Americans are not sav-
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ing enough to compensate for the reduction in public and private retire-
ment benefits. If they wish to maintain their standard of living, many 
Americans will need to work later in life.
Although recent changes to federal policy have altered financial 
incentives in ways that should make it more attractive for older Ameri-
cans to work, these policies have not addressed the barriers to finding 
suitable employment that older workers frequently face. Survey evi-
dence shows that a high percentage of older Americans already wish to 
remain employed rather than withdrawing fully from the labor market, 
but many want or need to work fewer hours or to find less physically de-
manding jobs. Our research indicates that the need to make a job transi-
tion, particularly a job transition that involves a change of employer, is 
a major impediment to continued employment for seniors. In addition, 
as job stability has declined and the incidence of worker dislocation has 
risen over the last 20 years, a growing number of older Americans have 
found themselves involuntarily out of work and searching for a new job 
late in life. Many are unsuccessful in their search. 
Although labor force participation among older women has grown 
in the last two decades, it has declined among men in their fifties. The 
decline in employment among older, less-educated men has been pre-
cipitous: labor force participation among men in their fifties with less 
than a high school education fell by 11 percentage points over the last 
two decades. The current low rate of labor force participation among 
men in their fifties—traditionally a group considered to be of preretire-
ment age—does not portend well for increasing the labor force partici-
pation of these cohorts as they age. 
Why is it so difficult for many older Americans, particularly the less 
educated, to transition to new employment? Part of the explanation may 
be that older workers—especially those who have worked for a single 
employer for an extended period and thus have no recent experience 
with having to find a job—do not have a clear idea about how to search 
for employment. Employer reluctance to hire older workers is another 
factor. Unwarranted stereotyping accounts for some of this reluctance 
to hire older workers, but more legitimate concerns about older work-
ers as potential employees play a role as well. Lack of technical skills, 
low perceived returns to training, and high health insurance costs are 
among the most common reservations that employers cite about hiring 
older workers. 
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Job training and employment programs, currently funded under the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) and, to a lesser degree, the Trade Ad-
justment Assistance Act (TAA) and the Older Americans Act (OAA), 
are the primary active labor market programs through which the federal 
government seeks to overcome impediments to employment faced by 
workers. In real terms, federal funding for these programs has fallen 
significantly over the last decade. Moreover, services to older work-
ers have been deemphasized under WIA compared to what they were 
under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), WIA’s predecessor, de-
spite the fact that the population is aging and older workers’ needs for 
such services likely have risen. Some states and private organizations 
have begun to take steps to address the impediments to employment 
that older workers face. Many of these initiatives have focused on pub-
lic relations efforts to reduce what program managers perceive to be 
widespread discrimination by employers against older workers. Some 
state and private initiatives also have sought to improve the delivery of 
employment and training services to older job seekers, but funding for 
these initiatives has been limited. 
Failure to develop and implement effective programs to retrain 
older workers and place them in jobs has high public costs. Among 
other concerns is the fact that many of those who fail to find work end 
up on public assistance in the form of Social Security Disability Insur-
ance (SSDI), at least in some cases not because they cannot work but 
because they are unable to find work. Partly as a result, the costs of the 
SSDI program are soaring. Although the difficulties that older workers 
experience as they seek to transition to new jobs will not be easy to 
overcome, we propose the following five policy steps in order to begin 
to address the problem seriously: 
 1) Increase funding for employment and training programs that 
serve older workers. 
 2) Modify performance standards for WIA service providers to 
eliminate disincentives to serve older workers.
 3) Experiment with promising approaches to serving an aging 
workforce more effectively, including
• Improving outreach to seniors and to their potential employ-
ers,
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• Posting older-worker specialists who are knowledgeable 
about the employment and training issues seniors often con-
front at “one-stop” centers, and
• Providing specialized technical skills training for seniors. 
 4) Evaluate promising initiatives using rigorous methodologies 
to determine whether and to what extent they improve older 
workers’ employment prospects and would be cost-effective if 
adopted nationally. 
 5) Reform health care financing to reduce disincentives to hiring 
older workers. 
We elaborate upon these proposals later in the chapter.
RECEnT TREnDS In THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATIOn 
RATES OF OLDER AMERICAnS
Various researchers have noted the increasing rate of labor force 
participation among older Americans in recent decades (Burtless and 
Quinn 2002; Munnell and Sass 2007; Purcell 2005; Quinn 1999). Al-
though the share of men aged 55 and older who were active in the la-
bor force fell from the early 1900s through the mid-1980s, labor force 
participation rates leveled off beginning in 1985 and have risen slightly 
since the mid-1990s. Among women, the pre-1985 trend towards earlier 
retirement was offset by rising labor force participation overall, with 
the result that labor force participation rates among women 55 and older 
were relatively flat from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s. Since 
the mid-1980s, labor force participation among older women aged 55 
and older has trended upwards (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-
Related Statistics 2006). 
These aggregate trends mask important differences, however, in 
trends across education groups and across more refined age categories. 
Although labor force participation rates have increased since the 1990s 
among older women in all age groupings (Figure 5.1), the increase in 
male labor force participation in recent years has occurred only among 
men over age 60 (Figure 5.2B) and has been most pronounced among 
men over age 65 (Figure 5.2C). As shown in Figure 5.2A, labor force 
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participation among men in their fifties—men traditionally considered 
to be of preretirement age—has actually continued to fall. 
One possible explanation for the decline in labor force participa-
tion among men in their fifties could be that their financial situation has 
improved, either because their lifetime earnings have risen or because 
their wives are now more likely to be employed, making earlier retire-
ment a more viable option. Examination of labor force participation 
trends by education level suggests that this is not what has happened. 
The labor force participation rate for college-educated men in their fif-
ties has been fairly stable over the last 20 years but has declined for 
those with lower levels of education, especially those with less than a 
high school education. Between 1984 and 2005, the labor force partici-
pation rate for men aged 50–59 with less than a high school education 
dropped by 11 percentage points, and the decline for men aged 50–54 
was almost as large as that for men 55–59. This drop can be explained 
neither by rising income levels (real wages for less-educated men have 
fallen) nor by increased spousal employment (labor force participation 
rates for women with less than a high school education have been stag-
nant). Below we discuss some of the factors that underlie these trends 
and the special policy challenges they pose. 
AMERICAn WORkERS WILL WAnT OR nEED TO WORk 
LATER In LIFE THAn In THE RECEnT PAST 
For the past few decades, the health of older Americans has been 
improving, while changes in the mix of occupations associated with the 
growth of the service economy, as well as technological advances affect-
ing many blue-collar jobs, have made work less physically demanding. 
In addition, life expectancies have increased steadily, increasing in turn 
the financial resources required to maintain individuals’ standard of liv-
ing over their lifespan (Munnell and Sass 2007; Technical Panel on As-
sumptions and Methods 2003). In the past, rising incomes and generous 
public and private retirement benefits made it attractive for Americans 
to retire at younger ages despite their increased life expectancy (Costa 
1998). In the future, however, financial incentives are likely to make it 
more attractive for Americans to keep working longer.
Bartik & Houseman.indb   165 2/29/2008   1:42:13 PM
166   
C. Women 65–69
Figure 5.1  Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates of Older Americans, 1984–2005, by Gender and Age (Women)
A. Women 50–59 B. Women 60–64
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C. Men 65–69
Figure 5.2  Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates of Older Americans, 1984–2005, by Gender and Age (Men)
A. Men 50–59 B. Men 60–64
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
%
 
i
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
Less than HS HS/GED Some college College or more
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
%
 
i
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
%
 
i
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1984 1988 19 2 1996 20 2004
%
 
i
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
Less than HS HS/GED S me college College or more
B
artik &
 H
ousem
an.indb   167
2/29/2008   1:42:14 PM
168   Abraham and Houseman
Social Security Reforms 
Several features of the Social Security system discouraged work 
at older ages in the past. Recent changes have greatly reduced if not 
eliminated these disincentives. First, the Social Security earnings test, 
which determines any reduction in current monthly benefits for those 
with earnings from employment, has been liberalized for those between 
age 62 and the normal retirement age and eliminated for those above 
the normal retirement age. These changes allow beneficiaries to earn 
more without experiencing a reduction in their current Social Security 
benefits. Although under previous law those whose benefits were re-
duced because of the earnings test could expect to receive higher future 
benefits, this fact seems to have been poorly understood by benefit re-
cipients, and consequently the liberalization of the earnings test appears 
to be one of the factors responsible for the recent increase in labor force 
participation at older ages (Munnell and Sass 2007). 
Second, new rules regarding the delayed retirement credit are being 
phased in. When fully implemented in 2008, these rules will approxi-
mately equate the actuarial present value of Social Security benefits 
received by those who choose to delay receipt of benefits to the value 
for those who begin collecting benefits at the normal retirement age. By 
reducing the penalty previously imposed on those who chose to con-
tinue working past the normal retirement age, the delayed retirement 
credit appears already to have increased work among those age 65 and 
older (Munnell and Sass, 2007). 
A third change whose full effect has not yet been felt is the sched-
uled increase in the normal retirement age—the age at which individu-
als may begin to receive full benefits—from 65 to 67. Although workers 
still may retire and begin to collect Social Security benefits at 62, their 
monthly benefit amount will be proportionately lower than would have 
been true in the past, reflecting the larger actuarial reduction needed 
to equate the expected present value of lifetime benefits for a person 
retiring at age 62 to that for someone retiring at age 67 as opposed to 
age 65. This is a reduction in benefits that should increase the number 
of Americans who want to work at older ages (Munnell and Sass 2007; 
Thompson 2004).
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Changes to Private Sector Retirement Plans 
Roughly half of workers of retirement age are covered by an em-
ployer pension plan, but the character of those plans has changed a great 
deal. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finance show that the share of 
those with a pension covered by a defined benefit plan fell from 87 per-
cent to 44 percent between 1983 and 1998; over the same time period, 
the share covered by a defined contribution plan rose from 40 percent 
to 79 percent (Friedberg and Webb 2005). Analysis of data collected 
from employers by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that 
the shift away from defined benefit plans towards defined contribution 
plans continued through 2005. In addition, many employers offering 
defined benefit plans have converted them to cash balance or pension 
equity plans that in important respects are more like a defined contribu-
tion plan than the traditional defined benefit plan (Costo 2006).
The ongoing shift in employer-sponsored retirement plans from 
defined benefit to defined contribution plans is providing additional fi-
nancial incentives to workers to retire at an older age. The traditional 
defined benefit plan imposes a significant financial penalty for working 
past a certain age; in contrast, the present value of retirement benefits 
under a defined contribution plan continues to grow so long as the indi-
vidual continues to work (Friedberg and Webb 2005). Further, although 
this would not have to be the case, defined contribution plans tend to 
be less generous than defined benefit plans in practice. Ghilarducci and 
Sun (2006) find that employers contribute significantly less per capita 
under defined contribution plans than under defined benefit plans. Simi-
larly, the cash balance plans offered by employers who have converted 
from traditional defined benefit plans generally have been less gener-
ous than the plans they replaced (Government Accountability Office 
2005a). Research has concluded that participants in defined contribu-
tion plans retire later on average—perhaps as much as two years lat-
er—than participants in defined benefit plans and that the shift towards 
defined contribution plans has been an important reason for the recent 
increases in labor force participation at older ages (Friedberg and Webb 
2005; Munnell, Cahill, and Jivan 2003).
New rules regarding phased retirement plans included in the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 also may increase the share of older individuals 
who choose to work.1 The new rules allow in-service distributions from 
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defined benefit pension plans to employees aged 62 and older, meaning 
that they are allowed to reduce their hours on the job while beginning 
to collect pension benefits, something that had not previously been per-
mitted for employees below the normal retirement age specified in their 
employer’s pension plan.2
Falling Retiree Health Benefit Coverage
Paralleling these changes in pension benefits has been a decline in 
the coverage and generosity of retiree health insurance. As medical-
care costs have risen, so too have the costs of retiree health insurance. 
In addition, the rules that govern how firms must account for those costs 
have changed in a way that makes it less attractive for firms to offer 
a retiree health insurance plan. Federal Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 106, 
issued in 1990, requires companies to report retiree health insurance 
benefits as a liability on their financial accounting statements. 
Issuance of this standard is widely believed to have triggered a 
reduction in the coverage of such plans. Data from employer surveys 
sponsored by the Kaiser Family Foundation show that the fraction of 
companies with 200 or more employees offering retiree benefits fell 
from 66 percent in 1988 to 36 percent in 1993 and has fluctuated be-
tween 35 and 40 percent since that time, except for a dip in 2005 (John-
son 2007; McCormack et. al 2002). Other data from the Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPSIC), an employer 
survey that covers both large and small employers, show that the share 
of private sector employees who work for an employer with a retiree 
health plan fell between 1997 and 2003 (Buchmueller, Johnson, and 
Lo Sasso 2006). Furthermore, in recent years a growing share of firms 
with plans have closed them to new retirees (Eibner, Zawacki, and Zim-
merman 2007). In coming years, all of these changes can be expected 
to reduce significantly the share of retirees with employer-sponsored 
health coverage. In addition, the premium contributions that eligible 
workers must pay to be covered have risen sharply (Buchmueller, John-
son, and Lo Sasso 2006). Increases in the cost of coverage may strain 
the finances of older individuals and also may reduce take-up rates, 
further depressing the share of retirees with employer-provided health 
insurance coverage.
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Inadequate Savings Rates
The ongoing shift away from defined benefit plans and anticipated 
declines in retiree health insurance coverage imply that fewer Ameri-
cans will enjoy generous company-provided benefits in the future, and 
hence that they will need to save more to ensure adequate income in 
retirement. Yet a recent survey of adults conducted by the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) shows that many do not fully under-
stand how these changes affect their retirement security, and, among 
those who do, few have altered their savings behavior to compensate 
for the decline in generosity of retirement income provided by employ-
ers. EBRI found that large numbers of adults grossly underestimated the 
amount of savings they would need to cover expected medical expenses 
in old age and overestimated their chances of receiving traditional de-
fined benefit pension plans (Helman, Copeland, and VanDerhei 2006). 
More generally, recent studies have highlighted the fact that many 
individuals are not saving sufficiently to maintain living standards in 
old age (Congressional Budget Office 2003). One effective method of 
increasing retirement savings would be to change default options to 
require employees who do not wish to participate in 401(k) and similar 
retirement plans to opt out rather to require those who wish to par-
ticipate to opt in (Madrian and Shea 2001). The Pension Protection Act 
creates a safe harbor for such automatic enrollment plans in the form of 
minimum employer contribution schedules that, if adopted, exempt the 
employer from the usual nondiscrimination tests otherwise required to 
ensure that 401(k) plans do not offer disproportionate benefits to high-
ly paid employees (Deloitte 2006). This safe harbor provision should 
encourage more employers to adopt an automatic enrollment default. 
Another proposed reform would replace incentives for retirement sav-
ings that operate by making contributions to retirement plans tax de-
ductible—an incentive that is worth considerably more to high-income 
households than to low- or middle-income households because of their 
higher marginal tax rates—with a plan that matches contributions up to 
some threshold amount (Gale, Gruber, and Orszag 2006). 
It is unclear how effective such reforms can be in increasing retire-
ment savings for the typical American. Their adoption would not change 
the fundamental fact that wages for middle- and lower-income Ameri-
cans have been stagnant or falling, and that many feel they have limited 
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slack in their household budgets to set aside money for retirement. This 
problem is implicit in the analysis of Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 
(2006), who challenge the conventional wisdom that Americans are not 
saving optimally for retirement. For individuals with low or modest 
incomes, “optimal” savings may be at or near zero with standard dis-
count rates. Instead of relying on savings, many Americans, because of 
declining Social Security and pension benefits, may need to delay full 
retirement to maintain their living standards. 
THE PROBLEM: OLDER WORkERS MAy HAvE 
DIFFICULTy FInDInG SUITABLE EMPLOyMEnT 
The premise that there will be a growing supply of older Americans 
who want to work seems uncontroversial. Recent Social Security and 
pension policy reforms, coupled with inadequate retirement and sav-
ings income and the decline in retiree health benefits, will give more 
older Americans an incentive to postpone retirement or reenter the labor 
force. By itself, an increase in the number of older workers seeking em-
ployment will put downward pressure on their wages or, if wages do not 
adjust smoothly, will result in involuntary or disguised unemployment. 
Employer Demand for Older Workers
Some have argued that any increase in the supply of older Ameri-
cans seeking employment will be matched or exceeded by an increase 
in demand among employers seeking to hire them. Many policy ana-
lysts predict that, faced with massive retirements among the baby boom 
generation, employers soon will face serious labor shortages. This, 
they believe, will induce employers to work harder to retain their ex-
isting workforce and to recruit more actively among the pool of retir-
ees (AARP 2006; Dychtwald, Erickson, and Morison 2006; Ernst and 
Young 2006; Judy and D’Amico 1997). These analysts predict that em-
ployers’ need for older workers will lead them to be more accommo-
dating both of older workers’ physical limitations and of their desires 
for more flexible employment, including part-time or part-year work. 
Under this scenario, older workers will find it relatively easy to arrange 
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flexible, phased retirement with their existing employer or to land an 
attractive job with a new employer. 
Other researchers are more skeptical that the future will be this rosy 
for seniors. Although the baby boom generation already has started to 
retire, existing research finds little evidence that companies are moving 
to establish broad-based worker retention programs (AARP 2006; Ernst 
and Young 2006; Government Accountability Office 2005b). A large 
employer survey about phased retirement options offered to white-col-
lar workers found that such programs were uncommon and that, when 
these programs were offered, employers typically operated informally, 
choosing to make special arrangements for the most valued employees 
(Hutchens 2007). Dychtwald, Erickson, and Morison (2006), who make 
a strong case that employers will need to retain employees to avoid 
shortfalls in the near future, also acknowledge that employers will want 
to be selective in whom they retain. For this reason, they advocate liber-
alization of “nondiscrimination tests for flexible retirement plans so that 
employers [can] more easily customize work arrangements and offer 
them to employees with exceptionally valuable skills and experience 
without breaking antidiscrimination laws and uniformity mandates” (p. 
62). Low-skilled workers, who are the most vulnerable to cuts in Social 
Security and in the worst position to increase their own savings for re-
tirement, arguably are the least likely to benefit from any growth in em-
ployer retention programs. Freeman (2006) also has criticized the labor 
shortage hypothesis, arguing that employers will meet any shortages 
with immigration and offshoring. Again, the least skilled workers are of 
greatest concern, because they tend to be the most adversely affected by 
pressures from immigration and offshoring.    
Evidence on the Difficulty Older Workers Face in Finding  
new Work
Many older Americans work long hours or in physically demand-
ing jobs and would like to cut back on their hours or change the type of 
work they do as they age. Although much of the literature on retirement 
transitions discusses the prevalence of so-called bridge jobs, it appears 
that far more individuals would like to work in later years than in fact 
do so. For example, 73 percent of workers aged 51 to 61 surveyed in the 
1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) said that they would like to 
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continue paid work following retirement (AARP 1998). Other surveys 
have yielded similar findings. Yet actual employment rates among older 
Americans are far lower than one might expect from these survey re-
sponses. In 2001, when those interviewed for the 1992 HRS would have 
been aged 60 to 70, only 57 percent of men and 44 percent of women 
aged 60 to 64, and only 32 percent of men and 21 percent of women 
aged 65 to 69 were employed either part-time or full-time. Other data 
show that among men aged 55 to 64 who received pension or retire-
ment-plan income in 2002 just over a third were working in March 
2003, and the corresponding share among men 65 and older was only 
12 percent (Purcell 2005). 
Although there are multiple reasons why the number of individuals 
who plan to work in later years is substantially higher than the number 
who, in fact, realize their plans, our research suggests that the difficulty 
older workers experience with transitioning to new jobs is a significant 
factor. We draw on panel data from the Health and Retirement Study. 
The HRS panel includes a representative sample of Americans born 
in the years 1931 to 1941. Seven waves with interviews conducted 
biennially from 1992 to 2004 are currently available. In each wave, 
survey participants answer detailed questions about many aspects of 
their health, work, and finances. We use questions about future plans 
for work and retirement that were asked of individuals employed at the 
time of the survey. We then exploit the panel structure of the data to 
examine whether individuals followed through on these plans.3 
Among those with definite future work or retirement plans, a minor-
ity (39 percent) indicated that they planned to stop work altogether, and 
almost as many indicated that they planned to work fewer hours (29 
percent) or change the type of work they do (7 percent) (Table 5.1). Ex-
ploiting the fact that the HRS reinterviews the same individuals at two-
year intervals, we examine the degree to which individuals followed 
through on these work and retirement plans. Specifically, we identify 
the subset of individuals who indicated during the interview that they 
planned to stop work altogether, cut back on their hours, or change the 
type of work they do within the following two years. We then look at 
whether what they are doing at the subsequent two interviews—which 
take place about two years and about four years later—is consistent 
with their stated plans. We classify people as having reduced their 
weekly hours if the sum of weekly hours worked on all jobs dropped by 
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eight hours or more between waves. Whether individuals have changed 
the type of work they do is somewhat subjective, and there is no clean 
measure of such a work change in the HRS. We consider anyone who 
changed occupation to have changed the type of work they were doing. 
Because our measure of work and retirement plans groups those who 
plan to change their type of work with those who plan to begin working 
for themselves, we also treat those who move from employee to self-
employed status, or the reverse, as having changed their type of work. 
Table 5.2 compares individuals’ work and retirement plans with 
what they were actually doing when next interviewed two years later. 
Most interesting is the fact that those with near-term plans to stop work 
altogether were much more likely to follow through on those plans 
than were individuals who planned to reduce their hours of work or 
change the type of work they do. Whereas about 65 percent of those 
who planned to retire fully were not working at the next interview 
about two years later, only 35 percent of those who planned to reduce 
their hours and 24 percent of those who planned to change the type of 
work they do followed through on their plans. Roughly half of those 
who failed to realize plans to reduce their hours or change their type 
of work made no changes in their employment situation and roughly 
half stopped working altogether. Although various factors, such as an 
unanticipated worsening of health status, may help explain why rela-
tively few follow through on these stated plans, analysis we have done 
suggests that, for many older workers, the need to change jobs is an 
Table 5.1  Plans for Work and Retirement
Percent of observations for which plan reported
Including
“Don’t know”
Excluding
“Don’t know”Plan
Stop work altogether 24.5 39.3
Work fewer hours 18.6 29.8
Change type of work 4.5 7.3
Never stop work 7.8 12.4
Other 7.0 11.2
Don’t know 37.7 n.a.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from waves 1–7 of the Health and Retirement Study 
(1992–2004), based on 18,758 reports of individuals’ work and retirement plans. All 
estimates constructed using HRS sample weights.
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Table 5.2  Labor Market Outcomes among Those with near-Term Plans to Stop Work, Work Fewer Hours, or 
Change Type of Work (%)
Work or retirement outcome after 2 years
Change planned  
within 2 years Realized plan
Reduced 
hours of work
Changed 
type of work
Reduced hours 
and changed 
type of work Stopped work No changes N
Stop work altogether 64.8 9.7 2.5 8.6 64.8 14.5 751
Work fewer hours 34.9 25.5 6.9 9.4 27.7 30.5 569
Change kind of work 24.4 12.3 6.5 17.9 33.9 29.5 123
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from waves 1–7 of the Health and Retirement Study. Calculations based on reports from individuals 
who indicated that they planned to stop work or make significant changes to hours worked or job held within two years and who were 
interviewed in the following wave. Information on plans collected in waves 1 through 6; information on outcomes collected in following 
wave. All estimates constructed using HRS sample weights. In computing the percent distribution of work and retirement outcomes for 
people with given plans, we excluded a small number of cases (2 percent or fewer) for which the outcome could not be determined.
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important impediment to reducing hours and changing the type of work 
they do. In Abraham and Houseman (2005) we show that, among the 
employed, those who reported that their employer allowed employees 
to reduce work hours were much more likely to plan to reduce work 
hours and, if they had such plans, were much more likely to realize their 
plans to reduce hours than were individuals whose employers did not 
allow such flexibility. 
Because it may take more time than initially anticipated to make a 
planned change, especially when the change entails finding a new job, 
we also examine whether individuals realized their stated plans either 
by the next wave interview, about two years later, or by the subsequent 
interview, about four years later.4 When examined over this longer pe-
riod, a higher percentage of individuals realized plans to reduce their 
work hours or change their type of work. Even over this longer hori-
zon, however, only half of those planning to reduce their hours and a 
third of those planning to change the type of work they do appear to 
have followed through on their plans, compared to about 80 percent 
who followed through on plans to stop work altogether. Four years after 
stating plans to reduce their hours or change their type of work, those 
who failed to realize these plans were roughly twice as likely to have 
stopped working altogether as they were to be still working.
In analysis not reported here, we find that adults with low education 
levels have the most difficulty making such job transitions, as is consis-
tent with prior research on dislocated workers discussed below. Less-
educated individuals were significantly less likely to formulate plans 
to reduce their hours of work or change the type of work they do, and, 
conditional on having such plans, were significantly less likely than 
more-educated workers to follow through on those plans. We estimate 
that those who have not completed high school were 11 to 17 percent-
age points less likely to follow through on plans to reduce their hours 
and 10 to 17 percentage points less likely to follow through on plans to 
change the type of work they do.5 
Declining Job Stability and Its Consequences
The apparent decline in job stability in recent years poses a further 
obstacle for older workers who wish to continue working. Although 
long-term jobs are still quite common among older workers (Stevens 
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2006), recent evidence suggests that they are less common than they 
used to be. In a detailed look at trends in employment over the last 50 
years, Farber (2006) finds that mean and median job tenure among men 
have declined for all age groups, as has the incidence of being in a long-
lasting job (one that lasts at least 10 or 20 years). The largest declines 
have been among older men. Comparing men born in the 1930s to those 
born in the 1950s, for example, Farber shows that median job tenure at 
age 50 decreased by more than two years, from 11.9 years to 9.7 years. 
In addition, Farber finds some evidence of job churning (which he de-
fines as jobs lasting less than a year) among men in their thirties. Men 
in their twenties always have experienced a lot of job turnover, a fact in-
terpreted to mean that they were trying out various jobs before settling 
in to long-term employment. The fact that job churning has increased 
significantly among men in their thirties suggests that men today may 
be having more difficulty finding a suitable long-term job than were 
men in previous generations.  
Research evidence suggests that at least some of the decline in job 
stability among older workers is associated with layoffs. While the inci-
dence of layoff is lower among older than among younger workers, the 
gap has narrowed in recent recessions (Farber 2005), and, conditional 
on tenure in the job, workers aged 45 to 64 have become substantially 
more susceptible to job loss (Farber 2007). 
The narrowing gap between the dislocation rates of younger and 
older workers may be related to an aging workforce in sectors—like 
manufacturing—that are especially sensitive to business cycles and that 
have experienced large secular declines in employment in recent years. 
Case study evidence also suggests that business perceptions about the 
desirability of retaining older workers when there is a layoff may be 
changing. Historically, layoffs generally occurred in inverse seniority 
order, even in the absence of union contracts dictating such layoff rules 
(Abraham and Medoff 1984). This pattern has been widely interpreted 
to imply that employers value the skills and experience of their long-
tenure employees, though other research has indicated that the higher 
pay of more senior workers cannot be fully justified on the basis of 
their higher productivity (Medoff and Abraham 1980, 1981; Hellerstein 
and Neumark 2007). Recent high-profile cases involving Wal-Mart and 
Circuit City indicate that at least some employers have concluded that 
the extra pay long-tenure employees typically receive exceeds any ad-
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ditional productivity garnered from their experience and have adopted 
policies that some allege discourage long-term employment (Green-
house and Barbaro 2006; Leonhardt 2007). Besides wages that arguably 
rise faster than productivity, the high cost of providing health insurance 
for older workers provides an incentive to companies to lower the aver-
age age at the workplace. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence of a decline in job stability implies 
that older workers will be less able to rely on long-term jobs that last 
until retirement and more likely to need to search for new jobs, possibly 
in new fields, late in their working life. Yet research on dislocated work-
ers—defined as those who have lost their job for economic reasons—
unambiguously shows that older workers have an especially difficult 
time making job transitions. Using data from the Health and Retirement 
Study, Chan and Stevens (2001) find large and long-lasting adverse ef-
fects of job loss on employment among older workers. Only 61 percent 
of men and 55 percent of women who involuntarily lose their jobs are 
reemployed two years following job loss. Compared to similar workers 
who do not lose their jobs, individuals who experience job loss at age 
55 are an estimated 20 percentage points less likely to hold a job at age 
59. Farber (2005) finds similarly low levels of reemployment among 
older, displaced workers. He also finds much lower reemployment rates 
among less-educated workers. Among displaced workers who become 
reemployed, older displaced workers, who on average had longer ten-
ure and were earning more on the job they lost, also experience substan-
tially higher earnings losses. 
What happens to older dislocated workers who fail to find new 
jobs? Many appear to wind up in the Social Security Disability Insur-
ance (SSDI) program, collecting benefits from SSDI until they qualify 
for regular, age-related Social Security benefits. The fraction of the 
U.S. adult population on SSDI has grown dramatically over the last 20 
years, increasing from 2.2 percent of 25-to-64-year-olds in 1985 to 4.1 
percent in 2005. The largest increases have occurred among older, less- 
educated subgroups. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), Autor and Duggan (2006) estimate that between 
1984 and 2004 the rate of SSDI receipt rose from 14.8 to 19.7 percent 
among male high school dropouts aged 55 to 64 and from 9.1 to 12.7 
percent among female high school dropouts of the same ages. The ap-
proximately 5-percentage-point increase in disability coverage among 
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high school dropout men aged 55 to 64 compares to an 8-percentage- 
point decline in the labor force participation rate in this age group over 
the same period. Autor and Duggan point to increases in the generosity 
of benefits and to changes that have made it easier to qualify for bene-
fits when an individual has difficulty finding employment—not true in-
creases in the incidence of disability—as explanations for the dramatic 
growth in the program. They argue cogently that SSDI has become a 
program for the unemployable. 
WHy DO OLDER WORkERS OFTEn HAvE DIFFICULTy 
FInDInG nEW JOBS?
The above evidence indicates that older workers, particularly less 
skilled and less educated workers, have difficulty transitioning to new 
jobs. Part of the problem undoubtedly is that many of these workers do 
not know how to go about looking for a job. And even before they start, 
many are convinced that employers simply are not interested in hiring 
older workers, which itself may discourage active search (Government 
Accountability Office 2005b). 
An audit study conducted by Lahey (2008) provides perhaps the 
best research evidence to date of employer discrimination against older 
workers applying for entry-level jobs. In her study, Lahey sent resumes 
of women to be considered for entry-level positions to prospective 
employers in Boston, Massachusetts, and St. Petersburg, Florida. The 
resumes were carefully written to appear nearly identical, except that 
information on the resumes indicated that some applicants were rela-
tively young (age 35 or 45), while others were older (age 50, 55, or 62). 
Younger applicants were more than 40 percent more likely than older 
applicants to be called in to interview for the position. Two commonly 
offered reasons why employers, all else being the same, might prefer 
younger to older workers are that older workers lack necessary skills, 
especially technical skills, and that their wage and benefits costs are too 
high. 
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Lack necessary Skills
Although skills and experience are much-touted assets of older 
workers (see, for instance, AARP 2005), years of work experience may 
benefit an older worker primarily in the job in which he or she accrued 
that experience. Unless the skills from one job are readily transferable 
to another job, years of accrued experience provide an older worker 
with little advantage when those workers want or need to change jobs. 
Moreover, businesses indicate one problem they have with hiring old-
er workers is that they often lack up-to-date technical skills (Arizona 
Mature Worker Initiative 2006). Older workers themselves sometimes 
acknowledge their lack of computer skills (Government Accountability 
Office 2005b). Employers may be reluctant to invest in training older 
workers given the relatively short time that they can be expected to con-
tinue working (Arizona Mature Worker Initiative 2006). Perceptions 
that older workers are more rigid and slower to learn may reinforce 
employers’ unwillingness to hire older workers who require training 
(Bendick, Jackson, and Romero 1996).
Beyond lacking technical skills, older job applicants may not pos-
sess physical or social attributes that are important in some jobs. Older 
workers may no longer have the physical stamina or dexterity to han-
dle certain jobs, particularly jobs in low-skilled manual occupations in 
which many less-educated individuals historically have been employed. 
In addition, employers believe that some older workers would find it 
difficult to accept being part of an ethnically or culturally diverse work-
force, meaning that their presence could undermine effective commu-
nication and smooth functioning in many workplace settings (Arizona 
Mature Worker Initiative 2006).
High Wage and Benefits Costs 
Based on analyses of personnel records for the salaried workforces 
of several large companies, Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) find that 
senior workers receive higher pay than equally productive junior work-
ers. Hellerstein and Neumark (2007) find that manufacturing workers 
aged 55 and over are less productive than younger workers, but this 
lower productivity is not matched by lower earnings. The high earn-
ings of older workers relative to their productivity is widely seen as an 
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impediment to the hiring of older workers in many developed countries 
(OECD 2006). Recent high-profile cases in the United States suggest 
that relatively high pay for workers with long job tenures is becoming 
an important human resources issue for cost-conscious corporations. A 
memorandum by a top Wal-Mart executive to its board of directors, for 
instance, outlined a proposed policy to increase turnover and thereby 
reduce the average tenure of its stores’ employees, which it calls asso-
ciates, by setting wage caps on certain positions and requiring staff to 
work nights and weekends. The memo noted that the cost of an associ-
ate with seven years of tenure was 55 percent more than the cost of an 
associate with one year of tenure, yet the productivity of the two was 
the same. Similar concerns at Circuit City led to dismissals of about 8 
percent of its employees who were deemed overpaid so that these em-
ployees could be replaced by lower-cost workers (Leonhardt 2007). 
Although human resource practices that reward employee perfor-
mance with pay raises that exceed employees’ productivity growth may 
be coming to an end, the apparent pervasiveness of the practice points 
to another reason why employers are reluctant to hire older workers as 
new employees. According to one survey, employers believe that many 
older workers expect higher salaries than those that come with the jobs 
for which they are applying (Arizona Mature Worker Initiative 2006). 
A corollary is that employers fear that, if older workers take a job with 
lower wages than they feel entitled to, they may view the relatively low 
wages as unfair; consequently they may have low morale and perform 
poorly on the job. Thus, employers may be reluctant to hire a person 
who has earned significantly higher wages in the past, even if that indi-
vidual indicates a willingness to accept the job. 
Older workers also are more expensive to insure. Health insurance 
has become the most costly worker benefit (Government Accountabil-
ity Office 2006a), and according to analysis by Towers Perrin for the 
AARP (AARP 2005), on average, workers aged 50 to 65 have medical 
expenses that are 1.4 to 2.2 times higher than workers in their thirties 
and forties, translating into significantly higher health insurance costs. 
One of the leading obstacles to hiring older workers, according to em-
ployer surveys, is the high cost of providing them with health insurance 
(Arizona Mature Worker Initiative 2006). One study found that em-
ployers with health benefit plans are significantly less likely to hire per-
sons aged 55–64 than are employers who do not offer health insurance 
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(Scott, Berger, and Garen 1995). And the issue of high health insurance 
costs generally does not go away once the older worker reaches age 
65 and thus qualifies for Medicare coverage. Under existing Medicare 
rules, if an employee aged 65 or over working for an employer with 20 
or more employees is covered by employer-provided health insurance, 
in most cases that insurance policy, not Medicare, is the first payer for 
any claim that may be made. 
POLICIES
The aging of the American population is expected to place severe 
strains on the Social Security and Medicare systems in the coming de-
cades and has led to a broad consensus that it is in the public interest 
to increase employment among older Americans. The perceived need 
to increase employment among older Americans comes at a time when 
their job tenure is on the decline and job loss is on the rise. Although 
labor force participation among older women has risen in recent de-
cades and labor force participation among men over age 65 has edged 
up since the mid-1990s, labor force participation among men in their 
fifties—i.e., men in their immediate preretirement years—has declined 
over the last two decades. The decline has been particularly marked for 
less-educated men. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, selected policies designed to pro-
vide greater incentives for older Americans to work have been adopted. 
Most notably, the age at which individuals will qualify to retire with full 
Social Security benefits is rising from age 65 to age 67. For those with 
traditional defined benefit pensions, reforms to ERISA will facilitate 
workers’ participation in phased retirement programs within their com-
pany. Still, for many workers, whether because they seek a change in 
hours or job duties or because they are forced out of their jobs, contin-
ued employment at older ages will require a change of employers. The 
failure by many to make these job transitions has significant, if hidden, 
public costs, which include growing dependence of older Americans on 
the Social Security system and other forms of public assistance. Poli-
cies that provide financial incentives to older Americans to work, we 
believe, must be supplemented by policies that ease job transitions and 
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remove some of the substantial barriers to being hired that older Ameri-
cans face. Below we review federal employment and training programs 
that serve older workers and recent initiatives that some states have 
taken to facilitate employment among older Americans. We conclude 
by outlining policies that we believe are needed to fill existing gaps. 
Federal Programs
The Senior Community Services Employment Program (SCSEP) 
is the only federal employment program that specifically targets old-
er Americans. SCSEP serves approximately two-thirds of individuals 
aged 55 and over who receive federal employment and training services 
(General Accounting Office 2003). Funded under the Older Americans 
Act of 1965, the SCSEP program provides subsidized part-time and 
community service employment for individuals aged 55 and older who 
have incomes below 125 percent of the poverty level. Historically, 
moving participants to unsubsidized employment was not a stated goal 
of the program. Although this was changed in 2000, placement rates 
into unsubsidized employment remain relatively low (Government Ac-
countability Office 2006b). According to official program statistics, in 
recent years SCSEP has served around 100,000 seniors nationwide (Ta-
ble 5.3), most of them over age 65. The U.S. Department of Labor esti-
mates that this represents fewer than 1 percent of the eligible population 
(Government Accountability Office 2006b). Program funding has been 
stagnant in current dollars and, as shown in Figure 5.3, has been falling 
in real terms since the late 1990s. 
The Work Force Investment Act (WIA) is the country’s primary em-
ployment and training services program, although the number of older 
workers who are served by WIA programs is considerably smaller than 
the number served by SCSEP (Table 5.3).6 WIA provides basic labor 
market information and preliminary job skills services to any adult 18 
or over who seeks them. More intensive job search assistance and train-
ing services are limited to individuals enrolled in one of three funded 
WIA programs: the adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs. Older 
Americans are served under the first two programs. Priority for enroll-
ment in the WIA adult program is given to individuals on public as-
sistance and others in low-income households. Enrollment in the WIA 
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dislocated worker program is reserved for individuals permanently laid 
off from jobs. 
In July 2000, the WIA adult and dislocated worker programs re-
placed similar programs funded under the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA). The JTPA dislocated worker program enjoyed funding in-
creases that offset declines in funding for the JTPA adult program over 
much of the 1990s, but under WIA, funding for both programs has been 
stagnant in current dollars and falling in real dollars. In constant dollars, 
total funding for the WIA adult and dislocated worker programs was 35 
percent lower in 2007 than funding for the comparable JTPA programs 
had been ten years earlier, and the decline has been even steeper relative 
to the size of the working-age population. Within this funding context, 
official program statistics show that the absolute number of workers 
over age 55 served by WIA programs has been lower than the number 
served under the corresponding JTPA programs and that older workers 
have declined as a fraction of all adults served.7 
Figure 2: Trends in Real Spending on Employment and Training Programs 
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Figure 5.3  T nds in Real Sp ing on Employment a d Tr ining 
Programs (2006 constant dollars)
SOURCE: Budget numbers from U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Train-
ing Administration, Training and Employment Programs Budget Authority. PY 1984–
2004, http://www.doleta.gov/budget/tepbah.pdf. The authors deflated all budget fig-
ures using the CPI Series CUUROOOOSAO.
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Table 5.3  Data on Program Exiters, JTPA, WIA, and SCSEP Programs, 1997–2004
Program year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
SCSEP program
Program exiters
N 96,852 105,829 93,000
As % of population 55–64 0.38 0.38 0.32
JTPA/WIA adult programs
Program exiters
N 159,389 163,223 142,147 109,868 193,518 261,544 229,607 225,683
As % of population 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.13
Program exiters age 55+
N 14,823 15,180 14,073 6,922 11,418 14,385 13,776 13,541
As % of population 55–64 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
As % of all exiters 9.30 9.30 9.90 6.30 5.90 5.50 6.00 6.00
JTPA/WIA dislocated worker programs
Program exiters
N 266,112 240,896 205,637 99,491 147,715 200,264 194,425 178,446
As % of population 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.10
Program exiters age 55+
N 26,611 24,812 22,826 11,441 16,692 22,229 21,970 21,592
As % of population 55–64 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07
As % of all exiters 10.00 10.30 11.10 11.50 11.30 11.10 11.30 12.10
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SOURCE: Data on programs from Social Policy Research Associates (PY 1997–2000), the 2001 WIASRD Data Book, http://www.doleta 
.gov/performance/results/PY_2001_WIASRD_Databook.pdf (PY 2001), and the corresponding data books and links for PY2002 through 
PY2004.
JTPA/WIA adult plus dislocated worker  
programs
Program exiters
N 425,501 404,119 347,784 209,359 341,233 461,808 424,032 404,129
As % of population 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.24 0.22
Program exiters age 55+
N 41,434 39,992 36,898 18,363 28,109 36,614 35,746 35,133
As % of population 55–64 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12
As % of all exiters 9.74 9.90 10.61 8.77 8.24 7.93 8.43 8.69
Trade adjustment assistance programs
Program exiters
N 26,363 24,883 30,047
As % of population 0.01 0.01 0.02
Program exiters age 55+
N 3,045 2,924 3,933
As % of population 55–64 0.01 0.01 0.01
As % of all exiters 11.55 11.75 13.09
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Under JTPA, states were required to set aside 5 percent of their 
adult program allotment for older workers. This provision was dropped 
in WIA and, as can be seen in Table 5.3, the share of those in the adult 
program who are aged 55 and over declined from about 9 percent in 
the JTPA adult program to about 6 percent in the WIA adult program. 
Although one might hypothesize that eliminating the quota on spend-
ing for older workers in WIA resulted in a more efficient allocation 
of resources, recent government reports have raised concerns that the 
federal performance standards used to evaluate organizations that ad-
minister the WIA programs have resulted in a bias against serving older 
workers. Until 2005, the performance standards for WIA service pro-
viders included measures of participants’ postprogram earnings relative 
to their preprogram earnings. Some observers think that this created 
a disincentive to serve older workers, many of whom have consider-
able prior work experience and may wish to transition from full-time to 
part-time employment (General Accounting Office 2003). In an attempt 
to address this problem, revised performance standards introduced in 
2006 substitute a measure of postprogram earnings for the previous 
earnings change measure (Employment and Training Administration 
2006). However, even this new measure may discourage providers from 
serving older workers, who are likely to seek part-time work and thus 
have relatively low earnings. 
Older workers also may receive job search assistance and training 
under Trade Adjustment Assistance programs, which are reserved spe-
cifically for workers displaced by foreign trade. Fewer than 4,000 TAA-
qualified workers—about 13 percent of all participants in TAA training 
and placement programs—were 55 or older in 2003. The Trade Act of 
2002 wrote into law a five-year demonstration program under which 
eligible workers aged 55 and older who agree to forgo TAA-funded 
training and are able to find jobs within 26 weeks that pay less than their 
previous earnings (and less than $50,000) are eligible for a wage sub-
sidy of up to $10,000 cumulatively to supplement their earnings. States 
moved slowly to implement the demonstration program and, as was 
the case with a similar Canadian program in place from 1995 to 1998 
(Levine 2007), take-up of the TAA wage subsidies has been relatively 
low. In addition to a lack of awareness of the program and not wishing 
to forgo the possibility of training, eligible workers who did not partici-
Bartik & Houseman.indb   188 2/29/2008   1:42:16 PM
Removing Barriers to Work for Older Americans   189
pate cite the difficulty of finding a job within six months as required by 
program rules (Government Accountability Office 2006c). 
Recent State Initiatives
Although the federal government has taken no major policy initia-
tive for older workers in recent years, a few states are beginning to take 
steps to address what is perceived as a growing need for employment 
services among this population. To identify innovative policies at the 
state level, we conducted an informal survey of relevant state workforce 
agencies through their national association (the National Association 
of State Workforce Agencies). Although most states do not have older 
worker programs besides the federally funded SCSEP, 10 states re-
sponded to our survey with information on initiatives they are currently 
taking or planning. In some instances, the AARP has worked with states 
to plan and implement initiatives. In addition, the National Governors 
Association has selected eight states to participate in a policy academy 
designed to develop model programs to meet the needs of mature work-
ers (National Governors Association 2007). 
These state initiatives generally fall into three broad categories. The 
first is employer outreach and education. Several states have initiated 
programs to advise employers on how to accommodate an aging work-
force. Initiatives also include information campaigns to combat what 
are regarded as inaccurate and damaging stereotypes of older workers 
with the aim of reducing discriminatory practices against those work-
ers. These public relations efforts emphasize positive attributes of older 
workers relative to young workers, such as reliability and good social 
skills. Patterned in part on an AARP program, efforts in several states 
also feature or are planning to feature employers who evidence a com-
mitment to hiring and promoting older workers. The idea behind these 
programs is at one level to help seniors connect with employers who 
are willing to hire them, but at a deeper level to provide positive public 
relations for the identified companies and advance the notion that hiring 
older workers is a good business practice.8 
A second area involves outreach and better delivery of existing ser-
vices to older workers. One of the most common initiatives adopted 
by states is to place an older worker specialist in the one-stop centers, 
which serve as the central clearinghouse for all workforce development 
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programs under WIA. This specialist would be able to better direct older 
workers to services meeting their specific needs and, some think, make 
older workers feel more welcome at one-stops. The concern that older 
workers are often reluctant to go to one-stop centers was expressed by a 
number of state workforce representatives, some of whom consequent-
ly planned outreach efforts at senior centers and other places where 
seniors might congregate. Such outreach may also involve providing 
access to job listings at these remote sites. 
A third area involves tailoring programs to meet specific needs of 
older workers. One program, for instance, emphasizes peer counsel-
ing, networking, life planning seminars, and other resources targeting 
those over 50 who are changing jobs and even careers. In addition to 
having special planning and counseling needs, older individuals often 
lack basic technical and computer skills that are needed for many jobs, 
and, indeed that may be needed even to find a job. Training in Internet 
job search and in the basic computer skills required on many jobs is 
widely recognized as a prevalent need among older workers. Arizona, 
for instance, is planning the development of a Web-based mechanism 
for posting jobs and resumes that would be technologically friendly 
for older workers and efficient for businesses. Some states offer free or 
reduced tuition to older adults who wish to advance their skills at public 
postsecondary institutions. 
In sum, states are experimenting with a variety of approaches to 
increase workforce participation among seniors. These efforts involve 
changing employer perceptions of older workers and hence receptive-
ness to hiring them, reaching out to older individuals who may be un-
aware of work opportunities, and tailoring programs to meet the special 
needs of older workers. We are aware of no serious effort to evaluate 
any of these initiatives, which, given the lack of federal funding or other 
resources available, are all modest in scope. 
Policy Recommendations 
Several circumstances, discussed above, serve as a backdrop for 
our policy recommendations: 1) there is a public interest in increasing 
employment among older Americans, 2) many older workers will need 
to make job changes late in life in order to remain employed, 3) older 
workers face significant impediments to finding new employment, and 
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4) public funding for employment and training programs that help older 
workers has been low and is falling. These facts lead us to make the fol-
lowing recommendations:
Increase funding for employment and training programs to 
help smooth employment transitions for older workers. While the 
population of older workers is growing and many in this population 
will need to make job transitions to remain employed, overall funding 
for the major government programs designed to help workers prepare 
for and find employment has fallen by over a third in real terms in the 
last decade, and older workers have received a shrinking share of that 
shrinking pie. The chances that an older person who leaves or loses a 
job will reenter employment are low unless the individual transitions 
to a new job in a reasonably short period of time. Because many who 
fail to find jobs end up collecting Social Security disability payments 
or some other form of public assistance, it is critical to have effective 
programs to help older workers transition to new jobs.
To put the funding of workforce programs for older workers in some 
perspective, in 2004 about 0.1 percent of the adult population aged 55 
to 64 participated in a WIA adult or dislocated worker program.9 In 
the same year, about 9 percent of those aged 55 to 64 were collecting 
SSDI, at an average annual cost per participant of two-and-a-half to 
three times that of the average cost per participant of serving someone 
in a WIA program. Although by no means does everyone who drops out 
of the labor force qualify for SSDI, individuals who fail to find employ-
ment are much more likely to receive other forms of public assistance, 
such as food stamps, Medicaid, and public housing. Even a return-to-
work program with a modest success rate could save taxpayer dollars. 
In the absence of better information on the return-on-investment 
to be expected from increased expenditures on such programs, history 
may provide some useful context. Returning real expenditures on the 
employment and training programs that serve older workers (SCSEP, 
the WIA adult program, the WIA dislocated worker program, and the 
TAA program) to the level of a decade ago would require an increase 
in total spending of about 40 percent. Taking into account the growth in 
population that has occurred over the past 10 years and returning spend-
ing per working age adult (aged 25–64) to its 1997 level would require 
an increase in spending of about 48 percent. 
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Modify WIA performance standards to eliminate disincentives 
to serve older workers. The performance standards currently used to 
evaluate the federally funded WIA programs include a measure of the 
subsequent earnings of participants taken from state unemployment in-
surance quarterly wage records data. Because these data record only 
total earnings in a quarter, not hourly wages, and because older work-
ers are more likely than younger workers to want part-time employ-
ment, this performance standard creates an unintended disincentive for 
program operators to serve older workers. Although it is an improve-
ment upon the previously used measures that compared postprogram 
earnings to preprogram earnings, the WIA earnings performance stan-
dard requires further modification to eliminate this disincentive. One 
straightforward way to do this would be to develop different standards 
to be applied to clients of different ages. For instance, performance 
measures for employment services programs operating in the United 
Kingdom and Australia explicitly take into account the fact that some 
individuals face more serious barriers to employment than others; thus, 
service providers receive more credit for placing clients with significant 
employment barriers, such as older workers, into jobs (OECD 2006). 
Tailor programs to meet needs of older workers. As a general 
proposition, it is important that programs be designed appropriately to 
meet the needs of special populations, including older workers. Experi-
mentation with initiatives for older workers such as those recently taken 
or planned by some states should be encouraged. Promising approaches 
include outreach and education efforts directed towards both employers 
and seniors, placing older-worker specialists in one-stop employment 
centers, and developing job-search assistance programs and job training 
courses that address skill deficiencies common among seniors, such as 
deficiencies in basic computer skills. Experiences in Australia suggest 
that older people particularly benefit from intensive assistance that in-
cludes a personal coach and career counseling (OECD 2006). 
Rigorously evaluate older-worker initiatives. While we are con-
fident that program providers can do a better job of serving older work-
ers and helping them to find employment, it must be emphasized that 
relatively little is known about how this can best be done. Rigorous 
evaluation of new initiatives at the state level to assess their effective-
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ness and their suitability as models for the national level must be an in-
tegral part of any new funding for such programs. In the same spirit, the 
planned evaluation of the wage subsidies for older workers, introduced 
as part of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, should be com-
pleted. Programs that prove to be cost-effective should be promoted 
and expanded. 
Reform health-care financing to reduce disincentives to hiring 
older workers. The high cost of providing health insurance for older 
workers is a major impediment to reemployment in good, full-time jobs 
for older workers. For those aged 65 and older, making Medicare rath-
er than the employer insurance policy the first payer in the event of a 
claim would help address this problem. However, such reform will not 
help the bulk of older workers, who are under age 65 and thus not yet 
eligible for Medicare. A growing consensus of experts agrees that “the 
employer-sponsored system of benefits in its current form may not be 
sustainable, largely because productivity growth is unlikely to support 
rising benefit costs” (Government Accountability Office 2006a, p. 26). 
Health insurance reform of a more comprehensive nature, as addressed 
in detail by Swartz (2008), is needed to remove this serious barrier to 
employment for other older workers. 
COnCLUSIOn
Over the coming decades, work for pay is likely to be increasingly 
important to the financial well-being of many older Americans. Higher 
rates of employment at older ages also could help with addressing the 
long-term funding problems faced by the Social Security and Medicare 
systems. 
To date, public policy initiatives intended to increase employment 
among older Americans have focused primarily on monetary incentives. 
Recent changes to the Social Security system that allow Social Security 
recipients to earn more without having their benefits reduced, that make 
the present value of benefits roughly independent of the age of retire-
ment rather than favoring those who retire early, and that raise the age 
at which recipients qualify for full benefits should make employment 
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significantly more attractive to older Americans. Furthermore, trends in 
private-sector benefits should reinforce the incentives associated with 
these recent changes in the Social Security system. In particular, the 
marked shift from defined-benefit pension plans to less generous de-
fined-contribution pension plans and the sharp declines in the coverage 
of retiree health insurance plans, together with the fact that savings for 
retirement have not risen to offset the reduction in the generosity of the 
pension and health benefits available to retirees, should provide addi-
tional encouragement for Americans to work at older ages. 
Although the altered financial incentives associated with recent 
policy and labor market changes unquestionably will be important in 
promoting employment among older Americans, we have argued in this 
chapter that policies designed to make work more attractive financially 
should be accompanied by policies designed to improve the function-
ing of labor markets for older workers. Our research as well as research 
by others points to the special challenges to remaining employed that 
older individuals face, even when they possess the ability and the desire 
to continue working. These problems are particularly acute for low-
educated workers and for older individuals who attempt to transition to 
new jobs. 
We have advocated policies to help ensure that older workers who 
wish to remain employed are able to do so. The measures we propose 
should make it easier for older workers to search for a job and should 
help to address some of the legitimate concerns that employers have 
about hiring older workers. Although these measures are unlikely to 
address fully the problems we have diagnosed, they would make an 
excellent start and seem likely to have a significant societal payoff.
notes
This paper was prepared for A Future of Good Jobs: America’s Challenge in the Global 
Economy, a conference sponsored by the W.E. Upjohn Institute held in Washington, 
DC on June 22, 2007. We have benefited from conversations with many individuals, 
including Linda Levine, Blake Naughton, Debra Whitman, and Julie Whittaker of the 
Congressional Research Service; Dianne Blank, Barbara Bovbjerg, Mindy Bowman, 
Alicia Cackley, and Sigurd Nilsen of the Government Accountability Office; and Em-
ily Allen, Dalmer Hoskins, Sara Rix, and Jim Seith of AARP. Richard Hobbie of the 
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lent research assistance.
 1. For a description of these rules, see Deloitte (2006).
 2. Although the share of older individuals who work should increase, the effect of 
this change on total hours of work is ambiguous. Total hours of work could in-
crease if those choosing phased retirement would otherwise have quit working 
altogether, or they could decrease if those choosing phased retirement would oth-
erwise have worked full time. Although the context is somewhat different, the 
analysis reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (2007) of the effects of eliminating 
the Social Security earnings test for those below normal retirement age suggests 
the former effect may dominate. 
 3. This work updates research reported in Abraham and Houseman (2005). That pa-
per contains a more detailed discussion of the HRS and the questions pertaining to 
future work and retirement plans that we use. 
 4. For instance, consider an individual who stated in the 1992 interview that he 
planned to reduce his work hours by 1994. We count that individual as having re-
alized his stated plans if he was working at least eight fewer hours per week either 
at the 1994 or at the 1996 interview. Because we only observe work hours at the 
point in time of the interview, we do not know if an individual who is observed 
to be working the same hours as before or who has stopped working altogether 
reduced hours between interviews. 
 5. These estimates come from multivariate regression analyses that control for age, 
gender, and time period in addition to education level. This analysis is available 
from the authors on request. 
 6. We do not consider the Employment Service programs, which provide free labor 
exchange services to job seekers and employers but do not offer the more inten-
sive counseling, job placement, or training services of the other federal programs 
discussed in this chapter. 
 7. Figures for program year 2000 were affected by the transition from JTPA to WIA 
and do not reflect true changes in the population served. More generally, the ac-
curacy of data on the number of exiters from JTPA and WIA programs has been 
questioned because states have discretion in defining whom to count as an exiter 
(General Accounting Office 2004; Government Accountability Office 2005c). As 
long as how states define exiters has not changed significantly over time, these 
data should be indicative of broad trends both in the total number served and in 
the number of older individuals served.
 8. Public information campaigns and employer guidelines to combat discrimination 
against older workers have been a leading strategy used in many countries to try 
to increase the hiring of older workers (OECD 2006). 
 9. This figure comes from Table 5.3. For the purpose of the calculations reported 
there we have assumed that all program exiters aged 55 and older were aged 
55–64.
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Improving Job Quality
Policies Aimed at the Demand Side 
of the Low-Wage Labor Market
Paul Osterman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The last decades have been anxious ones for U.S. employees. The 
sources of worry are not hard to identify: for most workers, wages 
have not grown even at the pace of productivity gains, health and pen-
sion benefits are harder to obtain, and job security seems increasingly 
shaky. For many employees, stress levels and work/family pressures 
have ratcheted up as the job market becomes increasingly difficult to 
navigate. In addition, at the bottom of the labor market, too many adult 
Americans continue to find themselves in jobs that pay poverty wages 
and provide little in the way of a future. 
There are diverse explanations of these trends, some of which are 
well beyond the scope of this chapter. But one central concern is the 
decisions firms make about how to organize their work. As we will see, 
employers have alternative choices regarding their employment and 
human resource systems, and these choices have significant implica-
tions for the quality of jobs. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to think 
about what kinds of policy interventions might succeed in tilting those 
choices in the direction of better quality employment. Unlike traditional 
employment and training programs that focus on the supply side, that is, 
on changing the characteristics of individual workers, this chapter takes 
up policies that operate on the demand side to influence firms.
The chapter begins by briefly laying out the facts regarding trends 
in job quality. It then develops a framework for thinking about interven-
tions on the demand side of the market. The remainder of the chapter 
discusses various policy options. These include efforts to assist firms to 
improve the quality of the work they offer, as well as interventions in-
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tended to develop a set of standards and constraints regarding the nature 
of work that can be offered. 
TREnDS In JOB QUALITy
How many adults work in what might be termed “bad” jobs? The 
answer to this question obviously depends on definitions, and there is 
no common standard. One simple and compelling approach is to focus 
on wages since these are obviously the most important single consider-
ation. In 2006, the percentage of adults in the private sector who were 
working for poverty-level wages or less was 18.4 percent, a figure that 
is strikingly high, particularly given the strength of the job market and 
the widespread view that this standard is too low an estimate of what it 
takes to live a decent life.1 Among government workers (who represent-
ed 18.3 percent of employment), the rate was a surprisingly high 10.3 
percent (a finding that points directly to a policy recommendation). For 
men in the private sector the rate was 12.4 percent, and for women 22.1 
percent. These numbers change only marginally if they are weighted 
by the number of hours each person works.2 This order of magnitude is 
confirmed by a quite different data source, the National Compensation 
Survey of Occupational Wages. Conducted in 2001, it surveyed firms 
as well as state and local governments. In these data, 21.6 percent of all 
hours worked were in jobs that paid less than two-thirds of the median 
wage and 16.3 percent were in jobs that paid less than $8.00 an hour 
(Bernstein and Gittleman 2003).
Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that the fraction of jobs that 
are in the lower end of the earnings distribution is growing. The shape 
of the wage distribution is thinning in the middle and growing at each 
of the two tails. In one study, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) ranked 
occupations by their median earnings for the period 1980–2000. For the 
first 10 years (1980–1990) they find that employment grew most rap-
idly in higher paid occupations. However, for the second decade they 
identify a polarization: employment grew rapidly in both the best and 
the worst paid occupations while it declined in the middle range. Other 
studies find a similar pattern (Acemoglu 1999). 
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Adding to the concern is evidence that adults who find themselves 
in low-wage employment have difficulty moving to higher rungs of 
the labor market. One study found that among low earners in six years 
starting in the early 1990s, a period of remarkable economic strength, 
only 27 percent raised their incomes enough to rise consistently above 
the poverty line for a family of four (Holzer 2004). A more recent study 
using the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics came to a similar conclu-
sion. Looking at low earners in the years 1995–2001, the researchers 
found that 6 percent of those working full time and 18 percent of those 
working part time in any year had dropped out of the labor force by the 
next year. Among those who did stay in the workforce, 40 percent ex-
perienced either a decrease or no change in their earnings (Theodos and 
Bednarzik 2006). The experience of welfare reform suggests a similar 
pattern: the earnings for mothers who leave welfare and enter the job 
market remain very low over time (Acs and Loprest 2004). 
There is also reason to be worried about what is happening further 
up the distribution in the middle range of jobs that seem to be disap-
pearing. Many of these jobs are located in manufacturing, although oth-
er sectors are also experiencing losses. To get a flavor of the problem, 
consider recent reports of changes at Caterpillar, one of the nation’s 
largest manufacturers. In the past, a typical worker received a package 
that averaged about $25 an hour in pay; with benefits included the pack-
age was valued at $40 an hour. Under the new contract, new employees 
would receive $12 an hour and an additional $9 per hour in benefits. Ex-
plaining this shift, a group president at the firm commented that, “There 
is a balance that must be struck between being competitive and being 
middle class” (Uchitelle 2006). 
The loss of these good manufacturing jobs is obviously due to a 
range of forces, notably trade and technology, which are beyond the 
purview of this chapter. These are highly charged economic and po-
litical issues, and there is considerable divergence of opinion regarding 
this trajectory and what to do about it. However, as we will see, there 
are possible labor market interventions that might prove helpful in im-
proving the job growth and retention picture in this sector.
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Mapping the Distribution of Low-Wage Employment
If we are going to consider interventions on the demand side, it 
makes sense to try to understand what kinds of firms are most likely 
to be sources of low-wage employment.3 As before, I define low-wage 
workers as those who are earning at or below the hourly wage needed 
to lift a full-time, full-year worker with a family of four (including two 
children) above the poverty line.
Table 6.1 shows the industry distribution of low-wage and non-low-
wage earners in the private sector. Over one-third of private low-wage 
workers are concentrated in retail, food and drinking, and accommoda-
tion. This concentration poses a significant challenge because, as we 
will see, few employment and training programs are aimed at these 
sectors. 
Adding to the complications that these data pose for program de-
sign is the distribution of firm size among low-wage workers. Table 
6.2 shows this distribution (in the private sector). It is important to note 
that the firm size measure includes employees at all locations of the 
respondent’s employer and hence is an overstatement of the size of the 
actual establishment where the respondent works. 
As is apparent, low-wage workers are more likely to be found work-
ing for small employers than are better paid employees. This is consis-
Table 6.1  Distribution of Private Sector Low-Wage and non-Low-Wage 
Workers (%)
Low-wage Non-low-wage
Construction 4.7 8.2 
Manufacturing 11.4 18.3
Retail 20.3 10.1
Professional services 9.2 12.3
Food and drinking services 12.5 2.4
Health 9.9 13.0
Agriculture 2.5 0.5
Accommodation 2.6 0.9
Other 26.9 31.4
SOURCE: 2006 Outgoing Rotation Group. Data are limited to the private sector and 
are weighted by the sample weight and by hours worked. See notes for additional 
explanation of data preparation.
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tent with the long-standing pattern that large firms pay better than do 
small ones (Hollister 2004).4 More specifically, 40 percent of low-wage 
workers are in firms with 24 or fewer employees, and well over half are 
in firms with fewer than 100 workers. This concentration in small firms 
has significant programmatic implications that are often overlooked. In 
general, small firms are difficult for government programs to work with 
because the managers have little in the way of slack time and resources 
(and, not incidentally, are often more suspicious of the government than 
are larger organizations). In addition, many of the more innovative pro-
grammatic ideas, such as constructing career ladders, are of limited ap-
plicability in smaller organizations. Finally, it is very resource intensive 
for programs to work with large numbers of small employers, and the 
payoff, in terms of the number of people affected, is limited. 
Taken together, the implication of the industry and employer size 
distribution of private low-wage workers is that an effective public pol-
icy approach to the issue will need to incorporate multiple strategies. 
Policies aimed at directly working with employers may be less effective 
in some parts of the labor market, and standard setting efforts may be 
relatively more important in these sectors.
The Case for Demand-Side Interventions
Public policy aimed at addressing the large low-wage sector has 
traditionally emphasized education and training, that is, supply side 
programs aimed at improving people’s human capital. Similarly, labor 
market policy directed at middle-layer job loss has also focused upon 
Table 6.2  Distribution of Low-Wage and non-Low-Wage Employees by 
Firm Size (%)
Number of employees Low-wage Non-low-wage
<10 23.0 10.3
10–24 14.7 9.7
25–99 17.8 15.4
100–499 13.4 16.7
500–999 4.6 6.8
1,000+ 26.3 40.8
SOURCE: March 2006 Current Population Survey. The data are weighted by hours 
worked in addition to the sample weight.
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retraining and job search. These foci make sense and are certainly ap-
propriate. Consider, for example, the evidence regarding the distribution 
of basic skills. A 2003 survey of adults in several OECD nations directly 
measured literacy skills. The survey in the United States was a random 
representative sample of 3,400 adults and directly tested the respondents 
on their achievements in three types of literacy: prose skills, document 
interpretation skills, and numeracy (OECD and Canadian Ministry of 
Industry 2005). Five levels were identified, with a level one score sig-
nifying very low-level skills. In the United States, 20 percent of adults 
scored at level one in both prose and document skills, and 26 percent 
scored at level one in numeracy skills. For comparison, in Canada the 
fractions at these levels were 14 percent, 15 percent, and 19 percent. In 
Norway they were 7 percent, 8 percent, and 10 percent (p. 50). 
Improving human capital is therefore appropriate but it is incom-
plete. There is also an important case to be made for interventions on 
the demand side aimed at providing incentives and assistance to firms 
to improve the quality of their jobs. There is a broad array of evidence 
that the employment practices of firms, even after controlling for the 
characteristics of the labor force, make a difference in the employment 
outcomes of employees. For example, we know that workers do bet-
ter if they are employed in large firms, in firms that are unionized, in 
firms that invest in training, and in firms that pay wage premiums above 
the going rate. As an example of research along these lines, a study of 
the earnings mobility of low-wage workers that combined longitudinal 
household data on individuals with data on firms taken from the Un-
employment Insurance database found that nearly half of all transitions 
out of low-wage employment were associated with changes in employ-
ers. Because of the longitudinal fixed effect study design, this pattern 
could be attributed to the characteristics of the firm as opposed to the 
human capital attributes of the employees (Holzer, Lane, and Vilhuber 
2004). Scholars have also asked why some firms pay higher wages than 
others and have controlled for supply-side variables such as the occu-
pational distribution and human capital endowments of the labor force. 
In two such studies, Goshen (1991) finds that a firm effect accounts for 
between 31 and 51 percent of the variation across firms in wages, and 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) find strong plant-level effects in their 
wage-determination models.
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There is some evidence that firms exercise a nontrivial degree of 
discretion over their employment practices (and hence, by extension, 
that policy can influence these choices). One kind of evidence is pure-
ly anecdotal and is based on comparisons of the policies of different 
employers operating in the same product market. Many commentators 
point to the contrasting employment policies of Costco and Wal-Mart, 
but one might as readily highlight the employment situation of house-
keepers in unionized and nonunionized hotels.
Underlying the view that firms can exercise discretion is the idea 
that human resource policies tend to cluster together in bundles. These 
bundles characterize distinctive employment strategies. In the popular 
discussion, this idea is captured by a distinction between “high road” 
and “low road” policies, but the concept is more subtle than this. The 
idea of human resource bundles first emerged in research on the auto-
mobile industry, where scholars noted that Japanese firms such as Toy-
ota systematically combined job rotation, team production, and high 
levels of training into a coherent set of policies that improved both pro-
ductivity and quality. This was contrasted with a quite different bundle 
of policies which then characterized American automobile producers. 
This example is instructive in another way: over time, American auto 
manufacturers studied and learned from Japan and adopted their human 
resource strategies. This is an important point because it demonstrates 
that firms, faced with pressures of various kinds and provided with in-
formation and support, can in fact respond by implementing new ap-
proaches to how they organize their workforces. 
Additional data enable us to understand how clusters or bundles of 
human resource practices are related to low-wage work. This survey, 
conducted in 2002, is a representative sample of the for-profit private 
sector workforce (Bond 2003).5 In these data, 21.5 percent of the work-
force is low wage according to the definition used earlier. This figure 
is very close to the census figure. It is also noteworthy that other em-
ployment-related outcomes cluster with the wage pattern. For example, 
among the low-wage workers, 55.1 percent did not receive health insur-
ance from their employers. In addition, low-wage employers are much 
less likely to provide training than are other firms: 46.5 percent of low-
wage employees reported that their firms offered training compared to 
72.3 percent of the rest of the labor force.
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This pattern is replicated in other data. Although generalizations are 
difficult, it is fair to conclude that a central issue is that many companies 
are not prepared to invest in the skills and careers of their employees, 
particularly their lower-paid employees, as part of their overall com-
petitive strategy. Indeed, there is extensive evidence that employer in-
vestment in training is disproportionately directed toward higher-wage 
and better-educated workers and away from so-called “frontline” em-
ployees. For example, according to the National Household Survey in 
1995, among employees in the bottom quintile in earnings, 22 percent 
received formal training from their employers, whereas among workers 
in the top income quintile the rate was 40 percent (Ahlstrand, Bassi, and 
McMurrer 2003, p. 3).
A final question is whether it is in fact reasonable to believe that 
work can be reorganized so that today’s adult low-wage workforce can 
move into better jobs. Given the pervasive emphasis on the earnings 
gap between college and high school graduates, an observer might be 
forgiven for thinking that there is very little room in the job market for 
people with less than a four-year college degree. This is not correct. It 
is important to understand that there is a very large layer of jobs that 
require skills at roughly the level of a two-year associate’s degree. Ac-
cording to projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 28 percent of 
all job openings in the period 2004–2014 will be for jobs that require 
some college but not a degree. This is a larger figure than the expected 
openings for jobs that require college degrees (Hecker 2005). Another 
way of making this point is to note that the occupational category that 
is projected to generate the largest number of jobs between 2000 and 
2014 is “professional and related occupations,” and that of those who 
held these jobs in the 2000–2005 period, 40.5 percent had some college 
but less than a college degree. Other projections suggest that there will 
be a number of new jobs available for skilled blue-collar work (ma-
chine maintenance, technicians, repair jobs, and the like), and that these 
too require education in the “some college” or associate’s degree range 
(Goldberger, Lessell, and Biswas 2005).
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A FRAMEWORk FOR THInkInG ABOUT POLICy
There are a wide variety of tools available for influencing how firms 
organize their employment systems, and a framework or classification 
system is helpful. One important distinction is between what might 
be termed standard setting on the one hand and technical assistance 
or programmatic interventions on the other. Examples of the former 
include unionization, minimum and living wage legislation, and com-
munity benefit agreements. Examples of the latter are sectoral training 
programs, labor market intermediaries, and variants of manufacturing 
extension services. 
A second useful distinction is between interventions aimed at im-
proving the quality of existing jobs (“making bad jobs good”) and inter-
ventions aimed at creating, or retaining, more good jobs. Examples of 
the first set of policies are efforts to raise wages or to create job ladders 
in the existing job base, for example, in the retail, health, or hospitality 
industries. Examples of the second category are economic development 
programs that utilize labor market tools to attract good jobs or to assist 
existing firms to compete more effectively and hence to maintain the 
base of good jobs that already exist.
Table 6.3 organizes possible policy levers in terms of these dis-
tinctions. The distinctions in this table are to some extent arbitrary, but 
they do represent a useful way of thinking about the universe of policy 
interventions on the demand side. One important question, addressed 
Table 6.3  Policy Matrix
Standard setting Programmatic
Make bad jobs good Minimum wage
Living wages
Unionization
Career ladders
Intermediaries
Sectoral programs
Create more good jobs Community benefit 
agreements
Managed tax incentives
Extension services
Sectoral programs
Consortia or partnerships
under business or union
auspices
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below, is whether there is fruitful interaction across the different boxes. 
For example, when tax incentives are restricted to jobs above a certain 
quality threshold, it would make sense to provide programmatic assis-
tance to firms to enable them to meet the standards.
Several additional important questions should be kept in mind; one 
is scale. The employment and training field is full of examples of small 
boutique programs that seem successful but which either are inherent-
ly limited in their impact or have proved very difficult to replicate. It 
is therefore important to ask to what extent any potential innovation 
can have an appreciable impact on the problem. The second difficult 
question is sustainability. Promising programs are often short-lived and 
prove dependent on unreliable outside funding or a particular confluence 
of circumstances that led to the program in the first place. Developing 
mechanisms to build in greater stability is an important challenge.
Standard-Setting Policy
The goal of standard setting is to set a floor on the quality of jobs. 
The great attraction of this approach is that it is relatively straightfor-
ward and has the potential to reach a scale well beyond what is possible 
with more programmatic interventions. 
Standard-setting policy can be thought of as two subgroups: poli-
cies put in place by government (such as minimum wages), and others 
due to private action (such as unions). Turning first to public policy, by 
far the best known standard aimed at the low-wage labor market is the 
minimum wage. The federal minimum wage is currently $5.85 an hour. 
As is well known, there has been a long-term erosion in its real value, 
and until the recent modest increase it was at its lowest level since 1955. 
As a fraction of the pay of the average private sector nonsupervisory 
worker, it was at the lowest level since World War II (Bernstein and 
Shapiro 2006). In the face of this stagnation, 29 states now have set 
minimum wages above the federal level. The political power of this 
issue was demonstrated in the recent midterm elections when six states 
voted to increase their minimum wage.
Congress recently increased the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour 
to be achieved in steps by 2009. Exactly how many people would get a 
wage increase in 2009 depends, of course, on assumptions about infla-
tion and wage growth. It is important to note, however, that the $7.25 an 
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hour standard is still well below the poverty wage for a family of four 
with one bread-earner working full time and full year.
The contours of the standard debate regarding the minimum wage 
are familiar. Opponents argue that an increased minimum leads to job 
loss as firms lay off employees whose productivity falls beneath the 
standard, whereas advocates argue that the magnitude of the job loss 
is low and the gains that accrue to people who remain working at the 
higher wage well exceed any losses. In recent years the balance of opin-
ion has shifted to the latter view, at least for increases in the range under 
discussion.
Although the discussion of the minimum wage is typically framed 
in terms of its impact upon the wages and employment of directly af-
fected employees, a broader view suggests that more is at stake. One 
way to think about this is to ask why one would support a minimum 
wage instead of relying entirely on a more generous Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC). A simple view would be that the EITC would raise 
incomes without having the negative employment consequences of the 
minimum wage. The answer goes to the broader role of the minimum 
wage in the job market. By establishing a floor, a minimum wage may 
prevent low-wage employers from competing on the basis of wage 
costs with firms that are willing to pay above the minimum. Such com-
petition, if permitted, would drive down the overall wage structure. The 
EITC does not play this role and, in fact, permits firms to maintain low 
wages and substandard employment terms. This is not a criticism of 
the EITC—it is an important program with many virtues but it is not a 
substitute for the kinds of standards embodied by the minimum wage. 
There is, unfortunately, very little research that addresses this channel 
of the minimum wage, and it does seem doubtful that the federal mini-
mum at its current low level is important in this regard. However, in 
principle this is an important part of the case for an effective and bind-
ing minimum wage. 
Related to this line of argument, in the sense that the minimum 
wage is about more than just wage levels, is the view that an increased 
minimum wage would lead firms to adopt a different bundle of human 
resource practices. On one level this idea has been around for a long 
time and, in the context of the union literature, has been characterized 
as the union “shock effect.” The argument is that an enforced higher 
wage prompts a firm to reconsider and redesign its employment and 
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production system in order to increase efficiency and obtain the pro-
ductivity that would sustain the higher wage. More recently, economic 
theorists studying how firms make decisions about how much training 
to provide their workforces have argued that a higher minimum wage 
will compress a firm’s internal wage structure and lead to higher levels 
of training for those at the bottom (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).
Unionization
In addition to the minimum wage, the other long-standing and ob-
vious strategy for improving employment conditions in the low-wage 
labor market is unionization. The potential of unionization is suggested 
in Table 6.4 and shows the fraction of various groups that are low-wage 
workers according to the definition used earlier.
It is obvious that union status makes a considerable difference in 
the probability that an employee will work for low wages. These results 
hold in a regression analysis that also controls for industry in addition 
to the human capital and demographic variables.6 
Some recent research suggests that the apparent gains to be had by 
unionization is an artifact of various forms of selection bias that cannot 
be dealt with by the standard controls. For example, better motivated 
workers may join unions, or unions might succeed in organizing firms 
which in any case would have paid high wages. Related to this is the 
view that the union/nonunion wage gains shown in Table 6.4 reflect the 
success of unions in the past but are not reflective of what they can ac-
complish now (DiNardo and Lee 2004). 
These arguments have technical problems and are inconsistent with 
other evidence regarding the role unions play in reducing inequality 
(see, for example, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell [2003]).7 But whatever 
their merits in the higher reaches of the job market, these arguments are 
not credible in the low-wage sector, where the relevant personal charac-
teristics of the workforce do not vary a great deal, and similar national 
chains pay quite differently depending on their union status. The com-
mon sense pattern in the table is confirmed by accounts of recent union 
contracts in low-wage industries. For example, according to HERE, the 
Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees union, the average unionized 
hotel maid earns $13 an hour, while the national average for the job is 
$8.67 (Marshall and Greenhouse 2006).  
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Unionization in low-wage, particularly immigrant, sectors has been 
one of the few bright spots for unions in recent years. The success of 
Justice for Janitors is one notable example, and a similar campaign—
Hotel Workers Rising—is under way in the tourist sector. The unions 
involved in these campaigns—the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU), and the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees and HERE, which have merged to form UNITE HERE—are 
explicitly focusing much of their organizing strategy on the low-wage, 
often immigrant, labor market. SEIU has been one of the few unions 
in America to gain membership in recent years. Other unions, such as 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), have organized low-wage workers in the public sector with 
some success. 
The real concern about the role unions might play in reducing low-
wage employment is not whether, when successful, they improve em-
ployment conditions but rather the fact that their success rate is poor. 
The rate of private sector unionization has fallen from 25 percent in 
1973 to just over 7 percent today. Although data on success rates in 
organizing drives are hard to come by, recent research shows that of 
those organizing drives that lead to an election (and only about half of 
such drives even get to this stage), only one in five result in a first con-
tract (Ferguson 2006). Later in this chapter I will discuss how this issue 
might be addressed.
As the union movement has struggled, there has been growth in al-
ternative modes of organizing and representing low-wage workers. Of 
particular interest is the emergence of strong community organizations 
and worker centers.8 
Table 6.4  Percentage Low Wage By Union Status, Private Sector (%)
All Men Women
High 
school 
degree 
or less
Some 
college White Black Hispanic
Union 6.9 3.6 13.3 9.7 4.1 6.0 10.1 16.2
Nonunion 19.5 14.8 24.6 32.3 15.7 18.4 29.5 37.5
SOURCE: 2006 Census Outgoing Rotation Group. See notes for description of data 
preparation.
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There are several national networks of community organizations 
that work in low-wage communities and organize around economic is-
sues.9 These organizations are particularly active in campaigns to raise 
the state minimum wage, in living-wage campaigns, and in efforts to 
redirect the targeting of economic development subsidies. In addition, 
they also organize around job training and other policies directed at 
low-wage employees. One of the nation’s most successful job training 
programs, Project QUEST, which is described on p. 223, was estab-
lished by a community organization in San Antonio. The network of 
affiliated community organizations then replicated it in several other 
cities in the Southwest.
Worker Centers are organizations that provide legal and social ser-
vices to low-wage, often immigrant, workers who are employed in the 
small firms that populate much of the low-wage labor market. These 
small, scattered employment sites are not attractive targets for tradi-
tional union organizing campaigns. The centers started growing in the 
1980s, beginning with the first and still best known of these, the Work-
place Project in Long Island. Today, there are roughly 35 in the country 
(Fine 2006, p. 10). In addition to their service function, some centers 
try to replace street corner hiring with organized hiring halls (for exam-
ple, near Home Depot stores) that in turn attempt to standardize wages. 
They also run campaigns aimed at the employment practices of spe-
cific employers. Some centers have also pursued a legislative strategy. 
For example, the Workplace Project succeeded in obtaining passage of 
the New York Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, which seeks to stop the 
practice of employers holding back promised wages from a vulnerable 
population.
It is clear that in the national context, 35 Worker Centers cannot 
accomplish a great deal. However, when all of the representational ac-
tivity outside traditional union channels—community organizations as 
well as Worker Centers—is added up, it is fair to conclude that there 
is an important amount of activity. A central and very open question 
is whether these newer styles of organizing can join together with 
traditional unions to obtain the power necessary to have a noticeable 
impact. 
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new Standard Setting Strategies
As we will see, in recent years much of the creativity in programs 
has occurred at the state and local levels, and by the same token, it is 
at these levels of government that innovative ways of setting standards 
in the labor market have also been implemented. These efforts include 
living wage campaigns, community benefit agreements, and restrictions 
on the use of economic development incentives. These efforts combined 
constitute a sustained national movement to use political power to raise 
wage levels. 
The first living wage ordinance was passed in Baltimore in 1994 as 
a result of organizing by a community group affiliated with the nation-
al Industrial Areas Foundation network. Since then, according to the 
ACORN Web site that tracks the movement, there are 140 ordinances 
throughout the country.10 There is considerable variation in the cover-
age and structure of the laws, but the majority cover city contractors, 
city employees, or both. A smaller set of living wage laws are aimed at 
firms that receive business assistance from public sources.
Living wage campaigns, and the resulting ordinances, have mul-
tiple goals. Beyond the direct effect, one important objective is to use 
the campaigns as an organizing device and to force a public discussion 
of economic equity. Although difficult to measure, observation of cam-
paigns suggests that living wage campaigns are important in this regard. 
However, for the purposes of this chapter, we seek to determine the 
impact of the campaigns upon job quality.
The first point to be made is that the impact, positive or negative, 
is relatively small given the restricted nature of the ordinances. The 
estimate for Boston, for example, is that 1,000 employees had wage 
increases. The largest effort is probably Los Angeles, where estimated 
impact is on the order of 7,500 workers. However, the Boston experi-
ence is more representative. The magnitude of the mandated wage also 
varies albeit within a limited range. As of 2002 the ordinance in Boston 
set a wage of $10.25 an hour, while in Los Angeles it was $8.17.
There is an emerging evaluation literature on living wage cam-
paigns. What is striking is that even skeptics concede that the ordinanc-
es are successful in raising wages. The debate is over whether there are 
negative employment effects, but again, even the skeptics accept that if 
there are negative effects, the wage gains outweigh the costs, and that as 
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a result there is a net benefit to the low-wage group.11 Studies of the im-
pact on firms do not find major negative effects, and some suggest that 
turnover is reduced as a result of the higher wages. In short, living wage 
laws seem to accomplish their mission, but it is important to remember 
that the mission is very limited in terms of scope.
An extension of the living wage idea is to establish wage (and pos-
sibly benefit) standards on an industry basis. For example, a large ma-
jority of the Chicago City Council recently passed an ordinance that 
required large retailers in the city to pay a minimum wage of $9.25 
an hour, with scheduled increases to $10.00. In addition, the employ-
ers were required to either provide $1.50 an hour (with a scheduled 
increase to $3.00) in benefits or else supplement the wage by the same 
amount. This ordinance was vetoed by the mayor, but a campaign is un-
der way to elect enough city councilors to override the veto. A number 
of advocacy groups are considering or launching similar campaigns in 
retail and other industries in different parts of the country.12
A second initiative aimed at improving job quality through state 
and local government action manages the use of economic development 
incentives. These incentives, which are widely used by both states and 
cities, offer a variety of tax breaks and incentive payments to firms to 
influence their location and growth decisions. Until recently there was 
little public discussion or awareness of the terms of these deals. A rough 
sense of the scope of the problem is that, according to an analysis of 
Illinois data, 35 percent of jobs subsidized by economic development 
incentives in 2004 paid less than $27,000 a year. As recently as 1994, 
only six jurisdictions put any restrictions on the wage levels that could 
be subsidized by these development incentives. By contrast, the most 
recent estimate is that 43 states, 41 cities, and 5 counties have wage 
restrictions in place for at least one of their subsidy programs (cities 
and states can, of course, have multiple subsidy programs, and there is 
no estimate what fraction of all such programs have wage standards). 
In addition, 10 states require that any firm receiving a subsidy provide a 
public report on the number of jobs that it expects to retain or create as 
a result of the subsidy and the wage level of the jobs (see Purinton et al. 
2003 and McCourt et al. 2006). 
Community benefit agreements (CBAs) are in some sense a com-
bination of efforts aimed to control location subsidies and living wage 
campaigns. The central idea is to identify a large development project 
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that requires city approval. A coalition of community groups then nego-
tiates with the developer regarding first source hiring, wage standards, 
and other topics such as parking, affordable housing, and recreation. 
If an agreement can be reached, the coalition becomes an ally of the 
developer in obtaining the relevant approvals. Among the most active 
geographies for CBAs has been Los Angeles, where coalitions orga-
nized and supported by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Econo-
my (LAANE) have negotiated agreements in the Los Angeles airport, 
Staples Center, and Century Blvd. developments. Similar efforts have 
been initiated in Denver, Milwaukee, Boston, Seattle, and Chicago (for 
a description of CBAs, see Gross, Leroy, and Janis-Aparicio [2005]). 
As promising as CBAs are, there are also obvious limitations: they typi-
cally only benefit residents in the area of the large-scale development 
and the labor standards tend to be modest.13 Nonetheless, they are a cre-
ative addition to the toolkit of efforts to use a combination of political 
and standard setting power to upgrade job quality. 
A final important issue regarding standard setting in low-wage labor 
markets concerns enforcement. There is a perception among advocates 
that enforcement efforts and effectiveness has declined in recent years. 
Data on this are hard to come by, but a recent review of patterns in New 
York City does suggest that there are significant problems, particularly 
with respect to overtime pay and minimum wages.14 Improving this 
situation is the joint responsibility of both the federal government and 
state Departments of Labor. 
PROGRAMS THAT WORk WITH FIRMS
It is slightly unfair but not too far off the mark to characterize the 
old style approach to service delivery as one in which agencies trained 
people in occupations for which they thought there was demand and 
then either simply sent people out to look for work or helped them in the 
process. In either case, the connection between programs and employers 
was tenuous at best. While many programs may still have these charac-
teristics, a new model of best practice has emerged in recent years that 
features much more interaction with employers.
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Programs that work with firms to improve the quality of jobs focus 
on two main strategies. The first is redesigning jobs to create career lad-
ders or to enlarge the content of existing jobs. This strategy implies both 
working with management to redesign work and providing training and 
support to employees so that they can meet the additional responsi-
bilities and move up in the workplace. The second, simpler approach is 
to encourage firms to increase the quantity of training that they make 
available to lower paid employees in the hope that this will lead to ca-
reer advancement. 
The new program models vary along a number of dimensions: tar-
get groups, the auspices under which the programs are managed, and 
the nature of the services that are provided. What is striking, however, 
is that they have also coalesced around a common set of what might be 
termed “best practices” elements. It is these elements that move these 
innovations beyond the traditional approach of education and training 
programs and that make these new programs distinctive and important. 
The most important of these best practice elements is driven by an 
understanding that employment and training efforts work best if they 
connect effectively to both sides of the labor market, that is, to employ-
ers as well as clients. In order to accomplish this they work hard to 
become knowledgeable about the human resource needs of their target 
group of firms and, in some cases, they also seek to understand how 
they can contribute to the competitive success of the firms. In short, 
they seek to appeal to firms as a business proposition, not as a charity, 
public relations, or welfare effort. 
The second feature is that best practice programs make substantial 
investments in their clients. They reject the quick and dirty training, 
short-term investments, and simple job search assistance models that 
characterize much of the traditional education and training system. The 
investments that the new programs make take a variety of forms: long 
training periods, more sustained involvement with firms, and higher lev-
els of support to clients in terms of financial assistance and counseling. 
There are, however, important differences across the programs. 
Their auspices vary and include community groups, unions, community 
colleges, employer organizations, and state governments. The programs 
also vary in the extent to which they work with incumbent workers 
versus job seekers. 
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Much, but not all, of the discussion around these new models tends 
to focus on two broad program categories: labor market intermediaries 
and sectoral programs. Labor market intermediaries are organizations 
that consciously look both ways in the job market, attempting to work 
with both employers and with individuals. Some intermediaries are pas-
sive in that they effectively are just bulletin boards, providing matching 
services for firms or workers. Others are slightly more ambitious and 
take job orders from firms and try to find or train employees to fill them. 
However, the most creative intermediaries provide a range of services 
to employers, including what might be termed “HR Consulting” aimed 
at improving job quality. These intermediaries also work with individ-
uals providing training and placement for their client firms. Sectoral 
programs perform the same functions as do intermediaries, but they 
have the added characteristic of specializing in a particular industry. 
They seek to develop deep knowledge of the markets, technology, and 
labor market circumstances of the industry, and through this knowledge 
contribute to both the human resource and also the economic growth 
and development needs of the industry. Both sets of organizations try 
not only to improve access to jobs but also to help make bad jobs better 
and to create more good jobs. The relative weight put on these goals 
varies across different programs. Examples of programs include the 
following:
Cooperative Home Care Associates (CHCA) works with low-
paid home health care aides and seeks to transform the nature of their 
work by creating a workers’ cooperative, providing more training and 
skill than is typical, and leveraging this to charge a higher than average 
wage/benefit package and create a larger proportion of full-time work 
than is the norm. The model has been successful in New York City 
and is replicated in other locations by the Paraprofessional Health Care 
Institute. 
Boston SkillWorks. Several regions have pulled together funding 
streams and established intermediaries to work with firms to upgrade 
low-wage workers. Boston SkillWorks has received funding from pub-
lic sources and several local and national foundations and is a five-year, 
$15 million dollar effort. Managed by a local intermediary, Jobs for 
the Future, it has established career ladder programs in several local 
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hospitals and is working to do the same in the hotel/hospitality industry 
and in building services. Its goal is to upgrade roughly 2000 incumbent 
workers and to provide preemployment training to roughly 500 new 
hires. 
Pennsylvania Industry Clusters. A number of states have been 
very aggressive in pulling together disparate funding streams to create a 
more unified workforce policy (for a description of some of these efforts 
see Jobs for the Future [2005]). Many experts in economic development 
believe that an effective strategy is to identify clusters of firms in the 
same industry and work with them to address challenges that they have 
in common. Pennsylvania has applied this idea to its approach toward 
workforce development. The state identified 9 industry clusters and 17 
subclusters. It then established a $20 million annual appropriation to 
organize and deliver training through cluster-specific “industry partner-
ships.” It also reprogrammed existing federal and state community col-
lege funding to target the skill needs of the clusters. Industry partner-
ships must have an explicit strategy that spells out how the workforce 
services will improve industry competitiveness and job quality.  
Extension Services, such as the Massachusetts Manufacturing Part-
nership and the Jane Addams Resource Corporation. The Massachu-
setts program helps firms adopt the Toyota Production system. It works 
with individual companies and sponsors events at which firms make 
presentations as well as plant tours. The Massachusetts program is es-
sentially a technology/production assistance program that has a work-
force development component. The relative emphases are reversed at 
the Jane Addams Resource Corporation in Chicago, which works with 
small manufacturers in a corridor within the city. The activities of Jane 
Addams show that an extension service can both provide a range of 
services and serve as a link between the economic development and 
the workforce components. Jane Addams is part of the Local Industrial 
Retention Initiative and helps firms obtain various forms of technical 
assistance and services from city agencies. It runs a large (400 trainees 
per year) incumbent worker training program, as well as an entry-level 
machinists training program for unemployed residents. Jane Addams 
is also active in an effort to develop a small high school devoted to 
machining skills, and an initiative to benchmark and improve the man-
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ufacturing skills training provided by the community colleges within 
Chicago.
Project QUEST. QUEST is a training program in San Antonio, 
Texas aimed at the working poor who have high school diplomas. The 
program works with firms in San Antonio to identify job openings and 
to identify the skills required. The firms then make a good-faith pledge 
to hire program graduates and may redesign their jobs to create ladders. 
The jobs must meet living wage standards. The training is provided by 
local community colleges and typically lasts one and a half years. The 
program provides modest financial support and extensive counseling to 
the clients. It is organized and managed by a nonprofit organization that 
is closely linked to a community-based organization. Over 2,000 people 
have participated in QUEST. 
What Do These Programs Do?
These programs have various strategies for improving job quality, 
but the most common are attempts to create career ladders and to en-
large jobs. The most extensive efforts along these lines have been in the 
health care sector, including hospitals and nursing homes. An example, 
which comes from programs in Boston, is the creation of a ladder asso-
ciated with the job title Patient Care Technician. This is a low-level job, 
essentially the hospital equivalent of the nursing home title Certified 
Nursing Assistant. An associate’s degree or the equivalent is required 
to move up the ladder from this job in a hospital. Boston SkillWorks 
worked to create a ladder by encouraging hospitals to establish Patient 
Care I, II, and III positions with increasing responsibility, and to pro-
vide tuition assistance to enable people to study as they moved up the 
ladder. The new positions on the ladder provided both greater rewards 
and tangible feedback as people undertook the effort to move up. 
There are a large number of efforts around the country to build 
ladders of this kind in hospitals and nursing homes (Fitzgerald 2006). 
Many of the largest and best known health care programs have been 
negotiated by the SEIU union health care locals, although there are 
also many examples in the nonunion sector, such as the Boston one 
cited above. The Robert J. Woods Foundation is currently supporting 
roughly a dozen demonstration programs around the country that focus 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   223 2/29/2008   1:42:19 PM
224   Osterman
on how to build more learning opportunities directly into health care 
workplaces.
 There are also small programs to create comparable ladders in 
other low-wage settings, such as hotels and retail. For example, Work-
Source Partners, a firm that helps employers build career ladders, has a 
small effort under way with the CVS Drugstore chain to create a Retail 
Management Certificate program to move check-out clerks into phar-
macy technician and potentially store manager positions. The effort is 
supported in part by state (of Massachusetts) training funds and in part 
by CVS, which finances some coaching and support as well as some 
paid released time and tuition assistance. It is worth noting that CVS’s 
interest in creating career ladders is long-standing. For example, a case 
study conducted in 2000 described CVS as exemplary in attempting to 
upgrade low-skill workers through career paths and training (Ahlstrand, 
Bassi, and McMurrer 2003, pp. 65–74). Given, however, that the cer-
tificate program described above is still characterized as a pilot effort, a 
reasonable conclusion would be that even in a large organization with a 
commitment to the issue, change is very slow and incremental.
Some of the efforts, particularly in health care, are quite large. Out-
side of health care, however, most programs are still small and of the pi-
lot variety. These career ladder programs are typically at least partially 
funded by public or foundation training resources, although some of the 
union-linked programs are financed out of funds set aside in collective 
bargaining agreements. The motivation of employers, beyond social re-
sponsibility, is to reduce turnover (with its associated impact on recruit-
ing costs and perhaps customer service) and increase labor supply into 
occupations for which they are experiencing shortages. 
Assessing the Interventions
As promising as career ladder programs are, there are several dif-
ficult questions. The vast majority of the efforts are in health care (for 
reasons discussed below). How far these kinds of programs can extend 
beyond health care and whether the business case (reduced turnover, 
better service) is really compelling is unclear. Unfortunately, the most 
comprehensive review of career ladders suggests that these worries are 
legitimate. Fitzgerald (2006) reviews career ladder efforts in several 
other industries than health. For child care she characterizes the current 
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state of play as “embryonic” (p. 63); in education she writes that “nei-
ther school officialdom nor the public is entirely convinced that signifi-
cant skill upgrades are even possible among school paraprofessionals or 
are worth the money” (p. 92); and in biotechnology she concludes that 
“it is too early to say much about the results” (p. 118). Only in manu-
facturing is there very much to show, and here the star example is one 
program in Wisconsin. 
A thoughtful evaluation of the experience of one highly touted pro-
gram reinforces these worries (FutureWorks 2004). In 2002 Massachu-
setts launched its BEST (Building Essential Skills through Training) 
program. The initiative combined Adult Basic Education and flexible 
job training money and sought to work with firms in health care, finan-
cial services, manufacturing, and biotechnology to upgrade workforce 
skills and to build career ladders. The program was the result of a task 
force which issued the standard critiques of the employment and training 
system (narrow and constrained funding streams, and lack of employer 
involvement), and BEST was a state of the art response with respect to 
program design and flexible funding. The goal of the program was to 
create career ladders for low-wage workers in the targeting sectors.
Of the six sectoral programs, two did very poorly on all dimensions 
because of staffing and implementation issues. The remaining four pro-
grams did succeed in training a relatively large number of employees. 
However, virtually all of the training was short term. Even in the con-
sortia with the greatest employer enthusiasm, it proved very difficult 
to convince firms to care about anything other than short-term staffing 
needs. Firms were not willing to invest in career ladders: “Some em-
ployers had a hard time visualizing their entry-level workers as higher 
skilled employees. Others simply lacked the internal capacity required 
to promote career path development among their entry-level workers” 
(FutureWorks 2004, p. 21). The report goes on to comment that
. . . employer support and implementation capacity for career path 
development is in its infancy. While employers may support the 
career path notion in theory, few human resource directors, man-
agers, or supervisors . . . have the time or resources required to 
institutionalize the approach . . . it remains unclear whether limited 
demand for career path models is due to lack of information (i.e., 
employers are simply unfamiliar with the concept and need more/
better information about career path models), lack of time and re-
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sources (i.e., employers don’t have internal resources to develop 
and implement the approach) or due to employer perceptions re-
garding entry level workers (i.e., employers have difficulty view-
ing entry-level workers as future skilled labor). (p. 28)
The evaluation did document a substantial amount of training, particu-
larly in basic skills, but it was unable to attribute any gain in wages or 
career trajectory to the program.
The BEST program lasted for two years. On one hand, this can 
be seen as a sustained effort to implement a new model. On the other 
hand, two years is relatively short in terms of the goal of changing the 
employment practices of firms. However, what is clear from the experi-
ence is that the energy, organizational skills, and resources for such an 
effort need to come from the program and the intermediary. Few of the 
employers who were involved were willing to continue the training of 
entry-level workers after the program ended, much less engage in the 
organizational changes envisioned by the program (FutureWorks 2004, 
p. 39).
A more optimistic, but still very mixed, experience in manufactur-
ing was documented in a recent report on a project funded in 2001 three 
foundations (Mott, Ford, and Annie E. Casey) and managed by the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers (NAM) (Whiting 2005). The goal 
was to assist three local NAM chapters (in Connecticut, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania) in their efforts to work with five small and medium-sized 
manufacturing firms with the dual mission of improving their internal 
human resource processes and upgrading low-wage employees in their 
labor forces. Representatives from each association recruited firms to 
participate and then provided them with technical assistance on their re-
cruitment, training, supervisory, and compensation systems. In addition, 
the program brokered training services for employees in the firms.
The results of this effort, which ended in 2004, were positive 
but mixed. The project was slowed initially by the recession and fell 
one year behind schedule. As a result, the formal evaluation that was 
planned was scrapped. Recruitment of firms was slow, but in the end 
17 firms were involved. The narrative report points to employer reports 
of improvements in productivity and quality, and a variety of positive 
comments by employers are cited. These are credible achievements. 
However, after three years of effort, the best claim in terms of advance-
ment is that a total of 14 promotions and 28 pay increases could be 
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attributed to the program. Furthermore, the employers reported that 
without a continued subsidy they would be unlikely to continue with 
the program.
Beyond narrative accounts of specific programs, systematic re-
search on these models is thin. Although these new models have gained 
substantial attention in policy circles, there are limited data on either 
their diffusion or effectiveness. A 2002 survey by the National Network 
of Sector Partners identified 243 organizations that met four criteria: 
1) they worked with both employees and employers, 2) they targeted 
low-wage workers, 3) they provided a mix of services and not simply 
job placement, and 4) they invested in longer-term career advancement 
past the placement stage. More than half of these programs were less 
than 10 years old, and two-thirds of them served 500 or more persons 
per year. They were housed in a wide range of different kinds of orga-
nizations (Marino and Tarr 2004). 
The more formal evaluation evidence on these initiatives is promis-
ing but incomplete and thin. A pre/post evaluation of Project QUEST 
found very large gains for participants, and as part of that evaluation, 
a study of participant files suggested that creaming and self-selection 
effects could not explain away the gains (Osterman and Lautsch 1996). 
A qualitative evaluation reached positive conclusions about the ability 
of sectoral programs to achieve their goals, and a pre/post evaluation 
of six intermediary and sectoral programs by Public/Private Ventures 
found, 24 months after program completion, gains from $1–$5 per hour 
in wages for five of the organizations (Grote and Roder 2005; Pindus 
et al. 2004). 
Alternative Strategies for Working with Firms
The programs described above work with low-wage firms to im-
prove the quality of work by redesigning both jobs and job ladders. 
The most common alternative (but also complementary) approach is 
the straightforward one of increasing the training investments that firms 
make in their low-wage employees so that mobility prospects, within 
the firm and elsewhere, are improved. Recall the earlier evidence that 
the pattern of firm training expenditure is biased away from low-wage 
and frontline workers. Of course, an obvious question is why firms 
Bartik & Houseman.indb   227 2/29/2008   1:42:19 PM
228   Osterman
would be willing to train employees if this facilitated their departure to 
other (albeit better) employers.
There are a range of programs, typically at the state level, that aim 
to increase employers’ investment in training. A number of states pro-
vide tax credits to firms for employees who complete certified retrain-
ing programs. However, there have been no efforts to assess these pro-
grams either in terms of direct impact or whether they expand the scope 
of training rather than simply subsidize firms for what they would have 
done in any case (Bosworth 2006, p. 43).15 There are other ideas for us-
ing the tax system and financial aid to increase the training investments 
of firms, which will be taken up in the next section.
A more direct approach to transforming the employment practices 
of firms is to provide them with grants to subsidize or incent improved 
practices. We will see below that a number of states have established 
state training funds along these lines. There have been virtually no eval-
uations of these efforts, but one study of a Michigan program in the 
early 1990s found that firms that received training grants did increase 
their level of training for the period of the grant (although not beyond) 
and also achieved productivity gains (in this case, reduced scrap rates) 
that persisted beyond the grant. The pattern of the training outcomes is 
good news/bad news. The good news is that the grant did not simply 
subsidize what the firm would have done anyway. The bad news is that, 
despite evident performance gains, the HR practices of the firms were 
not shifted to a “higher road ” since the increase in training was not 
sustained (Holzer et al. 1993).
Other attempts to convince firms to improve their human resource 
practices rely on publicity and jawboning. For example, the Council for 
Adult and Experiential Learning (CAEL) in Chicago has organized an 
effort called Workforce Chicago. This model brings together leading lo-
cal firms to award and publicize best practice with respect to workforce 
training. There is considerable local publicity, the political establish-
ment has become involved, and the winning firms hold workshops for 
other companies on how to implement their practices. There is an active 
Web site and a quarterly newsletter. In addition, the organization has 
sought to be a forum for bringing together the business community with 
the higher education leadership to discuss common issues.
Local political leaders and sponsors find the model compelling 
enough to try to spread it to other cities. There are comparable efforts 
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now under way in Philadelphia and St. Louis, and CAEL has presented 
to the National Conference of Mayors. This said, there has been no as-
sessment of how effective this effort is in influencing employment prac-
tices (there is a certain “preaching to the choir” element to the effort) or 
in improving the circumstances of frontline employees in particular. 
Some Lessons on Working with Firms
Stepping back from these various efforts, it is useful to ask what are 
the lessons about the challenges of working with firms to upgrade low-
wage workers. A helpful first question is to ask what are the character-
istics of the firms that seem willing to work with employment and train-
ing programs to upgrade their workforces. In surveying the landscape 
of programs it is hard to avoid being struck by the disproportionate role 
that health care firms play in programs. For example, the vast majority 
of career ladder efforts are in health care. If we ask why this is the case 
then we can begin to understand what motivates employers.
Health is, as we saw earlier, a sector with large numbers of poorly 
paid employees and hence is a natural target. In addition, the overall 
shape of employment in the health sector is conducive to ladders in that 
there are multiple levels of jobs and a progression path. Other sectors, 
such as hotels, have more narrow pyramidal employment ladders, offer-
ing fewer opportunities for upward movement.
There is, however, more to the story about why health is an attrac-
tive target. Health care employers are not footloose; they cannot pull up 
stakes and move to a location with lower wages. Furthermore, they tend 
to be dependent on various public policies: licenses, approvals, and the 
like. Both of these factors lead health care employers to be willing to 
consider participation in these efforts. Adding to the incentives is that 
many health care employers experience high turnover and difficulties 
in maintaining a stable workforce. This increases their costs and also 
reduces the quality of their services. The programs that we have de-
scribed promise to address these issues. An additional consideration is 
that many hospitals are unionized, and the unions, particularly SEIU 
and ASFCME, have been very interested in building career ladders. A 
final consideration is that at least a subset of health care employers can 
be reimbursed via federal and state payment schemes for the expenses 
of the effort.
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When all these factors are taken into account, it is not surprising 
that efforts to upgrade the quality of work have had the greatest suc-
cess in health care. But the flip side is that it is also clear why making 
progress is so difficult in other sectors of the economy where many of 
the underlying supports and incentives are absent. Accounts of working 
with firms point to several difficulties (in addition to the absence of the 
considerations cited above for health). These difficulties can be seen in 
the BEST initiative, which worked with small employers in a variety of 
industries and in the NAM project, which focused on small manufac-
turers. Small and medium-sized firms that employ low-wage workers 
lack the organizational slack to improve their human resource systems. 
Their managers are stretched thin, and the human resource specialist (if 
there is one) also performs multiple functions and lacks the time and 
resources to radically transform the employment system. A sense of 
the difficulties can also be gained from the findings of a task force that 
interviewed small and medium-sized manufacturers in Indiana. The re-
port found that the firms 1) “see no quick payback and little financial 
incentive since investments in human capital do not receive as favor-
able tax treatment as investments in physical capital,” 2) “fear that they 
will be unable to secure the benefits of training investments as higher-
skilled workers might move to other firms,” 3) “are not confident that 
they can predict changing skill requirements much less design the mix 
of training and new skill development that will adequately prepare their 
workers,” and 4) “don’t know much about the education and training 
systems” (Ball State University 2003).
Small firms are difficult targets for the reasons cited above and be-
cause of the tremendous effort required to reach a substantial number 
of workers (given that small firms are small). However, there are also 
significant challenges in working with larger employers. Even in these 
companies there often is no advocate for transforming the work of low-
wage employees. American firms are notorious (in comparison to com-
panies in other countries) for the relative weakness of the human re-
sources function, and hence there is no natural constituency with power 
pushing for investment in the low-wage workforce (Pfeffer 1994). Fur-
thermore, many managers, in both large and small firms, are skeptical 
of the gains that could be achieved by upgrading their low-wage work-
ers. It is only when top management “gets religion” that there is an op-
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portunity to work with firms, and the task of propagating that religion 
and selling it within the organization is slow and difficult.
Summary
In the past decade there has been a good deal of investment and 
creative experimentation in working with firms to improve job qual-
ity. These initiatives have disproved one long-standing misperception: 
that employment and training policy is ineffective. We know that it is 
possible to design effective interventions that upgrade the quality of 
jobs and improve the working experience of low-wage employees. In 
addition, a clear consensus has emerged around the elements of a best 
practice model. 
Despite these accomplishments, however, it is not clear just how 
far it is possible to go with interventions of this kind. As the BEST and 
NAM experiences make clear, making progress is very slow and runs 
up against the natural difficulties of working with employers who have 
many other concerns on their minds and who do not have a history of 
interest in human resource issues. Even some of the more successful 
models, such as Boston SkillWorks, were many years in the making and 
impact a relatively small number of employees in a limited range of in-
dustries. In addition, there is ample room for knowledge development. 
We do not know, for example, whether models of this sort are most ef-
fective when implemented by community groups, unions, or business 
associations. 
A final issue is that these program models cannot succeed in a poli-
cy vacuum. In order for employees to move up a job ladder, or in order 
for them to simply receive training, traditional training programs need 
to have an appropriate level of resources. In addition, work supports of 
various kinds are important to enable the low-wage workers to succeed. 
The programs are thus challenged on scale along two dimensions: first, 
whether they can inherently work on a large enough scale to make an 
impact, and second, whether public resources will be available at an ap-
propriate level to enable whatever degree of success is possible.  
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MOvInG FORWARD
Improving low-wage work is the next frontier of labor market pol-
icy. In an era of exploding income inequality and welfare reform that 
has encouraged many people to join the low-wage labor market, it is 
essential that the United States systematically asks how to improve the 
quality of jobs. This challenge is given additional urgency by the evi-
dence that upward mobility out of the low-wage job market is very slow 
and uneven. 
If we look back at the evidence presented in this chapter, several 
broad conclusions stand out:
• There is a great deal of program activity and creativity on mul-
tiple dimensions and using multiple strategies. A wide range of 
actors, public and private, are involved. There are examples of 
interventions that work, and other examples of promising inter-
ventions should be supported and assessed.
• The program activity, while substantial, is well below any rea-
sonable estimate of what is required based on the universe of 
need. Perhaps more importantly, it is scattered and in no way 
constitutes a coherent national strategy or commitment to ad-
dressing the challenge of improving job quality.
• Any successful effort to improve the quality of jobs must include 
both standard setting and programmatic components. The stan-
dard setting strategy is important because it is scalable, i.e., it im-
pacts a large number of employers, and because it can influence 
practices among small firms and firms in sectors such as retail, 
which are difficult for programmatic efforts to reach. Whenever 
possible, it is desirable to offer firms programmatic assistance to 
achieve the standards.
• On the programmatic side, it is important to bring to bear a wide 
range of institutions, including traditional federal employment 
and training programs, state customized training, economic de-
velopment and small firm assistance programs, and new institu-
tions such as intermediaries and sectoral programs.
• This chapter has emphasized efforts to improve the employment 
practices of firms. It is clear, however, that more traditional hu-
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man capital training programs are of continuing importance both 
because of skill gaps in the low-wage labor force and because 
any effort to work with firms must include strategies for upgrad-
ing the workforce.
In short, the matrix presented earlier is a useful guide. We need to 
make bad jobs better, and we need to create more good jobs. In addition, 
any effective national strategy should include a combination of carrots 
and sticks. A strategy that relies entirely on training and economic de-
velopment programs working directly with individual employers or 
employer groups could achieve a good deal but is also slow and incom-
plete in its coverage. A strategy that supports increased unionization 
and better wage and hour standards would impact a larger number of 
employees but lacks the tools to help employers meet their responsibili-
ties. Some combination of the two approaches seems optimal.
A Prelude: The Current State of Play
 The central Federal Employment and Training program is the Work-
force Investment Act (WIA), but in recent years overall funding levels 
have been flat, and even the diminishing resources that are available 
have been diverted from training and instead are spent on job-match-
ing functions (the One-Stop Centers).16 In addition, restrictions on WIA 
funding mean that very little can be spent on working with firms to 
upgrade their employment systems. As a result of falling federal invest-
ment in the employment and training system, the real action has shifted 
to the states and to foundations. Foundation funding has been crucially 
important but is not a sustainable basis for building public policy. State 
funding for programs working with firms is largely found in the state 
training funds based on the unemployment insurance system. 
These funds were first started by California, with its well-known 
and largest fund, the Employment and Training Panel (ETP).17 The Cal-
ifornia ETP was financed by a small diversion of the unemployment in-
surance tax into the training fund, which set the pattern for many states. 
Today there are seven states that finance training funds via some draw 
on the UI tax system, but there are another 16 states that have compa-
rable funds that simply use an employer tax. These state training funds 
range quite widely in size, ranging from $100,000 per year in Delaware 
to over $70 million per year in California. They all support training for 
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incumbent workers, and 14 also support training for new or pre-hire 
employees. They typically require an application from a firm as well as, 
often, from a training provider or intermediary. Roughly 10 of the states 
seem to primarily use their programs as an economic development tool 
to attract new firms; however, in the remainder of the states the funds 
are potentially an important resource for improving the prospect of low-
wage incumbent employees. 
There are relatively few linkages between these funds and other 
employment and training funding streams. The states vary widely in 
how they measure impact and potential substitution (firms using the 
program to support what they would do anyway), and overall there is 
little that can be said with confidence in terms of assessment. The great 
advantage of these funds (in addition to simply the existence of the re-
sources) is that they tend to be much more flexible than federal money 
with respect to targeting and allowable activities. However, as noted, 
many of these funds do not address issues in the low-wage labor mar-
ket, and only half of the states have any such funds in the first place.
The other key player is the community college system. These insti-
tutions are by far the largest occupational training organizations, and 
many of their students are low-income adults. In 2000, among all col-
lege students, 29.6 percent were in community college occupational 
training programs, and another 28.7 percent were in other community 
college tracks. Of the students enrolled in occupational training, 64 per-
cent were in associate’s degree programs, with the remainder in certifi-
cate programs (Bailey et al. 2004). The profile of the students suggests 
that community colleges touch the working poor population to a non-
trivial extent. Fifty-five percent of students in occupational programs 
are 24 or older, 39 percent are minority, and two-thirds attend part-time. 
Eighty percent of community college students work full or part time 
while in school (Brock and LeBlanc 2005, p. 2). Another indication is 
that among first-time community college students between the ages of 
25 and 64 in 1995–1996, 71 percent were in the lower two income quin-
tiles compared to 50 percent of younger students (Prince and Jenkins 
2005, p. 2). Most of what community colleges do is straightforward 
education and training—not the kind of activity that has been the focus 
of this chapter. However, many community colleges have implement-
ed customized training programs that work directly with firms in their 
regions.
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The Road Ahead
Today there is no national framework or set of institutions for sup-
porting efforts to upgrade low-quality jobs. The lack of these institu-
tions in the labor market field has been contrasted with the creation of 
LISC, the Enterprise Foundation, and the Low Income Tax Credit as 
an integrated national effort to address housing quality.18 Several na-
tional foundations (notably Ford, Casey, and Mott) have sought to build 
equivalent institutions for the low-wage labor market. The foundations 
have succeed impressively in funding demonstration efforts and also in 
supporting nonprofits that provide technical assistance. However, in the 
long run a model based on foundation support is not sustainable nor can 
it operate on the appropriate scale. 
As already noted, there are promising strategies for working with 
firms, many of which have been implemented by an impressive range 
of actors, including business associations, non-profits, labor market in-
termediaries, and unions. One central problem, however, is that these 
efforts are underresourced. It is, of course, not surprising to hear a claim 
that more money is needed, but the problem goes beyond simply the 
level of funding. In general, the existing federal funding structure does 
not support what some have termed the “core intermediary functions” 
of organizing firms, working with their human resource staff, design-
ing career ladders, and supporting employees. Rather than seeing these 
functions as central, federal programs view them as overhead or “ad-
ministration” and sharply limit the amount of resources available. 
Taking into account both the federal and state funding streams and 
the substantive issues raised by these streams, two important federal 
policy initiatives are attractive. The first aims to create a federal pro-
gram and framework to support innovative intermediaries and other 
programmatic initiatives. The second tries to change the incentive 
structure confronting firms as they decide how much to invest in their 
employees.
 The Department of Labor should establish a “Low Wage Challenge 
Fund” for supporting programs that work with firms to upgrade the jobs 
of their low-wage workers. In addition to directly funding programs, 
matching resources should be available to incentivize states to establish 
or increase their customized training fund programs and to orient these 
programs toward the low-wage/low-skill workforce.
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The Low Wage Challenge Fund would systematically fund policy 
entrepreneurship. As already noted, the past decade has seen an impres-
sive flowering of new program designs. At the same time it is also true 
that there is a series of unanswered questions about these efforts that 
need to be studied and evaluated, not the least of which is the standard 
question about impact. In addition, these programs vary considerably in 
their auspices (who sponsors and runs them), in the role played by sup-
port services, and in whether they aim at particular industries or sectors 
or whether they provide broad occupational training. 
The fund would be structured to play the same role, but on a larger 
scale, that the foundation world is currently playing. That is, the fund 
would support innovative program models and also seek to leverage 
the resources of other systems, notably the state training funds and the 
community college system. 
The goals would be to provide incentives for states that currently 
do not have such funds to establish them (about half the states) and 
to move the funds away from their smokestack-chasing character and 
toward well-designed training for low-wage employees. There are al-
ready best practice states in this regard. For example, New Jersey has 
a “Supplementary Workforce Fund For Basic Skills,” which provides 
resources for literacy and Adult Basic Education training in firms, and 
Florida gives extra points in its application process to proposals that 
focus on low-wage workers. 
The goal of working with community colleges is to take advantage 
of the resources of this very large system that already educates large 
numbers of low-wage workers. Including the manufacturing extension 
services in this effort is also desirable because it speaks to the need to 
maintain the base of good jobs that we already have.
It is worthwhile to use federal resources to match and stimulate 
state training funds and community college programs because it levers 
additional resources. In return for federal matching, the state training 
funds should establish procedures to assure that any support they pro-
vide to firms represents a net addition to the firms’ training efforts di-
rected to low-wage workers (and does not simply substitute for what the 
firm would otherwise have done), and that the programs are subject to 
credible evaluation. 
The second broad goal is to reorient public policy to alter the incen-
tive structure facing firms and to encourage them to improve the quality 
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of the jobs that they offer. A key issue here is training expenditures. As 
we have seen, employer training is biased against low-wage workers. 
A few states attempt to address this problem by offering tax credits 
to firms that increase their investment in training their less well-paid 
employees; however, these programs are scattered and little is known 
about them. A federal tax credit for incremental (additional) training 
that was directed to low-wage employees would be an important step 
forward. It would be important to design the credit so that it targets 
the group of employees who need the extra boost and so that it is not 
a windfall that rewards firms for what they would do regardless. There 
are also good reasons to insist that the training lead to a general cre-
dential that provides mobility to the employee, although this needs to 
be weighed against likely reluctance of firms to invest in training that 
encourages their employees to leave. (A proposal along these lines can 
be found in Bosworth [2006]).
Strengthening Standards in the Low-Wage Labor Market
An increase in the federal minimum wage is long overdue. In ad-
dition, it is important to find ways to level the playing field for union 
organizing. The real concern about the role unions might play in reduc-
ing low-wage employment is not whether, when in place, they improve 
employment conditions but rather the fact that their success rate is poor. 
These negative trends in membership and campaign success rates con-
tinue even though numerous surveys suggest that a substantial fraction 
of unorganized employees would like to be represented by unions (see 
Freeman 2007). This pattern suggests that something is broken in the 
system established by the National Labor Relations Act. 
A good deal of effort is being devoted internally in the union move-
ment to raise the rate of union success. These efforts include putting 
more resources into organizing, being more strategic in designing orga-
nizing campaigns, and considering new models of representation, such 
as membership organizations without collective bargaining rights. On 
the national agenda are attempts to reform labor law to speed up elec-
tions and to reduce the incentives of employers to delay and to engage 
in unfair labor practices. One currently popular (in union circles) pro-
posal calls for card-check campaigns. Such procedures are of growing 
importance (see Brudney 2005). There is not uniform agreement, even 
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among those sympathetic to unions, that the card-check strategy is the 
best approach. However, it is clear that finding ways to level the playing 
field for unions in the low-wage labor market is an important compo-
nent of any strategy.
The third arrow in the standard setting quiver is to strengthen the 
use of economic development incentives to create good jobs. Here it 
is important to continue the trend of assuring that tax abatements and 
economic development subsidies are only available if they lead to good 
jobs. Much of the responsibility for this rests in state governments, and 
the role of the federal government would be to advocate and diffuse 
best practice. However, federal programs should also walk the talk with 
respect to the wage standards embodied in the Workforce Investment 
Act, TANF training programs, and other federal efforts. 
COnCLUSIOn
America is a wealthy country, and in recent years productivity has 
resumed its upward climb. Yet despite this success, low-wage work is 
not only far more prevalent than seems appropriate, but the share of 
employment that is below acceptable standards is increasing. The dif-
ficulty that low-wage workers have in escaping the bottom of the labor 
market makes these patterns even more troubling. 
The first step to addressing this is a real national commitment to the 
problem. There have been periods—for example, the New Deal or the 
War on Poverty—when labor market issues have been a central concern 
of public policy. Unfortunately, in recent years this has not been the 
case, and advocates have not been able to articulate a convincing narra-
tive that makes the case for serious policy steps to address the bottom 
of the job market. Nor has the political will been present. The success 
of recent state-level minimum wage campaigns and local living wage 
campaigns suggests that the political situation may be shifting. How-
ever, years of skepticism about what government can accomplish have 
undermined confidence that the problem can be resolved. As a result, 
the challenge remains of making a convincing case that effective policy 
is possible. 
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This chapter has described a multilevel strategy for improving job 
quality at the bottom of the labor market. A combination of standard 
setting and assistance to employers in upgrading their human resource 
policies holds promise. In my view both prongs of strategy are essen-
tial. A pure programmatic job training or sectoral strategy will run into 
significant difficulties of scale and will also have problems reaching the 
smaller firms, which are significant employers of low-wage workers. 
Standard setting plays a key role of giving firms incentives to partici-
pate in the programmatic efforts because those initiatives enable them 
to more productively achieve the standards. In addition, standard set-
ting will reach smaller firms while programmatic approaches may not.
For these efforts to succeed, adequate resources need to be available 
for job training, for work support, and to support the intermediary orga-
nizations that work with firms. Much of the real work needs to be done 
at the local and state levels, but the federal government has a central 
role to play both with respect to resources and standards. This chapter 
has tried to be realistic about what is possible and to recognize the limi-
tations of any set of programs. At the same time, there is reason to be 
optimistic, and an ambitious commitment to upgrading low-wage work 
can have an impact. We have learned a great deal about what works, and 
the next step is to implement what we have learned on a large enough 
scale to make a real difference. 
notes
 1. This is based on an analysis of the census Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data. 
The wage standard is based on the poverty level for a family of four and assumes 
2,080 hours of work a year. In 2006, this implied an average wage of $9.83 or less. 
The wage levels for the previous years are adjusted using the CPI to 2006 levels. 
The sample is limited to adults 25–64 years old who worked in the private sector, 
and only data in the fourth month rotation are analyzed here. There is an extensive 
literature regarding the use of ORG data that includes complications regarding the 
use (or nonuse) of allocated wages, the treatment of topcoding, and the elimina-
tion of outliers (among other concerns). In my analysis I have followed the data 
preparation steps described in Lemieux (2006), which represent the standard steps 
in the literature. Specifically, I use only nonallocated wages, eliminate outliers 
according to Lemieux’s rules, and adjust for topcoding using the conventions of 
Lemieux.
 2. In the private sector, if we weight each observation by the number of weekly hours 
worked, then 16.5 percent of hours overall are low wage.
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 3. For this purpose, the March Current Population Survey is more useful than the 
Outgoing Rotation Group data used above because, although its hourly wage data 
are less precise, it contains data on firm size. The wage data are less precise be-
cause they have to be estimated using usual hours worked per week and usual 
weekly earnings. The processing of the data follows Lemieux (2006). The data are 
weighted by hours worked. The industry and size variables refer to the longest job 
held during the year while the wage variable is an average over the whole year. 
I have eliminated anyone who was self-employed at the time of the interview as 
well as people who report that more than 10 percent of their total annual earnings 
was due to self-employment.
 4. Hollister argues that in recent years the traditional firm size effect on wages has 
weakened.
 5. The data are nationally representative of people ages 25–64 in the for-profit sector 
who speak either English or Spanish.
 6. Both an OLS and a logit regression were run in which the dependent variable was 
the probability of being low wage and the independent variables included controls 
for sex, race, education, and a series of industry dummy variables. In the OLS 
regression the coefficient was 0.109 and highly significant. In the logit the coef-
ficient on union was 1.36 and also highly significant.
 7. The research is based on examining what happens to wages in situations where 
unions win or lose an election by a very small margin. The argument is that in 
such cases the various forms of selection bias are eliminated. However, it is pos-
sible that an effective union can win an election by a large margin due to its power 
rather than to selection bias explanations, and in such a case the wage gains should 
be attributed to the union effect. In addition, in a growing number of cases agree-
ments are achieved via card-check and not by elections.
 8. The discussion of community organizations draws from Osterman (2003). The 
discussion of Worker Centers draws from Fine (2006) and from Gordon (2005).
 9. These networks include the Industrial Area Foundation, Direct Action Research 
Training (DART), PICO National Network, Gamamiel, and the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). The first four organize 
heavily through congregations and hence are often termed “faith-based” organiza-
tions. One recent estimate is that there are 133 of these faith-based organizations 
throughout the country.
 10. See www.livingwagecompaign.org.
 11. The skeptical view is summarized and reviewed in Neumark and Adams (2004). 
The more positive view is summarized in Thompson and Chapman (2006).
 12. A resource for data on these campaigns is the Brennan Center for Justice at the 
New York University Law School.
 13. In the case of the Staples agreement the wage standards for 70 percent of the jobs 
in the project were set at between $7.72 and $8.97 an hour and $100,000 was set 
aside to support training.
 14. According to the research, several surveys show that 67 percent of domestic work-
ers receive no overtime pay even though they are entitled to it, 59 percent of 
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restaurant employees have the same problem, and small retail stores in Brooklyn 
routinely violate wage and hour laws. See Brennan Center for Justice (2006).
 15. Bosworth reports that these tax credits are available in Rhode Island, Georgia, 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
 16. WIA Adult Formula funding declined from $945 million in fiscal year 2002 to 
$865 million in fiscal year 2006, and of these funds only about 40 percent are 
actually spent on training, a substantially lower share than under JTPA. See The 
Workforce Alliance, 2006, pp. 12–13.
 17. The material in this paragraph draws from King and Smith (2006).
 18. I owe this analogy to John Colborn of the Ford Foundation.
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Boosting the Earnings and 
Employment of Low-Skilled 
Workers in the United States
Making Work Pay and Removing Barriers  
to Employment and Social Mobility
Steven Raphael
University of California, Berkeley
The last few decades of the twentieth century witnessed fairly dra-
matic changes in the labor market outcomes and socioeconomic status 
of American workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Earn-
ings of the least skilled adults either stagnated or fell. Moreover, labor 
force participation and employment have declined considerably, sug-
gesting a reduction in demand for the labor of the least skilled and an 
accompanying withdrawal from the labor force on the part of many 
low-skilled workers unwilling to accept diminished wages.
Certain economy-wide developments have affected the employment 
prospects of all low-skilled workers regardless of race or gender. For 
example, the well-documented changes in the earnings distribution be-
ginning in the late 1970s have increased the relative returns to postsec-
ondary schooling as well as the returns to experience (Katz and Autor 
1999).1 Nonetheless, certain social and institutional developments are 
likely to have had disproportionate impacts on the labor market pros-
pects of certain subgroups within the population of low-skilled adults. 
For example, the prison incarceration rate between the late 1970s and 
the present more than quadrupled. That has had a disproportionate im-
pact on less-educated black men and has left in its wake large groups 
of less-educated men who are hampered by their criminal histories in 
their search for employment.2 As a further example, the expansion of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), welfare reform, the Medicaid 
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expansions, and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance program (SCHIP) greatly increased the relative returns to work 
over welfare for poor women with children.
This chapter documents the relative economic performance of low-
skilled disadvantaged workers in the United States and identifies key 
factors that have either enhanced their economic security or that are 
becoming increasingly important barriers to steady employment and 
self-sufficiency. As the introduction suggests, there are important dif-
ferences by gender. Low-skilled men are currently participating in the 
labor force at rates that are extremely low by historical comparison, 
which suggests that procuring and maintaining steady employment has 
become a serious problem for this particular group. The analysis be-
low demonstrates that the unprecedented decline in employment and 
participation among men is only partially explained by the decline in 
earnings potential. Thus, boosting the employment rates of low-skilled 
men will require both supply-side incentives that make work pay and 
demand-side efforts aimed at increasing employer willingness to hire 
from this particular labor pool.
Low-skilled women have fared better in recent decades, experienc-
ing more modest declines in earnings and changes in employment rang-
ing from modest decreases to substantial increases. The greatest gains 
in employment are found for those women most likely to have been 
affected by the institutional changes to the nation’s safety net during the 
1990s, in particular poor and near-poor women with children.
I analyze and offer several policy proposals designed to boost the 
employment and earnings of the least-skilled workers. First, I discuss 
several recent proposals to substantially expand the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) for childless adults. I analyze the likely costs of these 
proposals, the degree to which the expansions would actually benefit 
workers at the bottom of the income distribution, the potential effect 
of such expansions on the incentive to marry, and the likely impact on 
take-home earnings and employment. My preferred proposal is a hybrid 
of two proposals, one by Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006) and the 
other by Berlin (2007). It combines an expanded credit for childless 
adults with a targeted liberalization of the benefits calculation for the 
poorest married couples. While the employment effects of such an ex-
pansion are likely to be modest, the impact on annual income and mate-
rial poverty is substantial and would go part of the way toward reducing 
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the real decline in earnings experienced by low-skilled workers over 
the past three decades. Moreover, modest changes to the current system 
could eliminate the marriage penalty inherent in the EITC for the poor-
est couples at relatively little public expense.
Second, I offer several policy proposals intended to remove some 
of the educational and employment barriers that hinder the reentry of 
former prison inmates into mainstream society. Specifically, I propose 
that 
• Summary disqualification of former inmates and those with fel-
ony convictions from participating in federal public assistance 
programs and from receiving financial aid for education should 
be reversed.
• Employment bans based on former convictions and occupational 
licensing restrictions should be based on the content of one’s 
criminal record and not applied in a blanket manner. Moreover, 
when used, employment bans should be based on conviction 
rather than arrest records. Any bans on the employment of felons 
mandated by law should be based on the content of one’s previ-
ous behavior as well as the time that has elapsed.
• We should increase investment in labor market intermediaries 
that specialize in building relationships with employers willing 
to hire ex-offenders and in placing former inmates into sustain-
able employment.
• States should incentivize desistance from criminal activity by 
expunging certain criminal records after a fixed time period has 
elapsed. 
While the challenges faced by former inmates in the legitimate la-
bor market are many, these modest proposals would eliminate key bar-
riers to employment that affect increasing proportions of low-skilled 
men, at little cost in terms of public safety. 
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WHO ARE THE LOW-EARnERS In THE UnITED STATES 
AnD HOW HAvE THEy FARED?
Here I use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Micro-
data Samples (PUMS) from the U.S. Census of Housing and Popula-
tion to characterize the low-wage population and to document recent 
trends in earnings, employment, and institutionalization rates. I restrict 
the analysis to adults 18 to 55 years of age that are out of school, that 
are not in the military, and that do not report self-employment income. 
I measure each person’s hourly earnings by dividing total annual wage 
and salary earnings by total annual hours worked (measured by weeks 
worked last year multiplied by usual hours worked). For those individu-
als who did not work in the previous year or who are institutionalized 
at the time of interview, I compute hourly earnings by assigning the 
median hourly wage for workers in the same year, gender, race or eth-
nicity, education, and labor market experience group.3 Thus, average 
wages for all workers in the sample measure the actual wages for some 
and the potential earnings of those who do not participate in the labor 
force, based on the earnings of comparable individuals employed at 
some point during the year. 
An important strength of the PUMS data concerns the fact that the 
data covers the institutionalized population (including inmates in jails 
and prisons and inpatients in mental hospitals) as well as the noninsti-
tutionalized. As I discuss below, the institutionalized population now 
makes up a sizable proportion of many demographic subgroups among 
the low-skilled adult population. Thus, the ability to characterize insti-
tutionalization trends is central to fully comprehending the current state 
of the low-skilled adult population in the United States.
Who Are the Low-Earning Adults in the United States? 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 describe how the distributions of the male (Table 
7.1) and female (Table 7.2) populations have changed between 1980 
and 2000 for all adults in my sample and for adults in the bottom quarter 
of the earnings potential distribution. Each table presents the proportion 
of the population accounted for by four mutually exclusive racial or 
ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic 
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Asian, and Hispanic), the distribution of a given group’s share by level 
of educational attainment, and the proportion who are immigrant, insti-
tutionalized, or who report a work-limiting disability. 
The prime-age adult male population has become less white, more 
Hispanic, and more Asian. The fraction of all men that are black has 
increased slightly. Within racial groups, the distribution of educational 
attainment has shifted decisively towards higher levels for whites and 
Table 7.1  Comparison of All Out-of-School Men 18 to 55 with Similar 
Men in the Bottom Quarter of the Earnings Potential 
Distribution
1980 2000
All men
Low-wage 
men All men
Low-wage 
men
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.800
0.173
0.324
0.171
0.208
0.627
0.273
0.220
0.074
0.061
0.684
0.063
0.239
0.199
0.188
0.506
0.126
0.214
0.111
0.059
Black
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.114
0.047
0.042
0.016
0.008
0.254
0.140
0.084
0.027
0.008
0.126
0.025
0.056
0.032
0.014
0.269
0.095
0.126
0.044
0.009
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.015
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.006
0.016
0.006
0.005
0.002
0.003
0.038
0.004
0.008
0.008
0.017
0.032
0.008
0.010
0.006
0.008
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.071
0.038
0.020
0.008
0.005
0.103
0.069
0.024
0.008
0.003
0.145
0.064
0.048
0.024
0.011
0.184
0.099
0.063
0.019
0.006
Immigrant
Institutionalized
Disabled
0.071
0.018
0.084
0.082
0.150
0.350
0.159
0.038
0.139
0.152
0.247
0.248
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples 
(PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing and Population.
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blacks. Across groups, Hispanics constitute an increasing proportion 
of those with the lowest level of educational attainment. In addition to 
these changes, the proportion of immigrants among the male population 
has more than doubled, the proportion with a work-limiting disabil-
ity has increased by over 60 percent, and the proportion in institutions 
has increased by over 200 percent. The change in the proportion that 
is institutionalized reflects the net effect of two offsetting trends: the 
Table 7.2  Comparison of All Out-of-School Women 18 to 55 with Similar 
Women in the Bottom Quarter of the Earnings Potential 
Distribution
1980 2000
All women
Low-wage 
women All women
Low-wage 
women
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.798
0.161
0.387
0.136
0.114
0.772
0.226
0.367
0.108
0.072
0.695
0.051
0.230
0.225
0.193
0.617
0.095
0.240
0.168
0.118
Black
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.118
0.043
0.048
0.017
0.010
0.126
0.065
0.047
0.011
0.004
0.131
0.019
0.053
0.041
0.019
0.136
0.039
0.064
0.027
0.007
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.017
0.004
0.005
0.003
0.005
0.017
0.005
0.006
0.003
0.004
0.043
0.006
0.010
0.009
0.018
0.052
0.010
0.014
0.010
0.018
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.066
0.035
0.021
0.007
0.003
0.084
0.054
0.022
0.005
0.002
0.125
0.048
0.041
0.025
0.012
0.187
0.100
0.058
0.022
0.009
Immigrant
Institutionalized
Disabled
0.075
0.004
0.069
0.088
0.010
0.131
0.148
0.005
0.112
0.219
0.018
0.143
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples 
(PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing and Population.
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proportion of the male population in mental hospitals has declined con-
tinuously since 1980, while the proportion in local jails and state and 
federal prisons has greatly increased (Raphael and Stoll 2007).
For men in the bottom quarter of the earnings distribution there are 
some notable facts. In both 1980 and 2000, racial and ethnic minorities 
are considerably overrepresented among low earners while white males 
are underrepresented. Changes between 1980 and 2000 have reinforced 
this pattern: there has been a decline in the proportion that is white of 
0.12, an increase in the proportion that is black of 0.015, an increase in 
the proportion that is Asian of 0.016, and an increase in the proportion 
that is Hispanic of 0.081. Low earners are considerably more educated 
on average in 2000 than they were in 1980. Roughly 49 percent of low-
earning males in 1980 had less than a complete high school education, 
compared to 33 percent in 2000. Conversely, the proportion with a high 
school diploma increased from 33 to 41 percent. In contrast to the over-
all trend, the proportion of low-earning workers with a work-limiting 
disability declined from 0.35 to 0.25.
One of the most dramatic differences between the trends for low-
income men and the trends for all men concerns the large absolute in-
crease in institutionalization rates. In 2000, nearly one quarter of men 
whose earnings potential fell in the bottom quarter of the earnings dis-
tribution were institutionalized, and most of these men were in state 
or federal prisons or jail. This represents a nearly 10-percentage-point 
increase since 1980.
For women, Table 7.2 reveals that the overall distributions of the 
adult female population across racial or ethnic groups and levels of 
educational attainment are comparable to those of men (as shown in 
Table 7.1) in both years. For low-wage women, however, white wom-
en account for much larger proportions of the low-wage population in 
both years as compared to men. The proportion of immigrants and the 
proportion of disabled increase for women overall. Among low-wage 
women, the proportion that is immigrant more than doubles while the 
proportion with work-limiting disabilities increases slightly. The most 
notable difference relative to men concerns institutionalization trends. 
There is a very slight increase from a very low level in 1980 in the over-
all proportion of women in institutions (from 0.004 to 0.005). Among 
low-earnings women, the increase is larger (from 0.010 to 0.018), yet 
much smaller than that observed for men.
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Trends in Wages, Employment, and Institutionalization for 
Disaggregated Subgroups
Table 7.3 presents the average log wages for men and women for 
1980, 1990, and 2000 by race or ethnicity and by level of educational 
attainment; it also shows the change for each decade. Note that since 
wages are expressed in logs, the change between any two years is ap-
proximately equal to the proportional change in hourly earnings. For 
the entire period, potential wages decline for all men who do not have a 
college degree or more, and the largest declines occur for men with less 
than a complete high school education. Among the least educated white 
men, wages decline by roughly 22 percent between 1980 and 2000, with 
most of the decline occurring during the 1980s. For black and Hispanic 
high school dropouts, hourly wages decline overall by 17 percent, again 
with most of the wage loss occurring in the earlier decade. There are 
also sizable declines in the hourly wages of male high school graduates. 
These patterns clearly reveal the growing returns to education among 
men and are consistent with the findings of previous research.4
Wage trends for women are quite different from those for men. Per-
haps the most notable differences pertain to wage levels for a given group 
and at a given point in time. There are large intergender disparities favor-
ing males in each year within each race or ethnicity education group. 
However, these within-group disparities decline between 1980 and 2000.
The declines in hourly wages for women with the least skills are 
considerably more modest than the comparable declines experienced 
by men. For example, the hourly wages of white women with less than 
a high school diploma declined by 10 percent between 1980 and 1990 
and then increased by 3 percent over the subsequent decade. The com-
parable changes for similarly educated white men are declines of 18 
percent between 1980 and 1990 and 4 percent thereafter. Similarly, 
the hourly wages of white female high school graduates increased by 
roughly 2 percent between 1980 and 2000 while the wages of corre-
sponding white men declined by 14 percent.
Prior research on the labor supply responses of men and women 
suggests that declines in hourly wages should result in a decline in em-
ployment among those experiencing the wage change. A decrease in 
wages reduces the rate at which an individual can convert his nonmar-
ket time into money by supplying his time to the formal labor market. 
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To the extent that people value their time, a decline in the wages that 
one’s labor will command is likely to induce one to either supply less 
time or withdraw from the labor force entirely.5 Thus, in conjunction 
with the patterns in Table 7.3, this simple theory predicts that employ-
ment rates should have declined considerably for low-skilled men and 
less so for low-skilled women.
Indeed, employment does tend to decline for those demographic 
groups experiencing the largest declines in earnings. Table 7.4 presents 
the proportion of each group employed at the time of the census inter-
view for the same race/ethnicity-education-gender groups displayed in 
Table 7.3. There are sizable declines in the employment rates of the 
least skilled male workers. Between 1980 and 2000, the employment 
rate for white high school dropouts declined by 14 percentage points, 
while employment for white high school graduates fell roughly 7 per-
centage points. For black men, there are large declines in employment 
for all groups with the exception of college-educated black men, and 
there is an especially large decline (27 percentage points) for black high 
school dropouts. By 2000, only one-third of prime-age, black male high 
school dropouts were employed on a given day, compared to nearly 
two-thirds in 1980.
For the least skilled men the declines in employment rates during 
the 1990s are of equal magnitude to, or larger than, the declines ob-
served during the 1980s. By contrast, nearly all of the wage losses for 
these groups occur during the 1980s, suggesting that factors beyond 
declining wages are also driving the poor employment outcomes of 
less-skilled men.
Low-earning women experienced smaller wage losses than men 
from comparable demographic groups and with similar levels of edu-
cational attainment, and thus one would expect a priori that declines in 
employment would be more modest for women. In fact, with the excep-
tion of black and Asian women having less than a high school degree, 
the employment rates of all groups increased during the 1980s. Juhn 
and Potter (2006) demonstrate that this increase in labor force participa-
tion represents the tail end of a long trend towards greater participation 
among women of all skill levels. Between 1990 and 2000, this trend 
appears to have slowed, with modest to moderate declines in employ-
ment among women from all racial or ethnic groups and all levels of 
educational attainment.
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Table 7.3  Average Log Wages for Men and Women 18 to 55 years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate   
2.57
2.71
2.82
3.07
2.39
2.58
2.77
3.12
2.35
2.57
2.77
3.17
−0.18
−0.13
−0.05
0.05
−0.04
−0.01
0.00
0.05
Black 
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.33
2.47
2.62
2.88
2.19
2.35
2.58
2.92
2.16
2.36
2.60
2.96
−0.14
−0.12
−0.04
0.04
−0.03
0.01
0.02
0.04
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.37
2.59
2.69
3.03
2.24
2.44
2.68
3.08
2.26
2.41
2.68
3.15
−0.13
−0.15
−0.01
0.05
0.02
−0.03
0.00
0.07
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.35
2.53
2.68
2.92
2.19
2.39
2.62
2.93
2.18
2.33
2.60
2.92
−0.16
−0.14
−0.06
0.01
−0.01
−0.06
−0.02
−0.01
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate 
2.09
2.24
2.38
2.68
1.99
2.21
2.41
2.79
2.02
2.26
2.47
2.87
−0.10
−0.03
0.03
0.11
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.08
Black
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.04
2.21
2.35
2.75
1.96
2.15
2.37
2.82
2.00
2.19
2.44
2.86
−0.08
−0.06
0.02
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.07
0.04
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.13
2.29
2.41
2.69
2.07
2.25
2.49
2.79
2.10
2.26
2.53
2.91
−0.06
−0.04
0.08
0.10
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.12
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
2.04
2.21
2.33
2.61
1.95
2.16
2.37
2.74
1.96
2.16
2.40
2.76
−0.09
−0.05
0.04
0.13
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.02
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
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Table 7.4  Proportion Employed for Men and Women 18 to 55 years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White men
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate   
0.75
0.87
0.91
0.95
0.68
0.86
0.91
0.95
0.61
0.80
0.88
0.94
−0.07
−0.01
0.00
0.00
−0.07
−0.06
−0.03
−0.01
Black 
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.60
0.73
0.79
0.89
0.46
0.66
0.76
0.89
0.33
0.57
0.71
0.86
−0.14
−0.07
−0.03
0.00
−0.13
−0.09
−0.05
−0.03
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.75
0.84
0.91
0.94
0.69
0.83
0.90
0.93
0.63
0.73
0.80
0.89
−0.06
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.06
−0.10
−0.10
−0.04
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.77
0.83
0.88
0.92
0.73
0.79
0.86
0.92
0.64
0.69
0.79
0.86
−0.04
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
−0.09
−0.10
−0.07
−0.06
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.43
0.60
0.66
0.73
0.45
0.67
0.76
0.82
0.44
0.67
0.76
0.81
0.02
0.07
0.10
0.09
−0.01
0.00
0.00
−0.01
Black
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.43
0.62
0.73
0.86
0.39
0.62
0.76
0.90
0.37
0.58
0.74
0.86
−0.04
0.00
0.03
0.04
−0.02
−0.04
−0.02
−0.04
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.49
0.60
0.68
0.72
0.47
0.62
0.73
0.75
0.48
0.57
0.66
0.70
−0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.01
−0.05
−0.07
−0.05
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.39
0.58
0.67
0.74
0.41
0.60
0.73
0.80
0.37
0.53
0.68
0.75
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.06
−0.04
−0.07
−0.05
−0.05
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
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One interesting pattern evident in Table 7.4 concerns the within-
group gender disparities in employment rates. In 1980 and 1990, men 
are more likely to be employed than comparable women in every group 
displayed in the table, with the sole exception of black college graduates 
in 1990. While this gender disparity varies considerably across groups, 
differentials on the order of 10 to 15 percentage points are typical. In the 
year 2000, comparable gender differences are observed among whites, 
Asians, and Hispanics. For blacks, however, the employment rates of 
males have deteriorated far enough to render the male-female employ-
ment rate differentials negative for most educational groups.
Finally, Table 7.5 presents the proportion institutionalized at the 
time of the census survey. The proportion institutionalized is composed 
disproportionately of inmates of local jails and state and federal prisons. 
The table reveals stark intergender, interracial, and cross-educational 
group disparities in the incidence of incarceration and the change in 
this incidence over this two-decade period. The largest increases are 
observed for black males with less than a high school degree. Between 
1980 and 2000, the proportion institutionalized increased from roughly 
8 percent to 27 percent of this population, a number similar in magni-
tude to the 33 percent of this group that is employed. The incarcera-
tion rate for men without a high school diploma more than doubled 
for whites and Asians, and nearly doubled for Hispanics, although the 
levels are considerably lower than those observed for blacks. The in-
carceration rates for women are quite low, although the rate for black 
women tripled—from 0.01 to 0.03—between 1980 and 2000.
The proportion of men who have ever served time in prison is cer-
tainly larger than the proportion incarcerated at any given point in time. 
The U.S. prison population is characterized by a high rate of turnover: 
nearly one-half of the population is released each year, and slightly over 
half is admitted (Raphael and Stoll 2007). The Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics estimates that a black male born in 2001 has a 33 percent chance of 
serving prison time at some point in his life. The BJS also estimates that 
roughly 20 percent of all adult black males and 3 to 4 percent of white 
males have served time at some point in their lives (Bonczar 2003). In 
previous research on the California state prison system, I estimated the 
proportion of adults males by race, age, and education who had served 
time in the state prison system. Roughly one-third of prime-age (25 to 
44) white men with less than a high school education had been through 
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the state prison system. For black men with less than a high school edu-
cation, a prior prison spell was nearly certain (Raphael 2006).
These trends indicate that to a greater extent than ever before, low-
skilled men who are not institutionalized are likely to have felony con-
victions and prison experience in their past. Combined with relatively 
easy access to criminal records and employers actively screening for 
this factor, this trend indicates that this particular development has be-
come an increasingly important handicap for low-skilled men in the 
legitimate labor market. 
TO WHAT ExTEnT DO CHAnGES In WAGES ExPLAIn 
RECEnT EMPLOyMEnT AnD InCARCERATIOn TREnDS?
Thus, relatively less-educated men and women have both expe-
rienced declines in earnings since 1980, but men have experienced 
the most severe declines. These wage patterns correspond to uniform 
decreases in the employment rates of the least educated men, includ-
ing particularly large declines for black men, and mixed patterns with 
regard to the changes in employment for the least educated women. 
Concurrently, the proportion of males incarcerated and not working has 
increased—by a great amount for certain subgroups (black men in par-
ticular), and by a more moderate yet significant amount for less-skilled 
men more generally.
Certainly, these changes in earnings, employment, and institution-
alization rates are related, and the causality runs in multiple directions. 
Declining wages are likely to induce some to withdraw from the labor 
force. Moreover, decreases in the returns to legitimate work increase 
the relative returns to criminal activity, a factor that will increase the 
proportion of the population at risk of becoming incarcerated and, ul-
timately, the incarceration rate. Finally, men fail to accumulate human 
capital while incarcerated (Raphael 2006), may be stigmatized by the 
label of ex-offender when seeking legitimate employment (Holzer, Ra-
phael, and Stoll 2006, 2007; Pager 2003), and may experience an ero-
sion of their legitimate work skills and an augmentation of their propen-
sity to engage in crime while incarcerated. These factors are all likely to 
negatively influence employment and earnings.
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Table 7.5  Proportion Institutionalized for Men and Women 18 to 55 years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, Educational 
Attainment, and year
Panel A: Men
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
Black 
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.15
0.08
0.08
0.02
0.27
0.12
0.08
0.02
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.00
0.12
0.04
0.00
0.00
Asian
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
Hispanic
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
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Panel B: Women
1980 1990 2000 1980–1990 1990–2000
White
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate  
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
Black
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
Asian
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Hispanic
   Less than high school
   High school graduate
   Some college
   College graduate
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
−0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Housing 
and Population.
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The first two factors suggest that diminished wages are likely to be 
partially responsible for the low employment rates of low-skilled men 
and perhaps for their newly high incarceration rates. Put simply, if peo-
ple at the bottom of the earnings distribution are not working because 
working pays less than it used to, and are engaging in more criminal 
activity as a side product, then addressing this problem requires mak-
ing legitimate work pay. Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 do indeed suggest that 
those groups suffering the largest wage losses also exhibit the largest 
employment declines and the largest increases in incarceration, although 
the patterns across groups and the timing aren’t perfect. Hence, to the 
extent that society could alter existing taxes and subsidies to improve 
the take-home pay of low-earning workers, policymakers may be able 
to turn the tide on some of these more adverse developments.
In this section, I address two related questions that will provide the 
analytical research findings to more thoroughly investigate this policy 
idea. Specifically, to what extent are recent employment trends driven 
by falling wages? Concurrently, how much of the increase in institution-
alization rates can be attributed to poorer labor market opportunities?
Declining Wages and the Employment Rates of Low-Skilled Men 
and Women
To assess the extent to which declining wages drive declining em-
ployment rates, one needs to assess the degree to which labor supply 
behavior is responsive to changes in potential earnings. The theoretical 
concept used by economists to describe this behavioral response is the 
labor supply elasticity. The supply elasticity is defined as the percentage 
change in employment among a given group caused by a 1-percentage-
point change in wages.
In Appendix 7A, I describe the details of a procedure that I use to 
estimate the labor supply responsiveness of men and women to changes 
in wages. While I do not discuss the details here, I will note that the 
estimation method accounts for the institutionalized and the possibility 
that the labor supply decision may ultimately affect the probability of 
an incarceration spell. The elasticity estimates from this analysis are 
presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The estimates from a model that uses 
all men indicates a moderate degree of responsiveness of employment 
to wages, with a high-end labor supply elasticity estimate of roughly 0.2 
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(indicating that a 10 percent decrease in wages would cause a 2 percent 
decrease in employment). Race-specific estimates suggest that black 
men are most responsive to changes in wages.
In general, women’s supply behavior is more responsive to wage 
changes than that of men. The low-end overall elasticity estimate for 
women is nearly double the high-end estimate for men (0.4 vs. 0.2). 
In addition, the elasticity estimates for black and Hispanic women are 
particularly large. This range of elasticity estimates for both men and 
women is in line with the results discussed in Devereux (2003), Juhn 
(1992), Juhn and Potter (2006), and Pencavel (1997, 2002).
Using these elasticity estimates and the wage changes documented 
in Table 7.3, it is possible to calculate the degree to which declining 
wages explain recent employment patterns.6 I present the results from 
these calculations in Table 7.6. The first column presents actual changes 
Figure 7.1  Labor Supply Elasticity Estimates For Men, Based on Census 
Microdata by Race or Ethnicity
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on the regression model estimates from the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of 
Housing and Population.
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in employment rates between 1980 and 2000 for the race and education 
groups depicted in Tables 7.3 through 7.5. The second column pres-
ents the change in employment predicted by the actual change in wages 
for this group using the high race-specific elasticity estimate from the 
values presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The final column presents a 
similar calculation using the low elasticity estimate for the given race 
and gender group.
For the least educated men, declining earnings explains relatively 
small, but not unsubstantial, portions of the decline in employment rates. 
For white men without a high school degree, the predicted changes in 
employment attributable to declining wages range from no change to 
a decline of 3 percentage points. For black men without a high school 
degree, 4 to 6 percentage points of the 27-percentage-point decline can 
be attributed to a negative supply response to falling wages, constitut-
Figure 7.2  Labor Supply Elasticity Estimates For Women, Based on 
Census Microdata by Race or Ethnicity
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on regression model estimates from the 1980, 
1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Hous-
ing and Population.
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ing 16 to 22 percent of the decline. Similarly, for black men with high 
school diplomas (the modal category for this group of men), declining 
wages explain 3 to 5 percentage points of the 16-percentage-point de-
cline between 1980 and 2000 (roughly 18 to 30 percent of the decline). 
Thus, reversing wage trends for low-skilled men would likely lead to 
increases in employment rates, but the increases would fall far short of 
undoing the employment declines witnessed in recent decades.
Among women, only black and Hispanic women experienced sub-
stantial declines in employment between 1980 and 2000, and even for 
these groups, the declines are modest in comparison to those for men. 
For black women with less than a high school degree, roughly 16 per-
cent of the decline in employment is attributable to declining wages. 
For comparable Hispanic women, however, half to all of declining em-
ployment can be attributed to lower wages in 2000.
To be sure, the relative returns to work for the less skilled have been 
influenced by various policy developments over this time period that are 
not reflected in their hourly wages. For poor women with children, wel-
fare reform, the expansion of the EITC, Medicaid expansions, and the 
introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
have greatly increased the returns to work. In fact, with the EITC af-
fecting take-home pay by as much as 40 percent for some workers, the 
hourly wage provides a rather imprecise measure of the marginal return 
to an additional hour of work for the least skilled women. 
The wages of childless men as well as those of men who are non-
custodial fathers have not been influenced by these developments. In 
fact, for many of these men, the marginal return to working has likely 
been eroded by child support policies that garnish the wages of men 
with arrearages and impose large marginal taxes on legitimate labor 
market earnings, while (in cases where their former partners and chil-
dren are receiving public assistance) passing little to none of the col-
lected revenues on to their dependents (Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 
2006; Primus 2006). Thus, for low-skilled men as well, observable 
hourly wages provide a noisy and perhaps biased gauge of the after-tax 
rewards from work. 
Nonetheless, these tabulations do indicate that the phenomenon of 
falling wages provides a partial explanation for the eroding employ-
ment rates of the least skilled, especially for less-educated African 
Americans.
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Table 7.6  Comparison of Actual Changes in Employment Rates to Changes Predicted by Labor Supply Elasticity 
Estimates
Panel A: Men
Actual change in employment 
rates, 1980–2000
Predicted change, largest 
elasticity estimates
Predicted change, smallest 
elasticity estimates
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate   
−0.14
−0.07
−0.03
−0.01
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Black 
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.27
−0.16
−0.08
−0.03
−0.06
−0.05
−0.01
0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.01
0.03
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.12
−0.11
−0.11
−0.05
−0.02
−0.03
0.00
0.02
0.00
−0.01
0.00
0.00
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.13
−0.14
−0.09
−0.06
−0.02
−0.03
−0.01
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.00
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Panel B: Women
Actual change in employment 
rates, 1980–2000
Predicted change, largest 
elasticity estimates
Predicted change, smallest 
elasticity estimates
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate   
0.01
0.07
0.10
0.08
−0.01
0.01
0.03
0.06
−0.01
0.00
0.01
0.03
Black 
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.06
−0.04
0.01
0.00
−0.02
−0.01
0.07
0.10
−0.01
−0.01
0.04
0.05
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.01
−0.03
−0.02
−0.02
−0.01
−0.01
0.03
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.01
−0.01
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
−0.02
−0.05
0.01
0.01
−0.03
−0.02
0.04
0.09
−0.02
−0.01
0.02
0.05
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Popula-
tion and Housing.
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Declining Wages and the Increased Incarceration Rates of Men
There is now considerable evidence that economically motivated 
crime increases with unemployment and decreases as average wages 
rise, especially the average wages of low-skilled workers (Fagan and 
Freeman 1999; Freeman 1987; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 2002; 
Grogger 1998; and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001). A higher average 
propensity to commit crimes will result in a larger prison population 
(Raphael and Stoll 2007). These two effects jointly describe the path-
way between the eroding labor market position of low-skilled adults 
and the increase in incarceration. Simply stated, when work pays less, 
more people shun work and turn to crime. The more people that com-
mit crimes, the higher the proportion at risk for incarceration and the 
greater the incarceration rate.
In Appendix 7B, I outline a strategy for estimating the effect of 
the decline in wages described in Table 7.3 on the increase in incar-
ceration rates discussed above. The method requires drawing on exist-
ing estimates of the responsiveness of criminal activity to changes in 
wages, estimating the risk of incarceration conditional on engaging in 
crime, and estimating the time one is likely to serve conditional on be-
ing caught and incarcerated. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Table 7.7. The table presents estimates for men only, since the changes 
in institutionalization rates are quite modest for women. The first col-
umn of figures presents the actual change in the proportion institution-
alized, the next column presents the change predicted by wage changes 
between 1980 and 2000, and the final column presents the ratio of the 
predicted to the actual change. For relatively less-educated white men, 
declining wages predict an increase in the institutionalization rate equal 
to approximately 15 percent of the actual increase. By comparison, the 
proportion of the actual increase for low-educated black men predicted 
by their change in wages is quite small (on the order of 2 to 3 percent). 
This is driven largely by the much larger increases in institutionaliza-
tion rates for black men. The figures for Asian and Hispanic men are 
more in line with those for whites. For Hispanic high school dropouts, 
declining wages predict roughly 18 percent of the increase in incarcera-
tion rates. 
These results suggest that declining earnings explain a small por-
tion of the overall increase in incarceration. In previous research with 
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Michael Stoll (Raphael and Stoll 2007), I have estimated that declining 
wages for low-skilled men are responsible for no more than 13 percent 
of the increase in incarceration rates between 1980 and 2000. Nonethe-
less, small decreases in incarceration caused by, for example, a wage 
subsidy may generate substantial social savings. Correction expen-
ditures per prison year are on the order of $35,000 a year (Donohue 
2007). In 2005, there were approximately 1.5 million prison inmates. If 
a targeted wage subsidy were to reduce the prison population by a mod-
Table 7.7  Comparison of Actual Changes in Institutionalization Rates 
for Men and Predicted Changes Based on Changes in Hourly 
Wages
Actual change in 
institutionalization 
rates, 1980–2000
Predicted change in 
institutionalization 
rates given 
wage changes
Ratio, 
predicted/actual
White
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate   
0.037
0.019
0.008
0.001
0.005
0.003
0.001
−0.002
0.134
0.166
0.141
−2.250
Black 
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.190
0.077
0.042
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.000
−0.002
0.020
0.032
−0.011
−0.300
Asian
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.021
0.012
0.007
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.000
−0.003
0.118
0.338
0.032
—
Hispanic
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
0.021
0.033
0.016
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.002
0.000
0.182
0.136
0.113
0.000
NOTE: See text for discussion of predicted changes in institutionalization rates. The 
predictions make use of the absolute changes in log hourly wages between 1980 and 
2000, presented in Table 7.3.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.
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est 5 percent, 75,000 fewer inmates would be incarcerated on any given 
day, generating savings in corrections expenditures of roughly $2.6 bil-
lion. Moreover, this figure would increase considerably if we were to 
account for some of the harder-to-price social costs of incarceration 
(including the impact on families and public health) as well as the value 
in stolen goods or losses from the crimes averted. Thus, even small ef-
fects such as those in Table 7.7 deserve serious consideration.
CRIMInAL RECORDS AnD THE EMPLOyMEnT 
PROSPECTS OF LOW-EARnInG MALES
To be sure, the relatively poor labor market outcomes for very low-
skilled men and women are driven largely by skill deficits and a general 
lack of job readiness. This is true of low earners in years past as well 
as the present and of workers at the bottom of the earnings distribu-
tion in other market economies as well as ours. Nonetheless, the recent 
U.S. experience is one where earnings and employment have eroded 
while the formal level of educational attainment among the least skilled 
has actually increased. These incongruous trends suggest that factors 
beyond skills have operated to chip away at the relative and absolute 
economic position of these adults.
In this section, I discuss the likely impacts of the large increases 
in the proportion of low-skilled men with criminal records on their 
employment and earnings prospects. We have already seen that male 
incarceration rates have increased considerably, as has the proportion 
of men with prison time in their past. Here, I explore the mechanisms 
through which a prior incarceration experience is likely to affect earn-
ings and employment not only in the immediate future but throughout 
one’s lifetime.
Incarceration and the Accumulation of Work Experience
Serving time interrupts one’s work career. The extent of this inter-
ruption depends on both the expected amount of time served on a typi-
cal term as well as the likelihood of serving subsequent prison terms. 
The average prisoner admitted during the late 1990s on a new commit-
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ment faced a maximum sentence of three years and a minimum of one 
year—with many serving time closer to the minimum (Raphael and 
Stoll 2004). If this were the only time served for most, then the time 
interruption of prison would not be that substantial.7 
However, many people serve multiple terms in prison, either be-
cause of the commission of new felonies or because of violation of 
parole conditions after their release. A large body of criminological 
research consistently finds that nearly two-thirds of ex-inmates are re-
arrested within a few years of release from prison (Petersilia 2003). 
Moreover, a sizable majority of the re-arrested will serve subsequent 
prison terms. Thus, for many offenders, the typical experience between 
the ages of 18 and 30 is characterized by multiple short prison spells 
with intermittent, and relatively brief, spells outside of prison.
In previous longitudinal research on young offenders entering the 
California state prison system, I documented the degree to which prison 
interrupts the early potential work careers of young men. I followed 
a cohort of young men entering the state prison system in 1990 and 
gauged the amount of time served over the subsequent decade (Raphael 
2006). This analysis is summarized in Table 7.8. Panel A presents esti-
mates of the distribution of the total amount of time served, comprising 
multiple prison terms. The median inmate serves 2.79 years during the 
1990s, with the median white inmate (3.09 years) and median black 
inmate (3.53 years) serving more time and the median Hispanic inmate 
(2.23 years) serving less time.8 Roughly 25 percent of inmates served 
at least five years during the 1990s while another 25 percent served less 
than 1.5 years.
However, as a gauge of the extent of the temporal interruption, 
these figures are misleading. Cumulative time served does not account 
for the short periods of time between prison spells where inmates may 
find employment yet are not able to solidify the employment match 
with any measurable amount of job tenure. A more appropriate measure 
of the degree to which incarceration impedes experience accumulation 
would be the time between the date of admission to prison for the first 
term served and the date of release from the last term. 
Panel B of Table 7.8 presents the quartile values from the distribu-
tion of this variable. For the median inmate, five years elapses between 
the first date of admission and the last date of release. For median white, 
black, and Hispanic inmates, the comparable figures are 6.2, 6.4, and 
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3.7 years, respectively. For approximately one-quarter of inmates, near-
ly nine years pass between their initial commission to prison and their 
last release. In other words, one-quarter of these inmates spent almost 
the entire decade cycling in and out of prison.
Spending five years of one’s early life (6.4 years for the median black 
offender) cycling in and out of institutions must impact one’s earnings 
prospects. Clearly, being behind bars and having only short spans of time 
outside of prison prohibit the accumulation of job experiences during a 
period of one’s life when the returns to experience are the greatest.
Does Having Been in Prison Stigmatize Ex-Offenders?
The potential impact of serving time on future labor market pros-
pects extends beyond the failure to accumulate work experience. Em-
Table 7.8  Quartile values of the Total Time Served during the 1990s  
and the Time between the Date of First Admission and Date 
of Last Release for the 1990 Prison Cohort Between 18 and 25 
years of Age
Panel A: Distribution of Total Time Served
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
All Inmates 1.44 2.79 4.81
White 1.43 3.09 5.12
Black 1.93 3.53 5.45
Hispanic 1.29 2.23 3.97
Panel B: Distribution of Time between the Date of First Admission and the 
Date of Last Release
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
All Inmates 1.86 4.99 8.71
White 2.01 6.17 9.11
Black 2.88 6.42 9.16
Hispanic 1.44 3.65 7.62
NOTE: Tabulations are based on all individuals between the ages of 18 and 25 that 
entered the California state prison system during 1990 serving the first term of a com-
mitment.  Tabulation of the percentiles of the two time distributions are based on all 
terms served over the subsequent 10 years.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of administrative records provided by the California 
Department of Corrections.  
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ployers are averse to hiring former prison inmates and often use formal 
and informal screening tools to weed ex-offenders out of the applicant 
pool. Given the high proportion of low-skilled men with prison time on 
their criminal records, such employer sentiments and screening practic-
es represent an increasingly important employment barrier, especially 
for low-skilled African American men.
Employers consider criminal records when screening job applicants 
for a number of reasons. For starters, certain occupations are closed 
to felons under local, state, and in some instances federal law (Hahn 
1991). In many states employers can be held liable for the criminal 
actions of their employees. Under the theory of negligent hiring, em-
ployers can be required to pay punitive damages as well as damages for 
loss, pain, and suffering for acts committed by an employee on the job 
(Craig 1987). Finally, employers looking to fill jobs where employee 
monitoring is imperfect may place a premium on trustworthiness and 
screen accordingly.
In all known employer surveys where employers are asked about 
their willingness to hire ex-offenders, employer responses reveal a 
strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal records (Holzer, Ra-
phael, and Stoll 2006, 2007; Pager 2003). For example, over 60 per-
cent of employers surveyed in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
(MCSUI) indicated that they would “probably not” or “definitely not” 
hire applicants with criminal histories, with “probably not” being the 
modal response. By way of contrast, only 8 percent responded similarly 
when queried about their willingness to hire current and former welfare 
recipients.
The ability of employers to act on an aversion to ex-offenders, and 
the nature of the action they take in terms of hiring and screening be-
havior, will depend on their access to applicants’ criminal histories. If 
an employer can and does access criminal records, the employer may 
simply screen out applicants based on their actual arrest and conviction 
records. In the absence of a formal background check, an employer may 
act on an aversion to hiring ex-offenders using perceived correlates of 
previous incarceration, such as age, race, and level of educational at-
tainment, to attempt to screen out those with criminal histories. In other 
words, employers may statistically profile applicants and avoid hiring 
those from demographic groups with high rates of involvement in the 
criminal justice system (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006).
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The audit study by Pager (2003) offers perhaps the clearest evi-
dence of employer aversion to hiring ex-offenders and the stigma as-
sociated with having served time in prison. The study uses male audi-
tors matched on observable characteristics—including age, education, 
general appearance, demeanor, and race—to assess the effects of prior 
prison experience on the likelihood that each auditor is called back for 
an interview. The author finds consistently sizable negative effects of 
prior prison experience on the likelihood of being called back by the 
employer, with callback rates for the auditor with prior prison time one-
half that of the matched coauditor.
Summary
Incarceration is likely to negatively affect the earnings and employ-
ment prospects of former inmates. On the supply side, incarcerated fel-
ons fail to accumulate work experience during a period of life when 
earnings tend to increase the fastest. The time out of the labor force 
while incarcerated, as well as the longer time of tenuous attachment to 
the labor force while cycling in and out of prison, permanently alters the 
lifetime earnings path of former inmates for the worse. On the demand 
side, employers consistently express a strong reluctance to hire workers 
with criminal records. This reluctance is driven in part by liability fears 
and by a premium placed on trustworthiness, but also by public policy 
that legally prohibits employers from hiring convicted felons in certain 
job categories. In sum, the greater incidence of involvement with the 
criminal justice system that has occurred over the past three decades 
has most certainly negatively affected the prospects of the least-skilled 
U.S. adults.
IMPROvInG THE PROSPECTS OF LOW-SkILLED ADULTS: 
ExPAnDInG THE EITC AnD REMOvInG EMPLOyMEnT 
BARRIERS FOR FORMER InMATES
I have documented a severe erosion of the earnings and employ-
ment of less-skilled men in the United States and less detrimental de-
velopments for less-skilled women. While the sources of these trends 
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are certainly complex, there are direct policy levers under the control 
of federal and state government that could be effectively employed to 
reverse them. From among these, raising the minimum wage would 
most directly increase the earnings of the lowest-paid workers. While 
economists debate the likely employment effects of raising the mini-
mum wage, there is solid research suggesting that modest increases 
have very little effect on employment while increasing the total amount 
of income earned by the least skilled (Card and Krueger 1994).9 More-
over, the earnings of the least skilled are low primarily because of their 
low skills. Improving our primary, secondary, and postsecondary edu-
cational systems as well as augmenting the resources devoted to work-
force development would clearly benefit our lowest earners (the topic 
of discussion in the chapter in this volume by Lerman).
In this section, I offer and analyze two proposals for improving the 
take-home earnings of the least skilled workers and for boosting the 
employment rates of those who should be working yet are participating 
in the formal labor force at historically low levels. First, I discuss sev-
eral current proposals for expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit to 
single childless workers and offer a hybrid proposal that combines what 
I see as the best elements of each. Second, I discuss several steps that 
federal, state, and local policymakers could take to improve the chances 
of former inmates and convicted felons and aid the reentry of recently 
released inmates into conventional society.
Expanding the EITC
First introduced in the 1970s, the EITC has become one of the most 
important antipoverty policies in the United States. At a current cost of 
approximately $40 billion, the EITC distributes income to low-earning 
workers primarily in families with children, although there is a modest 
benefit for childless workers between 25 and 65 years of age. EITC 
benefits are calculated as a fraction of annual earnings up to a maximum 
and are phased out at a gradual rate for income earned beyond a fur-
ther threshold. For example, for a married couple with two children in 
2007, the EITC provides an additional $0.40 for each dollar earned up 
to $11,790, totaling a maximum annual benefit of $4,716. The benefit 
level is held constant until family earnings reach $17,390 and then is 
reduced by $0.21 for each dollar earned above this threshold until the 
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benefit is completely phased out (which occurs at $39,783). Since ben-
efits are conditional on having positive earnings, the EITC provides a 
strong incentive to participate in the labor force, although the program 
does provide an incentive for many workers who are already working 
to work fewer hours a year.10
The expansions of the EITC during the 1990s had very large im-
pacts on the employment and after-tax incomes of those adults most 
affected (Meyer and Holtz-Eakin 2001; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). 
However, these expansions had little impact on the earnings of single 
noncustodial parents or childless single adults with very low earnings, 
as nearly all of the extra resources devoted to the program went to 
households with children. In light of this fact, there are several recent 
proposals to expand the EITC for childless adults and noncustodial par-
ents (Berlin 2007; Center for American Progress 2007; Danziger and 
Gottschalk 2005; Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006). 
The attractiveness of such proposals lies both in their simplicity 
and in their direct effect on the earnings of the least skilled. Rising 
earnings inequality and declining wages, driven by a host of factors, 
have adversely affected the material well-being and employment rates 
of the least skilled workers. Thus, making work pay through a wage 
subsidy will directly counter these trends regardless of their source, and 
improve the material well-being of the poor, while providing them with 
a strong incentive to engage in the legitimate labor market and perhaps 
a disincentive to engage in criminal activity. To be sure, the existing 
proposals vary in three ways: 1) cost, 2) the degree to which the ben-
efits are targeted towards the lowest earners, and 3) the degree to which 
these expansions affect incentives in other respects, such as marriage. 
Moreover, along these three dimensions no one proposal dominates.
Here, I analyze several variants of two recent proposals to expand 
the EITC, and I fashion a simple hybrid of the two proposals that ad-
dresses the marriage penalty while maintaining the well-targeted na-
ture of the current EITC. The two existing plans that I analyze are as 
follows:
The Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (EHO) Proposal. In their 
book, Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men, Peter Edelman, Harry 
Holzer, and Paul Offner (2006) offer a plan for a targeted expansion 
of the EITC toward single childless workers and noncustodial parents. 
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The plan calls for a 20 percent wage subsidy for the first $7,500 in 
earnings, yielding a maximum subsidy of $1,500. Beyond earnings of 
$10,000, the subsidy is taxed away at the rate of $0.15 per dollar until 
it is completely phased out at $20,000 in annual earnings. The pro-
posal also calls for disregarding one-half of the earnings of the lower- 
earning spouse in two-earner families for the purposes of calculating 
EITC benefits. In the analysis below, I assume that all workers aged 18 
to 65 who meet the income criteria are eligible for the childless credit. 
Note that this proposal is quite similar to that recently offered by the 
Center for American Progress Task Force on Poverty.11
The Berlin Proposal. In a recent working paper, the president of 
MDRC, Gordon Berlin (2007), proposes a targeted expansion of the 
EITC singles benefit along with a change in the manner in which fam-
ily income is tabulated for the purposes of the credit. Regarding the 
childless credit, Berlin proposes an expansion for all adults 21 to 54 
years of age who work full time, at a rate of 25 cents per dollar earned 
through $7,800 of earnings, with a phaseout beginning for earnings 
beyond $14,400 at a rate of $0.16 per additional dollar earned (with 
a total phaseout income level of $26,587). Berlin also proposes that 
EITC benefits be calculated based on individual income rather than 
family income. Thus, in a two-earner household with two children, the 
higher-earning worker would claim the children for the purposes of the 
EITC, and the benefit attributable to this worker’s earnings would be 
calculated accordingly. The lower-earning worker would qualify for the 
childless credit.
To highlight the relative characteristics of these two proposals, I 
simulate the costs, impacts on the income distribution, and impacts on 
average earnings of these two plans (and, by extension, the likely im-
pacts on employment). For the sake of simplicity, I modify the existing 
proposals somewhat to highlight the tradeoffs in the two approaches. 
Specifically, I apply the EHO childless credit phase-in and phaseout 
rates as well as the income thresholds to the Berlin plan. In addition, I 
assume that all workers between the ages of 21 and 54 are eligible for 
benefits under the Berlin plan irrespective of whether they have full-
time or part-time status. I also consider an enhanced EHO plan that ex-
tends the 20 percent earnings subsidy through $10,000 in annual earn-
ings, effectively giving a 20 percent raise to a full-time minimum-wage 
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worker. Finally, I consider a hybrid plan that combines elements of the 
EHO and Berlin proposals. Specifically, I combine the EHO childless 
credit for all workers aged 18 to 65 with the Berlin income calculation 
rules applied selectively to families with earnings equal to or less than 
$30,000 a year. For qualified households with earnings above $30,000, 
I apply the income determination rules in the EHO proposal.12
I use the March 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS) to simulate 
how each of these proposals would have affected individuals’ outcomes 
in tax year 2005.13 Table 7.9 displays cost estimates of total EITC dis-
bursements using the parameters of each of these proposals to calculate 
EITC benefits for eligible families and individuals. Before proceeding, 
we should note a number of qualifications. First, these simulations pre-
dict a total cost for the current system of roughly $30 billion for tax year 
2005, which is approximately $5 to $6 billion below actual costs. In 
isolation, this fact suggests that the costs simulated in the table may be 
biased downward. Biasing the estimates in the other direction, I am as-
suming a 100 percent take-up rate for all available benefits. In practice, 
take-up of the EITC is not universal, especially for the childless credit, 
and thus this assumption is likely to bias costs upwards. Finally, the 
cost estimates in Table 7.9 do not account for any behavioral labor sup-
ply response among potential recipients—i.e., the cost estimates simply 
apply the alternative benefit formulations to those who work, without 
considering the likely impact of expanded employment. However, as I 
will discuss shortly, the employment effects of each of these proposals 
are likely to be quite modest, thus minimizing the importance of this 
particular behavioral effect on costs.
With these caveats in mind, the simulation suggests that the EHO 
plan would increase total EITC costs by roughly $18 billion, the en-
hanced EHO plan would increase them by $35 billion, the Berlin pro-
posal by $26 billion, and the hybrid proposal by $20 billion. For the 
Berlin proposal, my cost estimate is close to that cited by the author in 
the original working paper (approximately $29 billion). For the EHO 
proposal, my cost estimate is nearly double that cited by the authors 
($9.8 billion), although this discrepancy is nearly completely accounted 
for by the difference in the assumed take-up rate.14 Nonetheless, the 
costs estimates reveal a clear ordering, with the EHO proposal the least 
costly, the enhanced EHO proposal the most expensive, and the Berlin 
and hybrid proposals at intermediate cost points. As the enhanced EHO 
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Table 7.9  Simulated Costs of various Proposals to Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to Single Childless Adults 
and to Mitigate the Inherent Marriage Penalty
Simulated costs using the 2006 distribution of wage and salary earnings (millions of 2006 dollars)
Beneficiary category Existing system EHO proposal
Enhanced 
EHO proposal Berlin proposal
Hybrid EHO-
Berlin proposal
Single and childless 1,269 20,062 33,878 13,840 20,062
Married, no children 516 3,166 3,737 7,172 3,788
Married with 
children
13,383 15,203 15,202 25,251 16,571
Single parents 14,315 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615
Total 29,783 53,046 67,433 60,879 55,037
Difference relative 
to existing
18,165 35,551 25,997 20,156
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. Costs are simulated using data from the March 2006 Current Population Survey. See text for exact descrip-
tion. The EHO-proposed expansion includes a 20 percent credit for single childless adults up to $7,500 in earnings that is phased out 
after $10,000 in earnings at a rate of 0.15. The EHO proposal also includes disregarding half of the earnings of the lower-paid spouse 
in calculating the EITC benefit for married couples. The enhanced EHO proposal is similar with the exception that the 20 percent credit 
for a single childless adult applies to the first $10,000 in earnings and is phased out after reaching $12,000. The Berlin proposal applies 
the single childless benefit. The Berlin proposal uses the EHO single childless benefit formula applied only to single adults between 21 
and 55. The proposal also uses individual income rather than combined income in calculating the EITC credit for married couples. For 
married couples with children, the higher earner’s income is used to calculate the credit with children, while the lower earner receives the 
childless EHO credit. The Hybrid EHO-Berlin proposal is the EHO proposal with one modification: the EITC benefit for married couples 
with total wage and salary income of less than $30,000 is computed using the individual calculations in the Berlin proposal. The benefit 
for married couples with higher incomes is computed using the EHO disregard.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from the March 2006 Current Population Survey.
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proposal would have the largest impact on the take-home pay of low-
income workers, and thus the largest likely effect on employment, the 
cost estimates reveal the fairly obvious tradeoff between impact size 
and cost.
Table 7.10 investigates where in the earnings distribution the ad-
ditional dollars expended under each proposal land. To construct this 
table, I first simulated tax-paying units by assuming that all single 
childless adults as well as single parents file individual returns and that 
all married adults file joint returns. I then stratified the distribution of 
wage and salary earnings across these tax filing units into 10-percent 
slices, or deciles, ordering them from lowest to highest. The figures 
in Table 7.10 give the percentage of the additional dollars spent under 
each proposal (i.e., the last row of figures in Table 7.9) that would ac-
crue to each income decile.
The table reveals quite large disparities in how well-targeted these 
proposals are towards the bottom of the earnings distribution. The ad-
ditional dollars spent under the EHO and the enhanced EHO propos-
als are heavily concentrated in the bottom three deciles of the earnings 
distribution, with 91 percent of the former and 89 percent of the latter 
accruing to tax-filing units that have less than $20,000 in annual in-
come. Some of the additional benefits do hit higher up in the income 
distribution, since married couples with incomes as high as $51,000 a 
year would qualify for benefits under the EHO proposal.15 However, in 
proportional terms, the amount accruing to units with earnings above 
$40,000 is trivial. For the Berlin proposal, only 49 percent of the ad-
ditional dollars hit the bottom 30 percent of the income distribution, 
with a much higher proportion (38 percent) escaping above the median 
income. These figures suggest that there are many households where 
a relatively high-earning spouse is married to a relatively low-earning 
spouse whose income would qualify for the childless benefit. The hy-
brid proposal, on the other hand, reveals that a targeted application of 
the income eligibility calculations under the Berlin proposal (restricted 
to households with incomes below $30,000) preserves the targeting of 
the EHO proposal with relatively few additional benefits accruing to 
high-income households and a relatively modest increase in total costs 
above the base EHO proposal.
While the EHO proposal and its variants are well targeted, the Ber-
lin proposal wins out in terms of the implicit marriage penalty. Table 
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Table 7.10  Distribution of Additional Dollars Spent Above the Existing Credit by the Deciles of the Wage and 
Salary Earnings of Simulated Tax-Filing Units
% additional dollars going to each earnings decile under the following proposals
Deciles of the 
earnings distribution EHO proposal
Enhanced 
EHO proposal Berlin proposal
Hybrid EHO- 
Berlin proposal
D1:     <6,000 21 13 9 19
D2:       6,001–13,000 49 41 26 45
D3:     13,001–20,000 21 35 14 20
D4:     20,001–25,743 1 6 4 4
D5:     25,744–34,000 3 2 9 7
D6:     34,001–42,500 3 2 11 3
D7:     42,501–55,000 1 0 13 1
D8:     55,001–73,500 0 0 7 0
D9:     73,501–102,000 0 0 4 0
D10: 102,001 and up 0 0 3 0
NOTE: The figures in the table give the percentage of the additional dollars spent above the current system that would accrue to tax filing 
units of the given income class. The nature of the proposals is discussed in the notes to Table 7.9 and in the text.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from March 2006 Current Population Survey.
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7.11 calculates the credit for a two-earner family in which each working 
adult earns $10,000 per year (roughly the earnings of a full-time mini-
mum wage worker). Hypothetical credits are tabulated for married, for 
unmarried, and by the number of dependent children. While the actual 
financial effect of marriage will differ in magnitude and, sometimes, in 
sign from those presented in Table 7.11 for households with different 
income mixes, two full-time low-paid workers provide a good baseline 
for policy intended to reduce poverty and aid the lowest paid workers 
in the country. In general, the marriage disincentives will be higher for 
higher-income couples in most of the proposals analyzed here.
As can be seen, the current EITC, when considered in isolation, cre-
ates modest disincentives to marry. The largest penalty occurs for cou-
ples with one child ($683). The EHO proposal as well as the enhanced 
EHO proposal tend to exacerbate this problem. For a couple with no 
children, marriage reduces total credit income by roughly $1,950. The 
effect is somewhat smaller for couples with one child (−$1,500) and 
two or more children (−$964). These penalties are considerably larger 
for the enhanced EHO proposal.
In contrast, there is no marriage penalty under the Berlin proposal. 
Since benefits are calculated according to individual rather than joint 
income, the proposal has a neutral impact on household formation. 
This is clearly an attractive design feature. However, it comes at the 
expense of poorer targeting of the benefit dollars, as was illustrated in 
Table 7.10. The hybrid proposal also eliminates the marriage penalty 
for this low-income couple. However, the penalty is shifted further up 
the income distribution, specifically towards couples with combined 
incomes of $30,000 or higher. Aggregate benefits for such higher- 
income couples are smaller than for lower-income couples and account 
for a smaller percentage of annual income. Thus one might argue that in 
such instances the marriage penalty associated with the EITC is likely 
to have less of an influence on behavior than when the credit is larger, 
both absolutely and proportionally.
In our discussion of employment and earnings trends, the role of 
declining wages in explaining the declining employment of low-skilled 
men and women was heavily emphasized. One might ask whether the 
proposed expansions analyzed here would appreciably alter employ-
ment by greatly increasing the returns to formal work. Among the low-
est earners without children, such as those earning minimum wage, the 
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proposed expansions would substantially raise earnings (by as much as 
20 percent), effectively countering the ground lost between 1980 and 
the present. However, even among the least skilled, the proportion earn-
ing the minimum wage is low, and thus for many the proposed expan-
sions will only subsidize part of annual earnings, with some low-skilled 
workers likely to be operating within the phaseout income range.
Table 7.11  Calculation of the EITC Benefits for a Couple (Each of 
Whom Earns $10,000 per year) When Married and When 
Unmarried, Under the Existing System and Under Each 
Proposed Expansion
Number of children
None One More than one
Existing system
Married
Unmarried
Penalty
0
325
−325
2,237
2,910
−673
3,864
4,197
−333
EHO proposal
Married
Unmarried
Penalty
1,050
3,000
−1,950
2,747
4,247
−1,500
4,536
5,500
−964
Enhanced EHO
Married
Unmarried
Penalty
1,550
4,000
−2,450
2,747
4,747
−2000
4,536
6,000
−1,464
Berlin proposal
Married
Unmarried
Penalty
3,000
3,000
0
4,247
4,247
0
5,500
5,500
0
Hybrid EHO-Berlin
Married
Unmarried
Penalty
3,000
3,000
0
4,247
4,247
0
5,500
5,500
0
NOTE: Figures in the table represent the EITC benefit, under the existing system and 
under each proposal, that a two-earner couple, in which each spouse earns $10,000 
per year, would receive when married and when unmarried. The nature of the propos-
als is discussed in the note to Table 7.9 and in the text.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) pro-
gram parameters for the 2005 tax year.
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To assess the overall effects of these expansions on take-home pay 
and their potential to draw certain groups into the labor market, I have 
tabulated average annual earnings for certain subgroups of the popula-
tion with extremely low employment rates and characterized the ben-
efits under each of these proposals as a proportion of annual earnings. 
The proportional increase, when combined with estimates of the supply 
responsiveness of these groups, provides ballpark estimates of the boost 
to employment rates one might expect from the expansions discussed 
here.16
Table 7.12 presents the proportional increases in annual income that 
would be generated by the proposed expansions for selective groups 
of low-skilled males with very low employment rates. All tabulations 
pertain to single, childless men with the additional characteristics indi-
cated in the table. The first column demonstrates that the existing sys-
tem has virtually no effect on earnings (less than half of a percent) and 
thus likely has no effect on individual decisions to work among these 
men. The EHO/Hybrid proposal17 provides a notable increase in annual 
income, ranging from 2 to 6 percent, for all groups depicted; the larg-
est increase (6 percent) occurs for black high school dropouts between 
18 and 25 years of age. The enhanced EHO proposal has the largest 
proportional effects on income; it shows increases among young high 
school dropouts of 8 percent for all groups with the exception of Asian 
men, who would see a 5 percent increase. The Berlin proposal has the 
smallest effect on earnings among the new proposals; its effects range 
from 1 to 4 percent, and most men characterized in the table experience 
increases on the order of 2 percent.
How much of an increase in employment might we expect from 
these expansions? When combined with the labor supply elasticity es-
timates discussed above, the earnings increases in Table 7.12 are likely 
to have very modest effects on employment. For example, the EHO 
proposal is predicted to alter the employment rate of all black male 
dropouts by roughly 1 percentage point, while the larger enhanced EHO 
proposal might increase the employment rate of young black dropouts 
by as much as 2 percent. Given the lower responsiveness of less skilled 
men in the other racial or ethnic groups, the employment effects are 
likely to be even smaller.
As an overall assessment of the proposals, it is clear that no one 
proposal dominates, and that each has relative advantages and disad-
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vantages. The EHO proposal costs less and delivers more income to 
the lowest-earning workers.18 However, the expanded childless credit 
exacerbates the marriage penalty inherent in the current system. The 
Berlin proposal eliminates this penalty, but at a higher cost and for a 
less well-targeted program. The hybrid model, I believe, combines the 
strengths of both proposals, yielding a well-targeted expansion that re-
Table 7.12  EITC Credit as a Proportion of Annual Earnings for Select 
Groups of Single Childless Less-Educated Men, Under the 
Existing System and Under the various Proposed Expansions
Existing 
system
EHO and 
hybrid 
proposala
Enhanced 
EHO proposal
Berlin 
proposal
White, less than 
high school
18–55
18–25
26–35
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.08
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
Black, less than 
high school
18–55
18–25
26–35
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.04
Asian, less than 
high school
18–55
18–25
26–35
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.02
Hispanic, less than 
high school
18–55
18–25
26–35
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.08
0.05
0.02
0.03
0.03
NOTE: Figures provide the average credit under each system, divided by the average 
annual wage and salary earnings for workers in the given demographic group. All 
calculations apply to single, childless men. The nature of each proposal is described 
in the notes to Table 7.9 and in the text.
a For single childless men, the EHO and hybrid proposals are identical.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.
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duces, or for some eliminates, the disincentive to marry. While the mar-
riage disincentives are pushed further up the earnings distribution, one 
can reasonably argue that the behavioral impact of the penalty is likely 
to be smaller for higher-income couples.
The small projected employment effects of these expansions are 
disappointing and suggest that substantially increasing employment 
through supply-side incentives would require a much bigger and cost-
lier expansion than the proposals analyzed here. Nonetheless, the pro-
posals represent considerable increases in the incomes of the workers at 
the very bottom of the distribution, increases that will greatly improve 
their material well-being and provide strong incentives for a small slice 
of the nation’s poorest adults to engage in legitimate work.
Policies to Remove Barriers to Employment for Ex-Offenders 
Spending time in prison or having a prior felony conviction in 
one’s history is becoming an increasingly common characteristic of 
low-skilled workers, especially for low-skilled minority men. While 
the causes of this increased interaction with the criminal justice sys-
tem are varied, the lion’s share of this development is attributable to 
changes in sentencing policy that have both increased the average time 
that an offender spends behind bars and enlarged the scope of behav-
ior punished by a spell of incarceration (Raphael and Stoll 2007). My 
analysis of employment trends found that only a small part of the de-
cline in employment rates among the least-skilled men can be explained 
by declining wages, suggesting the limits of policies designed to boost 
take-home earnings. Fully addressing the employment crises for these 
men requires directly addressing the barriers to employment created by 
one’s official criminal past.
Facilitating the successful reentry of former inmates and felons into 
noninstitutionalized society is an extremely complex problem that will 
most likely require substantial investments in training, social services, 
employment services, and postrelease monitoring (see the discussions 
in Petersilia [2003] and Travis [2005]). The sheer size of this popu-
lation—roughly 600,000 inmates are released each year and nearly 5 
percent of the adult male population has served time—is indicative of 
the enormity of this challenge. Nonetheless, there are simple steps that 
the state and federal government could take that would not compromise 
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public safety yet would eliminate some of the challenges that former 
inmates and felons face in procuring employment and avoiding extreme 
poverty after their release.
To begin with, the summary disqualification of former inmates 
and those with felony convictions from participating in federal 
public assistance programs and from receiving financial aid for 
education should be reversed. Currently, those with prior drug fel-
ony convictions are prohibited from receiving federal financial educa-
tion assistance. Moreover, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act made drug felons ineligible for food 
stamps and cash assistance for life. States could adopt the federal ban 
on food stamps and cash assistance as is, or pass legislation to modify 
or eliminate the ban. States are not authorized to eliminate the ban on 
financial aid (Legal Action Center 2004).
The only possible rationale for such collateral punishment of drug 
offenders is that by enhancing punishment fewer people will engage in 
drug crimes. However, the deterrence effects of incarceration itself are 
hotly debated among those who study the determinants of crime (Lee 
and McCrary 2005; Levitt 1998), with much research suggesting that 
the likely effects are quite small. With this in mind, the deterrent effects 
of much more removed, and perhaps less salient, punishments such as 
a lifetime ban on food stamps receipt or becoming ineligible for Pell 
grants must certainly generate very little in the way of crime reduction. 
Such bans, however, do make it more difficult for released offenders 
to avoid extreme poverty and to turn their lives around. Financial aid 
through the Pell grant program is one of the main sources of assistance 
for those attending community college, an important source of training 
and secondary education for less-skilled adults. Food stamps very ef-
fectively provide basic assistance to meet the most fundamental needs 
of the poor. Banning former felons from participating in these programs 
is frankly counterproductive. Those states that maintain complete or 
partial bans on participation in public assistance should drop them, and 
the federal governments should reverse the ban on drug offenders re-
ceiving educational assistance.
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Employment bans based on former convictions and occupa-
tional licensing restrictions should be based on the content of one’s 
criminal record and not applied in a blanket manner. Moreover, 
when used, employment bans should be based on conviction rather than 
arrest records. Any bans on the employment of felons mandated by law 
should be based on the nature of one’s previous behavior as well as the 
time that has elapsed since the felony was committed. In their analy-
sis of the consideration that states give to criminal records, the Legal 
Action Center (2004) found that in nearly all states there is no standard 
or statute governing the consideration that employers and occupational 
licensing agencies are required to give to an employee who has a crimi-
nal history. In many states, employers can fire anyone who is found to 
have a criminal history regardless of the gravity of the offense, the time 
since conviction, or the relevance of the past behavior to one’s current 
job responsibility. In addition, employers are generally free to consider 
and discriminate based upon one’s criminal history in hiring, with most 
states allowing employers to consider arrests not leading to conviction. 
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006) demonstrate that most employers 
of low-skilled labor check criminal records in some manner (either by 
directly asking the applicant, by paying a private firm, or by performing 
a query of the state criminal history repository), and that the proportion 
of employers that check has increased considerably over the decade 
of the 1990s. The high propensity to check, the complete discretion in 
considering past criminal records, and the high proportion of men with 
prior convictions all indicate a need for some governing standard that 
addresses the interests of employers but also recognizes the employ-
ment needs of former inmates and those with prior convictions. With 
this in mind, states should prohibit firms from considering prior arrests 
that did not result in a conviction when making decisions about the hir-
ing or firing of an employee. Moreover, publicly mandated employment 
bans of former felons for specific jobs as well as licensing bans should 
be based on the content of specific offenses or offender characteristics. 
In general, a more considerate and rational process for determining the 
suitability of former prisoners for employment in certain occupations 
is needed.
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We should invest more in labor market intermediaries that 
specialize in the reentry employment needs of recently released in-
mates. When asked, many employers express an extreme reluctance 
to hire former inmates. However, a sizable minority indicate that they 
are indeed willing to hire offenders and actually do so, as measured 
by recent hiring outcomes. Governmental as well as nonprofit entities 
devoted to workforce development often serve an important informa-
tional role in matching clients to employers, which greatly minimizes 
the search costs for both parties. For a specific group of clients who face 
a stigma in searching for work, such job search assistance is likely to be 
particularly important.
Moreover, over time such intermediaries establish long-term rela-
tionships and credibility with employers and are thus more effective in 
placing their clients in employment. Because over the past decade many 
more people have been incarcerated for relatively less serious offenses, 
intermediaries should easily be able to identify the most job-ready can-
didates and offer up a steady supply of reentering former inmates who 
are prescreened and likely to be solid employees, or at least of compa-
rable quality to an employer’s average hire.
Given the scale of the flow of inmates out of prison each year (on 
the order of 600,000), there is a large potential role for agencies and 
nonprofits devoted to minimizing employment search costs, prescreen-
ing workers for employers, and aiding those who are reentering in be-
coming ready for conventional employment. 
States should incentivize desistance from criminal activity by 
expunging certain criminal records after a fixed time period has 
elapsed. In a recent analysis, Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway (2006) 
raise the important question of whether unfettered employer access to 
criminal records can be justified by the legitimate concerns of employ-
ers and the public. They assess whether the rate at which young offend-
ers desist from offending as time passes since the last offense merits 
limiting employer access to arrest and conviction information for suf-
ficiently distant past offenses. The authors demonstrate that for a cohort 
of young men in Philadelphia the likelihood of a repeat offense declines 
precipitously as time accrues since the last offense. This pattern is con-
sistent with both a causal effect of staying clean and a remaining popu-
lation of former offenders that becomes increasingly selected with time 
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since the last offense (to be specific, selection occurs towards a low 
propensity to offend). For policy purposes, however, the exact source 
of this pattern is irrelevant. Based on this pattern, the authors argue 
that limiting employer access to criminal records beyond a certain time 
period may effectively limit the collateral consequences of prison while 
not necessarily exposing employers and the public to sufficiently higher 
risk to warrant keeping access to the records open.
This simple proposal carries many advantages. Clearly, being able 
to procure and retain gainful employment is practically a necessary con-
dition for the successful reintegration of former inmates into noninsti-
tutionalized society. The expunging of one’s past offenses following a 
determined period of desistance will certainly improve the labor market 
prospects as well as the life prospects of former offenders. Moreover, 
the prospect of having one’s record wiped clean after a given period 
of desistance provides an incentive for former inmates to change their 
behavior.
Nonetheless, this proposal may have unintended negative conse-
quences if employers care about prior criminal activity and engage in 
indirect and imperfect screening practices. In other words, limiting an 
employer’s ability to access criminal records or to ask about criminal 
convictions may not preclude employers from using potential signals 
of earlier run-ins with the law in making hiring and promotion deci-
sions. At a minimum, employers may be able to effectively identify ex- 
offenders through such signals as education, where one comes from, or 
through unaccounted-for gaps in one’s employment history. At worst, 
employers may systematically discriminate against workers who come 
from groups that they perceive to have a high propensity to offend, such 
as young black men (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006). This important 
issue of how employers may respond to limits on access is key to de-
signing a policy that not only allows employers to take into account 
aspects of an individual’s history that are legitimately related to assess-
ing potential job performance, but also protects those who, through the 
passage of time, have demonstrated the irrelevance of their past infrac-
tions to their future performance.
There are several key choice variables that should be considered in 
designing an information policy that balances the ability of employers 
to have access to relevant information about applicants and employees 
with the interests of former offenders who have managed to stay out of 
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trouble. First and foremost among these choice variables is the length 
of the time limit placed on criminal history inquiries. If the limit that 
is set is too short, employers will not have confidence in formal checks 
and thus will employ informal screens as a supplement, undoing much 
of the potential benefit to ex-offenders from suppressing such informa-
tion in the first place. To the extent that the limit is too long, few of-
fenders will benefit and there will be little added incentive to stay clean 
because of the prospect of an expunged record. Kurlycheck, Brame, and 
Bushway (2006) focus on the seven-year limit set in the federal statute 
pertaining to the trucking industry. Clearly, more research on employer 
hiring practices with a focus on this specific question would greatly 
inform this choice.
A second choice variable concerns the starting point for the time 
period framing the criminal record. The authors advocate for a start 
date corresponding to the date of the most recent conviction, arguing 
that since few employers have access to incarceration information, time 
since incarceration is irrelevant. However, one can imagine that, with 
the knowledge that records are purged after seven years, employers 
may still downgrade applications from young men whom they suspect 
have served some time. Knowing that a clean criminal record check is 
consistent with either 1) never having offended, or 2) having offended 
and potentially served time but having had no contact with the criminal 
justice system for the past seven years, provides considerably more in-
formation than the alternative of ignoring incarceration.
A third important choice variable concerns whether there are some 
offenses that should never be purged. One might make the argument 
that someone who has served time for a felony sex offense should never 
work with children, or that workers with prior serious violent offenses 
should not be placed in jobs that involve providing security. Again, a 
better understanding of how employers consider such mitigating fac-
tors would provide useful information for forming a viable policy 
prescription.
Regardless, the growing numbers of noninstitutionalized felons 
raise important policy questions regarding reintegration and the man-
ner in which society can ease and facilitate the transition of former of-
fenders into productive and stable lives. Stable employment is clearly 
key. To the extent that we can improve the prospects of former offend-
ers without substantially harming the interests of employers, and while 
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providing a positive incentive to desist from criminal offending, we 
should do so.
COnCLUSIOn
The past three decades have not been kind to low-skilled work-
ers in the United States. In addition to low-skilled adults experiencing 
substantial real declines in hourly earnings, their employment rates, es-
pecially those for low-skilled minority men, have dropped to historic 
lows. Concurrently, the incarceration rates of these same adults have 
increased tremendously, to the point where for certain subgroups of the 
adult male population the likelihood of being institutionalized at any 
given point in time is nearly equal to the likelihood of being employed 
or the likelihood of being noninstitutionalized yet idle. 
These developments are clearly related. I have demonstrated the 
effects of declining wages on employment and incarceration rates. 
There is also a growing body of research suggesting a reverse causal 
link from prior incarceration to employment outcomes. This line of re-
search, combined with the disturbing incarceration trends that I have 
documented, indicates that the problems faced by ex-offenders repre-
sent an increasingly important and daunting challenge to antipoverty 
policy in the United States.
I have offered and analyzed two sets of policy responses by state and 
federal policymakers to these developments: 1) expanding the EITC for 
childless adults and noncustodial parents, and 2) taking steps to elimi-
nate some of the official barriers to employment and impediments to 
reentry for former prison inmates and convicted felons. These clearly 
address only a small set of the problems faced by low-income adults. 
Yet action on these fronts would most certainly be helpful.
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Appendix 7A
Estimating Labor Supply 
Elasticities by Race and Gender
I use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census PUMS files to estimate 
the labor supply elasticities for men and women overall and for men and 
women by race and ethnicity. I then use these estimates to assess the degree 
to which changes in employment between 1980 and 2000 can be attributable 
to changes in wages. The supply elasticity estimates come from estimating 
the equation
(7A.1) Eexry = αy + βe + κx + γLnWexry + εexry ,
where Eexry is the employment rate for adults in our sample in education group e 
(less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college plus), in la-
bor market experience group x (5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 
to 20 years, 21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, and 36-plus years), 
in racial group r (white, black, Asian, or Hispanic), and in year y (1980, 1990, 
and 2000), LnWexry is the corresponding average of log wages for members of 
this group, εexry is a mean-zero error term, αy represents a year-specific fixed ef-
fect, and βe represents a fixed effect for all adults in the education group e, and 
κx represents a fixed effect for experience groups. The coefficient γ gives the 
responsiveness of employment for members of the group to a change in aver-
age log wages. The labor supply elasticity is defined by the equation
η = W ∂E  =  1     ∂E    .        E ∂W      E  ∂1nW  
Since γ provides an estimate of ∂E , calculating the elasticity requires dividing 
through by the employment rate. Since I’m dividing through by the average 
employment rate, the elasticity should be interpreted as the responsiveness of 
the group at the mean. The inclusion of year-fixed effects as well as education- 
and experience-fixed effects means that the elasticity estimates are identified 
using variation in the changes in employment and earnings occurring within 
education and experience groups across racial or ethnic groups.
I estimate Equation (7A.1) separately for men and women to derive overall 
estimates of the responsiveness of male and female labor supply. I also esti-
mate the following modified specification
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(7A.2) Eexry = αy + βe + κx + δ × Blackexry + λ × Whiteexry + η × Asianexry 
  + γ0 LnWexry + γ1LnWexrt × Blackexry + γ2 LnWexry × Whiteexry 
  + γ3 LnWexry × Asianexry + εexry  ,
where Blackexry is a dummy variable equal to one if the group is black and zero 
otherwise, and Whiteexry and Asianexry are similar dummy variables indicating 
white and Asian demographic subgroups. This specification allows the sup-
ply responsiveness to changes in wages to vary by race and ethnicity. The 
base coefficient γ0 indicates the responsiveness of Hispanic labor supply (the 
group omitted by the dummy variables) to changes in wages. The coefficient 
on the interaction term between the black dummy and log wages, γ1, indicates 
the degree to which black labor supply responsiveness differs from Hispanic 
labor supply responsiveness. The overall responsiveness of black labor supply 
requires adding the based coefficient, γ0, and the coefficient on the interaction 
term, γ1. Similar derivations would yield the labor supply responsiveness for 
whites and Asians. Note that the addition of race-specific dummy variables 
indicates that supply responsiveness is being estimated using variation in the 
changes in employment and earnings occurring within education and experi-
ence groups and within racial or ethnic groups. Again, converting the respon-
siveness parameter into an elasticity estimate requires dividing by the race-
specific mean employment rate.
Equations (7A.1) and (7A.2) are estimated using employment rates and 
earnings potential for all men and women, institutionalized as well as nonin-
stitutionalized. Thus, any impact of wage changes on institutionalization op-
erating through withdrawal from the formal labor force will be reflected in the 
elasticity estimates.
Table 7A.1 presents the results of this analysis. For both men and women, I 
present estimation results for all adults in the sample and for adults with a high 
school degree or less. Parameter estimates for the coefficient on log wages and 
the interaction terms with log wages are presented in the top half of the table, 
while the implied elasticity estimates (the calculations represented graphically 
in Figures 7.1 and 7.2) are presented in the bottom half. The high elasticity 
estimates in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 use the largest race-specific estimates from the 
table, while the lowest are based on the smallest.
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Table 7A.1  Estimated Effects of Log Wages on the Likelihood of Being Employed at the Time of Interview for Men, 
and the Corresponding Implied Labor Supply Elasticities
Men Women
All men
Men with a high  
school diploma or less All women
Women with a high 
school diploma or less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log wage 0.159
(0.039)
0.136
(0.039)
0.029
(0.079)
−0.120
(0.093)
0.279
(0.049)
0.258
(0.050)
0.449
(0.083)
0.378
(0.093)
Log wage × white — 0.019
(0.018)
— 0.105
(0.035)
— −0.104
(0.024)
— −0.110
(0.049)
Log wage × black — 0.265
(0.023)
— 0.364
(0.039)
— 0.086
(0.028)
— 0.157
(0.059)
Log wage × Asian — 0.019
(0.032)
— 0.150
(0.107)
— −0.179
(0.040)
— −0.165
(0.045)
Implied labor supply 
elasticities
Overall
White
Black
Asian
Hispanic
0.196
—
—
—
—
—
0.180
0.637
0.186
0.184
0.039
—
—
—
—
—
−0.019
0.435
0.041
−0.170
0.426
—
—
—
—
—
0.227
0.548
0.124
0.488
0.792
—
—
—
—
—
0.449
1.008
0.388
0.816
R2 0.892 0.930 0.885 0.918 0.902 0.924 0.884 0.903
N 449 449 239 239 447 447 239 239
(continued)
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296  NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Dashes indicate that the variable in question was not included in the regression specification, 
therefore the data are not available. All models are based on regressions of the proportion of employment on average log wages based 
on demographic cells defined by year, level of educational attainment, labor market experience, and race/ethnicity. See text for the num-
ber of categories within each dimension and the specific definitions. All regressions include dummies for year-fixed effects, education 
group–fixed effects, experience group–fixed effects, and race-fixed effects and are based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. 
All models are weighted by the sum of the sample weights within the defined cells. Supply elasticities are calculated by dividing the point 
estimate for the effect of log wages on employment by the average employment rate for the group in question.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations based on data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census 
of Population and Housing.
Table 7A.1 (continued)
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Appendix 7B
Assessing the Contribution of Declining 
Wages to Increases in Incarceration Rates
Let c be the likelihood that an individual chosen at random commits a 
crime, and p be the likelihood of being caught and convicted, conditional on 
committing a crime. Let θ be the rate at which inmates are released from pris-
on. Assume that c is a function of legitimate wages—i.e., c = c(w)—where 
c’(w) < 0. Raphael and Stoll (2007) demonstrate that under these assumptions 
the long-run equilibrium incarceration rate will be equal to 
(7B.1) Inc =     c(w)p     .           c(w)p + θ
In Equation (7B.1), incarceration increases in the transition probability from 
nonincarceration to incarceration (c(w)p) and decreases in the transition prob-
ability out of prison (θ). Differentiating Equation (7B.1) with respect to wages 
yields the expression
(7B.2) ∂Inc = ∂Inc × ∂c =       θ      × p ×  ∂c   ,  ∂w        ∂c      ∂w    (cp + θ)2           ∂w
where the dependence of c on w is suppressed for simplicity. In practice, cp is 
a very small number (generally below 0.003) while θ is relatively large (around 
0.5). If we set cp = 0, Equation (7B.2) is reduced to 
(7B.3) ∂Inc = ∂Inc × ∂c = 1 × p × ∂c   .
  ∂w        ∂c     ∂w     θ           ∂w
If we assume that the time-served distribution is exponential, then the first term 
provides the expected value of time served. Thus Equation (7B.3) becomes 
(7B.4)   ∆ Incarceration = E(T ) × p × ∆Crime   .        ∆1nW        ∆LnW
Equation (7B.4) illustrates that the increase in incarceration caused by a de-
crease in wages will operate through the product of three factors. Moving from 
right to left on the right hand side of Equation (7B.4), a decline in wages will 
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increase criminal activity (that is to say,  ∆Crime will be negative). This in turn 
            ∆1nW 
will increase incarceration in proportion to the probability of being apprehend-
ed and sentenced, conditional on having committed a crime (the parameter, p). 
Finally, the ultimate effect on the overall incarceration rate will be larger the 
longer the expected amount of time the sentenced prisoner will serve (given 
by E(T ) in Equation [7B.4]). Thus with estimates for each of these factors, and 
with the wage trends presented in Table 7.3, one could estimate the proportion 
of the increase in institutionalization rates depicted in Table 7.5 that can be at-
tributable to declining wages. 
I draw estimates for each of these factors from various sources. Grogger 
(1998) estimates that the effect of a change in the natural log of hourly earnings 
on the likelihood of engaging in income-generating activity is approximately 
−0.25. I use this number for the change in crime caused by a change in log 
wages. Based on an analysis of criminal offending and incarceration among 
respondents of the NLSY79 data set, and the increased risk of incarceration 
over the past 20 years, I estimate that the likelihood of being caught and incar-
cerated among those who are actively engaged in income-generating criminal 
activity is 0.06 (see Raphael and Stoll [2007] for details). With regard to ex-
pected time served, the median inmate in the United States serves a term of 
slightly more than two years on a given prison spell. However, those offenders 
coaxed into criminal activity by declining wages are likely to commit fewer 
and less serious crimes relative to those already incarcerated. Thus, here I as-
sume that such marginal offenders that wind up in prison or jail serve no more 
than 1.5 years on average. Multiplying these three parameters suggests that 
the value of the derivative in Equation (7B.1) is equal to −0.0225. Multiplying 
this estimate by the actual change in wages for any given subgroup provides 
an estimate of the predicted increase in incarceration caused by the change in 
the group’s wages.
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notes
I thank Timothy Bartik, Adam Carasso, Sheldon Danziger, Harry Holzer, Susan 
Houseman, Robert Reich, and Eugene Smolensky for their much-valued input.
 1.  Among the many explanations for the increase in earnings inequality over the 
past three decades, some of the most common include skill-biased technological 
change that has increased demand for high-skilled workers and reduced demand 
for low-skilled workers (Autor and Katz 1999), the erosion of the real value of 
the minimum wage (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996), increased interna-
tional trade with less-developed nations (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997), and 
increased labor market competition from low-skilled immigrants (Borjas 2003; 
Freeman, Katz, and Borjas 1997).
 2. Between 1975 and 2005, the number of state and federal prisoners per 100,000 
U.S. residents increased from 111 to 491, constituting a 342 percent increase over 
this time period and a ratio of 4.42 inmates in 2005 to 1 inmate 30 years earlier. 
Between 1980 and 2005, the number of inmates in local and county jails increased 
from 81 per 100,000 to 252 per 100,000, a 211 percent increase and a ratio of 3.11 
inmates in 2005 to 1 inmate a quarter-century earlier. For details, see Raphael and 
Stoll (2007) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007).
  3. The computation is based on four mutually exclusive race categories (non-Hispanic 
white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic), nine educational 
attainment groups (no schooling, fourth grade or less, fifth through eighth grade, 
ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, one to three years of college, and col-
lege-plus), year (1980, 1990, or 2000), gender, and eight potential labor market 
experience groups (5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, 
21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, and 36-plus years). I measure labor 
market experience by assuming an entry age of 16 for workers with less than a 
high school education, 18 for high school graduates, 20 for those with some col-
lege, and 22 for college graduates. For workers who are institutionalized, I assume 
that they have not worked in the previous year since for many of these workers the 
long form of the PUMS is completed using administrative records that are likely 
to vary in quality across institutions (Butcher and Piehl 2006).
  4. See Autor and Katz (1999) for a general discussion of wage trends in the United 
States. Juhn (2003) also computes wages for nonparticipants using the average 
wage of workers in matching demographic groups who work fewer than 13 weeks 
for the computation. Here I match to median wages for workers in one’s demo-
graphic group without placing a restriction on weeks worked, because preliminary 
analysis revealed workers with unusually high wages among those working few 
weeks. This latter pattern most likely reflects measurement error in the “weeks 
worked” variable in the IPUMS-CPS database. 
  5. That is to say, the substitution effect associated with a decline in wages militates 
towards supplying less time to the labor market. The income effect of lower wag-
es, however, will in isolation induce one to supply more time to the labor market 
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and consume less free time. While these two effects are offsetting and thus imply 
that a decrease in wages may correspond to an increase in time supplied, much of 
the recent empirical research on the labor supply effects of diminished low-skilled 
wages suggests that the net effect on labor supply has been negative (Devereux 
2003; Juhn 1992, 2003; Pencavel 1997, 2002). 
  6. I calculate the predicted change in employment attributable to declining wages by 
multiplying the supply elasticity by the actual proportional decline in wages and 
by the base employment rate for each group in 1980.
  7. Of course, I am not saying that a year in prison is not costly. However, a year’s 
absence from the labor market during the beginning of one’s career would have 
only a small effect on accumulated experience.
  8. The California inmate population is roughly evenly distributed between whites, 
Hispanics, and blacks and is overwhelmingly male.
  9. Research on the employment effects of raising the minimum wage suggests that 
small increases result in negligible levels of job destruction, though large increas-
es do indeed reduce employment. The impact on total earnings accruing to mini-
mum-wage workers depends on how sensitive the demand for labor is to changes 
in wages. Most research suggests that demand for low-skilled workers is relatively 
inelastic, and thus an increase in the minimum wage leads to a total increase in the 
aggregate wage bill accruing to low-wage workers.
  10. In particular, for households with incomes in the region of the benefits schedule 
between the maximum benefit threshold and the phaseout threshold, the EITC 
increases income without altering the marginal return to an additional hour of 
work. Simple economic theory predicts that such an increase in income would 
induce most people to work fewer hours. Workers whose income places them in 
the phaseout region of the benefits schedule have particularly strong incentives 
to work fewer hours, as the phaseout rate reduces the hourly wage by 21 percent 
while the benefit provides a positive increase in income. Existing research sug-
gests that the negative incentive effects are particularly strong for secondary earn-
ings in two-parent families (Eissa and Hoynes 2004).
  11. In the report, From Poverty to Prosperity: A National Strategy to Cut Poverty 
in Half, The Center for American Progress (2007) proposes an expansion of the 
EITC nearly identical to that in Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006), with the ad-
dition that the childless tax credit be made available to all adults over age 24 and 
to adults between 18 and 24 who are not enrolled in school. The report also calls 
for an expansion of the phase-in rate for families with three or more children to 45 
percent. Currently, a phase-in rate of 40 percent applies to all families with two or 
more children. Thus, the proposal would not affect the phase-in rate for two-child 
families while increasing the rate for larger families.
  12. An alternative form of this hybrid would be to calculate benefits based on indi-
vidual income for some phase-in period (say the first three years of marriage as 
proposed in Edelman, Holzer, and Offner [2006]).
  13. I use the March 2006 CPS to first classify all adults by marital status and by 
whether they have dependents under 18. The four possibilities are then used to 
simulate tax filing units, where presumably single childless workers file inde-
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pendent returns, single parents file returns as a head of household, and married 
couples file joint returns. 
  14. Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006) assume a take-up rate of the childless benefit 
of 0.67 and limit the credit to workers aged 21 to 64. Imposing these two restric-
tions lowers my cost estimates for this plan to $8.6 billion, quite close to the $9.8 
billion estimate offered by the authors.
  15. Under the EHO proposal, the highest possible phaseout income would be for a 
married couple with two or more children. Using the 2006 EITC phaseout total, 
total earnings must satisfy the equation Incomeh + 0.5 × Incomel ≤ 38,348, where 
the first term is the income of the higher-earning spouse and the second term is the 
income of the lower-earning spouse. The highest possible total income that is still 
eligible for a benefit is approximately $51,000. However, the benefit accruing to 
such a household would be miniscule.
  16. This method basically ignores how the EITC affects the returns to the margin-
al hour. To be sure, for many workers who receive the EITC credit, the credit 
increases take-home pay while providing an incentive to reduce hours worked. 
With this caveat in mind, the calculated employment effects are offered as base-
line estimates for the purposes of bounding the employment effect from above. 
Nonetheless, the fact that most recipients receive the EITC as a once-per-year 
lump-sum payment may indicate that the connection between the benefits calcula-
tion parameters and the returns to additional work on the margin may be blurred 
for most. If this is the case, these simple calculations would provide reasonable 
first approximations. 
  17. For “single with no dependents under 18,” the EHO proposal and the hybrid pro-
posal are identical.
  18. The analysis above looks at the proportion of income accruing to the deciles of 
the simulated tax-filing units. Analysis of the absolute dollars accruing to these 
deciles also reveals larger absolute benefits for households in the bottom three 
deciles.
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 personal savings for, 110, 161–162,  
 171–172, 194
 shift from defined-benefit to defined- 
 contribution, 4, 97, 161, 169, 194
 Social Security and, 161, 168
 See also Pensions
Return-to-work programs, expansion and  
 revamping of, 10–11, 245–246, 265
Rhode Island, tax credits in, 241n15
Robert J. Woods Foundation, health care 
workplaces, 223–224
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Savings plans, 110, 161–162, 171–172,  
 194
SCANS. See Secretary’s Commission on  
 Achieving Necessary Skills
Science skills, 41
 development of, 155n18, 225
 in STEM occupations, 132, 133f, 134,  
 137
 test scores on, 28, 33
Science, technology, engineering, and  
 mathematical (STEM),  
 occupations, 132–134, 133f, 136,  
 137
SCSEP. See Senior Community Services  
 Employment Program
Secretary’s Commission on Achieving  
 Necessary Skills (SCANS),  
 USDOL, 25, 36, 45, 49, 60, 62– 
 63, 71n4
Sectoral Employment Development  
 Learning Project (SEDLP),  
 earnings and, 58
Sectoral programs, 58, 227
 evaluation of, 225–226
 as programmatic intervention, 211t,  
 221, 222–223
SEIU. See Service Employees  
 International Union
Senior Community Services Employment 
 Program (SCSEP), 184, 185f
Service Employees International Union  
 (SEIU), 215, 223, 229
Services sector
 job displacement in, 145, 149, 153
 low-income workers in, 206, 206t
 offshoring in, 92–94, 126–128, 130– 
 132
 trade-related values of, 125–126, 127f
 U.S. civilian employment in, 126,  
 129–130, 129f, 155n25
 white-collar workers in, 119, 225
SIPP. See Survey of Income and Program  
 Participation
Skill certification
 national standards for, in non-U.S.  
 countries, 37
 state licensing vs., in U.S., 37–38, 63
 U.S. school-based statistics on, 38–39
 U.S. work-based reforms for, 61–62,  
 70
Skill formation
 learning styles differ in, 22–23, 54
 as life cycle process, 17, 20, 59–60,  
 181
 models of, in non-U.S.-developed  
 countries, 18, 22, 62
 See also Cognitive skills; Job skills;  
 Noncognitive skills
Small firms, 93, 241n14
 low-wage employees in, 206–207,  
 207t, 230–231
Social compact, 120, 123
 public interest in, 190, 193
 universal health coverage in, 101– 
 102, 110, 112
Social Security Disability Insurance  
 (SSDI), as form of public  
 assistance, 163, 179–180, 191
Social Security system
 benefits eligibility in, 168, 193–194,  
 195n1
 effect of aging population on, 161,  
 183
 overdependence on, 13, 183
 payroll taxes for, 84, 115n22
Social skills, 45–46
Soviet Union, migration from, 154n9
SSDI. See Social Security Disability  
 Insurance
State Children’s Health Insurance  
 program (SCHIP), poor women  
 with children and, 245–246
State programs, 222, 228
 age discrimination and, 189, 195n8
 expungment of criminal histories  
 with, 247, 288, 289–291
 job quality incentives for, 236–237
 licensing laws vs. skill certification,  
 37–39, 63
 minimum wage settings, 212–214,  
 216
 partnerships that involve, 151, 219
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State programs (continued)
 subsidies from, 218, 227, 234
 work incentives for older workers in,  
 11, 163, 189–190
 See also specific states, e.g.,  
 Massachusetts
STEM. See science, technology,  
 engineering, and mathematical  
 occupations
STRIVE, job training by, 48
Supplementary Workforce Fund for  
 Basic Skills, 236
Survey of Income and Program  
 Participation (SIPP), 38–39, 179– 
 180
Switzerland, 72n13
 health care spending in, vs. U.S., 88
 health coverage in, 10, 99–100, 111
TAA. See Trade Adjustment Assistance  
 (TAA) program
TAA Reform Act, 143, 145
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy  
 Families), 48, 238
Tax breaks. See Tax incentives
Tax code revisions, 113n3, 114n19
Tax credits, 11, 235, 237
 health coverage, 141, 143, 148
 training investments by employers  
 and, 228, 241n14
 See also specifics, e.g., Earned  
 Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Tax incentives, 171, 211t
 economic development with, 218, 238
 fringe benefits as, 83–84, 86–87, 88
 improving job quality with, 11, 228
Tax rates, restructuring of, 106–109
Taxes, 113n3
 filing categories, 300–301n13
 health coverage and, 100–101, 104– 
 109, 113n3
 revenue levels from, 13, 107–108,  
 149–150
 training costs and, 66–67, 233
Teamwork skills, 20, 21, 25
Tech Prep programs, 46–47, 63
Technological improvements, 222
 benefits vs. costs of, 1, 87–88, 91–92,  
 122
 as workplace force affecting low- 
 educated workers, 6–7, 18
Technology skills, 25, 62
 older workers and, 164, 180–181, 190
 shift to, in trade and immigration,  
 119, 127–128, 153
 in STEM occupations, 132, 133f, 134
Temporary Assistance for Needy  
 Families (TANF), 48, 238
Texas, San Antonio, projects, 216, 223,  
 227
Toyota, 209, 222
TPA. See Trade promotion authority
TRA. See Trade Readjustment  
 Allowances
Trade, 119, 299n1
 dislocation due to, 2, 7, 19, 119, 122
 importance of, to U.S. economy, 7, 8ff
 liberalization of, and second thoughts, 
 120–123, 154n1, 154n5
 services, and offshoring, 125–132,  
 127f, 128f
 skilled immigration and, 119–120
 worker adjustment assistance policies  
 and programs
  current, 140–144
  next steps, 144–150
  reform of UI, 150–153, 153t
Trade Act (2002), 143, 146, 149, 188
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)  
 program, 120, 140–144, 154n6
 benefits of, 140–141, 188–189, 193
 current limitations of, 10–11, 142, 153
 job training funding, 48, 122, 123,  
 141, 149, 163, 185f, 187t
 legislative history of, 145–146
 performance data on, 142–144
Trade deficit, 7, 8f, 120, 128f
Trade promotion authority (TPA), 120,  
 145, 146
Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA),  
 141
Treaty of Detroit (1950), 85
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UAW. See United Auto Workers  
 (organization)
UI. See Unemployment insurance
U.K. See United Kingdom
Undocumented immigrants, policy and,  
 120, 140
Unemployment, 222, 268
 costs to workers of, 144–145, 172
 rates of, 19–20
Unemployment insurance (UI)
 at center of labor market adjustment  
 policies, 140, 141
 as labor policy reform proposal, 146,  
 147, 150–153, 153t
 payroll tax for, 149–150, 233
 reemployment incentives in reform  
 of, 149, 151
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and  
 Textile Employees, 215
Union representation, 7, 135, 178
 bargaining and, 92–94, 224, 237
 effective education and training with,  
 17n18, 59, 208
 improving job quality with, 11, 223,  
 229
 membership rates and, 215, 237–238
 purpose of, 211t, 214–215, 215t
 shock effect of, and employer  
 practices, 213–214
 social welfare programs and, 84–85
 standards and, 120, 214–215, 215t,  
 240n7
 TAA and, 145–146
UNITE HERE, collaborative campaign,  
 215
United Auto Workers (UAW,  
 organization), 17n18, 85, 113– 
 114n10
United Kingdom (U.K.), 37, 66, 72n13,  
 192
United States
 economy of, 122
  effect of health care spending on,  
 88–89, 97
  immigrants role in, 132, 138–139
  strength of, 1, 13, 18
  trade and GDP in, 1, 7, 8ff
 military forces of, 26–27, 49, 102– 
 104, 103t
 population in
  changing demographics of, 95–97,  
 110, 161
  foreign-born in, 132, 133f
  institutionalization within, 258,  
 260t–261t
 states within (see specifics, e.g.,  
 California)
U.S. Congress
 Internal Revenue Code revisions,  
 113n3, 114n19
 laws passed, 44, 48, 55, 86, 89, 102,  
 124, 134–135, 143, 145, 149, 163,  
 169, 287
 legislation not passed, 120, 140,  
 155n23
 standards and, 38, 212
U.S. Court of International Trade, 142
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security
 Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(CIS), 135–136, 155n15
U.S. Dept. of Labor (USDOL), 25, 219
 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)  
 within, 42
 Employment and Training  
 Administration, 135, 185
 funding from, 11, 48, 63–64, 70,  
 235–236
 Office of Apprenticeship (OA) within, 
 39, 64–65
 Office of Foreign Labor Certification  
 (OFLC) within, 136
 O*Net, 130, 131
 TAA benefits and services from,  
 140–141, 142
U.S. Secretary of Labor, Former 
Employees of BMC Software Inc. vs.,  
 142
Universal health coverage
 funding for, 99, 104–109, 111
 principles of, 10, 100–102
Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, New  
 York (state), 216
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Urban Institute–Brookings Institution,  
 Tax Policy Center, alternative  
 minimum tax estimates, 114– 
 115n20, 114n19
USDOL. See U.S. Dept. of Labor
Verbal skills, overemphasis on, 21, 45
Virginia, prisons in, 49
Visas. See Nonimmigrant visas
Vocational education. See Career and  
 technical education (CTE)  
 programs
Vocational programs, in community  
 colleges, 53
Vocational schools
 aptitude test for, 26–27
 proprietary schools as, 47, 53–54
 workplace preparation by, 47–48
Vocational training
 in prisons, 49
 school-based, 17, 17n16, 21, 39, 46,  
 61
Wage rates, 35
 assess valued skills by, 27–28, 67
 high, and specific work experience,  
 26, 28
Wages, 155n22, 299n4
 effect of workplace forces on, 6–7,  
 137–138, 172
 fringe benefits and/or, 83–84, 86,  
 182–183, 218
 growing inequality of, 2–3, 3f, 6,  
 13–14n4, 13n2, 14nn5–6, 18–19,  
 20, 299n1
 incarceration rates and, 268–270,  
 269t, 297–298
 poverty-level, 204–205, 239n1
   (see also Minimum wage)
 premium, 40–41, 181–182, 208
 public insurance for, 141, 143, 146,  
 148–149, 155n26, 188, 216
 shock effect of unions on, 213–215,  
 215t
 standards for, 212–219, 237–238
Wagoner, Rick, health care shift proposal  
 by, 81, 113n1
Wal-Mart, 178–179, 182, 209
Washington (state)
 apprenticeship earnings in, 57, 65
 Seattle, projects, 219
White-collar workers, 85, 210
 low-income workers as, 206, 206t
 offshoring jobs of, 119, 134
 potential job tradability of, 129–130
White non-Hispanic workers
 educational attainment of U.S., 30t– 
 31t, 32–33, 249t, 250t
 employment rates of, 5, 253, 256,  
 256t–257t, 266t–267t
 incarceration and, 258, 260t–261t,  
 268–270, 272t
 labor supply elasticities and, 263,  
 263f, 264f
 literacy skills of, 34–35
 low-wage, 215t, 249, 251, 269t, 285t
 as students in U.S. vs. other  
 developed countries, 33, 51
WIA. See Workforce Investment Act
Wisconsin, 54, 225
 Milwaukee, projects, 219
Work-Source Partners, 224
Worker Adjustment and Retraining  
 Notification (WARN) Act, 140
Worker Centers, 216
Workforce categories, 113n2
 age cohorts among, 95–97, 110, 136,  
 162, 178
 foreign-born as, 132, 133ff, 134
 fringe benefits negated for some, 82,  
 90, 94, 150
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 188,  
 238
 job training funding, 48, 55, 163,  
 184–185, 185f, 191, 233, 241n16
 program exiters from, 186t, 187t,  
 195n7, 195n9
 reform of, 163, 192
Workplace forces, 26, 119, 222
 effects of, and low-educated men, 6–7
 employer policies among, 209–210
Workplace Project, Long Island, 216
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Writing skills, 20, 208
Writing skills (continued) 
NAEP test scores on, 33, 51
Youth, WIA program for, 184
YouthBuild, 48
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit re-
search organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employ-
ment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of 
the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established 
in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The 
Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income 
during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
velopment and local labor markets.
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